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ABSTRACT 
The issue of democratic deficit and crisis of legitimacy has been at the forefront of the 
development of the European project in the last twenty years. However, little attention has been 
directed towards analysing the way in which democratic legitimacy underlines the construction 
of the EU’s foreign policy. This thesis draws on a broad understanding of democratic legitimacy 
which is seen to encompass various aspects: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and 
openness to public debate. It shows that the media had a positive effect (although in contrasting 
degrees) on the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy in two issue areas, highlighting 
the ways in which it achieved this. Drawing on insights from political theory, it argues that the 
European public sphere has the potential to foster the four characteristics highlighted above 
through the ability of the media to politicise foreign policy issues, which are commonly closed 
off from democratic scrutiny. Three types of interaction effects between the media and 
policymakers within the European public sphere are identified: indexing, bounding and agenda 
setting. Firstly, indexing captures the ability of policymakers to influence and shape media 
discourse in order to aid their interests and goals by communicating in a favourable manner their 
policies to the general public. Secondly, through bounding the media can have  a constraining or 
limiting effect on the range of policies – and their effectiveness – that policymakers can pursue, 
even if the latter are not aware of or willing to engage with the frames constructed by journalists. 
Finally, agenda setting captures the ability of the media to purposively influence decision-
making processes through its discourse. Empirically two distinct areas of EU foreign policy are 
explored: the EU’s approach to global climate change and its policy towards Russia. Hence, the 
study makes a significant contribution to the understanding of EU foreign policy and to its 
international actorness. Secondly, it extends in a comprehensive manner the debate regarding the 
crisis of legitimacy and democratic deficit in the EU to the realm of foreign policy. Finally, it 
also contributes to the literature on Foreign Policy Analysis which engages with the issue of 
democratic legitimacy. 
Keywords: European Union, foreign policy, European public sphere, media, Russia, climate 
change. 
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
During the last two decades enthusiasts of the European project have been accused of taking for 
granted the Union’s commitments to democracy and overlooking the fact that its decision-
making processes often make people feel disengaged with politics. The dissolution of the 
permissive consensus which provided thrust to European integration in the first decades of the 
European Union (EU) is commonly thought to have prompted disaffection with the European 
project and intense debate around the EU’s democratic deficit (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2000; 
Follesdal and Hix, 2006; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Bovens, 
Curtin, and Hart, 2010). Hence, since the adoption of the Maastricht treaty which opened the 
path for the European Parliament (EP) to gain more and more competences, the need to connect 
political decisions with EU citizens has been a prime concern for both policymakers and 
scholars. Mitigating the democratic deficit – the discrepancy between the Union’s commitment 
to democracy and its political practices – has legitimised countless campaigns meant to bring the 
EU closer to its citizens and raise its profile. Simultaneously, the politicisation of European 
issues and the polarisation of European political debates by political parties across member states 
have raised significant question marks regarding the EU’s commitment to democratic values and 
have opened decision-making processes to democratic scrutiny.  
In the recent period, constraining dissensus – where political issues within the EU are 
increasingly being debated, contested and negotiated – has replaced the former permissive 
consensus, putting a break on European integration, while also making it more legitimate  
(Hooghe and Marks, 2008; de Wilde, 2011; de Wilde and Zürn, 2012). Coupled with this, 
institutions such as the EP or the Ombudsman, thought to represent the interests of individuals 
within the EU have strengthened their institutional power. Policy areas with direct impact on EU 
citizens’ welfare – dealing with economic, migration, or mostly domestic policies – have been 
the target of measures directed at mitigating the Union’s democratic deficit (Diez, 1999; 
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Flockhart, 2010; Larsen, 1997; Moravcsik, 1997). On the other hand, the area of foreign policy1 
seems to have been insulated both from the erosion of the permissive consensus and to a large 
extent from the debate surrounding the Union’s democratic deficit. Consequently, this thesis 
enquires into the broader question of whether the EU’s foreign policy enjoys democratic 
legitimacy. It offers a contrasting understanding of democratic legitimacy to the approaches 
currently found in the literature. Most of these approaches link democratic legitimacy to the 
notion of democratic representation and the way in which the legal and institutional framework 
of the EU allow citizens to have their interests represented in the making of the Union’s foreign 
policy. This thesis seeks to complement these approaches by introducing a notion of democratic 
legitimacy which encompasses multiple aspects: transparency, accountability, responsiveness 
and openness to public debate. An increase in any of these aspects is considered to be 
synonymous with enhancing the notion of democratic legitimacy (Buchanan, 2002; Rothstein, 
2009; Forst and Schmalz-Bruns, 2011). The thesis achieves this goal by analysing the way in 
which democratic legitimacy is enacted through the activity of the media2 and its interactions 
with policymakers within the European public sphere (EPS). Hence two research questions are at 
the centre of the enquiry presented in this thesis: 
1. Can the EU enjoy democratic legitimacy in its foreign policy through the activity of the 
media? 
2. In what ways does the activity of the media endow the EU’s foreign policy with 
democratic legitimacy? 
In answering these two research questions, the thesis proposes and employs a model which maps 
out three types of interaction effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting) between the 
media’s discourse – the policy definitions it frames – and policymakers. These interaction effects 
are seen to have different implications for the enactment of democratic legitimacy in foreign 
policy decision-making. The argument is explored through two cases – the EU’s approach to 
global climate change and its policy towards Russia – which represent two distinct areas of EU 
                                                          
1
 Foreign policy is understood in this thesis as a set of goals, approaches and initiatives formulated by a nation state 
or another type of international actor (e.g. international organization), and directed towards other actors in the 
international arena, and involving issues whose effects go beyond its sovereignty. 
2
 In this thesis the term ‘media’ is used mostly as a singular noun to express the aggregate of journalists and 
publications – together with the underlying communities and institutions they create. ‘Media’ is also rarely used 
throughout the text as a plural noun to refer to the plurality of publications within a certain landscape.  
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foreign policy, in this way painting a reliable, though not comprehensive3, snapshot in time of 
the presence of democratic legitimacy in decision-making in the EU’s foreign policy. The two 
research questions will be explored by focusing on a sample which includes two member states 
with very diverse political cultures and media systems (the United Kingdom and Romania) and 
the transnational level. Drawing on the empirical findings the thesis will show that the EU’s 
foreign policy enjoyed (in contrasting degrees) democratic legitimacy, enacted and maintained 
through the activity of the media within the European public sphere. The next two sections will 
explore the notion of democratic legitimacy, followed by an overview of the way in which the 
literature on the EU’s foreign policy has engaged with the issue of democratic legitimacy. 
Following on from that, the last two sections of this introductory chapter will provide a note on 
the theoretical framework and methods applied, together with an outline of the thesis.  
 
Defining democratic legitimacy: legitimacy and democracy 
In the broader literature on EU policymaking, legitimacy has been conceptualised along the lines 
of two continuums: internal/external sources and input/output/throughput legitimacy. In relation 
to the first continuum, internally, the issue of democratic deficit and crisis of legitimacy has been 
at the forefront of the development of the European project in the last 20 years. Traditionally, it 
was framed as the detachment of citizens from EU politics and studied through rigid research 
frameworks which focused on the state of public opinion or the way the principle of democratic 
representation is granted by constitutions (Boyce, 1993; Featherstone, 1994; Crombez, 2003; de 
Swaan, 2007). Besides the disenfranchisement of the EU citizens at the supranational level, it is 
fair to argue that the EU also suffers from a deficit of external sources of legitimacy. Externally, 
legitimacy is best described by the fact that ‘people [or generally addressed body of audience] 
have beliefs about a political order that motivate them to support that order in some way, to 
accept obligations towards it’ (Peters, 2006, p. 89). Legitimacy beyond national borders is seen 
in this literature to rely on the beliefs or consent of the addressed population as well as non-
                                                          
3
 A more comprehensive approach would entail analysing a multitude of other issue areas such as international 
development, international trade, conflict resolution, the fight against terrorism, etc.  Chapter 4 will highlight that 
the case studies chosen cover a wide spectrum of the EU’s behaviour in the international arena, which can be viewed 
as representative for other issue areas in the EU’s foreign policy. 
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EU(ropean) normative yardsticks4 (Lucarelli, 2006; Johansson-Nogués, 2007; Laidi, 2008; De 
Zutter, 2010; Bickerton, 2011a).  
The second distinction finds that input legitimacy tends to remain constant throughout time and 
is based on widespread ontological public support shared within a political community. 
Formally, it is linked to the spread and enactment of such principles such as transparency and 
accountability which lie at the base of a democratic political system (Moravcsik, 2002; Ramos, 
2008; Gaus, 2010; Levrat, 2010; Weiler, 2012). On the other hand, various utilitarian 
calculations on the part of individuals coupled with their assessment of the effectiveness of 
policy outcomes can grant output legitimacy to a political system (Scharpf, 1999; Buchanan and 
Keohane, 2006; Lucarelli, Cerutti, and Schmidt, 2010; Schmidt, 2010a, 2010b). The literature 
tends to agree that there is no trade-off  between input and output legitimacies and both provide 
and maintain the public authority of an actor (Scharpf, 1999; Bogdanor, 2007; Bellamy, 2010). 
Moreover, Schmidt argues that throughput legitimacy ‘focuses on the quality of the governance 
processes of the EU as contributing to a different kind of normative legitimacy from both the 
performance-oriented legitimacy of output and the participation-oriented legitimacy of input’ 
(Schmidt, 2013, p.5). This thesis explores the concept of democratic legitimacy – discussed in 
this section – which can be seen to resemble the category of internal legitimacy and encompass 
all the different types of legitimacy covered by the input/output/throughput continuum. 
While many definitions of what a democratic system entails have been developed in the 
literature, they all seem to converge to the minimal idea that democracy means a government of 
the people and for the people (Held, 1991; Abromeit, 1998; Archibugi, 2004; Lord, 2006; Hix, 
Noury and Roland, 2007). All democracies in this respect have to be based on a sense of 
collective identity which is constructed, rather than an ontological characteristic of the state 
(Lijphart, 1999). Democracy thus stems from the recognition within an already formed state – 
and a national political setting – of the collective identity on which it was built (Eriksen, 2007). 
Only after this occurs can more formal principles of democracy be institutionalised within a 
state: ranging from rule of law, to free elections or respect for human rights. What is disputed 
                                                          
4
 Eriksen skilfully portrays this idea: ‘I suggest as a criterion of a legitimate foreign policy that the EU does not 
aspire to become a world organization– a world state– but subscribes to the principles of human rights, democracy, 
rule of law also for dealing with international affairs, hence underscoring the cosmopolitan law of the people’ 
(Eriksen, 2006, p. 10). 
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within the EU is the capacity of individuals to have their voices heard and shape politics 
(Habermas, 1992). Conversely, the issue of democratic deficit and crisis of legitimacy has been 
at the forefront of the development of the European project in the last twenty years. However, 
one should note that the notion of democracy has been highly debated throughout literature and 
history, having a myriad of understandings (Habermas, 1986; Dahl, 1989; Held, 1991; Beetham 
and Lord, 1998; Lijphart, 1999; Terchek, 2000; Cunningham, 2002; Archibugi, 2004; Diamond 
and Morlino, 2005; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2009; Isakhanand Stockwell, 2012).  
Two broad types of justifications have been developed by supporters of democracy: intrinsic and 
consequentialist. The former argue that individuals should have a degree of control over polities 
and decision-making processes, democracy effectively assuring such levels of control. On the 
other hand, consequentialist arguments claim that democracy can have positive externalities, 
whilst through policy outcomes it can foster values such as peace, prosperity or welfare. A deep 
commitment to democracy based on both types of arguments is considered to be at the heart of 
the EU, as its fundamental treaties highlight that: 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the 
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail (Article 2, 
Lisbon treaty).  
On the other hand, Lord argues that democracy should be predicated upon the idea of ‘political 
control over political equality‘ (Lord, 2012, p.41), in this way favouring responsible government 
over responsive government. He adds that ‘democracy is a right to join together with others as 
equals to exercise public control over a polity before it is a system of rule likely to produce 
particular kinds of policy outputs’ (Lord, 2012, p.40). This perspective on democracy which 
mirrors preeminent views in the literature on the EU implies that because institutions such as the 
EP or the Council contain directly elected members or put forward by national governments– 
which have gained support through popular vote –, formally the benchmarks for democratic 
legitimacy are fulfilled (Hooghe, 2003; Eriksen and Fossum, 2004; Bogdanor, 2007; Holzhacker, 
2007; Hooghe and Marks, 2008). 
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Due to the EU’s institutional complexity – relative to the nation state – it is argued in the thesis 
that a more nuanced understanding of democratic legitimacy is needed in order to complement 
the dichotomous understanding based on normative and consequentialist justifications, which 
translates into a focus on the principle of democratic representation. One source for the lack of 
democratic legitimacy within the EU might reside in the fact that the transfer of sovereignty that 
gave birth to the Union was not accompanied by an increase in transparency and accountability 
(Fuchs and Schneider, 2011). A contrasting view – on which this thesis draws – holds that the 
EU’s democratic deficit has its roots beyond the principle of representation or the increasing 
power of transnational bureaucracies unchecked by public scrutiny and control. Eriksen and 
Fossum (2012a, p.16) warn that, ‘under modern conditions, democratic legitimacy cannot be 
based on direct participation of all citizens in the making of the laws they are subjected to, 
because the people are never present to make the choices’. Justification of policy outcomes to 
those affected by them creates a certain type of legitimacy built on accountability and autonomy. 
The latter requires that those affected by policies are able to contribute to their development 
through transparent decision-making processes. Simultaneously, legitimacy also encompasses a 
set of rules and procedures that policymakers have to comply with and ‘serves to ensure that a 
polity is fit to make binding decisions on behalf of a demos’ (Eriksen and Fossum, 2012a, p.18).  
Complementary to the need to assure political control over political equality through the 
principle of representation,  democratic legitimacy is viewed in this thesis to be dependent on the 
extent to which decision-making processes are accountable, transparent, open to public scrutiny 
and participation, and infused with responsiveness – in this way fostering the autonomy of 
individuals. An increase in any of these aspects is synonymous to enhancing the concept of 
democratic leigitmacy. Firstly, making public actions justifiable on the grounds of common and 
universal democratic values captures the notion of accountability. According to Olsen (2013, 
p.1), accountability is a central democratic value as it provides citizens the ability to control 
decision-making processes, and provides avenues for policies to gain wide consent and foster 
democratic legitimacy. Moreover, it means that citizens and those affected by policies have 
instruments which compel representatives and bureaucrats to justify their decisions and actions 
to the general public, and face sanctions if their performances are unsatisfactory, or in the case of 
power abuses (Borowiak, 2011). Secondly, transparency is considered to be a prerequisite for 
assuring democratic legitimacy, and broadly refers to the access that members of the general 
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public have to information about policymaking and political decisions or laws (Schmidt, 2013, 
p.6). It also can be considered to capture the ‘composition of the space in question where 
(political issues) can be seen and understood’ (Curtin 2007, p. 246).  
Thridly, responsiveness means that national or transnational polities and institutions are open to 
creating points of access in an indiscriminate manner for the public, which allows them to hold 
policymakers accountable (Goodhart, 2011). In the case of the EU, it grants citizens the 
opportunity to safeguard their interests and rights through mechanisms different from those 
available at the domestic level, in this way enhancing the ability of citizens to debate, contest or 
influence matters related to multi-level governance (Goodhart and Taninchev, 2011, p.1063). In 
the case of responsiveness, policymakers are open to the views and interests of the public 
expressed either through participatory formal institutional processes and debate within the public 
sphere, or through the input of elected representatives. Finally, openness to public debate entails 
the expectation that policymakers engage regularly through either formal or informal 
mechanisms in justifying and explaining their decisions to individuals in the public sphere, 
whilst also trying to materialise their promises and commitments (Bovens, Curtin and Hart, 
2010a).   
 
The EU’s foreign policy and democratic legitimacy: How can this be? 
The issue of democratic legitimacy is becoming more and more debated in the literature 
enquiring into the EU’s foreign policy (Bickerton, 2011a, 2011c; Laidi, 2008; Sjursen, 2006b, 
2006a). Policymakers have sought to draw on public support for their foreign policy decisions, 
but have eschewed from making them accountable (Bickerton, 2011c; Kandyla and de Vreese, 
2011; Wisnievski, 2011). In the same vein, most of the mainstream literature has functioned on 
the assumption that the elite character of the EU’s foreign policy makes it immune to and closed 
off from democratic scrutiny (Bull, 1982; Hill, 2003; Howorth, 2001; White, 1999). Such a 
tendency is also endemic within parts of the broader tradition of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). 
Here scholars hold polarised views regarding the role of democratic legitimacy in shaping 
foreign policy. Some claim that foreign policy is and should be placed beyond any form of 
democratic control (Rosenau, 1961, 1967; Key, 1968; Waltz, 1979; Kennan, 1985; Ginsberg, 
 
 
8 
 
1988; Weaver, 1993). Others view democratic legitimacy as an ontological characteristic of 
Western political systems reinforced by the causal links between public opinion or the discourse 
of the media and foreign policy decisions identified by the analyst (Brody, 1992; Cohen, 1993; 
Page, 1996; Robinson, 2011). Nonetheless, some foreign policy analysts engage in studying the 
notion of democratic legitimacy by focusing on the principle of democratic representation or by 
proposing other complementary understatings of democratic legitimacy – as this thesis seeks to 
achieve (Iyengar and Reeves, 1997; Miller, 2007; Entman, 2008). 
During the last few years scholars have increasingly been arguing that because foreign policy, 
similarly to domestic politics, needs to comply with democratic requirements, research should 
enquire into what a democratic EU foreign policy would look like. According to Sjursen, such an 
endeavour is reinforced by the erosion of intergovernmentalism which has been marked, for 
example, by the increase in the EP’s powers in the realm of foreign policy. The EP is a key actor 
in setting the budget for the European External Action Service (EEAS) and recently has had a 
central role in the discussion that preceded the creation of the EEAS (Sjursen, 2012, p.153). The 
majority of the literature that has followed this advice has assessed the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU’s foreign policy by adopting a formal and intergovernmental understanding of democracy 
based on the primacy of the principle of representation. Studies have focused here on a minimum 
understanding of EU democracy where the Union’s power is limited to controlling and backing 
up representative democracy at the national level. The EU’s scope is to set up a system to resolve 
issues that member states cannot settle on their own (Held, 2003; Archibugi, 2004; Moravcsik, 
2004; Crum, 2005; Lord, 2006; Hix, Noury and Roland, 2007). In terms of foreign policy, this 
conception of democracy is based on veto rights and intergovernmental logics similar to 
diplomatic behaviour; legitimacy is granted through national elected representatives. Peter Hain, 
the British representative at the European Convention skilfully captures this approach positing 
that, ‘if foreign policy is to enjoy legitimacy, there must be accountability through elected 
governments to national parliaments’ (quoted in Sjursen, 2012, p.147). 
This thesis aims to enquire into the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in the foreign 
policy of the EU through the activity of the media and its interactions with policymakers. The 
concept of the (European) public sphere is brought into the conceptual framework in order to 
better highlight the ability of the media to enhance all the aspects of democratic legitimacy: 
 
 
9 
 
transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate5. In this way, it offers 
a complementary understanding to the way in which democratic legitimacy is infused in foreign 
policy decision-making within the EU by focusing on the democratic norms and values fostered 
by the public sphere. Most democratic theorists also hold that the public sphere contains 
empirical sources for the existence of democratic legitimacy within a certain political system and 
the precondition for democratic legitimacy to accrue through the activity of the media 
(Habermas, 1986; Calhoun, 1993; Curran, 1993; Fraser, 2007; Koçan, 2008).  
Conceptually, the public sphere – or the European public sphere (EPS) in the case of the EU – is 
considered to be the space where individuals can interact with politics through the media and its 
discourse, and where democratic legitimacy is created and enacted. Discourse surrounding 
transnational European issues together with communication fluxes enacted through the EPS that 
link non-national actors to individuals within the EU are also thought to increase democratic 
legitimacy (Liebert, 2012, p.123). Hence, the EPS links individuals to decision-making processes 
through the communicative fluxes created by the media, which is seen here as a crucial actor in 
creating the EPS (Koopmansand Statham, 2010d; Medrano and Gray, 2010; Pfetsch, Adam and 
Eschner, 2010; Trenz, 2010a; Statham and Trenz, 2012b) – an idea developed throughout the 
second chapter. Access to information transmitted by the media opens up decision-making 
processes to democratic scrutiny and contributes to their transparency and accountability. The 
media have the ability to publicise and politicise European issues within the public sphere, 
informing people what to think about, but also how to perceive such issues (Cohen, 1993; 
Larsson, 2002; Statham, 2008; Maurer, 2011; de Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Fossum, 2012). At the 
same time, policymakers seem to be prone to perceive the media as the purveyor of public 
opinion – even equating the views expressed by journalists with those of the general public 
(Everts, 2000; Holsti, 2000; Kull and Ramsay, 2000; Sinnott, 2000; McLaren, 2002; Brewer and 
Gross, 2005; Aldrich et al., 2006; Knecht and Weatherford, 2006; de Wilde, 2011). Thus, the 
interaction between the media and policymakers is paramount for answering the puzzle set out in 
this thesis. This thesis proposes and employs an interaction model (between the media and 
policymakers) consisting of three types of effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting). The 
                                                          
5
 Conversely, a focus on the European public sphere and the way in which EU foreign policy is politicised through 
the media provides a deeper understanding of the role of democratic legitimacy, than a focus solely on the erosion of 
intergovernmentalism and the principle of democratic representation would. 
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next section outlines the theoretical framework together with the research methods applied, 
followed by a summary of the structure of the thesis in the final section of the chapter. 
 
Case studies, theoretical framework, methods, and sample 
The thesis focuses on two case studies resembling two very different issue areas of EU foreign 
policy, which are discussed in more detail in chapter 4: the EU’s climate change policy and its 
policy towards Russia. Generally, case study frameworks are frequently employed by social 
scientists who seek to enquire into various social and political phenomena (Gerring, 2004; 
Bennett and Elman, 2006, 2007). Even though case study research has been under intense 
scrutiny related to its reliability and degree of rigour involved, it is considered to be the most 
appropriate tool for studying organisation settings coupled with their dynamics, such as in the 
case of foreign policy (Odell, 2001; Brecherand Harvey, 2002; Thomas, 2011). By comparing 
two very different case studies this thesis seeks to address questions of reliability and rigour, 
employing a comparative case study approach which can help paint a coherent and relevant 
picture of the two issue areas of foreign policy analysed.  Moreover, Yin points out that ‘in 
general, case studies are the preferred strategy when `how' and `why'  questions are being posed, 
when the investigator has little control over  events and when this focus is on a contemporary 
phenomenon within some  real life context’ (Yin, 1994, p.1). In each case (i.e. the EU’s climate 
change policy and its policy towards Russia) the empirical analysis focuses on two high level 
events seen as defining moments for the EU’s foreign policy: the 2009 Copenhagen summit and 
the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. It is expected that the broad trends highlighted by the 
thesis relating to the nature of the interactions between policymakers interact with the media – 
and their implications for the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted – would be relevant 
and apply to the EU’s foreign policy more generally. Hence, the thesis provides a robust and 
reliable framework for understanding the effects of the media’s activity (within the public 
sphere) and its interactions with policymakers on democratic legitimacy. This framework can be 
applied to various areas of the EU foreign policy, but also to nation state foreign policies, or 
multi-level and transnational governance. 
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The thesis presents in chapter 3 and employs a theoretical model based on three types of 
interactions effects between the media and policymakers: indexing, bounding and agenda setting. 
Interaction effects can help understand the way in which the activity of the media within the 
public sphere endows decision-making6 with democratic legitimacy. Firstly, indexing refers to 
instances where the media enjoys low degrees of autonomy and independence, being employed 
by policymakers as a tool for publicising or gathering support for their policy approaches. 
Bounding implies that media discourse can affect decision-making – acting as an external 
constraint – in situations where policymakers are not willing to interact with its discourse or are 
simply unaware of it. Finally, agenda setting captures the ability of the media to influence 
decision-making purposely through interactions with policymakers who are open to its discourse. 
Furthermore, the interaction effects between the media and policymakers are predicated upon the 
way the former frames policy definitions through its discourse. Policy definitions are understood 
here to be modalities of perceiving social and political reality by the media, which can focus on 
and frame various policy problems, solutions or expectations.  
Chapter 4 highlights that empirically policy definitions are identified and distinguished through 
the method of frame analysis which broadly entails dissecting the way in which discourses are 
constructed and their effect on social and political contexts. In analysing interaction effects and 
their implication for the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy, the 
findings of the frame analysis are correlated with data from interviews, questionnaires and 
various primary or secondary sources. Triangulating the analysis in this way allows for greater 
reliability and validity in the findings and the overall conclusions presented in the thesis.  
Two member states (the United Kingdom and Romania) together with the transnational level (the 
EU’s institutions together with transnational publications) were chosen for the analysis due to 
their different roles and contribution to the EU’s foreign policy, or their contrasting political 
systems and media landscapes. A more practical reason resided in nature of the media sources 
whose language was accessible to the author. Nonetheless, an even more reliable study would 
have aimed to include more member states; however, such an endeavour would have probably 
required the concerted efforts of an entire research group. The frame analysis was conducted on 
                                                          
6
 Policymaking and decision-making are used interchangeably throughout the thesis to describe processes in the 
EU’s foreign policy. 
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two quality newspapers from each member state and three transnational publications. The choice 
for quality media is justified by the fact that they can portray a valid picture of their respective 
media landscapes, and are the most likely avenues for public debate and for the discussion of 
European issues. Media sources are complemented by data from interviews and questionnaires 
which targeted specific policymakers and journalists who were either involved in decision-
making or were writing on the two issues within the timeframe analysed. The annexes (A, B, C, 
D, E and F) at the end of the thesis describe the sample for both media sources and interviews 
and questioners, whilst highlighting the difficulties encountered, together with the biases and 
shortcomings of the sample.   
 
Structure of the thesis 
The thesis begins by establishing in chapter 1 the way in which the issue of democratic 
legitimacy has been analysed within the literatures on the EU’s foreign policy and the tradition 
of FPA. In particular, it underscores that the scholarship focused on the EU’s foreign policy can 
be broadly understood along the lines of three debates centred on the EU and the nation state, the 
role of the EU’s institutions or the EU’s ontology. The chapter highlights that in the literature the 
notion of democratic legitimacy has been to a large extent researched by focusing on the legal 
and constitutional arrangements which are meant to ensure the principle of representation. 
Following on from that, the chapter highlights that some foreign policy analysts have viewed 
foreign policy as a policy area detached from the general public or have taken for granted the 
existence of democratic leigitimacy in democratic systems. Others have enquired into the notion 
of democratic legitimacy by focusing on the principle of democratic representation or by using 
other complementary approaches. 
Drawing on the analysis of the two literatures, chapter 2 advocates for an approach based on the 
activity of the media, which is seen to have the potential to endow decision-making with 
democratic legitimacy. The concept of the European public sphere (EPS) is introduced here in 
order to highlight the potential of the media to enhance the multiple aspects of democratic 
legitimacy – transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. The 
EPS is understood to be the space where individuals come into contact with policymakers and 
 
 
13 
 
decision-making through the discourse constructed by the media. The chapter then highlights 
that the media is the central actor in the EPS, and that its interactions with policymakers are key 
to understanding the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in the EU’s foreign policy. 
One part of the chapter is also devoted to the structure of the EPS, which is seen to be the result 
of the overlapping between various Europeanised national public spheres.  
Chapter 3 provides a theoretical discussion of the interaction effects model (between the media 
and policymakers) proposed and employed in the thesis. It presents three types of interaction 
effects – indexing, bounding and agenda setting – and underscores their implications for the way 
in which democratic legitimacy is enacted within the public sphere. The policy definitions 
(articulating policy problems, solutions and expectations) framed by the media are central to 
identifying and distinguishing interactions effects between the media and policymakers. In 
chapter 4, the methodology employed in order to empirically evaluate the three interactions 
effects and their meaning for the enactment of democratic legitimacy is presented. However, the 
first part of the chapter provides a detailed background to the two case studies explored in this 
thesis. The second part highlights that frame analysis is used in order to identify the most 
relevant and salient policy definitions constructed by the media. Data from interviews and 
questionnaires (with policymakers and journalists), together with various primary and secondary 
sources complement the frame analysis, and provide more reliability and validity to the findings 
of the thesis.  
Chapters 5, 6, 7 involve empirically analysing the interaction effects within the transnational 
level and the two member states, in order to answer the two research questions. Each substantive 
chapter first provides an overview of the context within which the media and policymakers 
interact in foreign policy (the media/foreign policy nexus), followed by an analysis of the policy 
definitions framed by the media and the subsequent interaction effects in the two case studies. 
The final part of the chapters discusses the implication of the interaction effects for the way 
democratic legitimacy was enacted in the two issue areas of EU foreign policy.   
The thesis then turns to the conclusions which discuss the theoretical and empirical findings of 
the thesis together with the strengths and shortcomings of the framework employed. The final 
part of the chapter reflects on the avenues for further research prompted by the findings of the 
thesis. 
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Chapter 1– Democratic legitimacy and EU 
foreign policy: Is such a link conceivable? 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Even though the lack of democratic legitimacy that the EU is widely perceived to suffer from has 
concerned scholars, students and practitioners, attention has been only recently directed towards 
the area of foreign policy. The thesis aims to fill this gap (and to answer to the two research 
questions presented in the previous chapter) by enquiring into the way in which the media 
through its activity and interactions with policymakers in the European public sphere has the 
potential to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. In focusing on the media 
and its role within the public sphere, this thesis provides a robust understanding of democratic 
legitimacy, complementing approaches constructed around the principle of representation. The 
emphasis on democratic representation has characterised the few studies that have enquired into 
the link between the EU’s foreign policy and democracy. The notion of democratic legitimacy is 
seen to encompass multiple aspects – transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness 
to public debate. The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the current debates on 
the foreign policy of the EU and the way they deal with the issue of democratic legitimacy. 
Three broad debates are identified, centred on the idea of the national state and the EU, the role 
of the Union’s institutions, and finally the role of the ontology on which the EU is predicated. In 
doing so, the first section positions the argument developed within the debates regarding the EU 
foreign policy and defines its key concepts. The second section surveys the way foreign policy 
analysts have aimed to account for the relationship between democratic legitimacy and foreign 
policy.  
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1.2 Debating the nature of the EU’s foreign policy 
By enquiring into the way in which the EU’s foreign policy is endowed with democratic 
legitimacy through the activity of the media within the European public sphere, this thesis is also 
implicitly challenging the wide consensus that the foreign policy of the EU is an elite driven 
domain where only states, institutions and national or supranational identities matter. Rather than 
asking how any of these three aspects construct the foreign policy of the Union and influence its 
effectiveness, it looks at the way the EU’s ontological commitment to democracy is translated 
into practice in this policy area. The need for such an endeavour is justified by the pervasiveness 
of democratic values within the make-up of the European project: being present in the EU’s 
treaties and, at least theoretically, informing its policy practice (Wimmel, 2009; Fuchs and 
Klingemann, 2011b; Eriksen and Fossum, 2012b). Throughout this thesis, EU foreign policy is 
understood to be the result of the fusion between member states and the EU institutions’ actions 
and interest, and their interactions within the dynamic and multi-level setting of the Union. This 
choice is also justified by the myriad approaches found throughout the literature and the 
consensus regarding the complexity that characterises EU foreign policy. This section provides a 
review of the literature on EU foreign policy and positions the argument of the thesis within it. 
Although not exhaustive, a list of three main areas of focus can be identified within this 
scholarship: a focus on the nation state which involves either comparing it to the EU or analysing 
the role the member states, an interest for internal processes – mainly institutional realities –, and 
a focus on ontology and the way identities, polities and narratives are constructed and employed. 
At the same time, the theme of effectiveness or whether the foreign policy of the EU actually 
works is present throughout all three perspectives. The last part of the section explores the way 
in which scholars have recently enquired into the impact of the decline of intergovernmentalism 
on the relationship between democracy and the EU’s foreign policy. 
 
1.2.1 The EU and the state 
The broader focus on the nation state has spawned two types of debates in the EU foreign policy 
literature: the first aims to account for the nature of the foreign policy of the EU in relation to the 
nation state, while the second analyses the way the national interests of member states influence 
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the foreign policy of the Union. Despite the recent focus on processes7, scholars of European 
Studies have always tried to figure out the ‘nature of the beast’ (Risse‐Kappen, 1996). Questions 
enquiring into the nature of the EU have been posed in relation to all of its policy areas: from 
justice or foreign policy to migration and agriculture. In this sense, during the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s the challenge for many was to evaluate whether developments in foreign 
policy analysis can be used in order to analyse the Union’s foreign policy (Allen and Smith, 
1990; Carlsnaes, Sjursen and White, 2004; Hill, 1993; White, 2001). The question whether the 
EU’s foreign policy resembled that of the nation state was crucial here. The literature became 
divided between the idea that the EU is a new kind of international actor and the perspective that 
it is similar to or should be analysed in way same as the nation state. In support of the latter 
argument, Hazel Smith contends that the EU needs a foreign policy ‘much the same as that of the 
nation-state’ (Smith, 2002, p.7). She goes on to propose that scholars should spend more time 
conceptualising the ways in which the EU can become as effective as the nation state and not on 
the nature of the Union as an international actor.  
In his review of the arguments put forward in the literature, White (1999, p.46) stresses that the 
foreign policy of the EU differs from that of the nation state in a number of important aspects: it 
is not a fully sovereign entity, its actors are more complex than within the state spanning from 
institutions, to interest groups and the member states themselves; and, as a result of the diverse 
mixture of actors involved in foreign policy, its processes differ, having a direct impact on the 
way in which the international agenda of the EU is constructed. The Union also lacks a coherent 
military capacity and has only recently started developing a diplomatic body (the EEAS), making 
its available instruments more limited than those of the nation state – which has a more coherent 
diplomatic system and is traditionally equipped with instruments of both soft and hard power. 
Thus, the instruments that are in the hands of the Union seem to be not as effective as those of 
the nation state (White, 1999, p.48). Moreover, many scholars have highlighted the gap that 
exists between the EU’s own expectations of its role in the international arena and its capabilities 
or instruments (Hill, 1993; Ginsberg, 1999; Howorth, 2001; Hyde-Price, 2006; Rynning, 2011; 
Smith, 2011). The issue of effectiveness has been also linked with the coherence of the 
coordinative processes between the EU's institutions and the member states, with an emphasis on 
                                                          
7
 Bickerton (2011a, p.26) contends that the analysis of EU policies ‘has moved from the ontological (what is the 
nature of the EU beast?) to the pragmatic and descriptive (what does the EU do and with what effects?)’. 
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the nation state’s superior ability (Balducci, 2007; Biscop and Andersson, 2007; Howorth, 2004). 
Consequently, a discussion of the differences between the EU and the nation state (from a sui 
generis perspective or not) finds the Union searching for a more effective foreign policy that 
could provide concrete policy outcomes and successes. 
The comparison with the foreign policy of the Westphalian nation state has proven to be very 
fruitful at an intellectual level, giving birth to ideas spanning from views which posit that the 
complexity of the EU makes it have a sui generis foreign policy, to the perspective that its 
foreign policy is similar to that of nation states – only weaker –, or that the Union should strive 
to have a more Westphalian type of foreign policy.  However, this negative identification with 
the nation state has mostly overlooked the way the EU has shifted the boundaries and links 
between state, society and politics, transnationalising its foreign policy and opening it up to a 
transformed type of engagement with democratic legitimacy. Hence, the question of the presence 
of democratic legitimacy and the way it is enacted in the EU’s foreign policy is ignored here 
altogether.  
The second strand of arguments which focuses on the foreign policies of the member states also 
sidelines the issue of democratic legitimacy, as most contributions draw their assumption from 
the realist tradition in international relations (IR) theory. Democratic legitimacy is largely 
irrelevant here, as domestic factors more broadly are generally considered to be less salient for 
the construction of the EU’s foreign policy. Member states and the way they pursue their 
national foreign policy strategies have also been a focus in scholarship. Disagreements regarding 
the policy towards Russia or about the degree of Atlanticism that the EU should convey have 
been frequent among the member states (Biscop and Andersson, 2007). Traditionally it has been 
considered that foreign policy is a domain of high politics where cooperation still remains 
intergovernmental (Bull, 1982; Moravcsik, 1997). As conflicts tend to be pervasive, little 
agreement can be forged on foreign policy issues within the EU which becomes the result of the 
‘lowest common denominator’ between the national interests of the member states (Nuttall, 
2000).  
Moreover, Hyde-Price (2006, 2007) contends that the EU is a ‘calculator, not a crusader’ in that 
it behaves like a normal interest maximiser in the international arena and almost never shows 
signs of being altruistic. This happens because the member states are still very keen to protect 
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their sovereignty and wish to pursue their individual interests. As such, from Hyde-Price’s view, 
the foreign policy of the EU is prone to remain intergovernmental. Moreover, big member states 
such as France or Germany engage in developing and accept EU foreign policy only when it 
promotes their interests or it does not endanger them – in instances when second order interests 
and issues are involved, such as human rights or humanitarian aid. While the variety of diverging  
national interests has made it almost impossible for these member states to settle on important 
foreign policy issues, they have been quite successful in developing – at least rhetorically –  
common normative goals in marginal issue areas. These have included the promotion of human 
rights, democracy, rule of law, environmental protection, or tackling climate change and poverty 
(Hyde-Price, 2008). Drawing on the realist tradition in IR theory, Hyde-Price’s view legitimates 
the idea that only the three big EU member states – France, Germany and Great Britain – have 
the capacity of developing the EU into a strong international actor. They can achieve this only if 
they work together to pool all their influence in order to successfully shape the international 
agenda on pressing issues like Iran or North Korea (Hyde-Price, 2007). What this ultimately 
suggests is that member states are considered to have a central role in forging the foreign policy 
of the EU. This thesis acknowledges the salience of member states and includes two sample 
states which vary regarding the level of commitment, power and influence in shaping EU foreign 
policy, but also other characteristics – which are detailed in chapter 3 – such as the political 
system or the media culture: the United Kingdom and Romania. 
 
1.2.2 Institutional approaches  
Recent years have shifted the focus more towards processes and assessing the institutional 
realities that contribute to the creation of the EU’s foreign policy. The foreign policy of the EU is 
viewed in this literature as epiphenomenal to the institutional processes internal to the Union, 
being one of its by-products (Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011; Menon, 2011; Balfour, Bailes and 
Kenna, 2012). Within this scholarship, sociological institutionalist approaches which have 
become increasingly popular during the last two decades are based on the social constructivist 
theories of institutional building and learning developed in IR scholarship for the study of 
international organisations (Guzzini and Leander, 2006; Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 1994, 1999). 
These perspectives advocate a greater focus on the decentralised nature of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP), where decisions and expertise are shared among various institutions, 
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committees and policy groups. This approach also gives a higher degree of attention to the way 
in which member states contribute to the institutional processes behind foreign policy either as 
entrepreneurs, implementers, drives or barriers (Smith, 2004; Aggestam, 2011, 2008; Birchfield, 
2007; Flockhart, 2010). Accordingly, foreign policy in the EU is not always the result of the 
lowest common denominator, but tends to balance towards a consensus from which decisions 
can derive. EU foreign policy is seen as being characterised by ‘a constant rule-governed process 
of negotiation between actors which produces policy positions and international outcomes’ 
(Smith, 2005, p.55). 
While advocating a more inward perspective that looks at the internal processes of the EU's 
foreign policy, the institutionalist scholarship tends to equate issues of democratic legitimacy 
with the way in which decisions are adopted. But, as Hill and Wallace have pointed out, foreign 
policy encompasses more than formal processes. According to them, an ‘effective foreign policy 
rests upon a shared sense of national identity, of nation states’ place in the world, its friends and 
enemies, its interests and aspirations’ (Hill and Wallace, 1996, p.8). In the case of the Union, 
where national identity is itself contested, the idea of effectiveness framed in this way becomes 
misleading. The key question here is whether the lack of a coherent identity that could sustain an 
effective foreign policy validates the recent focus on institutional processes in the literature. A 
closer look at the Union points to the fact that one cannot separate ontology from praxis in its 
foreign policy (Bickerton, 2011a, p.118). An institutional approach looks only at one side, at a 
technical and very complex area of EU foreign policy, overshadowing and taking for granted 
other components of the EU’s ontological constitution, such as the need for democratic 
legitimacy.  
Although only marginal at this point, more critical institutionalist approaches share an emphasis 
on discourse in shaping the foreign policy of the EU. Drawing on Bourdieu’s sociology (1990, 
1992, 1998a, 1998b), discourse refers here not only to the structure, the text or the ideas that are 
put forward, but also to the agents that create them. In its broader scope, this literature seeks to 
understand the relationships between ideas and policy, and the way ideas bring about change in 
institutions. The focus is on agents rather than on structure, as ‘ideas provide us with interpretive 
frameworks that make us see some facts as important and others as less so’ (Beland and Cox, 
2010, p.3). Hence, ideas provide individuals, through communication, with a shared 
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understanding of what represents legitimate political action within institutions. The link between 
ideas and policy is researched by looking at the ideas that construct or deconstruct political 
institutions and the way they are interpreted and enacted. According to Schmidt’s (2001, 2008b, 
2010a) conceptualization of discursive institutionalism, ideas are always the result of discursive 
processes which take place within discursive contexts.  Discourse shapes the behaviour of actors 
within their field, but ultimately their existence and reification is linked to their intentionality. 
Schmidt (2008b) differentiates between coordinative discourses which describe practices that 
take place within institutions far from the public eye, and communicative discourses through 
which elites and institutions communicate political ideas to the general public. She goes on to 
argue that the more structural coordinative discourses are central to the construction of the EU's 
foreign policy. This happens because complex polities need to spend a significant degree of time 
and resources on internal coordination, in this way putting more emphasis on coordinative 
discourses and less on trying to build popular support and legitimacy. Conversely, in simple 
polities where political activity is usually concentrated around a single authority (such as in 
Britain), the communicative strategies of institutions towards the general public tend to be more 
elaborate than those devised in order to coordinate policy actors.  
In order to account for the influence of the ideas that both types of discourse create, most 
discursive institutionalist studies focus on the framing power and practices of policy actors. From 
this angle, agents frame their ideas in certain ways with a view to promote their interests. 
However, this is a rather narrow understanding of framing processes, which to a large extent 
departs from its common use in media studies or foreign policy analysis (detailed in chapters 3 
and 4). Not only policy actors possess frame abilities, but also the media which in more complex 
polities (to follow Schmidt’s argument) takes the lead in presenting policy ideas and definitions 
to the general public, sending its feedback to policymakers. Although the media’s actions might 
not always be deliberate or intentional, its communicative abilities can be seen as a source for 
articulating policy problems and for providing policy solutions (Mehta, 2010, p.33) – this 
approach will be developed in chapter 3. Nonetheless, this thesis does not seek to explain how 
democratic legitimacy as a policy problem has come to influence the evolution of the EU’s 
institutional make-up dealing with foreign policy, nor that of European media institutions. It 
aims to explore the way the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy is fostered within 
the public sphere through the ability of the media to frame policy definitions and its interactions 
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with policymakers. However, this thesis does take into account the role of institutions and their 
developments or dynamics in shaping the foreign policy of the EU, chapter 5 exploring the way 
in which democratic legitimacy is perceived and enacted by EU policymakers within its 
institutions. 
 
1.2.3 The focus on ontology 
The EU’s search for meaning has driven scholars to enquire into the way the ontology of the 
Union predisposes it to behave in certain ways in the international arena. This has prompted a 
debate regarding the way in which the EU’s foreign policy is endowed with democratic 
legitimacy stemming from its internal make-up and citizens (Sjursen, 2007, 2011, 2013; Bruno 
and Vrailas, 2008; Thym, 2008; Manners, 2010c; Bickerton, 2011b; Stewart, 2011). However, a 
focus on democratic legitimacy has been only marginal, and at times ignored in favour of the 
view that the EU is inherently democratic – due to the deep commitment to principles of 
democracy inscribed in its treaties – which constrains it to behave normatively and altruistically 
in the international arena. The idea that the EU is a postmodern power which acts normatively in 
its international relations has become very popular during the last ten years. Manners (2002) first 
introduced the idea in his 2002 seminal article which has been developed and criticised by a 
whole array of scholars. When asked to state his opinion about the idea that the EU acts as a 
normative power in the international arena, the current president of the European Commission 
Jose Manuel Barroso argued that ‘the EU might be one of the most important normative powers 
in the world because of its ability to establish normative principles and apply them to different 
realities’ (quoted in Manners, 2008a, p.60). Barroso agrees here with Manners’ idea that the EU 
projects its power in the international system by shaping various principles and norms, and 
persuading different actors to adopt them. By endowing its norms with universality and imposing 
them on others, the EU is spreading a culture that transcends the state-centric approach which is 
commonly believed to characterise international politics (Manners, 2008b, p.55).  
According to Manners, the Union erects new prescriptions of normality against which the 
behaviour of other states should be judged. Nonetheless, simply by acting in such a manner does 
not mean that the EU is a normative power, because it does not imply that the adoption of the 
Union’s norms would aid the life of individuals around the world. In this sense, Manners stresses 
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that it would be incorrect to take for granted the idea that the EU ‘has been, is and always will be 
a normative power in world politics’ (Manners, 2008b, p.45), without analysing the normative 
constitution of the EU. He identifies two main aspects that have historically influenced the 
conception and development of the EU: namely a hybrid-polity which has its critical goal in 
transcending the political boundaries imposed by the nation state and a political-legal 
constitution that formalises the norms and values inherent to both the hybrid polity and the 
peoples of Europe into law (Manners, 2002, p.240). The former aspect of the constitution of the 
EU acknowledges that the Union’s normative stance in its international relations might be the 
sole creation of a group of scholars and politicians committed to the idea of a United Europe 
(Beland, 2009). By creating various narratives about the EU – and consequently about us – they 
have positioned the Union as an altruistic promoter of norms and values (Diez and Pace, 2011; 
Forsberg, 2011; Whitman, 2011).  
Terms such as force for good or Normative Power Europe have been advanced in order to create 
this self-image of the EU (Eriksen, 2006; Flockhart, 2010; Forsberg, 2011; Selden, 2010; 
Wagnsson, 2010). During the Cold War, as Manners (2010b) claims, the hybrid-polity was still 
searching for a different foreign policy avenue through which it could establish the EU as a 
strong international actor. During that period, the hybrid-polity opted at times either for the 
development of a civilian power, or for that of a military power – a political and conceptual 
dance that was regulated by the relations between the two superpowers of the time, the US and 
the Soviet Union. As such, in times of tension the development of a military force was favoured, 
while during the détente, relying on civilian power was seen as a much better option (Manners, 
2010b). Manners goes on to argue that after the Cold War these two views lost ground to the idea 
of the EU behaving in a normative way in the international arena. The hybrid-polity tried to 
achieve this by constructing different narrative norms aimed at shaping perceptions within the 
international arena of different states and regimes. They portrayed different states as evil or 
threatening, but never gambled with the option of intervening with military forces in order make 
them more secure (Sjursen, 2006a; Selden, 2010; Rogers, 2009). Manners  (2002, 2008a, 2008b) 
unfolds this argument in order to show that the fact that the EU acts in a normative way does not 
stem from the nature of the hybrid polity that governs it, but from its politico-legal constitution 
that constrains its policies and actions.  
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Through a politico-legal constitution, Manners is referring to the formalisation within the EU’s 
treaties of various norms and values that are considered to be universal. He identifies nine 
principles that both constitute and are promoted by the EU: democracy, human rights, rule of 
law, sustainable development, freedom, equality, good governance, social solidarity and 
sustainable peace (Manners, 2008b, p.46). These principles are also present within the United 
Nations Charter and are widely held within international law, pointing to the idea that the EU has 
the duty of promoting them externally. As such, although the EU might consider using military 
force to mediate different conflicts, the principles that lie at its foundation do not permit it to take 
the right to life of any individual. A big contradiction is thus uncovered here between the goal to 
develop military capabilities, potentially employing them for conciliating different conflicts and 
the EU’s inherent higher commitment to the right to live of individuals (Diez, 2005; Diez and 
Pace, 2011; de Zutter, 2010). 
Criticising the EU’s normative self-image, de Zutter (2010, p.1117) points to the a priori 
recognition from other actors that this narrative entails. In positing that the Union behaves as a 
normative, sui generis actor in the international arena there is an inherit assumption that other 
actors endorse its international stance. Normative recognition stems here from the quality of the 
norms that the EU diffuses. Scholars following Manners’ take on normative power tend to 
consider the norms that form the base of the EU’s identity as being intrinsically universal 
(Lucarelli, 2006; Johansson-Nogués, 2007; Birchfield, 2007; Aggestam, 2008; Forsberg, 2011). 
Others have acknowledged that these norms are not in themselves universal; it is the inherent 
recognition by other actors in the international arena that provides them that quality8. More 
recently, norms have been considered to be ‘“universable” only when the relevant community for 
moral action is (constructed as) humanity at large’ (de Zutter, 2010, p.1117). Even if they might 
have been formally included in various international treaties, it is the performative aspect behind 
norms that attaches universability to them. The assessment of a norms’ practical impact on a 
certain moral community is crucial for establishing claims for universability (Aggestam, 2008; 
Laidi, 2008; Youngs, 2010). In its classical form, the Normative Power Europe narrative evades 
this issue by arguing that the EU is and always will be a normative power regardless of where its 
foreign policy practices might lead (Manners, 2002). Finally, Tonra (2011, p.1194) contends that 
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 Norms become universal once they are integrated into international law.  
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the EU’s norms stem from a multitude of narratives constructed (nationally) within the member 
states which highlight the contestation processes underpinning the relationship between identity 
(society) and foreign policy. Conversely, a single European narrative of foreign policy and 
exceptionalism is yet to appear and transfer legitimacy to the EU, as national narratives resonate 
with powerful images of national identity: ‘French puissance; Finnish ‘peacekeeping 
superpower’; German zivilmacht’ (Tonra, 2011, p.1198). 
Following the argument presented above, legitimacy in the international arena – which should be 
distinguished from democratic legitimacy – can be granted only by the acceptance of a large 
moral community of states and peoples (Lucarelli and Manners, 2006; Hurrelmann, Schneider, 
and Steffek, 2007b; Lucarelli and Fioramonti, 2009b). It must also be based on the way that the 
respective community comes to create and incorporate universal norms. Internally, in the case of 
democratic legitimacy, this would mean that norms need to be validated by democratic processes 
of will formation and ‘therefore transformed into norms willed by the political community of the 
EU as those they choose to pursue in international politics’ (Bickerton, 2011a, p.98). Thus, the 
interests and preferences of the public affected need to be reflected in the norms that the EU 
seeks to promote in its international relations. Only then can the EU promote its norms in the 
larger moral community of states and peoples and attach universality to them. 
Laidi (2008) has applied this line of argumentation to the issue of democratic legitimacy, 
enquiring into the way the ontology of the EU democratically validates its foreign policy aims 
and norms. He points out that the Union has the potential of constructing a more democratic 
foreign policy than the nation state due to three of its characteristics. Firstly, the European 
Commission’s power is continuously contested, forcing it to always try to find new ways of 
enhancing its democratic legitimacy in all policy areas, including foreign policy. It achieves this 
through various communication campaigns and initiatives, negotiations with stakeholders and 
consultations with members of the civil society. Secondly, the EP which is the first directly 
elected transnational parliament in the world has considerably broadened its field of competence 
in foreign policy during the last years (Thym, 2008; Woolcock, 2010; Caballero-Bourdot, 2011; 
Herranz-Surrallés, 2011; Wisnievski, 2011). Finally, the EU’s foreign policy is built upon its 
ability to create norms that bind both domestic and global actors in order to provide public goods 
beyond the nation state (Manners, 2011). Within this process citizens are not viewed as voters, 
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but as organised interest groups that can shape both the agenda and the outcomes of EU foreign 
policy. While Laidi is right to highlight the role of democratic legitimacy in the construction of 
the Union’s foreign policy, he does not present a model that describes how this might be 
achieved or the mechanisms behind it. He takes for granted the role of formal institutions in 
advancing democratic legitimacy and considers processes of social preference aggregation to be 
working in foreign policy similarly to domestic policies, where citizens form and are represented 
by interest groups far more often. On the other hand, this thesis builds on the idea that the 
activity of the media within the European public sphere can play a crucial role in linking 
individuals to policymaking, boosting accountability or transparency and encouraging 
policymakers to be responsive to public debate – in this way endowing the EU’s foreign policy 
with democratic legitimacy. 
 
1.2.4 The decline of intergovernmentalism as an avenue enhancing democratic legitimacy 
Recently the five year project RECON (Reconstituting Democracy in Europe) funded by the 
European Commission has explored the democratic norms and standards under which the EU 
operates. The central research puzzle of the RECON project (in its foreign policy section) 
enquired into the sources that can endow the EU with democratic legitimacy in the context of a 
departure in understanding decision-making processes in the Union’s foreign policy through a 
purely intergovernmental logic (Sjursen, 2011, p.1079). In the case of intergovernmentalism, 
democratic legitimacy is derived indirectly from the domestic political systems of the member 
states, entailing ‘consensus decision-making, veto rights, respect for national sovereignty and 
policy-making through a system of complex interstate bargaining’ (Tonra, 2011, p.1190). Most 
of the analyses undertaken within this project focused on the role of national parliaments and the 
EP in infusing the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy (Kantner and Liberatore, 
2006; Koenig-Archibugi, 2002; Stie, 2010). For example, Wisnievski  (2011, p.4) finds that the 
EP has managed to attain a much better position to negotiate with the other EU institutions on 
foreign policy issues than the Lisbon treaty afforded it. Such an influence has often gone well 
beyond the budgetary prerogatives of the EP, although it has not challenged the primacy of the 
member states or of the Commission on substantive foreign policy issues. The EP could 
contribute to enhancing the accountability of decision-making processes in the EU’s foreign 
policy by exerting some type of enhanced control over the EEAS and the High Representative on 
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Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Bátora, 2010, p.2). On the other hand, Lord (2011, p.1142) 
puts forward two reasons for why national parliaments cannot hold adequately accountable the 
Union’s decisions in foreign policy. Firstly, developing specialised groups within national 
parliaments that can effectively exert democratic control over the institutions of the Union bears 
high costs. Secondly, national parliaments have control only over individual member states, but 
not over other members of the Council as a whole.  
More normatively oriented scholars – who view democracy and democratic legitimacy as having 
an added value for the development of the EU and its citizens – find that endowing the Union’s 
foreign policy with democratic legitimacy is hampered by the nature of foreign policy itself. 
Firstly, Eriksen (2011) questions whether the complexity of the bureaucratic system behind the 
construction of foreign policy can act as an instrument against democracy. Because foreign 
policy is still very much a domain of high politics, basing decision-making processes mostly on 
the work of experts and functionaries in the EU's institutions has the effect of completely closing 
off this policy area from public deliberation, participation and scrutiny. Secondly, some NGOs 
and Think-tanks working on specific security and foreign policy issues are found to have been 
considerably involved in decision-making processes (Joachim and Dembinski, 2011, pp.1164–
65). However, most of these organisations are based only around a certain number of issues (e.g. 
arms trade or defence), while others that deal with more popular debates (e.g. human rights or 
climate change) rarely get the opportunity to influence policy. Hence, Joachim and Dembinski 
raise a deep concern whether the activity of these organisations can be seen as contributing to the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy. They argue that it is questionable to what 
extent NGOs and Think-tanks are representative of, or can speak for those either negatively 
affected by or opposed to the foreign policy of the Union (Joachim and Dembinski, 2011, 
pp.1164–65).  
Studies here draw on a limited conception of democracy based on the principle of representation, 
where democratic legitimacy is dependent on the ability of representative institutions such as the 
EP to strengthen their influence and control over decision-making processes in foreign policy. In 
this way, they ignore deeper levels of democratic legitimacy which imply the existence of a link 
between decision-making processes and the general public together with its preferences. This 
thesis argues that the EPS has the potential to link citizens to decision-making processes through 
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the media’s activity and its interactions with policymakers. The media is seen here to be able to 
boost the accountability and transparency of the EU’s foreign policy, whilst opening it up to 
democratic scrutiny and public debate – chapter 2 provides a detailed discussion of these aspects. 
Chapter 2 will focus on the ability of the media to enhance democratic legitimacy by 
incorporating and exploring the concept of public sphere – and the EPS. The next section of this 
chapter takes the argument forward, surveying the way in which the study of foreign policy has 
accounted for democratic legitimacy.  
 
1.3 Democratic legitimacy: An absent or hidden variable in Foreign Policy 
Analysis 
1.3.1 Public opinion and foreign policy 
The lack of attention towards democratic legitimacy in the literature on the EU’s foreign policy 
is contingent upon the broader tradition of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) which to a large 
exetent overlooks democratic legitimacy completely or takes for granted its presence in 
democratic systems9. However, some analysts have enquired into the notion of democratic 
legitimacy by focusing on the principle of democratic representation or have used other 
complementary approaches – a goal also shared by this thesis. Traditionally, foreign policy 
analysts have acknowledged that foreign policy is a domain of high politics, where issues 
regarding democratic legitimacy do not and should not concern policymakers. Most of this 
literature has tended to equate democratic legitimacy with integrating the statistically constructed 
notion of the public opinion into decision-making processes. Almond (1950) and Lippmann 
(1955, 1997) underscored that political elites should keep decision-making processes in their 
sphere, as the views of the public in relation to international events are unstable and irrational. 
Consequently, the public can have very damaging effects on the foreign policy of a state, due to 
its capricious and unstructured views which are formed only after a certain event has happened. 
However, the context of the Cold War could be considered to have influenced the appearance of 
such views. The need for the US to maintain a high degree of secrecy, speed and flexibility in 
                                                          
9
 Nevertheless, Shapiro and Jacob (2000, pp.243–244) argue that if there is no link between the media, public 
opinion and foreign policy, we can easily conclude that ‘the level of democracy at work does not extend beyond the 
existence of procedural democracy’. 
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tackling the challenge of communism was at the base of these perspectives. Hence, most scholars 
engaging at the time with foreign policy issues tended to side with realist arguments about IR, 
emphasising the ultimate duty of politicians to safeguard through rational methods the national 
interest of the state. Lippmann (1955) underlined that the public tends to emotionally judge 
international events, showing more forgiveness towards cooperative actors or calling for extreme 
policies in situations of conflict with other actors. Rosenau (1961, p.95) also contended that the 
public cannot be trusted as their ‘response to foreign policy matters is less one of intellect and 
more one of emotion’. Political elites should thus be wary of engaging with public opinion in 
foreign policy issues, for citizens do not have the interest in issues and access to information, and 
are prone to make irrational and hasty judgments. The lack of strategic thinking on the part of the 
public is also mentioned as a reason for not listening to its opinion, as in the words of 
Morgenthau (1967, p.558) citizens ‘would sacrifice tomorrow’s real benefit for today’s apparent 
advantage’. 
Not all segments of the public are thought by classical foreign policy analysts to have such a 
malign effect. Writing at the beginning of the Cold War, Gabriel Almond (1950) distinguished 
three groups within the public: the general public, the attentive public and the elites. He 
recognised the general public as the most numerous category of individuals which share a large 
disinterest for foreign policy issues, acting only in response to high profile international events. 
Contrary to them and in a significantly smaller number, the members of the attentive public are 
concerned with policy matters and try to stay informed, but have few pathways to put forward 
their opinions. Elites are a very influential and informed ‘stratum of the population which gives 
structure to the public, and which provides the effective means of access to the various 
groupings’ (Almond, 1950, p.138). Elites are the group that form the selection base for 
policymakers, and go back and forth from public to political life. According to Almond, they are 
the gateway for public opinion to reach policymakers working in foreign policy. The latter group 
(of elites) seems to functionally resemble Deutsch (1969) and Hass’ (1958) concept of epistemic 
communities. According to more recent work, the concept encompasses ‘network[s] of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 1992, 
p.3). Similarly, Habermas mentions the existence of the ‘quasi-public domain which consists of 
‘opinions that circulate in a relatively narrow circle … skipping the mass population’ (Habermas, 
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1989, p.15). Opinions formed within this narrow communicative space can spread to the general 
public and infiltrate public opinion.  
The Almond-Lippman consensus – as it has come to be known in literature (Aldrich et al., 2006; 
Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Baum and Potter, 2008; Bennett, 2008; Brody, 1992; Graber, 
2009) – was first challenged by revisionists lead by Page and Shapiro (1992), who argued that 
not only do the views of the public about foreign policy tend to remain stable, but these opinions 
are based on informed judgments. According to them, the public starts with a lack of information 
and gradually gathers enough in order to construct rational and stable foreign policy preferences. 
The revisionist insight that citizens tend to be well informed and construct stable opinions about 
foreign policy has a blurring effect on Almond’s distinction between different types of public. 
Thus, the classical category of the attentive public is expanded to include all individuals and 
groups of individuals within a state and fuses into the concept of the general public. This notion 
of the general public will also be employed throughout the thesis. Moreover, the media is 
considered to have an important role in blurring the distinction between different groups as it 
addresses the public as a whole (Lewis, 2004; Aldrich et al., 2006; Schoen, 2007). Further on it 
will be pointed out that foreign policy analysis have sought to integrate the media as the link 
between foreign policy and public opinion, but only giving it only a small degree of agency and 
overlooking the dynamics between it, the general public and the political sphere.   
A third group of foreign policy analysts considers that public opinion has the role of constraining 
policymakers. Rosenau (1961) first proposed the idea that very often public opinion acts 
similarly to a sleeping giant, allowing policymakers to make decisions on their own. However, 
when policymakers steer out of the limits imposed by the public, they can incur considerable 
costs. Acting like a ‘system of dikes’, Key (1968) claimed that public opinion channels the 
direction of foreign policy, making policymakers avoid decisions that would collide with the 
views and interests of the general public. Public opinion becomes ‘activated’ only when 
decisions have unpopular outcomes or challenge basic norms and values prevalent within the 
public sphere. According to Vengroff and his colleagues (2000), six factors mediate the 
relationship between foreign policy and public opinion: the nature of the problem and of the 
solutions proposed, the effectiveness of the communication process within and among elites, 
elites’ awareness and interpretation of public opinion, the perceived level of public support, and 
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the nature of decision-making processes. Shiraev has also identified an intervening variable, the 
policy climate, which can be seen as a ‘prevailing sentiment among policymakers and other 
individuals capable of influencing the direction of foreign policy through their roles as security  
and defence executives, analysts, problem definers, gatekeepers, watchdogs, and experts and 
commentators’ (Shiraev, 2000, p.298). The policy climate encompasses the range of views 
prescribing how a country should deal with international issues and its behaviour in the 
international arena.  
These new insights into the role of public opinion in foreign policy have led researchers to 
enquire into other avenues such as social and cognitive psychology. Studies here highlight the 
fact that the social impact of the images of war casualties has made people more sensible to 
international conflicts (Brueggemann and Wessler, 2009; Bulkow, Urban and Schweiger, 2012; 
Kim et al., 2012; Nowak, 2012; Wolfe, Jones and Baumgartner, 2013). The idea that members of 
the general public rather than those of the elite would have a higher chance of becoming 
casualties, coupled with transformations in weapons technology which place greater uncertainty 
on human life are considered to have driven the general public towards being even more 
informed and rational in relation to international affairs (Jon Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987; 
Kuypers, 1997; Manheim, 1994). Cognitive psychology has been also applied by revisionists to 
show that individuals tend to make judgments with minimal cognitive effort. Mental schemas are 
employed by individuals in order to make adequate decisions without having access to all 
possible information (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010; Krosnick and Kinder, 1990; Rahn, 1993; Zaller, 
1992). A consequence of this that has been presented in the literature is that members of the 
general public that choose the right heuristic(s) – what people seem to do most of the time 
(Brody, 1994) –, on average construct similar foreign policy preferences as they would do if they 
were fully informed (Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998).  
This finding attaches more importance to the sources that provide even limited information to the 
public. Additionally, Zaller (1992, p.48), has shown that individuals tend to utilise and base their 
actions, behaviours and ideas more on the information that they have recently acquired, that is on 
top of their heads, and do not apply a complex cognitive model of evaluating past and present 
information. On an aggregate level, random opinions are cancelled out, revealing a stable and 
rational whole. The media is here the obvious source of information about foreign policy for 
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members of the general public (Maher, 2003; Norris, Kern, and Just, 2003b; Sheafer and Gabay, 
2009). This thesis takes into account the findings from cognitive psychology and posits that the 
media not only informs the individuals what to think about, but it also suggest to them how to 
think and evaluate a certain piece of information, because individuals are prone to choose the 
most readily available cognitive mechanism for constructing opinions about foreign policy. The 
next section explores the way in which foreign policy analysts have sought to explore the 
influence of the media on decision-making processes and its interactions with policymakers in 
foreign policy. 
 
1.3.2 Media and foreign policy 
Foreign policy analysts with a focus on political communication have been keen in stressing that 
the media can behave as a strategic actor that shapes both the views of policymakers and public 
opinion (Kuypers, 1997; Strobel, 1997; Robinson, 1999, 2002; Gilboa, 2005; Baum and Potter, 
2008; Graber, 2009, 2010). Consequently, Baum and Potter (2008, p.40) conceive the media as a 
silent independent actor that has the possibility at times to shape foreign policy decisions. The 
CNN effect10 seems to confirm this view, as studies have shown that politicians are influenced by 
widespread news and communication in the media (Brody, 1992, 1994; Hammond and Herman, 
2000; Olsen, Carstensen and Høyen, 2003; Gilboa, 2005; Rid, 2007; Drezner, 2008; Akor, 2011). 
The influence of non-stop 24 hours news reporting on foreign policy decisions (commonly 
known as the CNN effect) has been associated with television and only in a small degree with 
the print media. Most research on the CNN effect has enquired into case studies regarding the 
influence of the media on the US or British governments’ decision to intervene militarily in 
situations where human rights have been seriously breached (Brody, 1992, 1994; Auerbach and 
Bloch-Elkon, 2005; Holsti, 2004; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1990; Isernia, Juhasz and Rattinger, 
2002). 
 
                                                          
10
 The CNN effect captures the extent to which continuous 24 hour news broadcasting has any influence on foreign 
policy (Natsios, 1996; Livingston, 1997; Mermin, 1997). Drawing largely on lessons from the US political system, it 
is built on the assumption that news media have the ability to influence public opinion and electoral battles or 
debates. According to Gilboa (2005), due to the CNN effect, policymakers have no choice other than to direct their 
attention to issues which have been extensively covered by the news media. Consequently, the CNN effect points ‘to 
the ability of the first truly global television network to inform the public instantly and continuously of news from 
anywhere in the world and thereby force national policymakers to deal with the reported problems and issues 
quickly – often without sufficient time to deliberate’ (Nacos, Shapiro and Isernia, 2000, p.2). 
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In his 20 year review of the scholarship on the CNN effect, Robinson (2011) underscores that  
most studies would agree that the influence of the media is dependent on the degree of policy 
uncertainty – the existence of disagreement within the executive on a certain policy. The success 
of the media hinges upon the occurrence of strong policy uncertainties which allow it to side 
with one party, thus increasing its chances of influencing foreign policy. Otherwise, in situations 
of consensus and agreement within the government, the media has only the option of either 
supporting official policies or criticising them without hoping to shift political decisions. While 
intuitively and logically sound, Robinson’s (2001, 2007, 2011) theoretical model is narrow in 
scope and considers the interactions between media and policymakers as inherently fixed and 
mechanical. The complex relationships between journalists and policymakers, that differ from 
one issue area to another, are overlooked in favour of a framework that seeks to account for any 
policy development. Secondly, multi-level decision-making – as in the case of the EU – makes it 
very hard to trace the appearance and evolution of policy uncertainties. This points to the 
conclusion that a more complex and nuanced model must be employed in order to account for 
the interactions between the media and policymakers, and its influence on foreign policy within 
the EU. Due to the various institutions and the national interests that interact within the foreign 
policy of the EU, disagreements that lead to policy uncertainty are far more present than within 
the nation state. Thus, pinpointing the way in which media reporting converges with policy 
uncertainty would imply limiting the analysis only to a certain set of institutions or actors in EU 
foreign policy and overlooking others. As will be shown later on, and detailed in chapter 3, this 
thesis presents and employs an interaction effects model which captures the interactions between 
the media (and its discourse) and policymakers. The three interaction effects – indexing, 
bounding and agenda setting – are explored in order to shed light on the way in which the media 
through its discourse and interactions with policymakers has the ability to endow the EU’s 
foreign policy with democratic legitimacy.   
Most of the research on the CNN effect has been focused on developments in US politics, 
making its findings and methods not directly applicable to other cases, as very few media 
systems are alike or similar11. During the last ten years the media/foreign policy nexus – the 
                                                          
11
 According to Isernia and his colleagues (2002, p.204), three main differences pose significant difficulties for 
exporting the findings drawn from US scholarship to the European context: the superpower status of the US relative 
to Europe’s rather emerging status, the contrast between the US presidential system and the multitude of 
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context within which the media and policymakers interact – has been analysed in the European 
context as well, primarily in what Hallin and Mancini (2004) consider as liberal and democratic 
systems (the UK, France and Northern Europe). What unites these countries’ media systems is a 
commitment to three basic journalistic principles – independence from any political party, 
balance between the views presented and objectivity. Nonetheless, this only represents an ideal 
descriptive model as commercial, managerial or political influences very often interfere in the 
processes of media reporting (Curtin, 2007; Boomgaarden et al., 2010; Bondebjerg and Madsen, 
2009). This categorisation has served as a background for most studies that engage in surveying 
the dichotomous attitude of the media – either consenting to (or supporting) the approach of the 
government or opposing it. Media systems from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) seem to 
depart from this dialectical model due to their recent establishment and limited experience of 
interacting with policymakers in more or less democratic arenas (Olausson, 2010). For example, 
in her analysis of the way in which the Bulgarian media framed NATO’s military intervention in 
Kosovo, Balabanova found that the event was extensively covered by the media, which 
maintained on most occasions a neutral approach to reporting. At times, it criticised the 
government’s position to firmly back NATO’s policy in the region by presenting with empathy 
the ‘refugees’ fate and the devastation of the war’ (Balabanova, 2007, p.104). She finds that the 
overwhelming presence of neutral perspectives can be explained by the fact that the relationship 
between the media and the political sphere in post-communist countries is characterised by a 
high degree of consensus. While Western media systems are accustomed to criticising the 
policies of governments and always seek transparency, most journalists in former communist 
countries see themselves as being merely objective news reporters which have to avoid 
supporting any political argument. Another hypothesis raised by her study highlights concerns 
regarding the fact that the Bulgarian media might also be less willing to invest resources in lost 
causes, avoiding to publish approaches that depart from mainstream views found within the 
political arena and society12 (Balabanova, 2007, p.110). 
Baum and Potter (2008, p.40) have proposed a more complex and dynamic model than the CNN 
effect for accounting for the media’s interactions with policymakers and its potential to affect 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
parliamentary systems present in Europe, and the deep transatlantic differences between media cultures. This has led 
Page (2000, p.89) to argue that a decent theory of foreign policy and the media must specify the system to which it 
applies. 
12
 This hypothesis can also be applied to Romania. 
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foreign policy. They argue that rather than studying bilateral relationships between the media, 
the general public and policymakers, a synthesis that fits all three actors into a coherent set of 
interdependent links would be required. These complex interrelationships are considered to be 
similar to those of supply and demand, and between consumers and producers in classical 
economic theories. In the same way as in the economic marketplace, the foreign policy 
marketplace tends to reach a point of equilibrium where the media supplies enough information 
to individuals to allow them to construct viable opinions, but below the point in which leaders 
have to base most of their foreign policy decisions on public opinion. Information here is the 
most important commodity exchanged between the three actors. In situations where the media 
delivers information below the equilibrium point – e.g. the beginning of international events –, 
policymakers have an advantage. By providing a more and more complete flow of information, 
the media brings the foreign policy market to the equilibrium point. Over time, the effects of the 
media turn the balance in favour of the general public, providing it levels of information that 
resemble those available to policymakers. Baum and Potter (2008, p.45) go on to argue that the 
media will again step up and limit the level of information it diffuses so as to rebalance the 
market. Although this approach advances the scholarly field significantly in comparison to older 
more static views of the media’s role in foreign policy, it strikes by its simplicity. Baum and 
Potter’s model incorporates an implicit view found throughout the literature that the media 
blindly conveys the message of policymakers to the public and receives its feedback (Entman, 
2004), in this way taking for granted the presence of democratic legitimacy. Portraying all actors 
involved in the foreign policy marketplace as rational consumers and producers of information 
paints a very structural and deterministic view, where media coverage of international events is 
the main driving force behind foreign policy. 
Others have proposed that influential and powerful groups control both the media and 
governments, in this way having the ability to gain public support through the media for policy 
initiatives and approaches supported by governments (Iyengar and Simon, 1993; Mermin, 1999; 
Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000; Shapiro and Jacobs, 2000; Iyengar and Kinder, 2010). The 
‘manufacturing consent’ model as it has come to be known also implies that actors (either 
journalists or policymakers) who oppose the overarching control imposed by powerful groups 
are marginalised within the system, most being forced to adopt a propaganda style of discourse. 
Moreover, Chomsky and Herman (2002) have famously argued that consent is also reified by the 
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structure of discourse which constrains actors not even to start exploring opposing points of 
view. Such an understanding of the media/foreign policy nexus positions the media as an agent 
of propaganda that cannot foster public debate by providing free and unconstrained access to 
news and information. The media is downgraded here from its democratic legitimacy enhancing 
ability to a mere ‘supportive arm of the state and dominant elites, focusing heavily on themes 
serviceable to them, and debating and exposing within accepted frames of reference’ (Herman, 
1993, p.25). 
Nonetheless, the manufacturing consent theory should not be discarded altogether as 
policymakers are the most reliable, and sometimes the only sources for journalists that focus on 
foreign policy. In this sense, Zaller and Chiu (2000, p.81) highlight that even if most journalists 
writing on foreign policy have degrees in IR, politics is empirical, based on realitiy; hence, 
journalists have to rely heavily on their sources in order to interpret it. Media are to a large extent 
dependent on governments, and when the latter decide to take a course of action or to initiate a 
certain policy, journalists are compelled to report on it (Strobel, 1997). On the other hand, 
policymakers seem to be aware of the power of the media, often regarding it, more or less 
implicitly as ‘an expression of public opinion’ (Balabanova, 2007, p.18). According to Cohen 
(cited in Strobel, 1997: 60−65), the media may ‘not be successful much of the time in telling 
people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about’.  
One could go further and argue that the relationship between the media and policymakers in 
foreign policy obscures any objective notion of the general public or public opinion, only the 
image created by the former and perceived by the latter having salience. Therefore, the general 
public becomes ‘an empty signifier of democratic discourse that functions as long as nobody 
notices that it cannot be given any substance’ (Góra, Mach and Trenz, 2012, p.165).  
This understanding of the role of public opinion in foreign policy seems to be similar at first 
sight to the permissive consensus that allowed the European project to develop for more than 
four decades. The permissive consensus has managed to co-exists alongside deep Eurosceptic 
debates and views expressed throughout the media within the European public sphere due to the 
positive policy outcomes derived from a neo-functionalist approach to European integration. 
Hooghe and Marks have recently signalled the move towards a constraining dissensus in most 
policy areas, where the basic democratic and jurisdictional legitimacy of the EU is contested 
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(Hooghe and Marks, 2008). Increasing politicisation of European issues is thought to have 
contributed to the erosion of the permissive consensus (Koenig-Archibugi, 2002; Mayer and 
Vogt, 2006; Wagner, 2007; Meyer, 2009; Kandyla and de Vreese, 2011). However, EU foreign 
policy has been built on a rather different type of permissive consensus, one in which support for 
more European integration has rarely been challenged in the EPS or by the images of the public 
opinion constructed by the media. The complexity and low salience, coupled with low levels of 
coverage of foreign policy have left this policy area unaffected by the emergence of a 
constraining dissensus. At times, it has determined both policymakers and the media to argue 
that democratic legitimacy and responsiveness may not be desirable in the face of an under 
informed public13 (Entman, 2000, p.26).  
This thesis brings in the concept of the public sphere in order to highlight the ability of the media 
through its discourse and interactions with policymakers to endow policymaking with 
democratic legitimacy – discussed in more detail in the next chapter. Chapter 3 then presents 
three types of interaction effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting) which can be explored 
in order to analytically account for the way in which the media endows democratic legitimacy to 
policymaking. The three interaction effects focus on the way in which the media frames policy 
definitions, coupled with its interactions with policymakers. Chapter 2 will advance the 
discussion by emphasising the way in which the EPS through the activity of media feeds into 
decision-making process in EU foreign policy, boosting their democratic legitimacy. 
 
1.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that the study of EU foreign policy has tended to overlook the role of 
democratic legitimacy, considering this policy area highly detached from society. This is 
surprising, as a focus on the democratic deficit of the EU has been central to the debate regarding 
the future development of the Union in other policy areas. Linked to this, scholars have also 
explored the way in which the shift from permissive consensus to constraining dissensus has 
impacted most EU policy areas, with a limited focus on foreign policy. The literature review thus 
                                                          
13
 Entman also contends that debate regarding the existence of a permissive consensus in foreign policy might not be 
useful as ‘elites do not fully understand manifestations of public opinion any better than they do world politics’ 
(Entman, 2000, p.22) 
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links directly with the two research questions about whether and in what ways the media endows 
the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. Chapter 2 will show that the concept of the 
European public sphere is incorporated into the argument in order to highlight the ability of the 
media to enhance all the aspects of democratic legitimacy: transparency, accountability, 
responsiveness and openness to public debate. The EPS is to a large extent created by the 
communicative activities of the media, which fosters transnational communication flows by 
publicising and politicising European issues. Unlike scholarly analysis focusing on the nation 
state, the EU’s institutional make-up or its ontology, this thesis does not claim that its analytical 
emphasis – democratic legitimacy – lies at the heart of the Union’s foreign policy. Rather, it 
proposes that due to the fact that the EU transcends the limits of the national sovereignty, being 
built and conceived as a project that sustains peace and development through upholding the 
principles of democracy, the role of democratic legitimacy in all the Union’s policy areas should 
not be ignored.  
On the other hand, some foreign policy analysts have ignored the role of democratic legitimacy 
altogether or have reified it, taking its existence for granted in democratic systems. Others have 
enquired into the notion of democratic legitimacy by focusing on the principle of democratic 
representation or by employing other complementary approaches. The concept of the public 
sphere is thus central to the construction of democratic legitimacy, providing the space where 
politics meets society and norms are debated and perpetuated. In this way, it has the ability 
through the activity of the media to boost the accountability and transparency of decision-making 
processes and open them up to public debate. Two case studies (detailed in chapter 4) have been 
chosen in order to reflect two very distinctive areas of EU foreign policy: global climate change 
policy and the policy towards Russia. Chapter 3 presents the interaction effects model employed 
in this thesis for analytically identifying the ability of the media to endow the EU’s foreign 
policy with democratic legitimacy. Instances of the three types of interaction effects (indexing, 
bounding and agenda setting) are empirically distinguished by using frame analysis coupled with 
data from interviews, questionnaires and various primary and secondary sources – detailed in 
chapter 4. Chapters 5-7 will then explore empirically the two case studies in order to answer the 
two research questions. 
 
 
 
38 
 
Chapter 2 – The European Public Sphere 
and democratic legitimacy 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
While the idea that the EU’s foreign policy should be built on democratic legitimacy14 has only 
recently surfaced in the literature, the argument that the Union spreads democratic norms around 
the world through its external relations has become part of the official discourse and of the EU’s 
self-image. The previous chapter advocated the need to inquire into the way the EU draws on 
internal sources of democratic legitimacy in its foreign policy. The purpose of this chapter is to 
develop the idea of the public sphere and the way in which the actions of the media (within the 
public sphere) have the potential of endowing foreign policy decision-making with democratic 
legitimacy. By introducing the notion of the European public sphere (EPS) this chapter 
highlights the ability of the media through its interactions with policymakers to enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy – and builds towards answering the two 
research questions in the empirical chapters. Through the EPS decision-making processes are 
opened up to public debate and scrutiny, boosting in this way their accountability and 
transparency. The EPS should not be understood as a singular space, but as the result of multiple 
overlapping Europeanised national public spheres. Unlike public spheres circumscribed to nation 
states, the EPS is to a larger degree created by the activity of the media and the transnational 
communicative processes it fosters. One might go as far as to argue that the EPS is what the 
media makes of it (Risse, 2010). Hence, a focus on the EPS provides a link between how 
democratic legitimacy is enacted through the activity of the media coupled with its interactions 
with policymakers.  
As stated in the introduction to the thesis, interactions between the media and policymakers are 
crucial for understanding the way in which democratic legitimacy is endowed to the EU’s 
                                                          
14
 It was highlighted before that democratic legitimacy is a concept composed of multiple aspects: transparency and 
accountability to openness to public debate or responsiveness. Conversely, increases in any of these aspects are 
synonymous with enhancing the democratic legitimacy of decision-making processes.  
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foreign policy. In chapter 3 the interactions between the media and policymakers will be mapped 
out by presenting a model of interaction effects (and their implications for the way democratic 
legitimacy is endowed to the EU’s foreign policy). The model will be employed empirically in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7 in order to answer the two research questions and explore the two issue areas 
of EU foreign policy: climate change policy and the policy towards Russia. The first two sections 
of this chapter provide an outline of the theories of the public sphere and the way they can be 
applied to the European setting. This will be followed in the second part of the chapter by an 
overview of the potential effects of the activity of the media within the EPS on the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy. 
 
2.2 Conceptualising the public sphere 
At the basis of theories of the public sphere stands the idea that individuals through participation, 
communication, and deliberation construct their social world. Society is created, perpetuated and 
altered by the actions of individuals within the public sphere (Bell, 2007, p.1). Thus, the public 
sphere is the space in which individuals meet politics and more or less intentionally shape the 
power of the nation state. Manifestations of intentionality imply here ‘organizing in interest 
groups and mobilizing the body of nongovernmental discursive opinion that can serve as a 
counterweight to the state’ (Fraser, 2007, p.25). Eriksen (2007, p.25) highlights that a level of 
direct participation can only be achieved if the public sphere encompasses three basic 
characteristics: it is non-coercive, rational and secular. Conceptually the public sphere is founded 
on open rational debate which is devoid of any incursion from the nation state and where 
individuals express their ideas in a free and open manner, exercising their civil and political 
liberties. Democracy and secularity are considered to be paramount for the existence of such a 
public sphere, which through discursive action maintains a reflexive society, continuously 
mirroring it. Nonetheless, the public sphere conceptualised in these terms paints only an 
idealised picture of the way in which it unfolds into material reality. In day to day social practice, 
different layers of intentionality intersect, segmenting the public sphere and rendering it less 
rational and more coercive than the ideal type. As this thesis is interested in the reality – the here 
and now – of the EU’s foreign policy, trying to uncover the way in which it is endowed with 
democratic legitimacy, the analysis will depart from the ideal model of the public sphere. 
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The above discussion underlines the contested character of the notion of the public sphere which 
is derived from the discrepancies between material practices and the ideal type. Simultaneously, 
the normative role that the public sphere has to play in society seems also to be contested. On the 
one hand, the public sphere reflects a historically constructed relation between the political and 
the social, where the social practices of individuals become institutionalised in language, law or 
other traditions. This is a rather static and descriptive notion of the public sphere, which focuses 
more on its historically constructed ontology and overlooks any questions of political or social 
change that derives from individuals. On the other hand, a normative view conceptualises the 
public sphere as the space where public scrutiny maintains democracy, and where the liberties 
and freedoms of individuals are safeguarded by the ever-present need of legitimating policies. To 
be more explicit, the latter view of the public sphere draws on the former and departs from it in 
that it highlights the active role of the public sphere in shaping and legitimising politics within a 
certain community.  
While acknowledging the need for understating the historical forces at work in the evolution of 
the public sphere, this thesis focuses more on its present transformative character. Two main 
arguments justify this preference. Firstly, a historical analysis of the public sphere will show that 
foreign policy has been traditionally a domain outside of public scrutiny. Moreover, Habermas 
(1998, 2000, 2001, 2006) and Taylor (2004) highlight that it was not until recently, with the 
overarching spread of democracy that the public sphere could be opened to debates about foreign 
policy. Secondly, many scholars have pointed to the fact that the EU – as with many other 
aspects – has a different type of public sphere than the nation state, one which is more dynamic, 
complex and constructed at many national and regional levels, making it more difficult to be 
captured solely by a historical approach (Boomgaarden et al., 2010; de Beus, 2010; de Vreese 
and Boomgaarden, 2006; Eriksen, 2007; Meyer, 2009; Trenz, 2004, 2007; Van de Steeg, 2010; 
Risse, 2010). The section on the EPS will detail these differences, but for the moment it is worth 
presenting how the relation between the public sphere, democracy and legitimacy has been 
conceptualised and researched in the literature.  
The contested character of the notion of the public sphere is found throughout Habermas’ (1989, 
1998, 2000) work on the concept. While he traditionally views the public sphere as a common 
space that both emanates from and shapes society in an inclusive manner, in the revised versions 
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of his theory he adds the idea that it is built on different categories and layers – be they social, 
geographical, historical or political. For example, on the societal level, class, race, age or gender 
seem to make a difference when informing the way individuals engage with each other in the 
public sphere. Through their interactions such divisions tend to coagulate – gaining democratic 
strength and legitimacy – and ‘wash’ into political decisions. Fraser offers a more stylised 
version of the argument positing that the internal divisions within the public sphere manage the 
tension between ‘normative legitimacy and political efficacy’ of social action (Fraser, 2007, p.7). 
Consequently, only decisions that are bottom-up – in that they derive from public communicative 
discourse –, and yield practical democratic results are considered to be legitimate within the 
public sphere, and thus, binding for society.   
By seeking public legitimacy for political decisions, the public sphere alters power relations 
significantly (Dahl, 1989; Calhoun, 1993; Goode, 2005; Bell, 2007; Splichal, 2011). 
Policymakers become more constrained to enter the public arena and open their judgments to the 
scrutiny of individuals. This puts more and more emphasis on the need to foster open public 
debate which has norm-giving power bestowed on it by a certain moral community of the 
willing. To be more precise, the emphasis on public debate is built on the idea that everyone is 
entitled to take part in it, the rationale of the more the better applying in this case. Democracy 
seems to be intrinsically linked to the imperative of open debate within the public sphere 
(Eriksen, 2007, p.30). The more a political regime shifts towards authoritarianism, the less 
political decisions reflect the debates within the public sphere, culminating with situations where 
such debates are silenced. However, the public sphere should not be understood as an intentional 
political actor which shapes the political agenda. It is both the context in which society meets 
politics and part of the process through which public debate shapes political decisions. In a 
stronger conceptualisation, Risse posits that the role of the public sphere is to inform citizens, 
monitor and critically evaluate the government (Risse, 2010, p.108). 
Nonetheless, an inherent tension arises when one tries to analyse democracy outside the nation 
state.  The level of ‘embeddedness of democratization in a nation state’ (Eder, 2007, p.48) cannot 
be overestimated in its influence on the way ideas of democracy are put into practice. The 
particular restriction imposed by the nation state on its democracy can be accounted for by 
looking at the pervasiveness of the public sphere. By channelling the flows of communicative 
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power in all corners of society, the public sphere becomes the space through which the periphery 
can gain the same discursive position as the centre. Where this transfer has been institutionalised 
into national or regional parliaments we can talk about the existence of a strong public whose 
preferences are – at least in theory – incorporated into political decisions. By the same token, a 
weak public only has the power of deliberating outside the political system. However, in the case 
of the EU this distinction seems to be misplaced as the widespread presence of parliaments – at 
various levels, local, regional, national, supranational – points to the a priori existence of a strong 
European demos (Koopmans, 2010). This issue will be developed when analysing the nature of 
the EPS, but for the moment it is worth noting that the aggregation of parliaments at various 
levels seems to yield a mix of strong and weak publics which shift and interact through time and 
in relation to different policy areas and events. As the institutionalisation of participatory 
practices and open debate is much weaker at the EU level than in the nation state (but embodies a 
broader set of democratic ideals), the European demos’ strength fluctuates in accordance with 
the level of politicisation within the public sphere (Statham and Trenz, 2012).  
On the other hand, according to Vivien Schmidt (2008b), the more political issues become 
salient in the media the more legitimacy is granted to parliaments to deal on behalf of their 
citizens. This happens because for most people, politics does not exist outside the area defined 
by the media (Sheafer and Gabay, 2009; Bulkow, Urban and Schweiger, 2012; Kim et al., 2012; 
Nowak, 2012; Wolfe, Jones and Baumgartner, 2013). Paraphrasing Alexander Wendt’s famous 
phrase, one can argue that the ‘public sphere is what the media make of it’ (Risse, 2010, p.116). 
The argument referring to strong publics should be limited only to the existence of parliaments, 
as democratic legitimacy should be built on the existence within all institutions of the state of 
democratic procedures which provide the framework for individuals to shape politics through the 
public sphere in a normative sense. In this thesis democratic legitimacy is conceptualised to 
encapsulate multiple aspects: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to 
public debate. The media opens up all institutions to politicisation and public contestation 
through its democracy enhancing role. At the same time, the media can downplay events within 
the political sphere and shift public attention to more trivial aspects having, as Trenz (2009) 
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points out a dumbing down effect. Nonetheless instances of such discourse from the media 
reflect public disengagement with politics because15:  
communication through the media constitute second-order observations that 
enable participants as well as audiences to not only observe themselves and 
their contributions but also the observations  of others and their construction of 
reality. By mirroring and communicating social conflicts, the media contribute 
to social order in given society (Risse, 2010, p.117). 
 
2.3 The European Public Sphere 
2.3.1 Defining the EPS 
The discussion about the public sphere started having significant relevance within European 
Studies only in the late 1990s when a growing degree of attention was directed towards 
European integration and the role of national and transnational media in providing thrust for it 
(Meyer, 2009, p.1047). Studies have shown that media reports about the acceding countries have 
had remarkable impact on public attitudes in the older member states in regard to future 
enlargement (Maier and Rittberger, 2008, p.262). This has led scholars engaged in 
conceptualising the EPS to argue that different national media in the member states have actually 
constructed over the years various conceptions of what the EU is and stands for (Fossum and 
Schlesinger, 2007). In this sense, the Europeanisation of national public spheres has long been 
advocated for in the literature as a way of creating an EPS. However, research on the way in 
which the media through the EPS can endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy 
is yet to have been attempted in a coherent fashion. The studies that have engaged with this issue 
have only described and assessed the views of the general public on various issues in the EU’s 
foreign policy by evaluating opinion polls and surveys (Kentmen, 2010). The activity of the 
media and the EPS have not been linked to foreign policy decision-making processes within the 
EU in order to account for democratic legitimacy16.  
                                                          
15
 This is one of the reasons why this thesis analyses only quality media which is expected to have a democracy 
enhancing role. 
16
 Nonetheless, a few media analyses (Meyer, 2010; de Vreese, 2001; Kratochví, Cibulková and Beník, 2011; Risse, 
2010a) have scratched the surface of the EU’s foreign policy, without any implication for its democratic legitimacy. 
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The relevance of the public sphere has been linked in the literature with the way in which the EU 
is conceptualised (Gripsrud and Weibull, 2010; Fuchs, 2010; Eriksen, 2007; Eder, 2010, 2007; 
Medrano and Gray, 2010; Statham, 2010b; Trenz, 2005). If the Union is thought of as a 
regulatory force which derives its legitimacy from its performance and not from the deliberative 
or representative character of its decision-making processes, only national public spheres have 
the duty to mediate the views and preferences of individuals. Legitimation at the European level 
is thus predicated upon the credibility of national governments. The EPS is conceptualised in this 
case as a disorganised structure of overlapping spaces that is driven by the interplay of national 
interests and the bargaining process that arise from it. Others have conceptualised the EPS as the 
result of a ‘multidimensional and gradual process that in one way or another extends public 
discourse beyond national spaces’ (Sifft et al., 2007, p.130). This perspective is linked to an 
understanding of the EU as both a regulatory force and as a post-modern sui-generis entity that 
strives not only for performance, but also for the promotion and deepening of the democratic 
norms and values that are its core. 
The EPS is inherently linked to the broadening of news coverage of EU issues (Meyer, 2005; 
Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Vliegenthart et al., 2008). Studies have argued that the EU is not 
adequately covered in national press, its visibility only increasing when high level events take 
place. Boomgaarden and his colleagues (2010, p.510) have shown that the EU is significantly 
more visible in newspapers than on television, with a special focus on the quality media. The 
limited amount of coverage around EU affairs has the potential of damaging the power of the 
media to endow policymaking with democratic legitimacy. However, policymakers seem keen to 
react to media reports that claim legitimacy by drawing inferences from public opinion 
(Schwaiger, 2003). Moreover, policymakers tend to be sensitive to the way the media presents in 
the EPS the views of the general public towards their policies (Gavin, 2009, p.770). This model 
of the public sphere assumes that public opinion formation takes place outside the political 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
For example, in his study of the way German and British newspapers frame the foreign policy of the EU, Meyer 
(2010, p.182) concludes that both national public spheres increasingly tend to view the EU as having an important 
presence in the international arena. However, these findings should not be taken at face value, as the study only 
explores four issue areas, where member states are, to a large extent, willing to act through the common framework 
of the EU, in this way promoting globally a multilateral approach: trade and aid, human rights, crisis management, 
terrorism and non-proliferation. 
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system. Through the media, within the EPS, policymakers come to know the views of the general 
public (Statham and Koopmans, 2009).  
The EPS is seen in this thesis as the result of the overlapping of national public spheres17. As 
such, the EPS can be thought of as the result of two complementary processes: collective 
identification and discursive exchange (Eriksen, 2007). Both these processes are dynamic in 
nature and have to be assessed according to their historicity. In relation to the former mechanism, 
collective identification, it is worth noting that the EPS based on a common identity must be seen 
as indispensable for the normative development of the Union, and thus for the assurance that 
multi-level governance within its institutions takes into account the views of the general public. 
However, in terms of foreign policy, many scholars have underlined the absence of a common 
identity that would transcend the narrowness of national interests (Bickerton, 2011a; Hill, 2003; 
Hyde-Price, 2007). Moreover, a political will that could forge such a collective identity is 
thought to be no more than rhetorical (Mitzen, 2006; Pace, 2007; Eriksen, 2011; Bicchi, 2011; 
Howorth, 2004). Member states are seen in these studies as being rational egoists who only 
support common EU foreign policy approaches when they do not collide with their national 
interests. These arguments cast doubt over the possibility of a functional EPS that could have 
significant influence on the EU’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, through the Europeanisation of 
national public spheres (discussed below) the media (national and transnational) can have the 
potential to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy – allowing this thesis to 
enquire into the two research questions presented in the introductory chapter. 
 
2.3.2 The Europeanisation of national public spheres 
During the last ten years most of the literature has pointed to the idea that the EPS is not a single 
coherent space, but is formed by the overlapping of various national public spheres (Bee, 2010; 
Koopmansand Statham, 2010; Risse, 2010; Statham, 2010d; Van de Steeg, 2010; Selmeczi and 
Sata, 2011; Dobrescu and Palada, 2012; Sicakkan, 2012). Even more, there is little evidence that 
the EPS resembles in any way that of the nation state, due to the peculiarities of multi-level 
governance characterised by the continuous power negotiations between member states and the 
supranational level. As highlighted earlier, the lack of unity within the EPS has been correlated 
                                                          
17
 Together with the one created by the activity of the transnational media. 
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with the absence of a European demos or a European identity (Schlesinger, 1999; Eriksen, 2007; 
Schlesinger and Kevin, 2002; Trenz, 2004; de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006). De Beus (2010, 
p.32) suggests that trying to identify an EPS at the transnational level will be futile because a 
European demos is more likely to appear within national borders where social and political life is 
infused with and transformed by European issues. An EPS viewed in these terms would not 
result in the dissolution of national borders or of different cleavages present within societies, but 
would encourage a dialogue, where various traditions, languages or cultures are given equal say. 
According to Lauristin (2007, p.397), the new CEE member states have been showing more 
readiness towards the development of a public sphere defined in these terms because they 
perceive it as a chance to take part in the European discursive space as equals, where their 
cultural and national specificities are cherished and encouraged. The spread of the same 
European issues and frames through different national public spheres has been considered to be 
evidence of the existence of such an EPS. Both theoretically and empirically, it is commonly 
accounted for through the process of Europeanisation which is discussed in what follows.   
The concept of Europeanisation18 captures the extent to which European discourse has extended 
from the supranational arena to the national public spheres in the member states and beyond 
them. To be clearer, it traces and assesses the way in which European issues are discussed within 
national discursive spaces, and through transnational communication flows come to travel from 
one domestic public debate to another. Furthermore, Koopmans and Statham (2010, p.43) 
maintain that national public spheres become Europeanised if discourses within these spaces 
evade the boundaries of certain national debates and assume transnational, European points of 
view. The minimal requirement for the presence of Europeanisation is that the general public 
already is or becomes aware of the European dimension of the discourses created and circulated 
by the media within national public spheres. On the other hand, the optimal requirement or the 
rule of thumb for an Europeanised public debate involves participating in a shared debate on 
European issues which are discussed using roughly the same criteria as in other national public 
                                                          
18
 The concept of Europeanisation should be distinguished from its mainstream understanding in the literature on 
European integration. Scholars more generally refer to Europeanisation as a process related to changes in policies, 
laws or identities (Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003). According to Radealli (2000, p.4), it includes ‘… processes of 
(a) construction (b) diffusion (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, 
styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making 
of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies’. Featherstone and Kazamias (2001) also view Europeanisation as a two way process between the EU and 
the domestic levels which are governed by both bottom-up and top-down constraints.  
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spheres (Bee and Bozzini, 2010). Sifft et al. (2007, p.147) in their study of the way newspapers 
frame European governance in five member states, found that most national public spheres are 
situated somewhere between the minimal and the optimal requirement of Europeanisation. In 
their opinion, national public spheres in the EU are not yet connected to a coherent European 
discourse which could be recognised by all participants. However, their study observed a high 
degree of openness in mediated domestic public debates towards European issues. 
In the context of overlapping public spheres, the creation of the EPS related to foreign policy 
issues is considered to be captured by two processes: vertical and horizontal – in the literature 
they have been commonly considered separately (Brüggemann and Kleinen-von Konigslow, 
2009; Koopmans, Erbe and Meyer, 2010). Vertical Europeanisation processes – highlighted in 
figure 2.1 – deal with the privileging within national public spheres of European approaches 
promoted by the EU’s institutions. Communicative processes could be here either top-down 
where EU actors intervene in national debates or most commonly bottom-up in which European 
issues are adopted by national actors.  The top-down variant need not be mediated, as institutions 
have the ability to distribute their own information to citizens and manage their interactions with 
the general public (Michailidou, 2007, p.49). On the other hand, horizontal Europeanisation 
considers the communication flows between different national public spheres. Koopmans and 
Statham (2010, p.38) argue that a stronger variant of horizontal Europeanisation takes place 
when issues from another European state are reported, and European actors or policies are 
clearly identified. Instances of diplomatic rows between two member states or between one and 
an institution of the Union are examples of the two processes of Europeanisation intersecting. 
Van Noije (2010, p.266) has empirically shown that such cases have received considerable 
attention from the media over the last two decades and have triggered considerable public 
debate. Conversely, instances of weak horizontal Europeanisation occur only when issues 
regarding developments in other member states are merely reported in a certain national public 
sphere.  
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Figure 2.1 Vertical Europeanisation of national public spheres 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This thesis views the EPS as the result of the overlapping of Europeanised national public 
spheres in the member states, without paying specific interest to the process of Europeanisation – 
which would be a worthwhile and lengthy topic in itself. Rather, it takes for granted the idea that 
national public spheres have become increasingly Europeanised, and analyses the discourse of 
the media and its ability to endow policymaking with democratic legitimacy through its 
interactions with policymakers in two member states within two very different political systems 
and media landscapes: the United Kingdom and Romania. To build an even more reliable picture 
it also analyses the transnational public sphere created by the activity of European transnational 
publications (Financial Times, European Voice and EUObserver). Transnational publications 
play an important role due to their extensive focus on the EU and their close connections to 
policymakers working within the EU’s institutions – which hold in high esteem the activity of 
transnational publications. This public sphere is much more limited in terms of the range of 
individuals from the general public involved than the British and Romanian ones. Moreover, it 
can provide valuable insight into the way in which EU policymakers interact with the discourse 
of the media and, as a consequence, the way democratic legitimacy – and its multiple aspects – is 
endowed to EU’s foreign policy. Moreover, national media frequently draw on or even translate 
analyses from transnational media, which makes the latter’s activity even more salient within the 
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EPS19. Chapter 4 will present an overview of the media landscapes and political systems for each 
public sphere, while the following three empirical chapters will start by presenting the context 
(media/foreign policy nexus) within which the media interact with policymakers in the public 
sphere.  
 
2.3.2 The EPS and EU foreign policy 
It has become a commonplace in the media studies literature to argue that ‘the more the EU does, 
the more likely it is to get on the news agenda’ (Boomgaarden et al., 2010, p.519). Analyses of 
media coverage of the EU have highlighted that crucial and large institutional events influence 
positively the Union’s visibility in the media20 (Curtin, 2007; Gripsrud, 2009; Lauristin, 2007; 
Koopmans and Zimmermann, 2010; Maier and Rittberger, 2008; Schlesinger and Kevin, 2002; 
Smith, 2007; Trenz, 2010b). Consequently, it is expected that when a country holds the 
presidency of the Union or chairs a summit of the European Council, more news about the EU 
will be generated in its national public sphere. Similarly, in relation to the two case studies 
chosen here – climate change policy and the policy towards Russia – it is expected that the EU’s 
response and engagement with to the 2008 Georgian-Russian war or the 2009 Copenhagen 
Summit have presented a high degree of press coverage. According to de Beus (2010), such 
increases in the quantity of news have the potential of constructing increased awareness over the 
debates around the EU, and thus build public support or opposition for various policies. A focus 
on foreign policy evades the common problem of the lack of issue convergence between national 
public spheres that characterises most reporting on the EU. Policy areas such as transport or 
agriculture are thought to cause very different patterns of issue coverage within the national 
public spheres of the member states (Craglia and Annoni, 2009; Curtin, 2007; Bondebjerg and 
Madsen, 2009; Boomgaarden et al., 2010; Michailidou, 2007; Meyer, 2005; Maier and 
Rittberger, 2008; Stevenson, 2009; Preston and Metykova, 2009). The topics of media reports 
about the foreign policy of the EU offer a higher degree of transnational convergence due to their 
low level of technical language, and consequently their easy accessibility to the general public. 
                                                          
19
 This can be seen as part of vertical Europeanisation processes within the EPS. 
20
 On the other hand, Trenz (2004, p.312) has suggested that most European news receive minimal representation in 
the media to the extent that they are presented in a way which tends to the readership’s needs.  
 
 
50 
 
Nonetheless, national media perspectives on EU foreign policy are expected to differ in the 
standpoint they assume when presenting similar issues.  
Koopmans and his colleagues (2010, p.64) have underscored that the views of EU and national 
policymakers are more visible depending on their influence in a particular area of foreign policy. 
In the case of climate change policy, which has an important supranational component, the views 
and the policies of the European Commission have been identified to be the most present in 
media reporting (Olausson, 2010). On the other hand, claims and discourses in relation to the 
EU’s approach to Russia made by national policymakers are more pervasive in the media than 
those constructed at the supranational level (Chifu, Nantoi, and Sushko, 2010; Kandyla and de 
Vreese, 2011; Kratochví, Cibulková and Beník, 2011). The preference for reporting on the 
European Commission’s activities in relations to climate change is also influenced by the fact 
that NGOs, environmental groups, interest groups and other civil society actors seem to view the 
supranational institutions of the EU as the main actor that could integrate their interests and goals 
(Smith, 2007; Trenz, 2004; Wal ter et al., 2009).  
Koopmans and his colleagues (Koopmans, Erbe and Meyer, 2010, p.67) have found that even 
though France, Germany and the United Kingdom make up less than a third of the Union’s 
population, their national media accounts for more than half of the claims about the EU. As such, 
they argue that media debates in Europe are not nationally biased in as much as they are 
influenced by the debates on the EU within these three core countries. Out of them, France seems 
to present the highest rate of attention to the policy views developed at the European level, while 
the British media tends to focus more on how the EU’s approach convergences or diverges with 
the UK’s national interest (Eder, 2007). The extent to which a country identifies itself with the 
European project is important for understanding such media differences between France and 
Britain – support for European integration triggers a higher degree of positive visibility of the 
EU’s institutions in media reports. Furthermore, Risse’s (2010, p.138) empirical analyses point 
to the conclusion that the media in various national public spheres seems to be reporting 
European issues at the same time through roughly the same frames. Risse outlines the findings of 
the analysis of the Häider debate, where European newspapers presented the issue not only as 
one of concern to Austria and its democracy, but also to the whole of Europe. The debate on 
enlargement presents the same characteristics as that on Häider, with regard to the creation at the 
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same time of ‘general frames of reference and meaning structures’ across Europe (Risse, 2010, 
p.150). However, in all empirical examples examined in his book, A Community of Europeans?, 
Risse (2010) finds that usually when European issues are discussed, they are on the lips of 
European or EU policymakers. 
A recent survey of the media coverage of the EU’s attitude towards the Orange revolution in 
Ukraine reinforces the idea that support for the Union’s leadership generates more positive 
coverage in national media (Kratochví, Cibulková and Beník, 2011, p.408). Accordingly, the 
French media was the most supportive in providing common aid to the democratic forces in 
Ukraine, highlighting the policies of the EU – the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). On 
the other hand, while still supporting a common EU position, the British media focused more on 
the rhetoric adopted by the New Labour government. Kratochví and his associates also found 
that a special interest in bilateral relations with Ukraine did not have any significant influence on 
the coverage of the coloured revolution by the media. Secondly, they showed that the Orange 
Revolution did not lead to a bilateralisation of relations with Ukraine, but to a high issue 
convergence in the EPS. Finally, they argue that technical policies such as the ENP – that the 
Commission wanted to publicise – did not receive too much media attention due to their low 
accessibility to the general public. The Union’s approach to Ukraine was presented in the 
European media with a larger focus on rhetoric than on concrete policies (Kratochví, Cibulková 
and Beník, 2011, p.408).  
In terms of a collective EU identity there are numerous reasons and evidence to argue that in the 
realm of foreign policy the Union could not coagulate a coherent transnational public sphere as 
the economic policy of the Union has done (Meyer 2002, 2005; Schmidt 2001; Van de Steeg 
2002). Nonetheless, the discursive exchange or the creation of common discursive practices has 
the power of fostering such a common European communicative sphere.  Following Van Dik, 
discourse is understood here as ‘both as a specific form of language use, and as a specific form 
of social interaction, interpreted as a complete communicative event in a social situation’ (1990, 
p. 164). In this sense, Karl Deutsch’s classical work on Nationalism and Social Communication 
becomes relevant. From his point of view, the defining characteristic of a political community – 
as the EU strives to be – is predicated on the existence of sustainable communicative practices, 
more specifically on its members’ ability ‘to communicate more effectively and over a wider 
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range of subjects with members of one large group than with outsiders’ (Deutsch 1953: 97). 
Here, citizens have the ability to follow and contribute to debates around various political issues. 
This in turn grants legitimacy to the political sphere because it promotes social cohesion and 
political accountability (Meyer, 2005, p. 123). Sifft et al. (2007) have shown that in highly 
developed democratic political communities – such as the EU’s member states – public debates 
focus more on issues that affect the direct well-being of the individual or relate to the core 
functions of the nation state. Foreign policy with its functions of safeguarding a state’s citizens 
from external threats is thus bound to stir up public debate. Both case studies that are analysed 
here – i.e. the EU’s policy towards Russia and its approach to climate change – involve foreign 
policy issues that over the years have been labelled by the general public, media, and polities 
within the EU as posing great exogenous threats (differing in nature and degree) to the member 
states and to the EU itself. 
It was outlined before that this thesis conceptualises the European public sphere as an ensemble 
of overlapping national and transnational public spheres. Drawing on Kentmen (2010), this thesis 
argues that in relation to foreign policy the absence of a coherent common public sphere is 
predicated on the both practical and discursive imbalance between the transfer of power from the 
nation state to the EU, and the skewed national orientation of political discourse within member 
states. For example, the UK converges with EU foreign policy approaches only when they are in 
line with its own national interest, but otherwise distances itself from the Union’s external 
actions and does not try to significantly alter them (Gillespie and O'Loughlin 2009). 
Simultaneously, in relation to the EU’s foreign policy, national media tend to favour 
domestically constrained views on foreign policy and not those developed at the supranational 
level (Brüggemann and Schulz-Forberg, 2009). For such a reason – as recent Eurobarometer 
surveys (European Commission, 2007, 2010g, 2010e, 2010f, 2011) show – EU citizens seem to 
have low amounts of information about decision-making processes in the EU’s institutions (in 
foreign policy, and more general). The next section delves into the crux of the argument related 
to the ability of the media through its discourse and interactions with policymaking within the 
EPS to endow policymaking with democratic legitimacy – which allows us to explore the two 
research questions.  
 
 
53 
 
2.4 The European Public Sphere and democratic legitimacy 
Whatever view they may hold regarding the nature and the form of the EPS, most scholars argue 
that such a transnational space has added benefit for the furthering of European integration. It 
embodies the democratic ideals and values on which the EU was predicated, and harbours the 
potential of internally legitimising the EU’s policy. It grants legitimacy to the EU’s efforts to 
promote universal principles around the world such as peace, prosperity, or respect for human 
rights. Moreover, the EPS through the activity of the media could help in mitigating the EU’s 
deep democratic deficit – which justifies the focus on the media in the first research question 
explored in this thesis. Koopmans and Statham (2010) maintain that the EPS has the potential of 
fostering democracy in the EU, although presently it might not have the same degree of 
coherence as a national public sphere. However, de Beus (2010, p.29) rightly warns that scholars 
should be very careful in the way they advocate a EPS, as it would need ‘to develop and stabilise 
in both a top-down and bottom-up way’. Elites should be willing to inform and educate the 
general public, while at the same time grass roots transnational networks would have to drive 
forward European public debates on various issues.  
The activity of the media within the EPS has the ability to spur the creation of processes and 
mechanisms that can endow the EU with democratic legitimacy. Moreover, it can enhance all the 
aspects which are considered in this thesis to compose the concept of democratic legitimacy –
transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. Firstly, the EPS acts 
as a space where individuals have the opportunity to engage in public debates regarding the EU’s 
affairs, thus allowing them to have direct contact through the media’s discourse with the 
European transnational environment. However, the interactions within this space are limited by 
the language barriers which also add more diversity to European debates. Schlesinger (2007, 
p.34) equates the formation of an EPS with that of a space which is intrinsically Anglophone due 
to the widespread presence of the language in discourses regarding the EU. Secondly, the activity 
of the media within the EPS increases peoples’ familiarity with the EU and their ‘sense that the 
political institutions of the community, along with decisions emanating from it, conforming to 
acceptable standards’ (Schmidt 2010, p.17). Simultaneously, this could lead to a transfer of 
legitimacy through the construction of narratives from the supranational level to the national 
level and back (Stevenson, 2009). Lastly, the media within the EPS can contribute to the degree 
of appreciation that individuals share towards the EU. Since legitimacy is dependent upon the 
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accessibility to, accountability, transparency and effectiveness of public debates and decision-
making processes, more discourse regarding the Union in national public spheres might prompt 
individuals to increase their trust in the EU (Góra, Mach and Trenz, 2012). Furthermore, EU 
governance presented to, debated and understood by European citizens can provide a voice to 
individuals that are normally marginalised at the national level (Bee and Bozzini, 2010).  
Within the EPS, communication cannot be separated from the social, political or cultural 
backgrounds in which it resides. Consequently, communicative processes entail not only the 
transfer of discourses, but also the creation of meaning structures be they social, political or 
cultural. Transnational communication, on the other hand, gives way to the production of 
discourses and meanings which evade the constraints imposed by centres of power located 
within nation states. Through this, it promotes several mechanisms which drive forward 
democratisation. In theory, forms of transnational communication within Europe provide the 
avenues where different national or regional actors can meet and become entangled in 
democratic processes of contestation or consensus formation. On the other hand, in Habermas’ 
(1989) classic theory, communication needs to be institutionalised in order to foster a democratic 
public sphere, where citizens could freely and equally interact with politics.  
Two main forms of institutionalised communication are considered to coexist in reality: 
mediated communication (Gripsrud, 2009, p.210) and regulative communication (Koçan, 2008, 
p.24). In the case of the EPS, mediated communication is seen to be the primary form of 
communication. Nevertheless, regulative communication is related to creating a culture open to 
consensus achieved through free and equal access to public debates. In this sense, Trenz (2010b, 
p.26) argues that the EPS is a space ‘in which particular information is distributed, issues and 
policies made transparent, positions and claims are staked and old and new divisions are 
demarcated’. It is an environment that through its own nature calls on actors and encourages 
them to accept transformations that are suitable to all the affected groups. The EU’s institutions 
can produce regulative communication which affects the nature of the EPS. For example, the 
inner workings of the EP seem to reflect the regulative potential of European communication, 
where consensus rather than political compromise and conflict are the modus vivendi in which 
MEPs act. 
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Mediated communication within the EPS requires the construction of various patterns of 
circulation through which discourses can overcome traditional national borders. While within the 
nation state the public sphere can play a significant role through its agenda setting powers, the 
EPS tends to lie equally at the periphery of each of the member states. At least in theory, this 
positioning of the media within the EPS facilitates the proliferation of processes of public 
legitimation because transnational discourses created here are in a larger degree protected from 
the interference of political interests. In weak and young democracies, as those of the new CEE 
member states, the majority of the media systems have been used as tools for political 
propaganda by the political parties in power, decreasing the public legitimacy granting role of 
the media’s discourse within the public sphere (Balabanova, 2011).  
The media can enhance the standards of democracy within the EPS. Through mediatisation, 
European issues come to be present in various national debates, fostering and creating new 
platforms of negotiations for ideas and different standpoints which are key to a democratic 
system (Krzyżanowski, Wodak and Triandafyllidou, 2009, p.5). As will be highlighted in the 
next chapter, the media frames policy definitions which influence the way in which individuals 
in the member states view the EU’s foreign policy. Policy definitions are understood to be 
particular modes of understanding social and political reality. Policy definitions together with 
coverage by the media also provide citizens with the necessary information that would allow 
them to construct reflexive opinions regarding the European views of politicians and evaluate 
them. As individuals in the EU have few chances to get in contact with policymakers at the 
supranational level, news reports and articles supplied by the media fill this knowledge gap, 
mediating the interactions between society and politics (Nieminen, 2009, p.73). EU 
policymakers may benefit from the media’s policy definitions and coverage by monitoring and 
evaluating the impact of their policies in the settings of member states (Koopmans, 2010). 
Moreover, mediatisation facilitates EU policymakers and administrators to initiate policies and 
open them to public debate (similarly to indexing effect detailed in the next chapter). The media 
can at times assume a more active role in setting the agenda or legitimising different patterns of 
behaviour and rules within the political sphere (Trenz, 2009, p.53).  
It is quite straightforward to argue that most individuals within the EU do not have any direct 
interactions with politics – be it domestic or foreign policy –, thus relying on the media to obtain 
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information. In this sense, the media within the public sphere has the ability to shape the views 
and preferences of individuals. The policy definitions framed by the media not only inform 
individuals what to think about, but also suggest to them how to think about and evaluate 
information. The foreign policy of the EU is commonly considered to be a policy area over 
which individuals or different groups of individuals do not have influence due to the fact that 
information is withheld from them. Only the public which is well informed about the 
international agenda has the right and the duty to decide in foreign policy matters. This 
apparently closed nature of decision-making in EU foreign policy makes the role of media more 
important than in other policy areas. The general public gets its information about the foreign 
policy of the EU only from the policy definitions framed media, and more importantly it is only 
through the activity of the media within the EPS that individuals can make their voices count in 
the heads of the policymakers.  
Hence, the media has here the ability to link individuals to EU foreign policy decision-making 
within the EPS. News about the EU’s foreign policy is scarce or almost nonexistent from other 
sources besides the media, making the EPS both the representative of individuals’ views and the 
force that shapes them. The relationship between the general public and the EPS, positions the 
media as both an opinion entrepreneur that seeks to mould the views of individuals, and as an 
actor – an entity similar to the Greek mythical hero Prometheus – that invades the traditional 
privacy of foreign policy decision-making, bringing it to bear the accountability of the general 
public. Through this, the media has the potential to encourage processes of public contestation 
and different forms of participative democracy within the EPS (Polonska-Kimunguyi and 
Kimunguyi, 2011; Splichal, 2011; de Wilde and Zürn, 2012; Dobrescu and Palada, 2012; 
Zografova, Bakalova and Mizova, 2012). The empirical chapters will endeavour to show 
whether the EU’s foreign policy can enjoy democratic legitimacy beyond the principle of 
democratic representation; i.e. through the activity of the media within the EPS – thus answering 
the two research questions. 
Despite its ability to shape the political agenda by being legitimated through the portrayal of 
public opinion, the media within the public sphere should not be viewed as a political actor in its 
own right. Nonetheless, at times it can become part of the political process. Its role in relation to 
political decisions is seen here to be ‘closely coupled with the political sphere through constant 
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co-operative as well as conflictual exchanges aimed at attracting audience attention’ (Meyer 
2009: 1049). The ability of the media to become part of the political process is predicated upon 
its agenda setting power, one of the three interaction effects between the media and policymakers 
explored in this thesis together with indexing and bounding. The next chapter will detail each 
interaction effect, highlighting their implication for the way democratic legitimacy is enacted 
within the (European) public sphere. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that the media through its activity and interactions with policymakers 
within the European public sphere has the ability to endow the EU’s foreign policy with 
democratic legitimacy. Thus, it justifies the focus on the media in the first research question: can 
the EU enjoy democratic legitimacy in its foreign policy through the activity of the media? It also 
provides an avenue into answering the second: in what ways does the activity of the media endow 
the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy? Within the public sphere, the media plays a 
central role as it informs individuals regarding foreign policy issues, and provides policymakers 
with feedback from the general public. As such, the public sphere is constructed in a significant 
degree by the activity of the media, meaning that the more issues get publicised, the more 
decisions pertaining from them get endowed with democratic legitimacy. This chapter has also 
highlighted that the EPS can enhance all the aspects which are seen here to compose the concept 
of democratic legitimacy: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public 
debate. Nonetheless, the absence of a coherent European demos or an overarching EU identity 
emphasises the differences between the EPS and that of nation states. Consequently, this thesis 
considers the EPS as a result of the overlapping of the Europeanised public spheres. Although 
this thesis is not interested in the Europeanisation of national public spheres per se, it takes it for 
granted and empirically analyses the activity of the media and its interactions with policymakers 
in two member states (the UK and Romania) and the transnational level – which is defined to 
refer to European transnational publications and the EU’s institutions. Moreover, as individuals 
have virtually no direct access to information and insight about the EU’s foreign policy, 
interactions between the media and policymakers are paramount for understating the way 
decision-making processes are made democratically legitimate. The next chapter will present the 
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model of interaction effects – between the media, together with the policy definitions it frames, 
and policymakers. This model will be then employed in the empirical part of the thesis in order 
to explore the way in which the EU’s foreign policy was endowed with democratic legitimacy in 
the two case studies – and to answer the two research questions. Chapter 4 will present the 
methodological framework used for identifying instances of the three interaction effects 
(indexing, bounding and agenda setting) which entails using frame analysis and correlating its 
findings with data from interviews and questionnaires (with journalists and policymakers), and 
other primary or secondary sources. 
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Chapter 3 – Theoretical framework: 
Mapping interaction effects within the 
media/foreign policy nexus 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have argued that although there has been intense academic debate for 
the past twenty years over the EU’s democratic deficit and the lack of democratic legitimacy 
which hinders its decision-making in most policy areas, little attention has been directed to the 
Union’s foreign policy. To a large extent scholars have focused on the relationship between the 
decline of intergovernmentalism within the EU and its prospects of extending the control of 
representative bodies such as the EP over the Union’s foreign policy. As detailed throughout 
chapter 1, this strand of research emphasises institutional developments, perceiving democratic 
legitimacy as a result of or even epiphenomenon to the expansion of the powers of the EP and 
the broadening of the control of directly elected representatives over the EU’s foreign policy 
bureaucracy – i.e. the EEAS. Chapter 1 also argued that the issue of democratic legitimacy has 
been treated in an incoherent manner by the broader tradition of foreign policy analysis. 
Legitimacy is rarely touched upon in the literature, most studies building on the assumption that 
media influence is equal to legitimacy (Kent, 2005, p.210).  
In this thesis, democratic legitimacy is defined as a concept composed of multiple aspects 
pertaining to decision-making processes: transparency, accountability, responsiveness and 
openness to public debate. The previous chapter made a case for the exploring the existence of 
democratic legitimacy in EU foreign policy through the prism of the European public sphere21 
which is commonly viewed to be able to enhance the aspects encompassed by the concept of 
democratic legitimacy. The media has a central role within the EPS due to its ability to construct 
                                                          
21
 The EPS is commonly considered to be the space where individuals can interact with politics through the media 
and the Internet, and where democratic legitimacy is created and enacted. The EPS links individuals to decision-
making processes through the media (Trenz, 2005; Baisnée, 2007; Koopmans and Statham, 2010). 
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transnational communicative flows, publicise and politicise European issues, in this way linking 
citizens to the decision-making processes. The way the media frames EU foreign policy and its 
interaction with policymakers are thus crucial for understating the way in which democratic 
legitimacy is enacted in this policy area. 
However, merely conceiving a causal link between the media and decision-making processes in 
EU foreign policy – in researching the existence and nature of democratic legitimacy – would 
prove to be very dangerous, as this area of policy is subject to a considerably larger number of 
constraining factors: ranging from the nature of the international system, its norms, to for 
example, the inner workings of the EU’s institutions. In his review of the literature on the CNN 
effect and the media’s influence on foreign policy, Piers Robinson (2011) highlighted that 
although such a causal link cannot be implied from empirical research, the media is to be seen as 
a necessary constraint on foreign policy decisions.  This thesis argues that within the nexus (the 
media/foreign policy nexus) created by the interactions between media and policymakers in EU 
foreign policy three types of interaction effects can be identified: indexing, bounding and agenda 
setting. Indexing, bounding and agenda setting as interaction effects underlying the 
media/foreign policy nexus hinge upon the way in which policymakers interact with and 
perceive the media (and the policy definitions that it frames). Policy definitions are researched 
here through frame analysis which will be detailed in the next chapter dealing with the 
methodology employed in this thesis. Framing is broadly considered to capture the way 
individuals, groups or entities represent reality focusing on some aspects while downplaying 
others. The media generally frame three types of policy definitions expressing problems, 
solutions or expectations. This distinction among the three types of policy definitions framed by 
the media allows us to empirically identify (and evaluate) instances of the three interaction 
effects (indexing, bounding and agenda setting) and their implication for the way democratic 
legitimacy is enacted.  
The core value of the interaction effects model resides in the fact that the three types of effects 
can shed light on the way democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy decision-making 
processes – and thus facilitate answering the two research questions. Firstly, indexing captures 
the ability of policymakers to influence and shape media discourse in the public sphere in order 
to aid their interests and goals by communicating in a favourable manner their policies to the 
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general public. Indexing can be thought to boost democratic legitimacy in cases where the media 
acts as an educator, empowering and informing individuals how to view and participate in 
debates and political processes when policymakers decide to open various issues to public 
scrutiny. On the other hand, through indexing policymakers can use the media as a tool for 
rallying support for their policies or even try to manipulate the general public in accepting 
policies which stray from democratic values. Secondly, through bounding the media can have  a 
constraining or limiting effect on the range of policies – and their effectiveness – that 
policymakers can pursue, even if the latter are not aware of or willing to engage with the policy 
definitions constructed by journalists. Bounding positions journalists as watchdogs of 
democracy, where their policy definitions can constrain the rhetoric and actions of policymakers, 
even if the latter are unaware or choose not to engage with the media’s discourse. Finally, agenda 
setting captures the ability of the media to purposively influence decision-making processes 
through its discourse. Through agenda setting journalists have the ability to link individuals with 
the political arena by presenting the views of the general public to policymakers. In what follows 
the chapter will present the framework of analysis employed in the thesis by expanding first on 
the types of policy definitions that the media is able to frame through its discourse. The second 
part then continues by describing each interaction effect, detailing their implications for the way 
in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy – and for the way in which the two 
research questions are explored in this thesis. 
 
3.2 Modelling interaction effects between the media and policymakers 
In chapter 2 it was argued that the media has a central role within the EPS in linking individuals 
to decision-making. In this way policies are made more transparent, accountable and open to 
public scrutiny and debate, boosting their democratic legitimacy. Hence, a focus on the way in 
which policymakers interact with and perceive the framing strategies of the media can paint a 
reliable picture of the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in the EU’s foreign policy. 
Three types of interaction effects are identified which capture the interactions between 
policymakers and media (and its discourse): indexing, bounding and agenda setting. Indexing 
defines instances where media discourse is more or less directly influenced by official rhetoric or 
the deliberate actions of policymakers. Bounding captures the ability of the media to constrain 
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political action and rhetoric without policymakers being aware of or engaging with its discourse. 
Agenda setting captures processes where policy definitions constructed by the media influence 
decision-making processes through the deliberate actions of journalists. Unlike bounding, in the 
case of agenda setting policymakers are aware of and choose to engage with the media. At times, 
indexing, bounding and agenda setting can overlap. However, exploring the likelihood of policy 
definitions framed by the media to influence official rhetoric and policy facilitates distinguishing 
between interaction effects. Moreover, the analysis of the policy definitions framed by the media 
coupled with data from interviews (with policymakers and journalists) and other primary and 
secondary sources allows us to pinpoint the significance that each interaction effect has on the 
way democratic legitimacy is enacted. Before presenting in more detail the interaction effects 
model presented in this thesis it is worth exploring the way in which other scholars have 
attempted to chart interactions within the media/foreign policy nexus. It will be argued that most 
of the analytical distinctions developed in the literature are not useful for enquiring into the way 
democratic legitimacy comes to be enacted in decision-making processes in foreign policy22. 
 
3.2.1 Other attempts to map interaction effects between the media and policymakers 
In his insightful analysis of the CNN effect Livingstone (1997, p.2) has identified three types of 
interaction effects in the case of international interventions. Firstly, the media can act as an 
accelerant, limiting decision-making response times, and putting pressure on policymakers to act 
quickly. This particular ability of the media falls into the agenda setting effect emphasised in this 
thesis, as policymakers would be affected by the media’s policy definitions and coverage only if 
they were aware and willing to interact with them. However, in this role, the media might be 
deliberately used by policymakers in their efforts to rapidly gain public support for their policy 
approaches – which points to instances of indexing. Secondly, Livingstone argues that the media 
creates policy impediments, in that it either undermines the moral or ethical bases behind official 
policies, or compromises operational security, especially in the case of military intervention. The 
impediment effect is often linked to the body-bag effect or the Vietnam syndrome which argues 
                                                          
22
 Most frameworks are not generally able to encapsulate ‘the reality that media can be integral to democratic 
processes that place limits on state power while  at a different juncture effectively operating as part of the apparatus 
of the state suggests a spectrum of state-supporting and opposing, activity on which different media operate’ (Kent, 
2005, p.205). 
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that – starting with the Vietnam war – public support for foreign policy and international 
intervention decreases as images and news of causalities are presented by the media. Defined in 
this way, the media as an impediment resembles instances of bounding, although Livingstone 
does not specify whether policymakers are aware of the policy definitions framed by the media. 
Finally, agenda setting for Livingstone refers to the way in which the emotional coverage of 
atrocities by the media compels policymakers to address the respective issue. While 
Livingstone’s framework provides a look into the spectrum of interaction effects found in the 
media/foreign policy nexus, it focuses too much on international intervention, and remains 
analytically underspecified – making it quite hard to strike a distinction empirically. Moreover, 
his framework paints a simplified picture which implies that policymakers would be always 
responsive to media coverage and its policy definitions if they are constructed and deployed at 
the right moment (in the event of international conflicts). 
A more underspecified and broad interaction effect – which was already discussed in chapter 1 – 
is the CNN effect. According to Robinson, the CNN effect is aimed at establishing ‘the degree of 
media influence on policymakers when they are deliberating over whether to intervene during a 
humanitarian crisis’ (Robinson, 2002, p.16). He further notes that the CNN effect implies that 
advocates of policy changes are aided by critical media which in conditions of policy uncertainty 
provides them with increased bargaining power. Secondly, media coverage is considered to 
compel policymakers to be responsive towards the image of the perceived public opinion painted 
by the media. However, claims according to which the CNN effect23 has dramatically changed 
the way in which foreign policy is conducted should not be equated with the idea that media is a 
crucial factor in determining policy. It rather shrinks decision-making times to respond to various 
events, ideas and debates in foreign policy, whilst opening them up to democratic scrutiny. In the 
literature, the CNN effect has been identified in two forms: strong and weak. The strong CNN 
effect is considered to have taken place in situations where the media has had a significant 
influence on decision-making processes, operating ‘as either a necessary or even sufficient factor 
in producing a particular policy outcome’ (Robinson, 2002, p.37). Defined in this way, the strong 
                                                          
23
 Most studies of the CNN effect have been focused around the issue of humanitarian intervention, which can 
hardly build a comprehensive picture of the whole spectrum of foreign policy. By employing two case studies which 
resemble two very distinct issues areas in EU foreign policy, this thesis aims to overcome the shortcoming 
highlighted above – nonetheless, analysing a larger number of issue areas in foreign policy would paint an even 
more complete and valid picture.  
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CNN effect resembles the agenda setting powers of the media, one of the three interaction effects 
presented in this thesis. On the other hand, a weak CNN effect encompasses instances ranging 
from situations in which the media acts as an accelerant (Livingston, 1997) to when it enables 
(Hallin, 1989) various policies to be adopted and put into practice. The weak version of the CNN 
effect is in itself a very ambiguous concept and largely ineffective as it includes instances of 
agenda setting, bounding and indexing (or manufacturing consent for that matter) without 
creating an analytical distinction among them.  
Touri presents another example which entails a three stage model in which the media influences 
decision-making processes in foreign policy. The first stage involves the way in which the 
commercial and strategic interests of the media impact its discourse. In the second stage, news 
frames target the general public; while, in the third stage, media discourse prompts perceptions 
and interpretation from the general public which constrain policymakers, as they are thought to 
be aware of the media’s discourse and the attitude of the public. Policymakers would act here in 
order to avoid domestic costs imposed by the media’s discourse and the perception of public 
opinion presented by journalists (Touri, 2006, p.88). O’Hefferman (1991) presents a contending 
model where the media is perceived to be an insider within decision-making processes. In this 
model, the media affects institutions and policymakers through five mechanisms: it sets the pace 
for foreign policy or constrains it, it defines standards and normal behaviour for policymakers 
within institutions, and it informs policymakers and directs or reinforces their attention. Mcquail 
(2006) has also distinguished between a number of interactions found within the media/foreign 
policy nexus. Firstly, he notes that the media can cause changes to policies – in any form – which 
can be differentiated according to the degree of intentionality involved, or the magnitude of the 
policy shift they determine. Secondly, in his model the media has the ability to reinforce changes 
pursued by executives or present official policies and approaches, whist also having the power to 
prevent policy change. Mcquail’s model represents without a doubt a step forward in mapping 
interaction effects within the media/foreign policy nexus, but his effects are too underspecified 
and very difficult to analytically differentiate, or research empirically. At the same time, he takes 
a one-sided approach, merely analysing interaction effects from the point of view of the media. 
Conversely, he ignores the issue regarding policymakers’ willingness to interact with and their 
awareness of the policy definitions framed by the media.  
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The next sub-section explores the way in which the media frame policy definitions which are 
seen to be key to understanding the three types of interaction effects. The remainder of the 
chapter will then describe each interaction effect in turn – indexing, bounding and agenda setting 
– pinpointing the source of policy definitions, the factors which influence the likelihood of the 
three types of policy definitions to be incorporated in official policies and rhetoric, whilst 
providing an account of their impact for the presence of democratic legitimacy. 
 
3.2.2 Media policy definitions 
The three interaction effects are shaped by the way in which the media, through its discourse in 
the public sphere, constructs various policy definitions. Policy definitions are understood as 
particular modes of understanding social and political reality. The literature on public policy has 
a long tradition of surveying and analysing the way in which the media frame policy definitions 
and their influence on policymaking (Rochefort and Cobb, 1994; Birkland, 1997; Kingdon, 
1997; Princen and Rhinard, 2006; Mehta, 2010). Through its discourse the media defines policy 
problems, solutions and expectations which can ‘represent events in a policy relevant way, as 
expecting, deserving, even requiring a governmental response’ (Kent, 2005, p.186). Empirically 
policy definitions are explored through frame analysis which is detailed in the next 
methodological chapter. Most scholars contend that the media’s policy definitions draw on or 
even mimic those constructed by other actors in the public and political spheres, and are defined 
only in relation to events, issues, debates or actors (Reese, 2003; Johnson-Cartee, 2004; Camaj, 
2010). For example, de Vreese (2012, p.367) argues that journalists are almost never primary 
originators of policy problems, solutions, and expectations, and act more as advocates. For the 
purpose of this thesis, policy problems, solutions and expectations created and promoted by the 
media are considered to stem either from policymakers, the ‘social psyche’ of the public (or the 
perceived views that individuals hold towards an issue), journalists, or the environment which 
underwrites interactions between journalists and policymakers.  
However, as highlighted by Wood and Peake, ‘foreign policy does not readily fit the theoretical 
mold most scholars associate with domestic issues’ (Wood and Peake, 1998, p.173). Hence, the 
way in which the media frames policy definitions will have its own peculiarities in the realm of 
foreign policy. In the case of foreign policy, the media’s policy definitions have a central role in 
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providing information to the general public – which they would not get through personal 
experience – and policymakers. The heavy reliance of individuals in the public sphere on the 
media for information and news about foreign policy is also recognised by Brewer and his 
associates (2003). Due to this dependency they argue that the media plays a central role through 
its policy definitions in shaping public perceptions of an actor in the international arena. On the 
other hand, the power of the policy definitions framed by the media to shape public opinion 
hinges upon the accessibility of the stories and the language journalists employ, coupled with the 
level of media exposure. This argument assumes that sustained media coverage over a certain 
period makes information more accessible, whilst also increasing the chance of influencing 
individuals’ judgments (Nelson, Oxley and Clawson, 1997). Additionally, Brewer and Gross 
(2005) insightfully have shown that individuals are almost never subject to a single policy 
definition or set of related policy definitions constructed around a certain issue or event. They 
argue that on the contrary individuals are usually subject to competing policy definitions, which 
are selected according to citizens’ own values.  
The way in which policy problems are defined can have important implications for the range of 
policy solutions that are proposed and seem viable. According to Hall, policy problems have a 
central role within decision-making processes, as they function as paradigms which underscore 
‘not only the goals of policy . . . but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing’ (Hall, 1961, p.279). At the same time, the way in which media define policy 
problems can have a significant impact on the institution and venue where they are discussed, 
and the range of instruments used to address them. Policy problems defined by journalists are not 
always the result of conscious and intentional actions, as they can favor one definition over 
another due to their commitment to the principle of objectivity. The most pervasive policy 
problems defined (such as human rights violations, armed conflicts or terrorist attacks) by the 
media usually require swift response and tend to assume centre stage on the political agenda. 
Consequently, in such salient situations the policy problems framed by the media can shape 
official approaches and drive forward new policies by exposing policymakers to the pressure of 
public opinion, even if the general public tends to be generally uninterested in foreign policy 
(Rosenau, 1967; Iyengar and Simon, 1993; Walgrave, Soroka and Nuytemans, 2008). 
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Rosenau contends that policy problems can be categorised according to the territory affected, 
saliency, the extent to which resources are needed in order to implement solutions, and the 
viability of finding solutions and putting them into practice (Rosenau, 1961). Metha (2010, 
pp.35–36) has identified three factors which can influence the likelihood of policy problems 
defined by the media to influence official policy and rhetoric. Firstly, the fit between the 
definition and the political environment implies that where a definition is line with those 
expressed by policymakers it is likely to become adopted. Secondly, the ownership of the 
problem and the range of those affected can limit or enhance the scope of a definition. Finally, 
the current political context – domestic or international – can influence the likelihood of policy 
definitions to be incorporated in official rhetoric and policy. On the other hand, Kent views 
culture, beliefs and myths as important filters for distinguishing between policy problems, 
together with various institutional practices and procedures (Kent, 2005, p.185). Bachrach and 
Baratz (1970) also point to the fact that the avoidance of policy commitments make for salient 
policy problems in general. 
Secondly, besides constructing policy problems, the media has the ability to act as a policy 
entrepreneur and push for policy solutions (Kingdon, 1997). In his seminal work on ideas and 
public policy, Hall (1961) has pointed to three factors that can lead to the successful adoption 
and implementation of a policy solution: policy viability, administrative viability, and political 
viability. Policy viability refers to the extent to which a certain policy solution reflects the policy 
context in which it is proposed, and the degree of change required in order to accommodate it. 
On the other hand, the concept of administrative viability reflects the ability of current 
institutional and bureaucratic structures to implement the proposed policy solution. The level of 
political willingness and commitment required in order to adopt a policy solution captures the 
notion of political viability. Those solutions which score higher on these three factors have a 
better chance of being incorporated into official policy discourse and, subsequently practice.  
Finally, the media expresses policy expectations which are very often prompted by a predefined 
political philosophy or identity which prescribes the appropriate role of the government given 
certain assumptions about the market and society – but also by the cultural, political or social 
discourse which is dominant at one time. Moreover, Mehta asserts that there are situations in 
‘which after a certain number of issues that are prominent in the media are inconsistent with the 
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leading public philosophy, the public philosophy itself gradually changes or is replaced by 
another’ (Mehta, 2010, p.44). Journalists usually construct policy expectations which are based 
on ‘the deepest and most unquestioned cultural values, myths and ideologies’ (Kent, 2005, 
p.343). Once entrenched in the public sphere some policy expectations ‘will remain long term 
fixtures of the policymaking landscape; other definitions may undergo constant revision or be 
replaced altogether by competing formulations’ (Rochefortand Cobb, 1994b, p.4). The next three 
sub-sections present the three interaction effects which characterise the media/foreign policy 
nexus by underscoring the way in which each hinges upon the policy definition strategies of the 
media. 
 
3.2.3 Indexing 
Indexing (detailed in table 3.1) captures instances where policymakers are widely considered to 
have the ability to influence media discourse and the policy definitions constructed by 
journalists. According to Berry (1990, p.xiii), ‘to a far greater extent than with domestic politics, 
the press is at one with the foreign policy establishment’. Tiffin points that in instances of 
indexing the major impact of the media resides in portraying to policymakers the benefits and 
costs of pursuing different lines of action (Tiffin, 2000, p.201). However, in general most 
scholars would agree that policymakers are more successful in conveying their message through 
the media in situations where their policies are clearly formulated and insulated from conflict 
(Brody, 1992; Herman, 1993; Berkowitz, 1994; Kuypers, 1997; Mermin, 1999; Sobel, 2000; 
Herman and Chomsky, 2002; Robinson, 2011). For example, in the case of the US policy 
towards the Nicaraguan Sandista regime, Bennett (1990) found that public opposition to the 
official approach was not covered by the media. In this type of situations, indexing suggests that 
journalists are prone to adapt their views to those expressed by policymakers. On the one hand, 
this implies that journalists might suffer from a lack of independence relative to policymakers, 
because powerful interest groups control both the media and governments, ‘and consequently are 
able to use the media to mobilise public support for governmental policies’ (Gilboa, 2005, p.32). 
The media are seen here not to act ‘independently of what other institutions and groups in society 
are saying and doing, although there is considerable discretion for the media to give more or less 
emphasis to certain agenda items’ (McCombs, Einsiedel and Weaver, 1991, p.101). On the other 
hand, indexing should not be viewed at face value, as Archetti (2010, p.32) warns that it is 
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almost impossible for scholars to evaluate whether journalists are not critical enough of 
policymakers or are simply doing their job. She adds that merely analysing the way in which 
policymakers and the media frame their discourse, whilst searching for a fit between them does 
not paint a clear and reliable picture of the causal links involved. This can be overcome by 
focusing on the three types of policy definitions discussed previously: problems, solutions, and 
expectations. 
Policymakers themselves are prime sources for indexing due to their ability to disseminate their 
message with the aid of the media through different techniques and channels: speeches, planting 
stories, releasing negative stories which might overshadow other bigger news items, feeding 
articles to the media, or providing them with cues24. Policymakers also view the media as a tool 
for surveying the general public and its opinions regarding official policies and discourse (Shaw, 
2000, p.30). Through regular leaks to the media, policymakers sometimes aim to prime the 
public in order to prepare the ground for the acceptance of a certain policy approach, or to build 
up public support (Auerbach and Bloch-Elkon, 2005, p.95). According to Harriman, states’ 
indexing abilities are enabled by the network of contacts that policymakers have with journalists. 
By providing the latter with inside information, policymakers attain the ability to manipulate the 
way in which topics are covered and presented by the media – in this way they can test the water 
or circulate different stories (Harriman, 1987, p.207). Cohen (1993, p.29) also found that some 
journalists take pride in collaborating with the government and being part of decision-making 
processes. Journalists also tend to view policymakers as their main sources, seeking to build 
sustainable contacts with political elites who are in powerful positions and have the ability to 
deliver them scoops (Jacobs and Shapiro, 2000). The salience of policymakers as sources in their 
attempt to influence the media is skilfully highlighted by Berkowitz who suggests that:   
                                                          
24
 Nonetheless, while policymakers might serve as the primary sources for journalists, the latter have the final say in 
what gets published (Touri, 2006, p.42). 
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Table 3.1 Indexing 
 Democratic legitimacy Source of frames Policy problems Policy Solutions Policy Expectations 
In
d
ex
in
g
 
Low levels of democratic legitimacy. 
 
The media as a tool at the disposal of 
policymakers. 
 
Policymakers can survey, manipulate 
and influence public opinion through the 
media. 
 
Media as educators of foreign policy and 
democracy. 
 
The media can promote public debate 
when policymakers choose to open 
various policies to public scrutiny. 
 
The media can socialise new 
policymakers into democratic 
institutional cultures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Policymakers. 
 
Perceived public 
opinion (by 
policymakers). 
 
 
 
 
More successful when they 
share broader ownership and 
affect large groups, nations, 
regions or even have global 
impact. 
 
Fit with definitions 
promoted by other 
influences actors in the 
international arena such as 
the UN. 
 
 
 
 
 
High policy and 
administrative viability 
mirrored by consensus 
among policymakers. 
 
Political viability – spiral 
of opportunity. 
 
 
 
More successful in 
cases where 
expectations fit with 
the broader social, 
cultural and political 
context. 
 
Due to rhetorical 
entrapment, 
expectations have to 
build on former 
commitments. 
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when policymakers attempt to influence public opinion, they often see the 
media as a convenient channel for transmitting their messages. Sometimes, they 
intentionally attempt to place stories, while other times, they position 
themselves as useful news sources whom journalists can depend on (Berkowitz, 
1994, p.89). 
 
The well-known manufacturing consent theory – discussed in chapter 1 – holds that when 
policymakers choose to define a policy problem or to propose a solution, the media are 
compelled to report on it (Livingston and Eachus, 1996; Miller and Parnell Riechert, 2001; 
Herman and Chomsky, 2002). In contrast to the CNN effect, the manufacturing consent theory 
argues that executives are rarely influenced by the media. In the literature, two versions of the 
manufacturing consent theory have been differentiated: elite and executive. The former contends 
that all political elites (whether they are in the legislative, executive or any other positions that 
bear power and authority in the political sphere) have the ability to influence media agendas (and 
its policy definitions), whilst the executive version implies that only policymakers in power can 
affect media content. In both versions, Hallin (1984) argues that the media takes cues from 
policymakers, and journalists can rarely afford to diverge from official approaches. Here, 
journalists are thought to have a low to non-existent degree of independence in relation to 
policymakers, and almost never try to act as advocates. Scholars also claim that journalists are 
generally ill equipped due to their lack of training in international affairs and low number of 
contacts with policymakers within the policy circle to actually influence foreign policy in a 
significant manner. Moreover, in times of crisis, journalists are thought to be prone to side with 
the government in order to defend national interests, as they do not wish to see the country fail 
(Kuypers, 1997; Seaver, 1998; Taylor, 1998). Nonetheless, the manufacturing consent approach 
is criticised for the fact that it tends to validate itself by identifying instances of passive media 
which is highly reliant on sources originating from the political sphere (Edwards and Wood, 
1999). According to Harriman, ‘journalists who stray far from [the state’s] assumptions know 
they are unlikely to see their work published’ (Harriman, 1987, p.186). Moreover, editors have 
the ultimate power in selecting news; for example, Kent found that in the case of the war in 
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Bosnia editors were unwilling to publish pieces which strayed away from the principle of 
objectivity and drew on non-elite sources (Kent, 2005, p.346). 
In the case of indexing, policy problems favoured by policymakers are more likely to be defined 
by the media in situations where they are framed to affect large groups, nations, regions or even 
have global impact. Consequently, problems that are perceived to originate in the minds of 
policymakers and have only a narrow effect on their interests are more likely to be challenged by 
the media (Garber, McQuail and Norris, 1998). Policy problems defined by external actors (such 
as other states, transnational groups, and international organisations) can also influence indexing 
effects by either providing more thrust to certain definitions or downplaying and overshadowing 
others. For example, identifying by the UN of situations such as those in Burma or in Tibet as 
major human rights violations can provide a benchmark for assessing policy problems defined by 
policymakers in the EU. As indexing argues that policymakers are more successful in shaping 
the agenda of the media in situations where there is internal agreement and policies are clearly 
formulated, it is straightforward that a fit between the policy definition and political environment 
is a precondition for the appearance of indexing effects. Similarly, policy and administrative 
viability of policy solutions are inherent to instances where policies are transmitted clearly 
through the media by policymakers. According to Miller and Parnell Riechert (2001), political 
viability only matters when policymakers are caught-up in a so-called spiral of opportunity 
where they need to constantly rearticulate their message through the media or even withdraw a 
certain solution if public opinion seems to be largely disaffected by it. Finally, policymakers 
usually have direct contributions through op-ed pieces in newspapers where they try to add 
legitimacy to their policies and define how a successful foreign policy should look like. 
Significant shifts from current and past policy approaches together with expectations that fall 
outside the certain social, cultural, religious or economic context they are subscribed to, are less 
likely to be adopted by the media. One might argue that policymakers in their efforts to influence 
the media find it very difficult to escape the effects of their past discourse, being subject to 
rhetorical entrapment even when current political developments might urgently call for different 
policies (Bennett, 2008). Additionally, reporting on polls might also reify a preferred 
understanding by policymakers of reality which may limit the amount of dissent that individuals 
choose to engage in (Noelle-Neumann, 1984). 
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Indexing suggests that journalists act as conveyors of discourses about official policies to the 
general public and to a certain extent as its educators concerning foreign policy. In this area the 
media reinforces policymakers’ perception of public opinion, their role within foreign policy 
decision-making and the overall scope of foreign policy (Key, 1968; Gamson and Modigliani, 
1989; Kennamer, 1994). The media can provide policymakers an effective avenue for gaining a 
deeper understanding of the views and interests of the general public ‘as they reflect the 
understanding of politics in the public sphere’ (Hodess, 1997, p.4). Policymakers use the media 
in order to test the reactions of individuals and set the ground for new policies; the media being 
considered a much faster and efficient way of probing the public than polls (Cohen, 1993, 
p.202). The media is thus a useful tool at the disposal of policymakers who can use it in order to 
divert attention from sensitive or unwanted problems, whilst also maintaining a virtual monopoly 
on the way in which journalists frame desired issues (Herman and Chomsky, 2002). In 
international negotiations the media might be used by policymakers in order to assess the 
willingness of other governments to cooperate (Touri, 2006, p.23).  
While at first glance indexing seems to point to a lack of democratic legitimacy, it should not be 
viewed entirely as malign manipulation. For example, journalists can build support for policies 
in the public sphere by educating people how to contribute to the public debates surrounding 
them. Secondly, the media can aid democratic regimes and sustain democratic legitimacy by 
creating and promoting expectations informed by democratic values (Entman, 1989; Bajomi-
Lázár and Hegedűs, 2001; Bellamy, 2010). In instances of indexing the media have the potential 
to grant legitimacy to political systems by conferring their own authority and legitimacy to 
institutions and policymakers (Hodess, 1997, p.2). Additionally, the media contributes to the 
preservation of institutional cultures in foreign policy which socialise new actors to democratic 
norms (Rid, 2007; Walgrave, Soroka and Nuytemans, 2008; Soroka, 2012). However, these latter 
qualities that the media may exhibit are only marginal to the reality that according to indexing 
journalists are simple purveyors of official discourse. In most instances of indexing, their actions, 
more or less consciously, do not question in the public sphere the transparency and 
accountability of decision-making processes in foreign policy.  
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3.2.4 Bounding 
The actions of the media can also have a constraining effect on decision-making processes in 
foreign policy without deliberately influencing political agendas or being taken into account by 
policymakers. Through the policy definitions it frames and the information it brings to light, the 
media can compromise certain policy approaches promoted by governments (Gilboa, 2005), 
limit the range of issues that can be successfully defined as problems (Strobel, 1997), undermine 
the effectiveness of policy solutions (Jackson, 1990; Iyengar and Kinder, 2010), create powerful 
images of how a government should behave in foreign policy (Wood and Peake, 1998), or more 
broadly damage the reputation of foreign policy actors, states or international organisations both 
domestically and internationally (Mercer, 2008). For example, Kent found that in the case of the 
war in Bosnia the activity of the British media had an incremental effect on policymaking by 
creating coverage and forcing minimal intervention from the state, even though British 
policymakers were largely unwilling to respond directly to the media’s discourse (Kent, 2005, 
p.222). Through bounding (detailed in table 3.2), journalists can exert a silent and unintentional 
control over decision-making processes, setting themselves the boundaries within which 
policymakers can operate. Governments and policymakers can suffer important damage to their 
reputation through the communicative acts and framing strategies of the media, in this way 
undermining the trust that the general public holds towards them and also that of more global 
actors. Damage to a government is determined here by both the simple act of covering a sensitive 
issue and by the known broader effects of the policy definitions employed by the media and its 
discourse (Miller, 2007, p.131). Bounding is able to damage reputations here due to the ability of 
the media to shape public opinion that can then, once perceived by policymakers, exert pressure 
on them. Powlick found in his study based on interviews with foreign policy officials that they 
tend to avoid policies and approaches that are perceived to encounter opposition from the general 
public because ‘there is a surprisingly widespread view among foreign policy officials that 
public input into, and even to some extent influence on, the foreign policy process is both 
necessary and desirable’ (Powlick, 1991, p.634). Thus, the second type of interaction effect 
(bounding) is a negative one, where policymakers are constrained by the discourse of the media 
even if they are not aware or willing to engage with it. 
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Table 3.2 Bounding 
 Democratic legitimacy Source of frames Policy problems Policy Solutions Policy Expectations 
B
o
u
n
d
in
g
 
The media has the ability to foster 
democratic legitimacy by boosting the 
accountability and transparency of 
decision-making processes in foreign 
policy. 
 
Media are the watchdog of democracy. 
 
The media encourages and gives thrust to 
processes of democratic contestation 
within the public sphere. 
 
However, journalists can have their own 
personal agendas or promote the interests 
of various groups. 
 
Journalists lack knowledge about foreign 
policy and are easy to dismiss policies that 
fall outside accepted boundaries. 
 
 
 
 
 
Journalists. 
 
Perceived public 
opinion (by both 
policymakers and 
journalists). 
 
Actors outside 
foreign policy 
circles. 
 
 
 
 
More successful when they 
share broader ownership 
and affect large groups, 
nations, regions or even 
have global impact. 
 
Fit with definitions 
promoted by other 
influential actors in the 
international arena such as 
the UN. 
 
 
 
 
 
By highlighting internal 
conflict or a lack of 
dialogue the media can 
undermine policies. 
 
The media can constrain 
policy solutions and their 
implementation and 
effectiveness by 
highlighting their low 
policy and administrative 
viability. 
 
 
 
 
The media is thought 
to reinforce the 
broader social and 
political context. 
 
Journalists are prone 
to cover policy 
failures and damage 
policymakers’ and 
states reputation. 
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In the case of bounding, the power of the media to constrain decision-making processes derives 
from its ability to deliver information framed in various modalities to the general public and to 
actors outside the foreign policy community (Zaller, 1992, 1994). Firstly, coverage by the media 
of sensitive issues can lead to protests or even revolutions. Members of the civil society or even 
of the general public can act as sources or be even drivers for such information to be conveyed 
by the media. Secondly, the media might augment and reinforce public opinion, contributing to 
the formation of strong coalitions within society. Actors outside foreign policy circles with 
different interests also tend to supply the media with information and points of view that can 
damage the reputation of policymakers, policies, institutions or even states. Finally, the nature of 
the structure which mediates the relationship between policymakers and journalists can, in 
situations where the former refuse dialogue, promote a sort of overtly critical or even vindictive 
attitude from the media (Cohen, 1993). Bounding is also influenced by the fact that between 
politicians and journalists there tends to be mainly an adversarial relationship due to the different 
objectives and interests they pursue (Touri, 2006, p.14). 
Bounding is more successful in instances where journalists highlight internal contradictions that 
underlie policy solutions. For example, supplying information regarding the low or limited 
policy and administrative viability of policy solutions can decrease the level of support from 
actors outside foreign policy circles and contribute to the erosion of broader coalitions. 
Additionally, by highlighting internal conflict or a lack of dialogue that a policy solution arouses 
among policymakers in foreign policy, the media can undermine its implementation and trigger a 
complete revision. The ownership of a policy problem again can enhance the ability of the media 
to constrain decision-making processes, whereby journalists investigate and bring to light the 
reasons behind the definition of an issue as a policy problem which affects only a narrow group 
of individuals close to those holding political power. Finally, constructing ambitious 
expectations regarding the goals and the outcomes of foreign policy puts significant pressure on 
policymakers to deliver concrete results. Otherwise, when policymakers fail to live up to their 
commitments, journalists are prone to cover their lack of success and damage their reputation. 
Nonetheless, in the case of high level international issues, the media are more likely to act as the 
guardian of national interests and public interest (Touri, 2006, p.171). More generally though, 
the media is thought to reify and act as a self-fulfilling prophesy in reinforcing the broader social 
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and political structure according to which it frames the actions and rhetoric of policymakers 
(Fairclough, 1995; Thompson, 1995; Hesmondhalgh and Toynbee, 2008). Furthermore, 
Berkowitz suggests that the setting and context of interactions can have significant effects on the 
nature of relationships between policymakers and journalists, namely directing it more towards 
adversity or cooperation (Berkowitz, 1994).   
Bounding relates to the media’s very often assumed role of watchdog of democracy (Soroka, 
2012). Journalists keep policymakers in check by highlighting the interests, contradictions and 
mechanisms through which policies are decided upon in foreign policy. Hence, they provide the 
necessary information to the general public that allows individuals to judge the activity of 
policymakers, in this way opening up political debates and boosting the transparency and 
accountability of decision-making processes. Media coverage and its framing strategies also 
encourage and give thrust to processes of democratic contestation in the public sphere. Individual 
concerns become endemic and spread throughout the general public, as individuals are provided 
with a chance to voice their views regarding foreign policy within the public sphere. Moreover, 
in democratic systems it is expected that mainstream media have a discourse that reinforces 
democratic values and is not inherently anti-establishment (Boyd-Barrettand Rantanen, 1998; 
Livingston and Bennett, 2003; Allern and Blach-Ørsten, 2011). On the other hand, journalists 
can have their own personal agendas or promote the interests of various groups, which can 
hamper their commitment to keeping policymakers under democratic scrutiny.  
According to Bennett (2004), in their quest to enlarge and satisfy their readerships, the media are 
prone to favour conflict and failure over success and consensus, most times lacking the patience 
to wait for policies to yield practical results. Moreover, policymakers complain that journalists 
lack knowledge about IR and foreign policy, and are quick to dismiss policies which fall outside 
accepted boundaries or stereotypes (Cohen, 1993; Miller, 2007; Potter and Baum, 2010). One 
explanation might reside in the uncertainty which characterises journalists’ activity due to the 
lack of access to information about international events (Touri, 2006, p.1). Accordingly, the 
media ‘upholds the legitimacy of holders of formal authority as long as they abide by the 
relevant enduring values, both in the public and private realms’ (Gans, 2004, p.61). What this all 
suggests is that bounding has the ability to enhance the democratic legitimacy of decision-
making processes, although journalists’ behaviour might be fuelled by other tendencies or 
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interests – each of the following three chapters will flesh out instances of bounding and their 
impact on democratic legitimacy for each case study.   
 
3.2.5 Agenda Setting 
Agenda setting (detailed in table 3.3) is understood to be the conscious effort on the part of 
journalists to influence policy, whilst, unlike instances of bounding, policymakers are aware and 
open to the discourse created by the media. Nevertheless, a word of caution should be expressed, 
as Miller (2007, p.16) amongst other scholars has raised important doubts whether an analyst can 
empirically observe the direct influence of media policy definitions and coverage on 
policymakers. On the one the hand, proponents of the CNN effect argue that 24 hour live 
coverage of international events increases pressure on policymakers to act in a certain way. 
Scholars have shown that the CNN effect is most salient in situations related to humanitarian 
intervention or aid, where emotional images presented around the world define policy problems 
and push politicians to come up with solutions (Entman, 2004; Balabanova, 2007; Chong and 
Druckman, 2007a; Bennett, 2008; Hamelink, 2008; Robinson, 2011). Hence, the media is more 
apt in defining problems and criticising governments for not addressing various salient issues, 
rather than taking a gamble and proposing various solutions. Berry (1990, p.xiv) also finds that 
‘when foreign policy officials are divided or uncertain, the press will focus on the struggle to 
define the foreign policy assumptions that guide specific policies’. 
Most studies enquiring into the influence of the media over decision-making processes have to a 
large extent looked at how discourse affects individual policymakers, with little light being shed 
on the role of the media on aggregate policymaking. Taking into account the environment of 
policymaking together with the media/foreign policy nexus allows this thesis to better grasp the 
way in which through its discourse the media has the ability to pursue or focus on certain policy 
problems, solutions and expectations while downplaying others. According to Wolfe and his 
colleagues (2013), the agenda setting powers of the media are enhanced by so-called ‘windows 
of opportunity’ which appear around high level events and give the opportunity to journalists to  
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Table 3.3 Agenda setting 
 Democratic legitimacy Source of frames Policy problems Policy Solutions Policy Expectations 
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The media can significantly 
enhance democratic legitimacy in 
foreign policy decision-making.  
 
Journalists become part of the 
political process. 
 
Journalists have the ability to link 
individuals to decision-making 
processes by conveying the views of 
the general public to policymakers. 
 
Journalists might behave as activists 
and contribute to forms of 
participative democracy. 
 
Journalists are in continuous dialogue 
with policymakers who choose to 
engage with them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Journalists. 
 
Relationships 
between journalists 
and policymakers. 
 
Perceived public 
opinion (by both 
policymakers and 
journalists). 
 
 
 
More successful when 
they share broader 
ownership and affect large 
groups, nations, regions or 
even have global impact. 
 
Events and trends in the 
domestic and international 
arenas. 
 
Fit with definitions 
promoted by other actors 
in the international arena 
such as the UN. 
 
 
 
The media have a largely 
negative effect on policy 
solutions and their 
implementation. 
 
Deliberate media efforts can 
be very successful when little 
to any amount of policy and 
administrative 
accommodation is required, 
or if it is favoured by lower 
ranking officials and the 
foreign policy bureaucracy as 
a whole. 
 
 
 
 
Media are the 
gatekeeper of 
policymakers’ 
commitments. 
 
Journalists behave 
like activists and 
follow certain 
values and goals 
taken up from 
sources other than 
official ones. 
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act as advocates who seek to change or initiate policy. Other studies focus on the timing within 
the policy process where the agenda setting powers of the media are more apparent and effective.  
For example, Akor (2011, p.98) argues that in the policy initiation stage, policymakers are more 
open to public debate allowing greater times for deliberation – in this way enhancing the 
democratic legitimacy of decision-making processes in foreign policy. Nonetheless, a focus on 
the three types of media policy definitions creates a more coherent picture of the way in which 
the media influences political agendas in foreign policy.  
The concept of agenda setting should be distinguished from the way in which communication 
scholars usually employ it to capture the extent to which media discourse influences views held 
by individuals, and subsequently public opinion (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Benton and 
Frazier, 1976; Weaver, 1993; Dearing and Rogers, 1996; Wood and Peake, 1998; Maher, 2003; 
McCombs and Ghanem, 2003; Walgrave and Van Aelst, 2006; Besova and Cooley, 2009). The 
common approach towards agenda setting found in the literature views the concept as the process 
by which media transmit their policy definitions and the salience of different issues to 
individuals – either the general public or policymakers. The media is considered in this literature 
as an integral part of decision-making processes due to its paramount role in gathering and 
transmitting information. On the other hand, Soroka (2012) contends that because personal day 
to day experiences are very unlikely to provide individuals with useful information about foreign 
policy, the media plays a crucial role in informing citizens. Nonetheless, the media has important 
effects on public opinion, suggesting to individuals what to think about and how to think about 
various issues (Cohen, 1993). 
Policymakers also seem to equate the actions and the views of the media with public opinion, 
providing journalists with a monopoly on perceiving and transmitting to policymakers the views 
of individuals (Corner and Robinson, 2006; Hamelink, 2008; Brueggemann and Wessler, 2009). 
Media influence also manifests itself here through the use of polling data and public opinion 
(Kent, 2005, p.200), where journalists ‘legitimate the notion that responses of representative 
samples to polls comprise a more valid expression of public opinion than do public actions by 
individuals or groups (...) and this legitimation undercuts the influence of leaders and pressure 
groups who dissent’ (Margolis and Mauser, 1989, p.368). Touri holds that in order to identify 
instances of direct influence of media on policymaking (agenda setting) one should focus on ‘the 
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perception of policymakers about the public and most importantly their perception of the media’s 
potential in shaping the public’s views of foreign policy issues’ (Touri, 2006, p.54). 
Relations between journalists and policymakers can have an important impact on the agenda 
setting power of the media. Firstly, due to the complexity of the field of foreign policy, 
professionals tend to shift roles either working for the government in different positions – very 
frequently as spokespersons – or working in the media. Secondly, relationships between 
journalists and policymakers tend to be more powerful and long-lasting in foreign policy than in 
other policy areas, due to the sometimes secret nature of diplomatic information. In his seminal 
study of media influence on foreign policy conducted during the 1960s, Cohen (1993) showed 
that policymakers admitted to regularly surveying journalists for new policy solutions or ideas 
when they seemed to be clueless or undecided on how to deal with a certain policy problem. The 
same study showed that journalists have generally a positive attitude towards influencing foreign 
policy. The media enters the foreign policy stage through the personal relationships 
policymakers forge with journalists:  ‘informal interplay, where it does occur, is valued by both 
sides – by the reporter who must establish good contacts to do his job well; and by the official 
who wants to see the press do a good job in presenting the issues’ (Cohen, 1993, p.145). 
However, Touri claims that most studies argue that the media has a limited impact on foreign 
policy as journalists are highly dependent on policymakers for sources (Touri, 2006, p.20). 
According to Miller (2007), the agenda setting powers of the media are even more pervasive 
when one analyses certain morally and emotionally charged episodes, when journalists ‘make or 
break’ political coalitions. Hence, ‘under the right conditions, the news media nonetheless can 
have a powerful effect on process’ (Strobel, 1997, p.5). 
What should be noted from this discussion is that the media is in a better position to influence the 
range of problems that policymakers have to tackle and the way they are defined, rather than 
propose various policy solutions25. Gilboa (2005) argues that the media can force policymakers 
to address certain issues even when they would prefer to ignore them. Thus, sustained media 
coverage has the potential to promote problem definitions even if they do not fit with the overall 
                                                          
25
 Moreover, Berry argues that, in contrast to domestic policy, the role of the media in foreign policy is to provide 
information to the general public, which makes it unable to coherently influence decisions in the policy initiation 
stage, when journalists are more eager to get the story published for the public. Conversely, in the policy outcome 
stage, the media can afford to adopt a more critical approach and highlight the failure or success of a certain policy 
(Berry, 1990). 
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political environment. One reason for this resides in the extent of the groups affected by the 
problem defined within the media. For example, scholars suggest that policymakers are prone to 
respond to policy definitions which highlight mass starvation, genocide, war, child labour, all 
events and developments to which the general public can easily relate to and feel empathy 
(Hallin, 1984; Rachlin, 1988; Livingston, 1997; Gitlin, 2003; Robinson, 2007). Media definitions 
of policy problems which are abstract and remote to the general public are less likely to be 
salient and influence the agenda of policymakers. Developments in the international arena and 
the broader global context can limit the range of problems that the media can define. At the same 
time, policy problems which focus on other competing issues are rapidly sidelined or are not 
thoroughly articulated by the media (Page, 1996; Edwards and Wood, 1999; Brueggemann and 
Wessler, 2009). Miller (2007) has argued that the ability of the media to successfully propose 
and influence policy solutions and their implementation is limited26, in all but one case when 
journalists express their criticism towards a range of solutions while supporting others. Thus, the 
media can be thought to have rather negative effects towards the proposal, adoption and 
implementation of policy solutions. A more nuanced interpretation suggests that, in the rare 
situations when policy solutions are being put forward by journalists, they can be very successful 
when little to no amount of policy and administrative accommodation is needed in order to put 
them into practice. Balabanova (2010) argues that policy or administrative viability can trump 
political interests and ambitions, if solutions are favoured by lower ranking officials and the 
foreign policy bureaucracy as a whole.  
The agenda setting powers of the media also dwell on its ability to express policy expectations. 
The media can be considered to influence decision-making processes through defining 
expectations and acceptable behaviour, and focusing on the context and pace of policymaking 
(Touri, 2006, p.21). The degree to which such expectations differ from those held by 
policymakers themselves or institutions is to a great extent questionable (Shapiro and Jacobs, 
2000). Nonetheless, Page (1996, 2000) underscores that media are the gatekeeper of 
policymakers’ commitments and never shy away from criticising them for not living up to the 
goals expressed in the past. Expectations are reified and reinforced by journalists, who seem to 
                                                          
26
 One reason for this might reside in the internal conflict which arouses between journalists’ realisation of the fact 
that their activity might have a transformative effect on others and their commitment to objective reporting. 
(Carruthers, 1999, p.273) 
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never forget policymakers’ discourse and be wary of each significant change in policy rhetoric or 
practice (Walgrave, Soroka and Nuytemans, 2008). In some cases though, journalists behave like 
activists and follow certain values and goals taken up from sources other than official ones, such 
as NGOs, artists, epistemic communities, or various transnational groups (Brueggemann and 
Wessler, 2009). Media perceptions of the structure and nature of IR can create powerful 
expectations which can influence policymakers because ‘the press’ definition of the structure of 
international affairs may become the prevailing definition among officials indirectly, because it 
is the one so many people accept’ (Cohen, 1993, p.211). Carruthers contends that policy 
definitions framed by journalists might have a more salient and long-lasting influence on 
policymaking as ‘mass media do less to mirror the world as it is than to shape a world as it 
should not be:  a world where war too readily appears an inevitable outgrowth of ‘human nature’ 
and still, after a long century of conflict, an appropriate form of dispute resolution’ (Carruthers, 
1999, p.273). 
Through agenda setting, under the right circumstances – when journalists or media institutions’ 
own agenda does not diverge from democratic values –, the media can significantly enhance 
democratic legitimacy in foreign policy decision-making processes. Firstly, by setting the 
agenda, journalists become part of the political process27. In this position they have the ability to 
link individuals to decision-making processes within the public sphere by conveying the views 
(perceived or real28) of the general public to policymakers. Issues that affect large areas of the 
general public and wouldn’t normally be known to policymakers get publicised and politicised, 
prompting policymakers to address them through various policies. Journalists might also behave 
as activists, backing up certain causes related to foreign policy which translate into a higher 
degree of support from the media for forms of participative democracy in the public sphere set 
up in order to engage with that specific issue. Finally, even more than in instances of bounding, 
journalists, through the policy definitions they construct and due to their continuous dialogue 
with policymakers, have a better position to boost the accountability and transparency of 
decision-making processes in foreign policy, or foster responsiveness (Valkenburg, Semetko 
                                                          
27
 O’Heffernan contends that while the media becomes part the policy process, the government can also be seen as 
part of the media process (O’Heffernan, 1991, p.82) 
28
 Unlike politicians, the media is considered to be more sensitive to the wishes of the general public and shapes its 
discourse accordingly (Key, 1968; Gamson and Modigliani, 1989; Risse-Kappen, 1991; Kennamer, 1994; Zaller, 
1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Eichenberg, 2000; Everts, 2000; Sinnott, 2000). 
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andde Vreese, 1999; Norris, Kern, and Just, 2003; Sheafer and Gabay, 2009). The next chapter 
focuses on operationalising these concepts and presenting the methodology applied throughout 
the following three empirical chapters. 
 
3.3 Conclusions 
The link between foreign policy and democratic legitimacy is yet to have captured the interest of 
foreign policy analysts in a substantial manner. Most studies argue that foreign policy (still) is an 
area of high politics closed off from the better part of society. Public opinion or the media have 
been treated only as intervening variables which at best can catalyse foreign policy approaches 
and initiatives which are already accepted by policymakers. Nonetheless, recent research has 
highlighted the agenda setting powers of the media. Drawing on insights from political theory 
and political communication scholarship, the previous chapter argued that the public sphere – 
defined as the space where individuals are granted the opportunity to interact with politics – has 
the ability to endow decision-making processes in foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. 
Within the public sphere the media has a central role as it provides information to individuals 
and conveys their (perceived) views to policymakers. This chapter has shown that in order to 
evaluate the way in which democratic legitimacy is endowed by the activity of the media and its 
interactions with policymakers, a theoretical model which surveys the interaction effects that 
characterise the media/foreign policy nexus is applied. Moreover, the interaction effects model is 
used in this thesis to shed light on the two research questions set out in the introductory chapter. 
Three types of interaction effects are identified: indexing, bounding and agenda setting. Firstly, 
indexing captures the ability of policymakers to influence and shape media discourse in order to 
aid their interests and goals by communicating in a favourable manner their policies to the 
general public. Secondly, through bounding the media can have a constraining or limiting effect 
on the range of policies – and their effectiveness – that policymakers can pursue, even if the 
latter are not aware of or willing to engage with the policy definitions constructed by journalists. 
Finally, agenda setting captures the ability of the media to purposively influence decision-
making processes through its discourse. 
Together with the analysis of the media/foreign policy nexus, policy definitions facilitate 
assessing the implication of interaction effects for the way in which democracy is infused in 
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foreign policy. Policy definitions are empirically analysed through frame analysis which is 
presented in the next chapter on methodology. Framing is thought generally to capture the way 
individuals, groups or other actors represent reality by focusing on some aspects while 
downplaying others. Policy definitions are divided in three categories: policy problems, solutions 
and expectations. Each category can stem from a myriad of sources ranging from policymakers, 
journalists, to the political and journalistic cultures found within a certain political system and 
their interaction, or the way public opinion is perceived by the media and policymakers. The 
likelihood that a problem definition framed by the media will be adopted in official discourse 
and implemented in policy practice is influenced by a number of factors: the fit between the 
definition and the policy environment, the ownership of the problem and the range of those 
affected by it, and the broader domestic or international political context. On the other hand, 
viability on three levels –policy, administrative and political – determines the potential of 
solutions framed by journalists to be incorporated in foreign policy rhetoric and practice. Finally, 
expectations are considered to capture the political philosophy of a political system and the 
subsequent broader cultural, social and economic context. The next chapter operationalises these 
concepts and presents the methodology employed for identifying and studying media effects, and 
their implications for exploring the presence of democratic legitimacy in the EU’s foreign policy. 
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Chapter 4 – Methodology 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the methods used in order to analyse the interaction effects between 
policymakers and the media, and their meaning for the way in which democratic legitimacy is 
enacted in the EU’s foreign policy. This thesis employs frame analysis and correlates it with data 
from interviews, questionnaires, official documents and other relevant findings drawn from 
scholarship29. Frame analysis can paint a representative picture of indexing effects coupled with 
the agenda setting and bounding powers of the media and the way it views and presents a certain 
phenomenon. Hence, the analysis of the framing activities of the media concentrates on the way 
in which journalists organise their discourse around a series of central ideas, themes and 
interpretations, in this way ignoring or downplaying other facets of reality (Baum and Potter, 
2008). This is supported by the use of semi-structured interviews and questionnaires with 
policymakers and journalists, which are examined in order to explore the links between the 
media and the political sphere. Insights from interviews, questionnaires and the wider literature 
are used in order to portray and evaluate the political and journalistic cultures which underpin the 
media/foreign policy nexus. Moreover, interviews and questionnaires explore personal contacts, 
the nature of interactions between journalists and policymakers, mutual perceptions of their roles 
and the perception of the role of democratic legitimacy within decision-making processes in 
foreign policy. Through mixing these methods, a narrative can be constructed for both case 
studies of how policymakers interacted with the media. At the same time, this allows answering 
the two research questions and evaluating the implications of the three types of interaction 
effects for the way in which democratic legitimacy was enacted throughout the two case studies 
– which will be detailed in the first part of this chapter. 
                                                          
29
 These methods help overcoming one of the major problems that plague research on the link between the media 
and policymaking in foreign policy which refers to the fact that coverage and content analysis are poorly linked with 
policy processes or outcomes (Kent, 2005, p.192). 
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Foreign policy analysts have been keen to recognise a major difficulty in the fact that it is hard to 
find or locate linkages between media activity and policymaking (Badsey, 1994; Gitlin, 2003; 
Gilboa, 2005). In this thesis, findings are based on congruencies and inferences between data 
gathered from various sources and analysed with multiple methods – pointing towards 
methodological pluralism. On the other hand, research enquiring into the influence of the media 
over foreign policy which employs data from interviews is plagued by two shortcomings. Firstly, 
it is hard to determine the actual importance that policymakers allocate to the influence of the 
media or the role of democratic legitimacy. Secondly, policymakers may find it difficult to 
measure the precise impact that the media had on their decisions30. More generally, policymakers 
tend to over or underestimate the impact of the media in relation to particular events, in this way 
providing a distorted view (Robinson, 2002, p.18).  
Within this thesis, interviews and questionnaires are used in order to provide background 
information and describe the context within which the media and policymakers interact (the 
media/foreign policy nexus). While data from actual policy meetings and committees is to a 
large extent still unavailable, this shortcoming can be overcome by using official documents, 
press releases, press statements, official declarations or press conferences. Hence, inferences 
about the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy are made only on the 
basis of cross-referencing and consistencies between all the methods and sources employed. 
Before presenting the methods used in this thesis, the first part of the chapter offers a background 
to the two case studies which are concentrated around two very distinct issue areas in the EU’s 
foreign policy: the EU’s climate change policy, and its policy towards Russia.The second part of 
the chapter expands on the method of frame analysis, the range of media sources, together with 
data from interviews and questionnaires used throughout the next three chapters. The third part 
of the chapter provides a detailed presentation of the sample employed in the thesis consisting of 
two member states (the United Kingdom and Romania) and the transnational level. 
 
                                                          
30
 According to Akor, ‘it is reasonable  to expect policy makers' perspectives on issues and their recall of details of  
those issues to change with time (…) it is also reasonable to expect officials' to be  dependent on the personality and 
style of the interviewer’(Akor, 2011, p.123). 
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4.2Case study selection: Two very distinct issue areas in EU foreign policy 
4.2.1 The Union’s global climate change policy 
The roots of the EU’s engagement with climate change policy can be found in the 1980s when 
environmental issues began appearing in domestic politics in states such as Germany, France or 
Belgium. The domestic electoral dynamics in these countries caused the expansion of European 
environmental standards, a trend which was accelerated in the 1990s with the accession of a 
series of new states where green parties were highly regarded (Kelemen and Vogel, 2009, p.442). 
Simultaneously, in the US the influence of environmental groups decreased after the drive 
spurred on by the seminal UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 
1972 died out (Vogler, 2005, p.837). Green parties in Europe had gained at the time the 
sympathy of the media which, throughout the 1980s publicised environmental calamities such as 
the discovery of a hole in the Ozone layer or the Chernobyl nuclear disaster (Kelemen, 2010, 
p.340). In practical terms, the development of the common market in the 1970s made it possible 
for the European Commission to create environmental regulatory standards and harmonise them 
in accordance with most the stringent adopted previously, unilaterally, by various member states 
(Costa, 2008). The adoption of the Maastricht treaty, by transforming the decision-making rule 
for environmental measures from unanimity to qualified majority voting gave new thrust to the 
Union’s environment policy, as member states that were unwilling to incur domestic 
environment costs found it more difficult to oppose new regulations (Andersen and Liefferink, 
1997). 
 
The adoption of the Kyoto Protocol is considered to be the first major expression of the EU’s 
leadership in global climate change policy, although its efforts did not materialise in no more 
than a washed out compromise (Kelemen and Vogel, 2009, p.448). During the negotiations for 
the Protocol, the EU opposed US efforts to make developing countries subject to equal emission 
targets. Through this, it tried to persuade third world and developing countries of its commitment 
to norms such as differentiated responsibility and international equity (Scruggs, 2003; Veenman 
and Liefferink, 2005; Paterson, 2009; Camia, 2010; Parker and Karlsson, 2010). Thus, on a first 
reading, Kyoto forced the Union to commit itself to take far more costly actions than it would 
have desired, losing in this way international competiveness in relation to other developed states 
that did not agree to the ambitious emissions targets (Harris, 2007b, p.361). On the other hand, 
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Vogler (2011, p.33) has underlined that within this evaluation there is a not so evident degree of 
hypocrisy, as the EU managed to negotiate favourable terms for most of its important industries. 
Post-Kyoto the attitude of the EU shifted towards accepting the compromise with other 
developed states. This can explained by the difficulty that some member states had in matching 
international commitments, the slow pace of negotiations after 1997 or the tendency of some 
member states to act unilaterally due to their close relationships with the US (Costa, 2008, 
p.537). Nonetheless, these shortcomings did not sidetrack the EU from assuming leadership in 
global climate change policy, while other states were still not taking the problem seriously 
(Kilian and Elgström, 2010, p.265).  
With the coming to power of the Bush administration in 2001, the US pulled out of the treaty 
stating that Kyoto was dead (Falkner, 2007; Paterson, 2009; Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007). In 
this context, the EU took on its shoulders the duty of seeing the treaty ratified. In the end, it was 
a compromise on the part of the EU which made this goal possible, namely supporting Russia’s 
bid for membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that paved the way for the Kyoto 
treaty to enter into force (Vogler, 2011, p.29; Parker and Karlsson, 2010, p.929). Since the 
ratification of the Kyoto treaty, the EU has made long term commitments in climate change 
policy. Firstly, it has introduced more aggressive climate and energy plans that would help build 
a more sustainable low-carbon economy. Secondly, ‘it has agreed to raise the share of renewable 
energy in its overall energy consumption from the current 8.5% to 20% and to raise the 
percentage of its automotive fuel use comprised of bio fuels to 10% until 2020’(Schmidt, 2008a, 
p.84). 
The Copenhagen summit which took place in December 2009 was widely seen as an opportunity 
for the EU to draw on its global leadership and drive forward a progressive agreement. Although 
the EU displayed leadership in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit, by promising funding to 
developing states (Parker and Karlsson, 2010; Oberthür and Dupont, 2011; Roberts, Parks and 
Vásquez, 2011), the events during the summit point to the idea that the Union lost its position as 
global leader in climate change policy. The US and the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, 
India and China) drafted the final version of the Copenhagen Accord constraining the EU to 
accept the deal. Curtin (2010, p.25) highlights that at the time, among developing, third world 
states and media in Europe and across the world, ‘there was a recognition that the EU had been 
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upstaged at best and humiliated at worst’. The Union’s multilateral approach had been replaced 
by a more bottom-up unilateral approach supported by the US and China. Even the European 
media argued that ‘the truth about Copenhagen is that (…) the EU completely failed to show 
leadership on environmental matters’ (Kilian and Elgström, 2010, p.258) 
According to Egenhofer and Georgiev (2010), Europe’s failure at the Copenhagen summit must 
not come as a shock, for the EU was at the time a minor power in global emissions and only 
developing countries can matter in the end in delivering any sustainable solutions. Moreover, at 
the time, China and the US were highly constrained by their domestic institutions and 
circumstances to search for unilateral solutions. In the US, president Obama could not support 
new international climate deals unless he managed to win a majority of 67 votes in the Senate, 
which was highly unlikely (Christoff, 2010, p.650). For the Chinese, sovereignty and national 
interest seemed to weigh more than global issues (Christoff, 2010, p.644). Nonetheless, 
following the Copenhagen summit, the European Commission argued that its efforts were a 
success because member states (which were also committed to ambitious emission reduction 
targets and to the use of environmental friendly technology) managed to act unitedly and provide 
a worthy example to small and island states. This was an example on which the EU drew during 
the following summits on climate change in Cancun, Durban and Doha, where it managed to 
form a broad coalition with small and island states. 
 
4.2.2 The EU’s policy towards Russia 
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, relations between Russia and the EU have been 
thought to be characterised by the dichotomy between conflict and cooperation (Krok-
Paszkowska and Zielonka, 2005; Lukyanov, 2008; Averre, 2009; Nichol, 2009; Haukkala, 2010). 
Periods of cooperation have succeeded or overlapped with subsequent periods of conflict, 
increasing in this way the complex character of EU-Russia relations and making the analyst’s 
effort of understanding them even more difficult, but also worthwhile. With the last enlargement 
towards CEE, the EU and Russia have become increasingly interdependent and in a continuous 
struggle for more influence in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Most scholars would contend that the 
eastwards advance of the EU has brought about an intense conflictual period in its relations with 
Moscow (Leonard and Popescu, 2008; Hopf, 2008; Haukkala, 2008; Light, 2008; Popescu and 
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Wilson, 2009; Tardieu, 2009; Pardo Sierra, 2011; Larsen, 2012). Not only the competition for 
more influence in the Eastern Neighbourhood, but also Europe’s dependency on Russian gas are 
considered to be the main factors contributing to the increasing conflictual nature of EU-Russia 
relations. Together with these, a clash of identities and interpretations of sovereignty has been a 
fertile ground for the appearance of various misunderstandings which have deepened the 
conflict. While the EU can be seen as a postmodern actor which has elevated itself from the 
constraints of sovereignty and nationalism, Russia has questioned the possibility of convergence 
with the Union on these terms (Berryman, 2012; Ziegler, 2012; Sakwa, 2013). On the other hand, 
Russia has been perceived as possessing a pre-modern identity which predisposes it to a positive 
and objective interpretation of international law and state sovereignty (Vasilyan, 2010, 89). 
Nonetheless, both Russia and the EU are in a process of defining their international actorness and 
foreign policy identities (DeBardeleben, 2012).  
Cooperation, when it has occurred, has been related only to broad or marginal issues in the 
international agenda which were seen by both Russia and the EU as not affecting their vital 
interests. According to Kaczmarski (2011, 160), Russia and the EU tend not to differ when it 
comes to second order or distant international concerns. For example, both the EU and Russia on 
many occasions have rejected the use of military force for the resolution of international crises. 
The Georgian-Russia war of 2008 provided Moscow with the opportunity to have its voice 
clearly heard in Europe and strike a new partnership with the EU, built on the economic and 
security interests they share. Such a partnership, although still very abstract in practice, has been 
a long-lasting concern on President Putin’s agenda (in both his past and current terms). As early 
as 2005, Putin was sending a clear message to the EU in an article published in Le Figaro: 
The Russian nation has always felt part of the large European family, and has 
shared common cultural, moral and spiritual values. On our historical path – 
sometimes falling behind our partners, other times overtaking them – we have 
been through the same stages of establishing democratic, legal and civil 
institutions. Therefore, the Russian nation’s democratic and European choice is 
entirely logical. This is a sovereign choice of a European nation that defeated 
Nazism and knows the price of freedom (Putin quoted in Headley, 2012, 243). 
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In the literature, the EU has been presented as a postmodern actor that in opposition to Russia 
does not rely on hard power in its international relations (Emerson, 2006; Haukkala, 2007; 
Ganzle, 2007; Light, 2008; Christou, 2010; Weaver, 2010; Tonra, 2010; Manners, 2010a). Such 
behaviour has created a degree of conflict in relation to the types of governance promoted in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood. However, Russia also prefers a weak hard power EU that does not have 
the capabilities to intervene in security issues: ‘Russia is stronger and faster… In every conflict 
situation, it comes out better’ (Popescu and Wilson, 2009, p.39). Each time the Union has 
seemed to be flexing its muscles and envisaged sending CSDP missions in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood, Russia has overtly expressed its criticism (Biscop, 2010; Delcour, 2010; 
Haukkala, 2010). Consequently, Russia uneasily accepts the Union’s sui generis identity as long 
as it gives it a free hand to exert its hard power (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012; Feklyunina, 
2012; Milevschi, 2012; Morozov and Rumelili, 2012; Sakwa, 2012).   
Most member states have sought to develop enhanced bilateral relations with Russia, who on its 
part has endorsed this kind of behaviour in different official documents (Sammut, 2010, p.79; 
Haukkala, 2008, 2009; Delcour, 2010; Cichocki, 2010). Germany and France offer the best 
example of developing this type of links with Moscow. Both have seen Russia as a main 
economic and security partner outside of the EU (Rahr, 2005, 2007; Lukyanov, 2008; Light, 
2008). According to Weaver (2010, p.67), the Union as a whole has suffered in consistency and 
coherence, as most member states have developed their bilateral relations without consulting or 
having in mind their partners in the EU. Individual member states are thus more prone to seek 
their own agenda in their ties with Russia, leaving EU institutions crippled and unable to put into 
practice any of their more ambitious policies in the Eastern Neighbourhood that would conflict 
with Moscow’s interests. The Commission or the EP are only left with the power of responding 
rhetorically towards Russia. Even though they have found in some occasions support for their 
initiatives from states such as Sweden, – in the case of inserting a membership perspective within 
the Eastern Partnership (EaP) – Germany and France decisively opposed them. One explanation 
for this would be that Western member states feel more unease at the prospect of immigration 
from the post-Soviet states than Sweden (Agh, 2010). Nonetheless, member states’ inclination to 
forge enhanced bilateral relations bypassing the Union’s institutions points to the fact that 
research on EU-Russia relations should have a primary focus on individual member states and 
then on the EU’s institutional dynamics in foreign policy. The policy over Russia case study 
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differs in this respect from the one on climate change policy, where the high degree of 
coordination between member states makes the Commission the main locus for decision-making.  
The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 had its roots in the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
South Ossetian war which ensued shortly after between ethnic Georgian and Ossetians, and left 
half of the region under the de facto control of the Russian joint peacekeeping force. During the 
spring and summer months of 2008 tensions escalated in the region, and on August 5 going 
through to August 7 Georgian forces launched a military offensive in an attempt to bring back 
the territory under Georgian control. Georgia’s intervention produced casualties among Russian 
peacekeepers which prompted a large scale intervention from the Russian army. Moscow 
justified it on humanitarian bases and in order to enforce the previous peace settled at the 
beginning of the 1990s. After five days of heavy fighting and raids on various Georgian strategic 
facilities and cities, the Georgian forces retreated. On August 12 a preliminary ceasefire was 
brokered by the French Presidency of the EU, which was signed by the two parties to the conflict 
in the following days.  
The Russian-Georgian war of 2008 represents a crucial moment in the logic of EU-Moscow 
relations and is analysed in this thesis as a defining moment for the EU’s policy towards Russia 
(Rynning and Jensen, 2010, p.142; Agh, 2010; Baun and Marek, 2010; Christou, 2010; Biscop, 
2010; Cichocki, 2010; Haukkala, 2010, 2009; Najšlová, 2010; Sammut, 2010; Wolczuk, 2010; 
Weaver, 2010; Vasilyan, 2010). Firstly, it relinquished all doubts regarding Russia’s desires to 
become a hegemon in the post-Soviet space. It showed that in times of crisis it was willing to 
deal a swift and deadly blow with its military power in order to protect its interests. The presence 
of Russians in all of the countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood has made their safety a national 
interest for Moscow. Although the 2008 August war was a public display of Russian hard power, 
Moscow was also engaged in a more silent attack in the background. Since 2004, many non-
Russian nationals from ENP countries have been awarded Russian passports, giving Moscow the 
legitimate right to protect them – it is estimated that at the time of the war around 170.000 people 
in Georgia held Russian passports (Popescu and Wilson, 2009, p.42). Nonetheless, Russia gave 
the West an important signal and managed to put its bid for leadership in the region across to the 
EU (Sammut, 2010, p.84).  
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Secondly, with the Russia-Georgian war, the EU realised that frozen conflicts in the Caucasus 
could not be contained anymore without any clear involvement. Its duty of pacifying the conflict 
was reinforced by the fact that NATO – with even talks of membership – and the US sided too 
early with Georgia, compromising any potential agreement (Biscop, 2010, p.83). Before the war, 
bureaucrats in Brussels were very reluctant to involve the EU in frozen conflicts, as they 
considered that this would damage not only its relations with Russia, but also the success of the 
ENP (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012; Ivan, 2012b; Milevschi, 2012; Nitoiu, 2012; Tudoroiu, 
2012). Since the end of the war, Commission officials have stressed that the EU’s mission 
consisting of 200 field specialists sent in to oversee the peace agreement in Georgia has been a 
success, and therefore the Union has proven that it possesses the instruments to manage, contain 
and end conflicts (Weaver, 2010, p.74).  
Thirdly, the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 redefined relations between Brussels and 
Moscow as the conflict culminated with the symbolic request from president Putin that all major 
figures in the foreign policy of the EU sign the ceasefire treaty over the conflict with Georgia. 
Russia felt that all the major leaders in the EU (the president of the European Commission, the 
High Representative on Security and Foreign Policy, and the president of that time of the 
Council) had to be present in order to legitimate the important decision that was to come for the 
EU (Matsaberidze, 2008). In comparison to the Copenhagen summit, the ceasefire agreement 
brokered by the French presidency of the EU was seen and framed by the EU as a major 
achievement and a mark of the fact that the Union was a major actor in the international arena 
(Cornell and Starr, 2009; Nichol, 2009; Tardieu, 2009; Barroso, 2010; Larsen, 2012).  
This section has highlighted that this thesis explores two very distinctive areas of EU foreign 
policy: the EU’s approach to global climate change and its policy towards Russia. Empirically 
the focus is on two high level events which are viewed as defining moments in relation to each of 
the two issue areas. Table 4.1 outlines the differences among the case studies which were 
detailed in this section. The following two parts of the chapter present the methodology and the 
sample employed in the thesis. 
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Table 4.1 Comparative overview of the two case studies 
 Policy over Russia Climate change 
a) Event analysed The Russian – Georgian war of 
2008 
The Copenhagen Summit of 2009 
b) The EU’s approach Normative rhetoric / Realist practice 
 
Normative rhetoric and practice 
c) Coordination between EU 
member states 
Low High 
d) Level of public debate Low 
 
High 
e) Solidarity between member 
states 
Low High 
f) Support for the role of the EU 
as an international actor 
The EU as an important player in 
world politics that could influence 
the international agenda in issues as 
Afghanistan or North Korea. 
The EU as democratising its Eastern 
Neighbourhood 
 
The EU constructed as a normative 
power which behaves as a force for 
good in the benefit of all the peoples 
of the world and the future of 
generations to come.  
g) Economic incentives Developing strong economical ties 
with Russia. 
Energy security 
 
EU a leader in environmental 
friendly technology 
 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Frame analysis 
The framing activity of the media is crucial in understanding and identifying the three interaction 
effects underlying the media/foreign policy nexus – indexing, bounding, and agenda setting. 
Through framing the media articulates its policy definitions and gets them across to the general 
public, and more importantly to policymakers. A focus on frame analysis allows for the 
identification of the way in which the discourse of the media is categorised around a series of 
central opinions and ideas, in this way constructing policy definitions. Frame analysis 
underscores the connections made by the journalists between different events, policies or 
phenomena and their possible interpretations (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005). Journalists frame 
policy definitions around real-world issues and events, in this way directing readers’ attention on 
certain interpretations and structures of meaning. According to Entman (1993, p.152), framing 
means ‘to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’. Other scholars have 
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conceived framing as being less dynamic and portraying rather fixed meanings31 which 
journalists can select in order to present and comment on various political issues, making them 
clear to the general public (Mermin, 1999; Page and Shapiro, 1992; Peffley and Hurwitz, 1993; 
Robinson, 2001, 2011). Readers are usually unaware of the range of the framing strategies 
employed by the media, and thus susceptible to adopting their views (Auerbach and Bloch-
Elkon, 2005, p.85). However, research in social psychology has shown that individuals integrate 
frames received from the media within their broader view of reality and existing interpretations 
or stereotypes developed incrementally through personal experience and interactions with 
various discourses (Edwards and Wood, 1999). As a consequence, the study of media framing 
also has to take into account the social, political and cultural context in which it operates. 
One common distinction found throughout the literature differentiates between framing and 
priming, whereby the latter refers ‘to changes in the standards that people use to make political 
evaluations’ (Iyengar and Kinder, 2010, p.63). De Vreese and his associates (2001) have 
identified two types of framing: issue specific and generic framing. The former are related to 
social and political structures, while issue specific framing refers to specific topics and salient 
events in the public sphere. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) have identified two other types of 
generic framing. Firstly, human interest framing focuses emotionally on the individuals and 
groups of individuals affected by certain issues, whilst conflict framing focuses on the 
conflicting nature of issues in foreign policy which can lead to polarisation. Another distinction 
can be made between distance and support framing. The former aims to create a certain sense of 
detachment between the general public and a particular issue, so as not prompt an official 
response from the executive. Support framing, on the other hand, implies overt support for 
official policy approaches (Robinson, 2002, p.35). While this differentiation can be useful when 
studying the influence of the media over international conflict and intervention, it provides little 
insight for an enquiry into the presence of democratic legitimacy in foreign policy, as both types 
of framing create instances of indexing32. Finally, in their extensive review of the literature 
                                                          
31
 For example, Giltin (2003, p.7) contends that ‘media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, of 
selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol handlers routinely organise discourse whether verbal or 
visual’.  
32
 Hence, for the purpose of enquiring into interaction effects, a differentiation based on the way in which the media 
frames policy problems, solutions and expectations provides a more detailed and reliable picture. 
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Chong and Druckman (2007b, p.116) find that the media’s framing strategies (and the resulting 
policy definitions) are considered strong if they emerge from intense public debate.  
Framing can also be seen ‘as an indicator of media power and autonomy in the sense that 
through its process journalists exercise the freedom and the power to be selective in the events 
they cover and consequently to represent the world in ways that reflect their own motivations’ 
(Touri, 2006, pp.39–40). At the same time, the media has the power to frame in a negative way 
and downplay events within the public sphere and shift public attention to more trivial aspects of 
social life – having, as Trenz (2009) points out, a dumbing down effect.  The media tends to 
select materials that have an inherent ‘newsworthiness’ in that they mirror issues of human 
interest – such as proximity, avenues for personalisation and dramatisation, or the status and 
notoriety of the actors involved – which hold high commercial value (Gavin, 2009, p.771). For 
example, in relation to the EU, even though most studies have shown that the British media tends 
to adopt an Eurosceptic discourse, ‘bad news’ can have an upward effect on the amount of 
knowledge that citizens have about the EU (Boomgaarden et al., 2010, p.518).   
Consequently, in constructing the three interaction effects, the framing of policy definitions is 
also complemented by media coverage33 which is widely considered to provide citizens with the 
necessary information that would allow them to construct reflexive opinions regarding European 
issues (Camia, 2010; Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Carvalho, 2007; Gavin, 2009, 2010; Gavin, 
Leonard-Milsom and Montgomery, 2011; Gavin and Marshall, 2011; Olausson, 2009, 2010). As 
individuals in the EU have few chances to get in contact with foreign policy decision-makers, 
news reports and articles supplied by the media fill this knowledge gap, mediating the 
interactions between society and politics (Nieminen 2009, 73). Policymakers may benefit from 
media coverage by monitoring and evaluating the impact of their policies in the settings of the 
member states. Moreover, mediatisation facilitates EU policymakers and administrators to 
initiate policies and open them to public debate, although the media can at times assume a more 
active role through framing in setting the agenda or legitimising different patterns of behaviour 
and rules within the political sphere (Trenz 2009, 53). Analytically, Robinson (2002, p.38) 
suggests that media influence and pressure on policymakers to act should be measured by the 
                                                          
33
 In this thesis, coverage as an indicator for the amount of interest that is afforded by the media to the two case 
studies is conceptualised in terms of the total number of articles. 
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number of front page news stories published. Such levels of coverage have to be sustained for a 
period of four to five days in order to attract the attention of policymakers. However, adopting 
this approach would paint a skewed picture of media influence as it suggests that policymakers  
will always be willing to interact with the policy definitions framed by the media (if they have 
sustained coverage), even in situations when they choose to ignore points of view which oppose 
their own approaches. This thesis aims to overcome this difficulty by analysing primary and 
secondary data from interviews, questionnaires, statements or press releases and correlating them 
with analysis of media framing and coverage.  
In his analysis of the CNN effect in the case of international interventions (Iraq 1991, Somalia 
and Bosnia) Robinson (2002, p.137) has applied a framework which implies identifying media 
frames according to a certain number of predictive keywords. This method is thought to increase 
the reliability and validity of the analysis, making it easier to replicate and test by other 
researchers. Another method aimed at insuring validity and reliability usually applied within 
larger studies by research groups involves using two or more researchers in order to code media 
reports separately, and test the findings through inter-coder reliability. This method makes 
findings harder to replicate by outside observers, and is impractical in the case of a PhD thesis. 
In this thesis articles were selected and coded on the basis of three separate readings. The 
methodology used for the selection of articles is presented in annex A. Section three of this 
chapter describes the publications included in the sample, while an overview of the articles 
analysed in each case is presented briefly in table A.1 in annex A (page 301) and in more detail 
in annexes C, D and E.  
In each of the three following chapters, frame analysis is used in order to identify the most 
pervasive policy definitions found throughout the selected articles during the three readings34. 
The frame analysis focused on the strategies employed by the media in order to select and 
emphasise certain aspects of reality, events, ideas or perceptions, whilst downplaying others. In 
the first instance, in each case study – throughout the sample member states and the transnational 
level – a quantitative descriptive analysis of the policy definitions framed by the media was 
operated. More specifically, for each policy definition, the number of articles containing it was 
                                                          
34
 In the third stage (the third reading) articles were read thoroughly in order to reinforce the validity and reliability 
of the analysis. 
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weighed against the total number of selected articles. The same process was then broken down 
and repeated for each publication, thus providing greater comparative depth to the study. At this 
stage, media coverage was also correlated with the policy definitions framed by the media as a 
means of uncovering their temporal relevance.  
The second stage implied a qualitative analysis which divided policy definitions framed by the 
media into the three types – problems, solutions and expectations – according to their message 
and aim. The significance and relevance of each type of policy definition was then judged both 
in relation to their frequency – explored in the first part of the analysis – and the different aspects 
that shape their potential to influence official rhetoric and policy. In the case of policy problems 
such aspects included: the range of ownership and of those affected by a problem definition, its 
fit with definitions promoted by other influential international actors such as the UN, or its 
ability to synchronise with and capture various flows and events in the international arena. 
Policy, administrative or political viability were the factors explored when considering the policy 
solutions framed by the media. The political philosophy which underpins the range of actions 
deemed appropriate for a government within a democratic system coupled with the ability of the 
media to express the current social, cultural and economic context were considered in the case of 
policy expectations. Drawing on the frame analysis, each empirical chapter correlates its findings 
with data from interviews and questionnaires, official documents and insights from scholarship 
in order to uncover the implications of the three interaction effects (indexing, bounding and 
agenda setting) for the way in which democratic legitimacy was enacted – and answer the two 
research questions. However, before detailing the methodology used during the interviews and 
questionnaires, coupled with their overall rationale the remainder of the section makes a case for 
the use of media sources in exploring political processes, with a focus on quality media.  
 
4.3.2 Newspapers as sources 
The choice for quality publications has often been argued for in scholarship drawing on their 
salience in their respective media landscapes and their nationwide distribution35 (Boomgaarden et 
al., 2010; Brüggemann and Kleinen-von Konigslow, 2009; Curtin, 2007; de Swaan, 2007; Trenz, 
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 Trenz (2004, p.313) has warned that although quality newspapers might have the biggest national coverage, they 
do not seek to address a national public or demos, but their narrow readerships. However, their target publics are 
dynamic and shift according to their interests in the issues presented.  
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2004; Stevenson, 2009; Statham, 2010c). Quality publications are the main public vehicle for 
both political and social discourse. Consequently, it is considered more likely to find articles 
about the EU in quality national newspapers than in local papers or tabloids (Meyer, 2005, 2009; 
Olausson, 2010; de Swaan, 2007; de Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006). Simultaneously, the 
quality media has been considered to provide the primary stimulus behind gathering popular 
support for more European integration (Risse, 2010). Additionally, the print media is also 
thought to allow space for more elaboration than television (Koopmans and Statham, 2010), thus 
granting journalists an increased potential to act as agenda setters – as it facilitates ‘autonomous 
opinion and will-formation processes of the public’ (Trenz, 2007, p.89). Quality publications 
have the potential to communicate the views of individuals to policymakers, thus shaping official 
rhetoric and policies (Trenz, 2004, 2007; D’Haenens, 2005). Nevertheless, even within the 
quality media there is an underlying danger of dumbing-down discourse and public debate. The 
personalisation of European topics, the search for the sensational or the overwhelming presence 
of advertisements might derail debates unto avenues that depart from rational and well-argued 
debate (Bennett, 2008). However, personalisation, dramatisation and fragmentation have a less 
severe impact on reporting in print media than on television and radio, allowing journalists 
working for newspapers to construct a more detailed and comprehensive discourse about foreign 
policy. Cohen (1993) has also argued that in comparison to other forms of media, newspaper 
reporting is more long-lasting and includes deeper analyses of events in the international arena.  
The media is considered to have the primary role of selecting, processing and distributing 
information and points of view about the Union to individuals. Besides the obvious focus on 
news reports for their role of informing about the EU’s policies, commentaries and editorials 
were at the centre of the frame analysis due to their power of constructing and shaping various 
ideologies36. They possess the ability to turn individual and collective opinion into public opinion 
which can influence policymakers (Pfetsch, 2005). Making allusions to the public and 
legitimising one’s views from public opinion is one common way in which editorial judgments 
are constructed. Moreover, commentaries do not offer objective reporting that takes into account 
all views. Most give priority to more or less normative or prescriptive opinions about what the 
EU is and should be (Kriesi, Tresch and Jochum, 2010; Koopmans and Zimmermann, 2010; 
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 Commentaries and editorials have been highly neglected both in media studies and political science as sources for 
empirical study (Pfetsch, 2005; Preston and Metykova, 2009; Trenz, 2004; Vliegenthart et al., 2008). 
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Meyer, 2005; Medrano and Gray, 2010; Schlesinger, 2007). Often debates might surface into 
editorials and commentaries in which journalists directly address other journalists or politicians 
that share opposite views. Nonetheless, Trenz (2007, p.91) has concluded that the central 
function of commentaries on the EU consists in allowing for the imagining of a ‘European 
society’ as a ‘collectivity of political self-determination’. These characteristics make the 
evaluation of commentaries and editorials very important for the assessment of the media’s role 
in shaping both public opinion and feeding the views of the general public to policymakers.  
Nonetheless, using media sources as a base for analysing social and political action has received 
a considerable amount of criticism from political scientists. They contend that the media does not 
represent an objective source of information due to its internal selection biases and its framing 
power (de Beus, 2010; Craglia and Annoni, 2009; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010; Kratochví, 
Cibulková and Beník, 2011; Koopmans, Erbe and Meyer, 2010; Koopmans and Zimmermann, 
2010). Besides the various arguments that have been put forward in the literature in favour of the 
idea that media research does not deviate from the norms of validity and reliability37, these 
criticisms actually highlight the goal of the present study (de Swaan, 2007; de Beus, 2010; 
Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010; Pfetsch, Adam and Eschner, 2010; Statham, 2010a, 2010b, 2010d; 
Trenz, 2007, 2004; Schlesinger, 2007; Preston and Metykova, 2009). It is because the media 
possesses such biases that one can assume that it has the ability to endow decision-making with 
democratic legitimacy and trace its normative role within the EPS. Moreover, Koopmans and 
Statham (2010, p.58) have stressed that the use of multiple sources can overcome the various 
limitations related to reliability and validity. The next section focuses on the use of interviews 
and questionnaires in order to complement frame analysis and their overall rationale.  
 
4.3.3 Using interviews and questionnaires with journalists and policymakers 
Open-ended interviews and closed-ended questionnaires (which also feature some open-ended 
questions) with journalists and policymakers were used in order to provide a better 
understanding of the interactions between policymakers and the media (and its policy 
                                                          
37
 While a coherent discussion of the arguments in support of the reliability and validity standards falls out of the 
scope of this chapter, it is worth noting that media studies scholars tend to agree that the print media is a useful 
source in both quantitative and quantitative analysis (Trenz, 2009; Statham, 2010d; Stråth and Wodak, 2009; Van de 
Steeg, 2002).  
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definitions). Correlated with frame analysis they allowed distinctions to be made among 
instances of indexing, bounding and agenda setting – as described in the first part of this chapter. 
Policymakers were selected in relation to their involvement in decision-making processes in the 
two issue areas of foreign policy explored in this thesis. The sample explained in annex B took 
into account the fact that in both issue areas individuals tend to move from working in national 
institutions to the transnational level38. The sample included both journalists working for the 
selected publications and freelancers. This choice was made because of the fact that both 
transnational and national publications rely on the activity of freelancers based in Brussels, who 
due to their increased technical knowledge of the EU are able to provide detailed and informed 
analyses. Swapping stories and personnel between transnational and national publications is a 
practice frequently employed (Siapera, 2004; Raeymaeckers and Cosjin, 2006; Lecheler, 2008; 
Lecheler and Hinrichsen, 2010; Gross and Kopper, 2011). Hence, sometimes Brussels based 
correspondents of national newspapers are asked to write from their point of view in 
transnational publications. In the same vein, national newspapers on some occasions publish 
translated articles from transitional publications based on commercial agreements (Harrisonand 
Wessels, 2009). Most correspondents based in Brussels and national journalists writing on the 
EU often contact or rely on the material produced by transnational publications (Lecheler, 2008). 
This happens because all three transnational publication analysed – which are presented in the 
next section – have a good reputation in Europe due to their high quality reporting on the EU 
(Meyer, 2009). Articles from transnational publications are frequently quoted by national 
newspapers and are seen as reliable sources, and thus avenues for legitimising media discourse 
(Preston and Metykova, 2009).  
Respondents were selected according to their involvement in the two issue areas examined, 
aiming for an equal spread between them (and between Britain, Romanian and the transnational 
level). The goal of the questions used was to probe into the dynamics of the media/foreign policy 
nexus in general, highlight the way in which policymakers interact with the media, and the way 
democratic legitimacy is enacted and understood in foreign policy. Annex F presents a sample of 
                                                          
38
 This cross section should be considered representative for those taking part in the two issues areas analysed here, 
and not for the wider group of individuals acting in the EU’s foreign policy. However, the results of the interviews 
can be perceived to paint a relevant picture of the media/foreign policy nexus and the subsequent interactions 
between policymakers and journalists in the EU’s foreign policy.  
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the general questions used in the interviews and questionnaires. More specific questions focused 
on the interactions between policymakers and journalists during the two key events analysed: the 
2009 Copenhagen summit and the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. The interviews and 
questionnaires with journalists covered topics related to the internal and external factors that 
influence the way policy definitions are constructed by the media, in this way taking into the 
account the complex nature of the relationship between journalists and policymakers (Statham, 
2010c, 2010d; Preston and Metykova, 2009; Van Noije, 2010; Medrano and Gray, 2010; 
Koopmans and Zimmermann, 2010; Koopmans, 2010). The internal factors included issues 
concerning: perceptions of readers’ demand, resources made available by various actors, quality 
of information from the EU as a source; while the external touched upon topics related to: 
framing and commenting strategies, targeting strategies or reporting strategies.  
The interviews with policymakers were focused around four substantive issues. The first set of 
issues explored their interactions with and their perception of the role of the media in the practice 
of EU foreign policy. Secondly, the interviews enquired into whether policymakers share a 
concern for democratic legitimacy and its multiple levels – transparency, accountability, 
responsiveness and openness to public debate. The third set of issues was aimed at tracing the 
internal processes that take place within institutions which deal w ith foreign policy, and more 
specifically the processes through which decisions and policy approaches are publicised. The 
contacts between policymakers and journalists were the subject of the final set of substantive 
issues.  
In analysing the interviews with journalist and policymakers in order to paint a reliable picture of 
the media/foreign policy nexus three aspects were taken into account. Firstly, there is a strong 
tradition in media studies of regarding the relationship between journalists and policymakers as 
paramount for the functioning of democratic systems: ‘a healthy symbiosis between politics and 
journalism is essential and life sustaining not only for them both but also for a third entity: 
democracy (...) when the symbiotic relationship falls ill, so does democracy’ (Merritt, 1997, 
p.52). In practice the symbiosis between the two spheres always falls short of the ideal, as both 
journalists and policymakers share different expectations and perceptions regarding their 
relationship and each other’s role in performing democracy. Journalists tend to praise themselves 
for being primarily objective mirrors to reality (Entman, 1989, p.8; Lewis, Williams and 
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Franklin, 2008, p.1). However, such a norm does not always apply to the way journalists choose 
the topics and stories that warrant coverage (Hesmondhalgh and Toynbee, 2008). Secondly, the 
main incentive for journalists seems to focus on whether an issue is interesting or not. Interesting 
within the journalistic culture possesses a strong symbolic meaning, as Niven (2012, p.263) 
points out: ‘in the academic world, calling work “interesting” might be seen as an insult, akin to 
calling it trivial (...) to a reporter, however, interesting is the currency of the realm’. A political 
issue (foreign policy included) is considered to be even more interesting when it questions with 
evidence the actions of elites, in this way making them more accountable to the general public. 
On the other hand, policymakers perceive ‘interesting’ or ‘good’ stories only those that highlight 
in a positive way issues where they would desire more visibility (Larsson, 2002, p.24).   
Thirdly, several studies have highlighted the significant differences in the way policymakers and 
journalists perceive the influence of media over politics in democratic societies (Bennett, 2004; 
Anderson, 2008; Kepplinger, 2002; Kappinen, 2008; Lewis, Williams and Franklin, 2008; 
Meyer, 2002; Newton, 2006; Larsson, 2002; Schudson, 2002, 1996; Ruusunoksa, 2006; Van 
Aelst et al., 2008; Strömbäck, 2011, 2008). Maurer (2011) has found that journalists see the 
media as having a weaker influence on decision-making processes than the estimates of 
policymakers. This happens because policymakers tend to be threatened by journalists that have 
their own political agenda which infuses their writing, pointing to the conclusion that the media 
is seen to have more power in relation to ‘political careers than as to the policy agenda’ (Maurer, 
2011, p.33). An alternative account finds journalists less willing to admit that they possess any 
sort of power to influence policymakers or use their discourse in an intentional way, due to the 
prospect of losing crucial informal ties with the political sphere (Van Aelst et al., 2008, p.499; 
Entman, 1989, pp.19–20). On the other hand, Larsson (2002, p.25) in his study of the Swedish 
media/policy nexus has shown that policymakers are willing to discuss their influence on media 
agendas through informal ties with journalists, because they see public relations as a central part 
of their role39. He goes on to argue that in their interactions, policymakers and journalists require 
a manoeuvring space which allows each group to secure its goals without significantly damaging 
the other’s interests. The relationship can be even curtailed in situations when one actor (usually 
journalists) exceeds its manoeuvring space by using informal contacts in a way that is deemed 
                                                          
39
 According to Maurer (2011, p.34), policymakers might also use their informal contacts with journalists in order to 
get across their message more clearly to the general public and without too much interference from the media.  
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illegitimate. On the other hand, journalists who develop close ties with politicians can easily be 
labelled as avenues for propaganda. In the case of the EU’s foreign policy, reporting on EU 
affairs has been a preferred activity for individuals who often have tended to drift from the public 
sphere to the political one. In the realm of foreign policy this trend has been even more evident 
as information in this area tends to be limited to a small number of officials and journalists 
(Krahmann, 2003). 
 
4.4 Sample 
Due to the complex and multilevel nature of the EU’s foreign policy the empirical analysis 
focused on two EU member states and the transnational level: Great Britain, Romania and 
transnational level (the EU’s institutions). Firstly, the choice for the for the two member states is 
justified by their differing roles, willingness and levels of commitment in acting in foreign policy 
through the framework of the EU. British support for the EU’s foreign policy has been often 
limited only to an abstract goal and its possible consequences, but almost never expressed in 
relation to the methods that could materialise such an aspiration (Aggestam, 2011). Since its 
accession in 2007, Romania is considered to have had among the member states – both old and 
new – one of the most pro-European attitudes towards the development of a common European 
foreign policy (Chifu, 2010; Ivan, 2012b). However, Romanian support has hardly been 
translated into willingness and commitment to act in practice towards achieving more European 
integration in foreign policy (Nitoiu, 2011; Ivan, 2012a, 2012b). Finally, the focus on the 
transnational level is justified by the role and salience of the EU’s institutions in constructing its 
foreign policy.  
In distinguishing media systems Hallin and Mancini (2004, p.11) assess them according to four 
major directions: the development of media markets, the development of journalistic  
professionalism, the type and degree of state intervention in the media system, and the link 
between political parties and media institutions (political parallelism). The media agenda is 
generally strongly impacted by the high level of parallelism, reporting and coverage focusing to 
a large extent on political life (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p.73). In practice, the strong links 
between media and politics translate into high levels of politicisation, with policymakers 
frequently shaping the agenda of the media: ‘ties between journalists and political actors are 
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close, the state intervenes actively in the media sector, and newspapers emphasise sophisticated 
commentary directed at a readership of political activists’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004, p.298). 
Within the Liberal or North Atlantic model (where the British media and the transnational 
publications are included) commercial publications dominate, leading to a high degree of 
professionalisation in journalism and a low level of parallelism. Due to the competitive and 
commercial nature of British media, Hallin and Mancini (2004, p.222) argue that the gatekeeping 
and public service role of the media is weaker than in other countries – which is also the case of 
the Romanian media landscape (Coman, 2009). Moreover, ethical regulations in the case of 
British and Romanian journalists are often overlooked in favor of market pressures (Morgan, 
1995; Balaban et al., 2010). On the other hand, Henningham and Delano’s (1998, p.153) study 
shows that for British journalists it is paramount that their reporting presents to the general 
public interpretations and assessments of complex issues. 
Two newspapers40 from each media landscape have been selected: The Guardian and The Times 
(UK), Adevărul and Jurnalul Naţional (Romania) and the Financial Times, the European Voice 
and the online publication the EUObserver.com (transnational level). They were investigated for 
a period of one year, two consecutive periods of six months before and after the two events 
analysed – the Georgian – Russian war of 2008 and the Copenhagen Summit of 200941. The 
selection of newspapers takes into account the characteristics of media systems and press 
cultures, namely the key political cleavages, the types of readerships, range of distribution, 
ability to influence public opinion and the journalistic style. Moreover, the publications have 
been chosen in order to mirror the split in political affiliations: centre-left vs. centre-right 
(Balčytienė and Vinciūnienė, 2010; Fossum and Schlesinger, 2007; Eriksen, 2007; Liebert, 2007; 
Medrano and Gray, 2010; Meyer, 2005). Countries have different media systems and political 
cultures which reflect the societal and cultural cleavages within subsequent general public. The 
publications selected for empirical analysis address these various national specificities – which 
are detailed in the following three subsections. 
 
                                                          
40
 The sample for the transnational level also includes the online publication EUObserver.com. 
41
 In examining the two issue areas of foreign policy, articles were identified using the Lexis-Nexis database and, in 
some cases, the online databases of the newspapers within a period stretching six months before and after each key 
event.  
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4.4.1 The transnational level 
At the transnational level, journalists share a cosmopolitan ideology underpinned by deep Euro-
optimism, which also compels them to maintain high professional standards. Transnational 
media have been held at bay from state regulation and government intervention due to the 
complex nature of the EU, in this way enjoying a larger degree of freedom than national media. 
The analysis included here two newspapers (their average circulation is presented in table 4.2) 
and one online publication: the Financial Times (FT)42, the European Voice (EV)43 and the 
EUObserver.com – which has a similar readership and coverage to the other two publications. 
None of these publications can be considered to be truly a ‘European newspaper’ because they 
do not aim to direct their discourse towards the general public living in the member states. In a 
2004 EUROPUB report on the way transnational European media report on EU topics, 
Firmstone (2004, p.8) found that transnational journalists believe that their European message 
cannot get across to individuals in the member states due to the national media which report 
mainly through domestic perspectives. However, these publications can be thought of as 
‘European wide’ or transnational media because their discourse usually transcends the 
boundaries of nation states and is almost never solely concerned with covering domestic politics 
within a single member state. Transnational publications frequently employ freelancers and their 
articles are quoted or even translated by British and Romanian (and generally national media) 
publications, as they are seen to contain expert and in depth analysis of EU issues.  
Table 4.2 Daily circulation for selected transnational publications
44
 
Newspaper/Publication Origin Daily Circulation 
  2008  
(August) 
2009 
(December) 
European Voice Transnational 18.926 19.318 
Financial Times Transnational 118.250 113.055 
EUObserver.com Transnational 25.000 visitors per day 
 
The Financial Times (FT) is widely considered to be the most important transnational newspaper 
(Baisnée, 2002, 2003, 2007; Raeymaeckers and Cosjin, 2006; Raeymaeckers, Cosijn and Deprez, 
                                                          
42
 The FT refers here to its European edition which should be distinguished from the British edition. It is mostly 
similar to the UK version, but has a larger emphasis on European issues. 
43
 Owned by the Economist Group. 
44
 Data was extracted from: www.ft.com;www.europeanvoice.com; 
http://www.silchestermarketing.com/EU_Oserver_Media_Kit.pdf. Accessed on 15/09/2013. 
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2007; Statham, 2007b; Pfetsch, Adam and Eschner, 2010; Balčytienė et al., 2006). 
Raeymaeckers and his colleagues (2007, p.115) found that the FT has a privileged position 
within the ‘Brussels bubble’. It enjoys a considerable amount of prestige, often being considered 
by policymakers in Brussels the only true European newspaper. Its status is built on greater 
access to resources than other transnational media and a commitment to thorough and critical 
reporting, providing a prime example of quality journalism. The FT has the largest press bureau 
based in Brussels which reports both on the day to day activities45 of European institutions, and 
also on political and economic developments in the member states and other countries in Europe. 
However, articles tend to be tailored for a European business oriented readership, the newspaper 
affording the majority of its space to issues concerning stocks and shares, financial markets, or 
companies in Europe. The FT shapes its discourse in order to cater for the interests of ‘national 
governments, EU institutions and European political parties as well as its readership’ (Firmstone, 
2004, p.34). 
European Voice (EV) focuses on presenting information and analyses about the EU and its 
institutions on a weekly basis46 catering for ‘everyone involved in European Union policy 
making, those who seek to influence the decision-making process from outside, and those whose 
work is directly affected by decisions taken in Brussels’ (Firmstone, 2004, p.2). It reports on the 
day to day activity of the EU’s institutions, portraying an overt optimism towards furthering the 
European project which matches the views of its readership. However, due to its weekly 
publication cycle it does not cover day to day events, but provides in depth analyses of events 
that have happened throughout the previous week. Firmstone (2004, p.7) has found that 
journalists from EV most times pitch their articles in order to influence EU policymakers and 
decision-making processes. Finally, EUObserver.com is an online publication which aims ‘to 
support the debate on – and development of European affairs’47. It publishes daily analyses and 
news reports which focus on the day to day activity of the EU. With four to five stories published 
                                                          
45
 Simultaneously, it tries to be a ‘paper of record’, following closely and mapping the activity of the EU’s 
institutions.  
46
 According to its mission statement, the ‘European Voice brings independent, authoritative and balanced coverage 
of the latest EU news and analysis. It gives you a comprehensive account of the activities of the key European Union 
institutions – the European Commission, European Parliament and Council of Ministers. Most of the best known 
figures in the EU depend upon European Voice to keep them up-to-date with EU affairs. European Voice writes 
with style, wit, force and intelligence. It communicates vital information and analysis with clarity and insight’ 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/page/european-voice-about-us/153.aspx. Accessed on 15/09/2013. 
47
 http://EUObserver.com/static/about. Accessed on 15/09/2013. 
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online each day written in a similar manner to newspaper articles, it is comparable in terms of 
space and coverage to both the FT and EV48. Similarly to EV, it practices a type of cosmopolitan 
journalism, highly optimistic regarding the European project. The readership of EUObserver 
tends to have considerable knowledge of and interest in EU affairs, nonetheless due to its online 
open-source character, articles and points of view published by EUObserver are more often 
quoted in national media.  
 
4.4.2 United Kingdom 
It was noted earlier that the British media belongs to the North Atlantic or Liberal model outlined 
by Hallin and Mancini, being characterised by strong market orientation, deep 
professionalisation and noninstitutionalised self-regulation. On the other hand, more 
‘pugnacious, critical and populist as ever’ (Gavin, 2009, p.777) the British media follows suit in 
portraying and perpetuating Eurosceptic views, a strategy adopted in order to mirror the views of 
the general public. Moreover, in their study of the way the British press framed the 1997 general 
Election and during the British EU presidency of 1998, Anderson and Weymouth (1999) have 
shown that Euroscepticism is widespread in British newspapers. The constitutional debate and 
the monetary union have also been framed through the prism of Euroscepticism by the British 
media, matching the disaffection of citizens with the EU (Davis, 2000; Dougal, 2003; Gleissner 
andde Vreese, 2005; Packham, 2007; Anderson and Price, 2008; Boomgaarden et al., 2011). 
Gavin (2001) also contends that the EU receives mostly negative coverage by British journalists 
who deem newsworthy only stories that contrast the actions of the Union with those of British 
citizens.  
Table 4.3 Daily circulation for selected British publications
49
 
Newspaper/Publication Origin Daily Circulation 
  2008  
(August) 
2009 
(December) 
The Guardian UK 332.587 300.540 
The Times UK 612.779 521.535 
 
                                                          
48
 The similarity in coverage between the three publications adds validity to the comparative approach employed 
here.However, journalists writing for the EUObserver benefit from less stringent space restrictions – due to the 
nature of online media – which allow them to develop more detailed analyses. Articles published in EV very often 
also contain complex analyses because of its weekly publication. 
49
 Data was extracted from: http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/abcs; www.thetimes.co.uk/. Accessed on 15/09/2013. 
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Two British
50
 newspapers have been selected for analysis: the Times and the Guardian – their 
average circulation is presented in table 4.3. The Times is considered to be committed to 
conservative values and the centrality of traditional national institutions, while the Guardian 
tends to adopt left-of-centre views. The Times has two permanent correspondents in Brussels 
who report on all issues related to the EU and frequently travel within the continent and write 
about political developments in European countries. Very often, articles about the EU’s foreign 
policy are co-authored with London based journalists such as the diplomatic, foreign or political 
editors depending on the subject and its relevance for British domestic politics. At times, during 
the last ten years, it has had correspondents based in Moscow, but news relating to Russia has 
been mainly supplied by a wealth of foreign correspondents which travel throughout the world. 
Articles on climate change and the EU’s approach are usually written by London based editors 
such as those responsible for environment or energy, in collaboration or with background 
information from Brussels correspondents. The newspaper has a section on World Affairs (with a 
subsection on Europe, broadly defined) where most foreign policy topics and those related to the 
EU tend to be included – sometimes high level international events are discussed in the front 
pages, or through editorials and op-eds. Articles about global climate change policy appear 
mainly in the World Affairs section, but also in the Environment section. In terms of its approach 
to the EU, Carvalho (2007, p.239) finds that the Times has been very vocal in criticising the UK 
government or the EU’s ‘measures to combat greenhouse emissions and legitimate the existing 
economic and social order’. Moreover, in their study of British media attitudes towards European 
integration, Carey and Burton (2004) show that the discourse of Eurosceptic newspapers (such as 
the Sun, the Mail, Express, the Times and the Telegraph) is aimed at influencing their readers 
regarding the negative effects that ‘more Europe’ can have on their daily lives. 
On the other hand, the Guardian focuses more on the global impact of politics, with an emphasis 
on the need to safeguard the security of future generations and foster the development of 
universal norms of responsibility and fairness (Forster, 2002). However, even the Guardian 
                                                          
50
 The analysis of the British media in both case studies was extended to six other British mid range newspapers and 
tabloids – Daily Express, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, the Independent, the Mirror and the Sun – in another 
publication currently under review (Nitoiu, 2014). The distribution of the sample used for the article is in line with 
the overarching assumption found throughout the literature that quality national newspapers are more likely to cover 
topics related to the EU. The findings highlight that the Guardian and the Times contained an average of around 
65% of the total number of articles selected for analysis. Moreover, the analysis shows that the other six newspapers 
constructed the same frames in both case studies as the Guardian and the Times. 
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which is widely seen as one of the pro-European British newspapers tends to take a critical view 
of integration in a number of policy areas – such as the adoption of the Euro (Werder, 2002). 
Similarly to the Times, articles about foreign policy and the EU are on most occasions a result of 
the collaboration between Brussels based correspondents and London based editors such as the 
political or international ones. However, in contrast to the Times, it employs just one permanent 
correspondent in Brussels who focuses his or her work only on the EU. From time to time, the 
Guardian publishes stories from freelance journalists, or due to its rather open approach to 
journalism, stories from the general public which are thoroughly fact checked. Unlike the Times, 
it tends to have correspondents in most major European capitals including Moscow, rather than 
foreign correspondents that travel around. Without a doubt, the newspaper presents high quality 
and detailed analyses on topics related to climate change and the environment (Gavin, 2009). 
This is a consequence of the importance that the newspaper attaches to these topics, with the 
Environment section taking up a substantial proportion of the newspaper, whilst stories related to 
this issue are featured regularly in the front pages. Moreover, the Guardian’s commitment to 
issues related to climate change is also reinforced by the number of staff and resources it devotes 
to these issues. For example, in the build up to the Copenhagen summit it increased its staff 
working on environmental issues from four to eight (Boykoff, 2012, p.253). Articles about 
foreign policy and the EU are featured in the International pages and, as in the case of the Times, 
when the topic is of high relevance for British domestic politics they are featured in the front 
pages.  
 
4.4.3 Romania 
Two main aspects have characterised the Romanian media since the country’s accession to the 
EU (Bocancea, 2011, p.107). Firstly, owners have had an overt influence on media reporting and 
the overall editorial direction of newspapers. Secondly, media discourse has become increasingly 
politicised mirroring the deep polarisation present in the Romanian political system. This 
confirms Gross’ (2008b, p.141) expectation that in the context of Romania’s membership to the 
EU, in the short and medium term ‘no major alterations to the media system and its function will 
occur until the culture of the political elites, media owners, and the citizenry evolves in a more 
liberal, democratic direction’. Freedom of expression has been a widely debated topic in the 
Romanian media landscape since the end of communism. On the one hand, journalists have been 
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deterred by the owners of their publication or by political elites through the use of the justice 
system from pursuing certain topics and expressing their opinions accordingly (Gross, 2008b). 
Nonetheless, political pressures have dwindled during the last ten years as a result of the 
privatisation of the media and their increasing economic self-reliance (Coman, 2004, p.589).  
Conversely, journalists themselves have often employed a rhetoric centred on the freedom of 
expression in order to cover-up blatant mistakes or unethical behaviour and interests (Coman, 
2009, p.190). In contrast to the British media, the Romanian media has an enthusiastic and 
supportive attitude towards European integration, Euroscepticism hardly ever surfacing in its 
reporting on the EU (Coman, 2004; Lazăr, 2006; Lazăr and Paun, 2006).  
Table 4.4 Daily circulation for selected Romanian publications
51
 
Newspaper/Publication Origin Daily Circulation 
  2008  
(August) 
2009 
(December) 
Adevărul Romania 45.707 156.430 
Jurnalul Naţional Romania 96.325 91.457 
 
Two Romanian newspapers have been selected for analysis: Adevărul and Jurnalul Naţional – 
their average circulation is presented in table 4.4.  Adevărul is the most important newspaper in 
Romania being the heir of the formerly state controlled Scânteia (Frumusani, 1999). It thus 
inherited and relies on the resources, expertise and personnel of the former publication which on 
many occasions implies support for the party in power (Bocancea, 2011, p.100). The newspaper 
is considered to have the most accurate and extensive coverage of foreign policy and 
international events. Since 2007, it has established a Brussels bureau hosting three 
correspondents who report on EU issues, including the Union’s foreign policy. The published 
version of the newspaper also includes a daily section (about four pages) where European topics 
are discussed. Additionally, the newspaper contains about ten pages with brief analyses featured 
in the Romanian edition of the Foreign Policy magazine. The chief editor of the newspaper’s 
Brussels bureau is also the chief editor of the Foreign Policy magazine, meaning that news and 
analyses centered on the EU’s foreign policy are frequently presented. The newspaper is owned 
by a prominent business man and member of the main right wing party which provides a subtle 
ideological orientation to its reporting. Commentaries, op-eds or even lead articles by 
                                                          
51
 Data was extracted from: http://www.brat.ro/. Accessed on 15/09/2013. 
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policymakers or analysts are often featured, together with letters from the general public which 
are meant encourage public debate on foreign policy topics. Unlike most Romanian publications, 
which merely copy paste or translate news about foreign policy from news agencies, Adevărul is 
committed to creating its content in an original manner as much as possible by accessing sources 
directly (Schifirneţ, 2010). Unfortunately, since late 2012 the Brussels bureau has been reduced 
significantly, with only one correspondent covering EU issues due to the numerous trials in 
which its owner has been involved – although by the spring of 2011 the Brussels bureau opened 
a surrogate TV station which broadcasted major EU events and interviews with high level 
policymakers.  
Jurnalul Naţional has the highest circulation in Romania and is considered to be the second most 
salient and influential newspaper after Adevărul (Ulmanu, 2002; Radu and Stefanita, 2012).  Its 
influence is based on its large resources and its ability to draw expertise and information from 
the large media conglomerate which contains it – besides the newspapers it also has five TV 
stations with regional affiliates plus a dozen radio stations. The owner of the newspaper is a 
prominent entrepreneur and former chairman of the second most important left wing party in 
Romania. This has translated in a continuous torrent of criticism and disapproval, sometimes 
with clear evidence and well constructed arguments for the actions of the right wing government. 
Moreover, the majority of the publishing space within the newspaper is afforded to issues of 
domestic politics which are used in order to criticise the government. Foreign policy surfaces 
only in the case of major international events or in order to highlight Romania’s approach in 
international relations. Romanian journalists often identify it to be the most responsive 
newspaper to the needs of the public, whilst correctly reflecting their interests (Ilaş, 2011). 
However, the low amount of resources directed towards reporting on foreign policy issues means 
that analyses and commentaries from experts outside the newspaper are almost never presented. 
More often than not, news is copied from international news agencies, journalists playing a 
crucial role though in selecting and adapting it for the Romanian public.  
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4.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the methodology employed throughout the thesis which entails a 
detailed frame analysis correlated with interviews and questionnaires with journalists and 
political actors, and other primary and secondary sources. Two case studies have been chosen in 
order to reflect two very distinctive areas of EU foreign policy: global climate change policy and 
the policy towards Russia. Research has been conducted on two countries (Romania and the UK) 
and the transnational level which have been chosen in accordance to their varying levels of 
public debate and accountability, in this way reflecting the heterogeneous character of the EPS, 
but also their approach to contributing to the EU’s foreign policy. Frame analysis is used in order 
to identify the most pervasive policy definitions found throughout the selected articles. Together 
with the analysis of the media/foreign policy nexus, frame analysis facilitates the assessment of 
the implications of interaction effects for the way in which democratic leigitmacy is infused in 
foreign policy.  
The analysis of quality publications is often preferred in scholarship due to their nationwide 
distribution and their potential to paint a reliable picture of national media landscapes. Moreover, 
they represent the main public vehicle for both political and social discourse where it is more 
likely for debates about EU foreign policy to surface. The next three chapters will each provide a 
detailed assessment of the interactions between the media and policymakers, whilst aiming to 
provide empirical evidence in order to answer the two research questions explored in this thesis. 
They will first present a general overview of the respective media/foreign policy nexus, drawing 
on data from interviews and questionnaires coupled with findings from the literature. The second 
part of each chapter employs frame analysis in order to identify the way in which the media 
articulated its policy definitions, whilst analysing instances of indexing, bounding and agenda 
setting and their impact on the role of democratic legitimacy within the two case studies – the 
EU’s approach to global climate change and the EU’s policy towards Russia. 
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Chapter 5 – The transnational level 
 
 
 
This chapter first provides an overview of the media/foreign policy nexus at the transnational 
level. The following section of the chapter analyses the way in which the media constructed its 
policy definitions and their subsequent interactions effects – according to the model described in 
chapter 3. In doing so, it builds on the frame analysis of the selected media for the two case 
studies correlated with background information drawn from interviews and questionnaires with 
professionals working in the transnational media and EU policymakers52. Three publications 
were selected as representative for the transnational media: EUObserver.com, the European 
Voice and the Financial Times. The distribution of the articles within the three publications is 
presented in table A.1 in annex A (page 301), while the coverage of the two case studies is 
highlighted in figures A.1 and A.2 in the same annex. Annex C shows that in the case of climate 
change the period surveyed was 1 June 2009 – 1 June 2010, with 160 articles selected. On other 
hand, in the case of the policy towards Russia the period examined stretched six months before 
and after the conflict  (8 March 2008 – 5 March 2009), with 227 articles selected. The final 
section discusses the implications of the interaction effects for the way in which the transnational 
media endowed the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy – in this way exploring the 
two research questions.  
 
5.1 The media/foreign policy nexus 
The EU is widely considered to be very successful in shaping the agenda of transnational media 
(AIM Research Consortium, 2006; Lazăr, 2006; de Vreese, 2007; Raeymaeckers, Cosijn and 
                                                          
52
 ‘EU policymakers’ refer in this chapter to professionals who are or have been involved in policymaking in the 
EU’s institutions in climate change and the policy towards Russia – interviews and questionnaires with ten EU 
policymakers have been conducted. On the other hand, ‘transnational journalists’ refer in this chapter to journalists 
working for the transnational publications analysed (EUObsever.com, the European Voice and the Financial Times) 
and focus their writing on the two issue areas of foreign policy – interviews and questionnaires with six 
transnational journalists have been conducted. 
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Deprez, 2007; Lecheler, 2008). This happens even though most journalists working for 
transnational publications believe that the EU is continuously trying to sell its policies, 
overlooking any notion of objectivity, and ‘making it very difficult to distinguish between 
advertising and objective facts’53. Savin’s (2011) analysis of the framing strategy of the EU also 
shows that the Commission is very successful in providing information to the media and 
sometimes as the main or only source, in this way setting the agenda in terms of the European 
topics that the transnational media report on. This builds on the activity of EU spokespersons 
who regularly consult with their staff and DG COMM in order to plan medium term 
communication strategies for their policy areas. Such strategies take into account the range of 
possible future legislative proposals, policy initiatives, and high level events. Spokespersons 
meet every day at 10 in the morning in order to discuss the midday briefing and the topics that 
would be covered (Bijsmans and Altides, 2007). Here, they also plan short term communication 
strategies, debate which policies and issues might be considered by journalists as interesting 
news, and brainstorm how to answer difficult questions at the midday briefing. The daily midday 
briefing presents journalists with an overview of the policies and initiatives pursued by the 
Commission (Machill, Beiler and Fischer, 2006). It serves as an opportunity for the media to ask 
for background information both from spokespersons and more specialised bureaucrats, in this 
way also forging important informal ties. 
Transnational journalists point to the fact that the ability of the media to successfully define 
policy problems, propose solutions or present expectations is hampered by a number of hurdles 
that they face when reporting about the EU. Firstly, similarly to other research projects (Neveu, 
1998; Baisnée, 2002; Kepplinger, 2002; Toynbee, 2008; Gross and Kopper, 2011), the 
interviews underscored that journalists are constrained to focus on the need to attract the 
attention of their readers, whilst presenting European issues in a clear and comprehensive way54. 
This is a challenge because transnational publications aim to reach various audiences ranging 
from national ones to those based in Brussels and even others in non-European states. Secondly, 
the complex bureaucratic nature of decision-making processes within the EU’s foreign policy 
and the highly technical language they produce often require journalists to acquire specific 
knowledge (Bicchi, 2011). Moreover, journalists from transnational media consider that their 
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readers possess a considerable amount of knowledge and interest in European issues, though they 
argue that the EU is ‘not supplying the most important information’55. Transnational journalists 
tend to perceive that the interest of individuals in European issues is continuously growing due to 
the increasing role of the Union in tackling the financial crisis, global climate change, or its 
overall status in the international arena56. Consequently, most transnational journalists admitted 
during the interviews that they feel compelled to take a more proactive role towards this issue in 
defining problems and scrutinising the activity of policymakers in EU foreign policy57.  
Transnational journalists tend to justify their policy definitions by arguing that they reflect public 
opinion and the attitudes of the general public (Negrea, Bargaoanu and Dascalu, 2010). The 
framing strategies of the transnational media draw on four main sources: policymakers, 
journalists, perceptions of public opinion and the web of interactions between journalists and 
policymakers. Most transnational journalists argued that they sometimes back up their views by 
using constructions such as ‘the people believe’, or drawing on opinion polls – although some 
argue that polls must be analysed before being presented58. People’s opinions are more 
frequently used by the media as a way of drawing the attention of EU policymakers, but also in a 
conscious attempt to impose a sense of democratic scrutiny on them. As part of an overarching 
commitment to the principle of objectivity, transnational journalists employ these strategies 
claiming that they adhere to the goal of portraying as many views as possible in order to paint a 
relevant image. Spokespersons working for the Commission and the Council reinforce the view 
that the media have the ability to provide feedback on what people think about the EU and how it 
should behave in the international arena. Due to this, EU policymakers argue that the Union is 
sufficiently open, providing equal information to all media regardless of their bias59. On the other 
hand, transnational journalists claim that the range of policy definitions they choose to frame is 
highly influenced by the way they perceive the specific views of their readership (Gleissner and 
de Vreese, 2005). As a consequence, it cannot be overstated that the needs and preferences of 
their readers have to be always taken into account. Transnational publications aim more for the 
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informed public who know the ‘value the power of information’60, mostly based in Brussels, and 
try almost always to address the EU’s institutions.  
The networks of interactions and relationships that journalists build with policymakers have an 
important impact on media frames. Firstly, policymakers tend to have more contacts with 
journalists that reside in Brussels and especially those who represent transnational media. 
Moreover, policymakers favour the Financial Times (FT) because it has the largest and the most 
professional press bureau (Blumler and Gurevitch, 1981; Neveu, 1998; Baisnée, 2002; Larsson, 
2002; Lazăr, 2006; Raeymaeckers, Cosijn and Deprez, 2007; Anderson, 2008; Negrea, 
Bargaoanu and Dascalu, 2010). Secondly, both transnational journalists and EU policymakers 
agree that in time relationships based on deep levels of trust can develop between them (Larsson, 
2002; Heikkilä and Kunelius, 2006). However, as Larsson contends (2002, p.25), even long-
lasting ties can be curtailed as ‘journalists appreciate the accessibility of sources, their openness 
and media-logical adjustments’, whilst policymakers ‘appreciate mainly what they perceive as 
being treated correctly in the media’. Data from the interviews conducted for this thesis 
correlates with the findings of EUROPUB project, in that according to transnational journalists, 
spokespersons working for the Commission do have not sufficient expertise in their area, and 
behave merely as PR staff or even salesmen of the benefits of European integration (Firmstone, 
2004, p.24). The EP is considered to have very active press departments, which mostly tender for 
the national media, in order to reach as many voters as possible. Hence, they are not very 
interested in constructing a European discourse similar to that found in transnational media, but a 
multitude of discourses adapted to the characteristics of audiences from each member state 
(Raeymaeckers, Cosijn and Deprez, 2007, p.111). 
According to Baisnée (2002), journalists – who have spent only a short period in Brussels and 
have not built trust relationships with policymakers – have a less positively biased attitude 
towards the EU. Moreover, they are prone to adopt a more scrutinising type of journalism which 
focuses on defining problems and shortcomings, rather than acknowledging policy successes. 
However, EU policymakers stress that policy problems defined by the media are more likely to 
be adopted when they reinforce their views and fit with the overall international context and that 
of the decision-making in EU foreign policy. Hence, in judging the quality of the media’s 
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discourse, EU policymakers search for ‘quality of information, accuracy and comprehensiveness 
of the information and analysis’61. The ownership of the policy definitions framed by the media 
together with their convergence with those framed by high profile third party actors in the 
international arena (such as the UN) are considered to have an important impact on the success 
of the adoption of policy definitions framed by the media. Moreover, transnational journalists 
argue that their own standpoint and conceptions of IR (and the role of the EU) influences the 
way they report, pointing to a highly biased approach to reporting about the Union. Transnational 
journalists view the EU as the most complex administrative system in the world, that has the 
potential of being more open to public debate than the nation state – especially in terms of 
foreign policy (Lecheler and Hinrichsen, 2010). They contend that the EU has the potential, and 
widely expect it to behave as a normative actor and live up to its commitments and ambitious 
rhetoric62.  
Moreover, EU policymakers perceive transnational journalists as mediators and multipliers for 
the EU’s discourse and its policies, whilst ‘journalists contact spokespersons usually when a 
need for supplementary background or technical informal arises’63. Hence, in its communication 
policy, the EU tends to work through multipliers as it does not have the staff and the resources to 
reach all of its corners. EU staff regularly attend both academic and policy oriented conferences 
expecting the other participants to spread the Union’s message. There is a continuous process of 
feeding news to journalists, because policymakers are always under the watch of the media and 
need to tailor their actions and discourse according to it (Statham, 2010c). Nevertheless, sources 
of indexing are to be found primarily in the network of informal ties and interactions between 
policymakers and journalists. According to the latter, even though the Union tries to deliver a lot 
of information about its policies, it doesn’t provide the most important or relevant for the media. 
Transnational journalists also argue that the Commission does not always give the correct 
information, very ‘often trying to project a positive spin’64. Information is usually acquired 
through informal means, which, in time, build a deep sense of trust between transnational 
journalists and EU policymakers. This leads to the fact that sometimes transnational journalists 
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publish articles that are fed by the EU’s institutions and support various policies (Statham, 
2007b). 
EU policymakers tend to engage with journalists representing media with a broader coverage, 
although most would argue that they do not favour or discriminate in establishing contacts with 
journalists. Simultaneously, some EU policymakers admit the existence of a hierarchy which 
privileges the more quality publications, favouring the FT which ‘seems to be the most 
professional and fair’65. Hence, in deciding the quality of newspapers, individuals working within 
the EU’s institutions dealing with foreign policy look at a number of factors with an emphasis on 
objective reporting and the ability to project informed, original or well-reasoned opinions. 
Publications that have a high number of staff working in Brussels are thought to provide quality 
information or accuracy and comprehensiveness in their analyses66. They share broader coverage, 
larger readerships and employ journalists that have the ability to understand highly technical 
issues in a professional manner. On the other hand, the lower quality media tend to be very 
biased in the sense that they reflect only the point of view of the authors and do not present other 
‘voices’ in order to paint a clear picture of reality (Firmstone, 2008; de Vreese, 2007; AIM 
Research Consortium, 2006). 
The most pervasive role that transnational journalists assume is that of educators or mediators 
within the public sphere. This provides them with the power to fill the knowledge gaps of 
individuals surrounding the EU and to teach them how to view the Union. Indexing suggests that 
most times this could lead journalists to politically biased reporting and a greater access to 
scoops through leaks from policymakers. Heikkilä and Kunelius’ study (2006, p.73) reinforces 
the finding that generally the EU is very successful in indexing the discourse of the media. They 
point to the overarching power of the ‘Brussels bubble’ to entrench a certain sphere of values in 
the writing styles of transnational journalists. In their extensive report on the habits and culture 
of journalists based in Brussels, they find that individuals working for transnational media tend 
to approach European issues from a cosmopolitan perspective. More specifically, this involves 
refraining from vigorously criticising the EU and not publishing articles that contain negative 
stereotypes or references to the Union. Indexing is also reinforced by the very close 
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relationshipst that journalists develop with their contacts working within the EU’s institutions. 
Transnational journalists have a tendency ‘to develop a reaction of protecting the institution, a 
kind of self-censorship which they justify by their belief that the Commission is acting for the 
public good’ (Baisnée, 2002, p.120). Moreover, according to the interviews, transnational 
journalists take cues from spokespersons and accept planted questions during press conferences 
or even publish stories requested by their contacts67.  
According to most studies, EU policymakers tend to consider that the media can have negative 
effects on policy solutions and their outcomes or effectiveness even in situations when they are 
not aware of it or willing to interact with it (Siapera, 2004; Brüggemann, 2005; Kappinen, 2008). 
From their point of view, this happens because all too often the media is subjective and tries to 
manipulate public opinion, as ‘journalists do not take a policy perspective, but they usually have 
a very well defined perspective of their own’68. Secondly, EU policymakers argue that regardless 
of the quality of the publication they write for, journalists tend to search for the bigger 
perspective, but also for the sensational and conflicts, most times overlooking other aspects and 
focusing only on the issues and countries their readerships have an interest in. Simultaneously, 
journalism is viewed to be hypercritical, because the media does not really understand political 
processes from inside: ‘the media like to write more about failure in the EU’s policies, than 
about its successes’69. Hence, the media is more prone to emphasise failure rather than success 
when covering the Union. EU policymakers argue that the media can hamper their activity by 
interpreting their policies in a narrow or even totally incorrect manner. For example, although the 
EEAS employs several layers of communication and uses a wide range of tools in order to 
address different audiences, public communication tends to remain technical and at times sticks 
to diplomatic language which implies that journalists need to have the ability read between the 
lines (Bicchi, 2011). On their part, transnational journalists who do not have strong ties with EU 
policymakers argue that they feel a sense of discontent towards the tendency of the EU to speak 
with one voice, almost never admitting the shortcomings that plague its approaches (Heikkilä 
and Kunelius, 2006). They consider that it is not their duty to mitigate the democratic deficit of 
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the Union, in as much as it is the EU‘s duty to reform itself (Baisnée, 2002, 2003, 2007; Lazăr, 
2006; Raeymaeckers and Cosjin, 2006; Schlesinger, 2007; Toynbee, 2008). 
Journalists working for transnational publications that have been based for a considerable time in 
Brussels have largely pro-EU attitudes and are in a better position to influence the foreign policy 
agenda (Baisnée, 2002, 2003, 2007). They have had the opportunity to build close ties with EU 
policymakers making them responsive to their (i.e. transnational journalists) policy definitions. 
Their ability is in stark contrast to that of ‘newcomers’ and especially correspondents for national 
media who do not keep their posts for more than a few years and are more prone to be 
constrained by the scrutinising needs of the editorial offices back home and by their lack of 
access to policymakers. On the other hand, journalists working for transnational media either see 
themselves as trying to enact the highest journalistic standards or trying to campaign for a certain 
point of view and policy initiative, almost never portraying any sense of Euroscepticism70. 
Through their campaigning efforts they usually try to find support in order ‘to reinforce [their] 
own opinions among those who are politically close’ within the EU’s institutions (Mancini, 
1993, p.49). Moreover, Maurer (2011, p.31) finds that the transnational ‘media’s agenda-setting 
power resembles the power of a referee who decides which issues enter the political playground’. 
She goes on to argue that EU policymakers would not take into account the framing activity of 
the media if they did not perceive it to capture and represent debates within the public sphere. 
This can be affected by the links between policymakers and the media, as through the regular 
and informal contacts with policymakers, which can develop into relationships of trust. The 
second part of the chapter empirically analyses the way transnational journalists defined policy 
problems, solutions and expectations, evaluating and discussing the impact of indexing, 
bounding and agenda setting on the way in which democratic legitimacy was enacted in each 
case study. 
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5.2 Interaction effects 
5.2.1 Climate Change 
Indexing 
The most salient policy definition identified in the sample referred to the long term risks 
associated with climate change and framed it as a top policy problem due to its broad and 
indiscriminate effects on peoples around the world. About 98 percent of the total articles (see 
table 5.1) included this policy problem, advising but also praising EU policymakers for 
considering climate change as a policy priority, because it possessed the potential to harm the 
livelihood of future generations. This policy problem also converged with policymakers’ own 
approaches, as the Union’s rhetoric highlighted the major challenge that climate change brought 
to global governance and to the security and economic development of the member states. 
Transnational journalists took cues here and drew on EU policymakers’ discourse in order to 
make their readers conscious of the medium to long term consequences of climate change. Both 
before and after the Copenhagen summit, the Union overtly stated its commitment to a low 
carbon society – by increasing its reduction targets from 20% to 30% (European Commission, 
2010a; European Commissioner for Climate Action, 2010a) – which was thought to ‘create new 
jobs and industries and will contribute to a more energy secure future’ (Council of the European 
Union, 2009). The three publications provided detailed scientific evaluations and reports from 
transnational NGOs which highlighted the malign effects that climate change could have on a 
global scale. In doing so, transnational journalists acted here as educators. Media discourse in 
this case (i.e. indexing) was also a tool for entrenching EU policymakers into the recognition of 
the threat posed by climate change and in the need to tackle it71.  
Defining climate change as a major risk also resonated with views from other influential 
international actors such as the UN, or transnational environmental NGOs, which made the 
policy definition even more salient within the public sphere – together with the fact that it was 
perceived to affect populations globally. Keeping to its deep commitment to objective reporting 
and being used by EU policymakers as a way of giving thrust to public debate, the transnational 
media presented statements and points of view from actors outside foreign policy circles. These 
statements were featured in order to highlight the weaknesses of defining climate change as a 
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major problem that the EU should tackle. Consequently, although most articles framed climate 
change as an important threat to the wellbeing of future generations, not all articles considered 
that the need to tackle the effects of climate change had to be backed up by substantive financial 
commitments. EUObserver (11 November 2009) noted that finances could be better spent on 
creating jobs. On the other hand, the FT highlighted that by committing itself to progressive 
measures to tackle climate change, the EU might be placed in a disadvantaged position, running 
the risk of driving ‘industry out of the region if it continues to push for deeper cuts in carbon 
dioxide emissions than other economies’ (Financial Times, 7 July 2009).  
Table 5.1 Indexing – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Climate change –medium to long term threat Policy problem 97.50 
The EU is the only actor that can forge a global 
agreement on climate change 
Policy expectation 63.10 
The EU still has the potential to globally lead in climate 
change 
Policy expectation 59.60 
Blaming other states Policy solution 55.60 
Equal climate change deal Policy solution 38.80 
Source: Author’s own data 
In another instance of indexing, the transnational media found itself in agreement with the 
Union’s institutions (drawing on their rhetoric), all of which advocated an agreement where both 
developed and developing countries would ‘contribute adequately according to their 
responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (European Commissioner for Climate Action, 
2010b). The EU was praised for proposing that rich countries should step up and commit up to 
50 billion Euros each year until 202072. However, failing to convince states such as the US, 
China, Australia or Japan to aid developing and poor countries, made the Union back down from 
its ambitious stance committing to offer in the run-up to the Copenhagen summit only around 7 
billion Euros over the following three years. This downgrade was severely criticised by the 
transnational media (EUObserver, 11 December 2009; European Voice, 3 December 2009). The 
three transnational publications viewed equality, burden-sharing and solidarity to be integral to 
any solution meant to tackle the effects of global climate change. The construction of this policy 
solution involved acknowledging that the larger part of the emissions which have caused changes 
in climate were produced during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 centuries by Western developed countries – 
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contributing to their development and increasing the welfare of their citizens. Hence, rich 
countries were seen as having the duty to compensate developing countries for the cost that 
adopting progressive climate change policies would entail: ‘the world's poorest countries who 
are already struggling to survive in a changing climate, need action, not more hollow promises’ 
(EUObserver, 6 November 2009). Not only did this policy solution as defined by the media 
converge with the UN’s approach, but was also seen as a policy priority by EU policymakers73.  
Putting the blame on other states for hampering the EU’s efforts to drive forward a progressive 
agreement was a strategy employed by EU policymakers in order to pressure states such as 
China or the US, and build internal consensus (and confidence) within the EU (Boykoff, 2011; 
Roberts, Parks and Vásquez, 2011; Van Schaik and Schunz, 2012). Policymakers used here the 
media – as described in the interaction effects model in chapter 3 – in order to publicise and 
gather support for a policy solution which involved trying to convince smaller and less 
influential states to support the Union’s efforts.They perceived that this would have prompted the 
US or China to revise their position. Furthermore, the transnational media was seen as an avenue 
for rallying support from the member states in putting the blame on the US or China, whilst also 
persuading and reassuring European businesses of the EU’s ability to lead in global climate 
change policy despite other states’ unwillingness to cooperate74. Numerous statements75 from EU 
policymakers were featured in order to give weight to this solution: for example, according to 
Connie Hedegaard, Commissioner for Climate Action, ‘climate change can be controlled only if 
all major emitters take action (...) the most convincing leadership Europe can show is to take 
tangible and determined action to become the most climate friendly region in the world’ 
(European Commission, 2010b). The majority of criticism focused on the US and the inability of 
president Obama to convince the US Congress to commit to clear emission targets and aid poor 
countries. Contrasting with the discourse of the other two transnational publications, the FT 
maintained a balanced discourse, arguing that pre-emptive and continuous blaming of the US 
was not the best strategy to convince it to engage with the effects of climate change (Financial 
Times, 17 November 2009). Unlike the US, China received lighter criticism for its unwillingness 
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to commit to tackling the effects of climate change. One solution proposed by the transnational 
media for getting China on board involved enhancing the EU’s strategic partnership with China. 
EV strongly advocated the idea that the Union ‘must help Beijing's low-carbon revolution 
succeed’ (European Voice, 26 November 2009). Due to its position as the world’s largest 
emitter, China had the opportunity to provide an example to other developing states and 
convince the US.  
High expectations were associated by the transnational media with the EU’s potential to draw on 
its global leadership and drive forward a fair and progressive agreement on climate change. In 
this instance of indexing the Commission was a prime source for such expectations, as it had to 
show ‘leadership by taking tangible action to become the most climate friendly region of the 
world’ (European Commission, 2010b). Before the summit, the Union was praised for its key 
role in supporting the Kyoto Protocol and its ability to arrive at a common stance between 
member states, in this way serving as a model for other countries. The media were again used by 
EU policymakers in order to publicise and gather support for the EU’s leadership in global 
climate change policy, whilst educating their readers regarding EU’s potential and ability to lead. 
Furthermore, media discourse was an avenue through which EU institutions put pressure on the 
member states to commit themselves to further emissions reductions or adaptation policies. 
Accordingly, this would have strengthened the EU’s efforts to convince other states76. For 
example, the FT frequently covered disagreements between member states, which were framed 
as a major hurdle that could have damaged the EU's capacity to act as a leader by example. It 
argued that the EU’s approach could have attained credibility and legitimacy globally only if the 
member states managed to work together and synchronise with the efforts of the Commission. 
Among the member states, the media underscored that Britain was at the forefront of the EU’s 
efforts, proposing deeper commitments than any other member state77.  
Throughout the six month period before the summit, the wavering position of the member states 
– which continuously moved from supporting a 30 percent cut in emissions to only 20 percent 
and back – was seen by the three publications as a sign of weakness that could have endangered 
the Union’s negotiating power and credibility in Copenhagen. Poland and Estonia were among 
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the most vocal opponents of committing the EU to ambitious emissions reductions. They went as 
far as challenging in court the proposals of the European Commission78, in order to develop 
burden-sharing agreements that involved the new member states from CEE being compensated 
for their emissions (EUObserver, 30 October 2009). Therefore, in such situations when the 
possibility of forging a common European position was bleak, being overrun by discussions of 
downgrading the EU’s commitments, the three transnational publications were keen to argue that 
the Union had the duty to set and promote ambitious goals in global climate change policy. Here 
the policy expectation expressed by the media seemed to find a fit with the political context of 
the EU, where interviews with policymakers showed that most member states wished to state 
their frustration with Poland. Not being able to do this on the record they turned to the media and 
leaked news regarding the negotiations between member states prior to the summit79. 
Although a large number of articles considered that Europe’s achievements at the Copenhagen 
summit fell short of its ambitious goals, in the six month period that followed the summit 
journalists emphasised that the EU had the potential to regain its leadership position, or had not 
even lost it in the first place80. The EU’s official rhetoric argued that the Copenhagen summit 
represented a success for the Union and a crucial step forward in tackling global climate change. 
The Copenhagen accord was supported by 109 states, whilst small and island states took account 
and seemed to be convinced by the Union’s global approach as it showed the ‘determination of 
most countries to act on climate change now’ (European Commission 2010b). This policy 
expectation was forged around a rather biased interpretation of the outcomes of the summit 
promoted by the European Commission (2010a). Here, the Union’s capacity to cooperate with 
small and island states or poor countries against the US or China was perceived to be a major 
breakthrough that could have led in the near future to a binding global agreement. Indexing again 
implied that the media was used in order to publicise and gather support among individuals in the 
public sphere for the idea that the EU had the potential to bounce back after the summit and lead 
in global climate change policy.  
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The EP deviated somewhat from the official discourse of the EU, admitting that the summit was 
a huge disappointment. However, former EP President Jerzy Buzek argued that the Union had to 
build on its experience and commitment and not give up on its global leadership: ‘we must learn 
the lessons of how to improve the negotiating process (...) there are some positive elements to the 
agreement, but the EU should continue to put pressure on the rest of the world to reach a more 
ambitious agreement at a later stage’ (European Parliament 2009d). On the other hand, especially 
EUObserver drawing on the support of public opinion, highlighted Europe’s duty and potential 
to lead in global climate change policy, because the environment, as a whole, was ‘one of the 
few areas where the EU has consistently won respect and recognition from its citizens’ 
(European Voice, 19 October 2009). Moreover with the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, the three 
publications were optimistic about the prospect of the Commission having a better position in 
coagulating a common EU approach, which would have increased its power and role in global 
climate change negotiations. 
 
Bounding 
Bounding was present in the way the transnational media defined three policy problems. It 
implied here that EU policymakers were largely unresponsive to the discourse constructed by 
transnational journalists perceiving them as being too critical or influenced by their tendency to 
highlight sensational news and failure, rather than the EU’s achievements81 (as specified in 
interaction effects model presented in chapter 3). The outcome of the summit was largely framed 
by the transnational media as a failure, where the EU drafted ambitious plans which were not 
matched by policy successes. Consequently, the media defined the disappointing result of the 
Copenhagen summit as a problem which had to be urgently tackled in the near future (table 5.2). 
Moreover, the outcome of the Copenhagen summit prompted the media to argue that because the 
EU had not materialised its ambitious goals it had effectively lost its leadership in global climate 
change policy. For example, according to an environmental analysis featured in the FT, the 
summit represented a ‘climate Waterloo for the EU’ where ‘there was the motivation to be the 
clear driver in the negotiations, but they were more or less kicked out at the end’ (Financial 
Times, 22 December 2009). The EU was criticised for not being able to take lead of the 
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negotiations and not striking a deal ‘directly with China, India, South Africa and Ethiopia’ 
(European Voice, 14 January 2010). Nevertheless, EV maintained its supportive tone, 
highlighting that the most important achievement for the Union at the summit was captured by 
its ability to harmonise the attitude of the 27 member states before Copenhagen.  
Articles also warned about a stalemate at Copenhagen even in the run-up and during the summit, 
arguing that the EU didn’t manage to build a successful negotiating position82 that would have 
allowed it to discuss on equal footing with China and the US (EUObserver, 18 December 2009). 
Both policy problems were constructed by the transnational media featuring views from 
academia and the global NGO community which criticised the EU for not having a stronger 
position that could have made the agreement more transparent. Even though EU policymakers 
were unresponsive to these two policy problems, the media acted as a gatekeeper of democracy 
putting exogenous pressure on them to live up to previous commitments and promises83. 
However, the transnational media linked both policy problems to division between member 
states which resonated with the views of the Commission (but not with that of the Council). 
Here, the three transnational publications anticipated the breakdown of the negotiations, 
underscoring the Union’s isolation and the tendency of a small number of the member states to 
promote different agendas during the summit (EUObserver, 3 May 2010). Interviews with 
policymakers working for the Commission highlighted the fact that the transnational media 
reflected their frustration with the new member states from CEE (especially Poland) which were 
unwilling to support the EU’s internal emission reduction approach84. 
Table 5.2 Bounding – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen  Policy problem 80.90 
The EU lost its global leadership after Copenhagen Policy problem 68.10 
Climate change is happening now  Policy problem 63.80 
Source: Author’s own data 
The media was also perceived by EU policymakers to be too critical in defining climate change 
as a policy problem which had to be tackled with urgency. A considerably lower number of 
articles (than those which framed climate change as a medium to long term threat) suggested that 
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climate change was a present emergency that had to be addressed urgently. According to the FT 
(7 July 2009), the world had no excuse for denying the short term-risks associated with climate 
change. World leaders were advised to add urgency to the negotiations on climate change in 
order to achieve a progressive agreement (EUObserver, 6 October 2009), and draw lessons from 
countries such as Norway. Transnational journalists constructed this policy problem by 
frequently featuring detailed scientific reports and analyses, together with official assessments 
from the UN and various transnational environmental NGOs. In this way, the transnational 
media provided individuals with information that would allow them to form coherent opinions 
and participate in public debates.  
The views of the general public were at times portrayed by the three transnational publications 
through letters and comments from their readers. EU policymakers were largely unresponsive to 
this policy problem due to the lack of consensus among the member states for recognising the 
urgency with which climate change had to be tackled (Christoff, 2010). For example, the 
Commission felt that pushing for the recognition of this policy problem might have discouraged 
some member states from implementing their currents commitments – which were highly 
negotiated and contested (European Commission, 2009b). Although it was largely ignored by EU 
policymakers, this policy problem resonated with the EP’s call to take into account scientific 
evidence and urgently adopt measures in order to achieve and sustain ‘stabilisation levels and 
temperature targets that provide strong probability of avoiding dangerous climate change’ 
(European Parliament, 2009e). 
 
Agenda setting 
Table 5.3 shows that central to the way in which the media reported during the period analysed 
was the idea that the Copenhagen summit represented a crucial moment – which is also 
highlighted by the spike in coverage in the period around the summit seen in  figure A.1 (page 
301). There the EU was expected to lead the adoption of a binding agreement that could tackle 
the effects of climate change85. Multiple articles drew on scientific reports or academic 
assessments in order to capture the magnitude of the summit which was seen as the ‘biggest 
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show on Earth, and, for scientists at least, the most important meeting the world has ever known’ 
(EUObserver, 7 December 2009), where more than 15.000 delegates from 192 countries met. 
More cultural initiatives also reflected (according to transnational media) the importance of the 
international gathering, such as the climate change scholarship programme initiated by the 
Danish government months before the summit (EUObserver, 21 September 2009). Through this, 
journalists acted both as educators and activists, popularising the summit and aiming to educate 
individuals regarding the policy expectations associated with it. At the same time, the three 
transnational publications often published reports which contained views from the general public 
or from various environmental groups and NGOs, together with public opinion polls (which 
emphasised the high level of public expectations associated with the summit).  
Table 5.3 Agenda Setting – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Copenhagen – a crucial moment  Policy expectation 97.50 
The EU should do more Policy expectation 57.50 
Source: Author’s own data 
The importance of the summit was an idea promoted by the EU from as early as 2008, the EP86 
even claiming in a resolution that it was the most important international meeting of the last 
decade (European Parliament, 2009b). Through their contacts with EU policymakers, 
transnational journalists managed to convey to them the views of the general public – having the 
potential to link individuals to decision-making processes –, putting pressure on the EU to 
achieve a progressive and fair global climate change agreement87. Moreover, both the three 
transnational publications and EU policymakers associated high hopes with the prospect of 
national leaders for the first time having the opportunity of negotiating a climate change 
agreement face to face, as Connie Hedegaard stressed: ‘the negotiators have been sitting opposite 
each other for years arguing from the same positions (...) that is why it is so crucial that the 
leaders say forging an agreement in Copenhagen is what they want to do. That will let [the 
negotiators] depart from here’ (Financial Times, 7 July 2009). 
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The agenda setting power of the transnational media also manifested itself in the way it defined a 
policy expectation which argued that the EU should commit even more resources in order to 
tackle climate change globally. Journalists acted here as activists drawing on the EU’s own 
ambitions of leading in global climate change policy, together with the pleas coming from 
various environmental groups for immediate action. In this way, they exerted pressure on EU 
policymakers to adopt even more ambitious goals and implement them. As described in the 
interaction effects model presented in chapter 3, agenda setting in this case was facilitated by the 
web of informal interactions that transnational journalists have with EU policymakers which 
allowed the former to provide policy input. Trust relations were enhanced by the fact that some 
EU policymakers dealing with climate also had experience of working within the media88. 
Moreover, transnational journalists’ tendency to argue that the EU should engage even more in 
tackling climate change was fuelled by their belief in the ability of the Union to act in the 
international arena for the well-being of other peoples89. What this points to, is that agenda 
setting meant here that the media became part of the political process pushing the EU to make 
deeper commitments. This effect was the most visible in the build up to the Copenhagen summit 
when intense media coverage from transnational publications elicited more ambitious 
commitments from the EU90– at least rhetorically (European Commission, 2008a, 2010c; Council 
of the European Union, 2009; European Parliament, 2009c, 2009a).   
 
5.2.2 The policy towards Russia 
Indexing 
The first phases of the Georgian-Russian war elicited a strong response from the EU which 
criticised Russia for its intervention in a country which shared aspirations for European 
integration. Moreover, the Council argued that Russia’s ‘decision (was) unacceptable and the 
European Union (called) on other States not to recognise this proclaimed independence and asks 
the Commission to examine the practical consequences to be drawn’ (Council of the European 
Union, 2008a). Indexing implied here that the media took cues from and drew on EU 
policymakers’ discourse in order to define Russia’s aggression against Georgia as a policy 
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problem – highlighted in table 5.4. Through this, it aimed to publicise and gather support within 
the public sphere for the EU’s initial critical stance towards Moscow in the weeks that followed 
its intervention. Furthermore, by providing detailed coverage (marked also by the increase in 
coverage during the conflict portrayed in figure A.2 – page 302) of Russia’s intervention, 
coupled with eye witness reports, transnational journalists sought to inform the general public 
regarding the horrors of the conflict. During the war, taglines such as ‘Russia is asking for 
trouble in Georgia’ (Financial Times, 9 August 2008) were frequently featured in order to define 
Moscow as the aggressor, and the sole actor responsible for the war. EV had the most critical 
discourse towards Russia’s intervention in South Ossetia, at times calling for the West 
(especially the EU) to step up, thus promoting an expectation that the EU should vigorously 
engage with Moscow. Conversely, it praised the French presidency of the EU for its swift 
response to the crisis and the way it managed, in the end, to coagulate a common European 
position in spite of the underlying division among the member states (European Voice, 16 
August 2008). Less critical of the Russian intervention, EUObserver noted that the EU itself 
might have fuelled Moscow’s sense of insecurity due to the recognition of Kosovo earlier that 
year, and the fact that the Union had been unwilling to reconsider its partnership with Russia in 
order to take into account the latter’s interests and aspirations. Russia's ambassador to the EU, 
Vladimir Chizhov, was featured expressing this concern two months before the war: ‘with the 
Lisbon treaty in force and a clearer picture of how the EU is organised, it would have been easier 
to negotiate the pact’ (EUObserver, 24 June 2008).  
Indexing was also evident in the way in which the three transnational publications framed Russia 
as a threat to Europe’s energy security. The media drew here on the views of the EP (European 
Commission, 2008b; European Parliament, 2008) and the Commission (European Commission, 
2008c, 2008d) which were claiming – whilst highlighting the principle of solidarity – that the 
member states should work towards devising a common stance in negotiating a broad EU energy 
deal with Russia. On the other hand, in order not to antagonise with the big member states such 
as France or Germany, the Commission was also arguing that in regard to energy relations, that 
Moscow was far more vulnerable, as the member states represented the larger part of its 
market91. Hence, through their discourse, transnational journalists publicised the EU’s somewhat 
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mixed and ambiguous approach, opening it up to debate within the public sphere92. Interest for 
the issue among the general public was meant to be aroused by the way in which the media 
framed this policy problem as affecting most member states. While acknowledging the Union’s 
need to diversify its gas suppliers and routes93, in this way short-circuiting Russia’s energy 
hegemony, the transnational media did not consider Moscow to be a major threat for the EU’s 
energy security. Exporting 60 percent of its gas to the EU, which covered only a quarter of the 
latter’s needs, Russia was seen being highly sensitive to a shift in the energy acquisition policy 
of the member states. Nonetheless, the Union’s efforts to diversify its gas supply routes were 
thought to be hampered by a lack of political will and commitment, and the special relationships 
that some member states tended to develop with Russia.  
Table 5.4 Indexing – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
The EU should be the main actor in dealing with Russia Policy expectation 77.10 
The war seen as a Russian aggression Policy problem 50.70 
The EU should cooperate with Russia Policy solution 38.90 
Russia promoting peace and wanting to integrate Policy solution 26.90 
Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s energy 
security 
Policy problem 23.30 
Source: Author’s own data 
Even though most articles recognised that the war was caused by Russia, or that Moscow was an 
important threat to Europe’s security, they also stressed that the EU had to recognise Moscow’s 
new status and try to enhance its partnership with it accordingly. This policy solution was built 
on the EU’s official approach of forging a strategic partnership with Russia which was based on 
consensus both among the member states (Simão, 2012; Ziegler, 2012; Sakwa, 2013) and within 
the EU’s institutions (Bengtsson and Elgström, 2012; DeBardeleben, 2012; Lomagin, 2012). 
Such a new relationship was seen as a credible policy solution which had to be based on a 
common approach that would be accepted by most member states, departing from the tendency 
of the old member states – such as Germany or France – to deal bilaterally with Moscow. This 
view converged with that of the Council – and with the overall approach of the EU aimed at 
building a strategic partnership with Russia – which adopted a rather moderate discourse towards 
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Russia, avoiding to name the party responsible for the war: ‘the Council recalls that the Union 
had expressed its grave concern at recent developments in Georgia, and the open conflict that has 
broken out between Russia and Georgia (...) military action of this kind is not a solution’ 
(Council of the European Union, 2008d). According to EV, there was ‘no reason to do business 
as usual with Russia’ (European Voice, 9 October 2008), because the EU could not have a 
chance to ‘project “soft power” in the post-Soviet zone’ (EUObserver, 5 January 2009) or 
engage Russia on a modernisation path without developing a common stance that would strike a 
balance between the EU’s norms and values, and individual economic and energy interests. 
Again, the transnational media aimed to educate its readers regarding the EU’s approach in a bid 
to gain public support for the idea of building a strategic partnership with Russia. Transnational 
journalists also opened the EU’s approach to public debate94, as EU policymakers felt that it 
required further public justification and legitimation95 – as specified in the interaction effects 
model presented in chapter 3. 
One main argument that was at the base of the EU’s reasoning behind striking a strategic 
partnership was that Russia was part of Europe and thus desired to be integrated in it. As such, 
Russia was presented by around a quarter of the total number of articles examined to share 
European values and a common historical heritage. Russian representatives and political elites 
were afforded a fair amount of space in all the three publications, where they explained 
Moscow’s intervention and why it did not represent a threat to European and global security. The 
FT featured interviews with Russia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov who argued 
that the Western media presented the war through Cold War stereotypes which predisposed it to 
view Moscow as the aggressor (Financial Times, 13 August 2008, 16 January 2009). Moreover, 
the Kremlin considered that its motivation for the war involved safeguarding the livelihood of 
Russian citizens in south Ossetia, which was well within the rationale and the remits of 
international law. The Russian ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, reassured the Union on 
many occasions that it was better to have Russia as friend than enemy (EUObserver, 18 August 
2008), and that Moscow was keen to enhance its partnership with the EU (European Voice, 28 
August 2008). The construction of this policy solution involved urging the members states to 
renounce their one sided strategy in dealing with Russia and try to understand the latter’s needs 
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and concerns, in this way also striving to include ‘Russia's voice in the European debate’ 
(EUObserver, 24 November 2008). In doing so, the FT featured a statement from an overtly 
Euro-optimistic Russian elite:  
We've always aspired to improve our relations with the European Union . . . 
because we consider ourselves a part of Europe, and moreover, we consider 
ourselves the geographic centre of Europe. From the first days of my presidency 
. . . we have clearly agreed that our foreign policy has to be multi-vectoral [ie 
open to the west, Russia and other countries] . . . We consume only 25-30 
percent of what we produce, and we sell the rest . . . So we cannot be a closed 
country . . . We are only asking one thing: let us live our lives . . . don't block 
us, help us communicate and trade freely, exclusively on the basis of market 
principles and free competition (Financial Times, 18 November 2008). 
The main policy expectation constructed by the transnational media argued that the EU had the 
duty and ability to engage as the main actor with Russia96. This policy definition converged with 
and was based on the Union’s own perception of its role in pacifying the conflict, and with the 
overall ambitions expressed officially by EU policymakers. Transnational journalists aimed to 
educate individuals regarding the Union’s capabilities and intentions, in a strategy meant to 
enhance public support for the idea that the EU had the potential to deal with Russia and should 
act accordingly97. During the twelve months covered by the frame analysis, the EU assumed a 
leading role in settling the conflict, urging both Russia and Georgia to cooperate (European 
Commission, 2010b), deal with moderation (Presidency of the Council of the European Union, 
2008a) and try to achieve a peaceful settlement (Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union, 2008b). Following the ceasefire, EU leaders also boasted about the Union’s commitment 
to securing the region through the independent observer mission it sent to Georgia (Council of 
the European Union, 2008b). Over eight in ten articles from both EUObserver and EV supported 
the EU’s efforts in pacifying the conflict and trying to engage Russia in a constructive 
partnership. Hence, the EU had to be concerned about Moscow’s intervention in Georgia, and, 
more broadly, its influence in other countries from the Eastern Neighbourhood (European Voice, 
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9 September 2008). The French presidency of the EU headed by President Sarkozy assumed 
centre stage in devising a ceasefire agreement that was fair for both Georgia and Russia, calling 
for an emergency EU response and a summit with Moscow in the initial phases of the war. 
Consequently, Sarkozy was praised for his approach which argued that the ‘that EU would 
welcome a real partnership with Russia, which is in the interest of everyone, but it takes two to 
tango’ (Financial Times, 2 September 2008). 
 
Bounding 
Division among the member states was defined as one of the main policy problems that plagued 
the Union’s approach towards Russia (table 5.5). Germany was presented as the main culprit, 
due to its appeasing attitude towards Russia: ‘whatever Russia does, Germany is generally 
unwilling to criticise it; this makes it hard for the EU to forge effective policies on Russia’ 
(Financial Times, 5 December 2008). Complex economic and energy98 interdependencies 
together with the close personal relationships between Russian and German political elites 
(Financial Times, 9 January 2009) were perceived to be the main influences on German policy 
towards Moscow. On the other hand, Poland and other new member states from CEE were 
criticised for promoting unnecessary tough stances towards Russia based solely on historical 
resentment. For example, during the war, Poland pushed for the suspension of the EU-Russia 
partnership, former Polish President Lech Kaczynski arguing that a broad group of member 
states from CEE was supporting this decision. The transnational media linked the frame of 
division to the idea that the EU was not able to live up to the principle of solidarity which is 
inscribed in its founding treaties. Informally, the EP99 and the Commission100 banked on the 
criticism expressed by the media calling for the member states to act in concert in order to 
achieve a peaceful resolution of the conflict and have a moderate attitude towards Russia. 
However, officially, only the EP sporadically criticised the member states for their tendency to 
forge bilateral solutions with Moscow. In turn, EU policymakers working within the 
Commission publicly argued that the discourse of the transnational media was narrow and highly 
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influenced by the fact that journalists do not have coherent knowledge regarding the complexity 
and constraints which characterise the EU’s relations with Russia101.   
Table 5.5 Bounding – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
The EU is divided in its approach towards Russia –seen 
in a negative light 
Policy problem 35.70 
The US and NATO to shape Europe’s approach 
towards Russia 
Policy solution 27.30 
Georgia is responsible for the war Policy problem 11.50 
Source: Author’s own data 
In another and much more evident instance of bounding, the media argued that Georgia might 
have been responsible for the conflict as it resorted to rash actions, not taking into account 
Russia’s warnings and interests. This policy problem implied that the EU or the US might have 
been responsible for encouraging president Saakashvili to antagonise Russia. EU policymakers 
were unresponsive to this frame as the EU stood firmly by Georgia, supporting its ambitions for 
European integration. Transnational journalists featured here detailed information regarding 
Georgia’s actions, providing the general public with a narrative that contrasted with the 
mainstream one which put all the blame on Russia.  
Supporting the efforts of NATO or the US in order to bring an end to the conflict was framed as 
a credible policy solution only in around a quarter of the articles, as journalists perceived that the 
US did not to have the interest or the capacity to bring an end to the conflict102. Nonetheless, 
before the war, Georgia and Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership in the spring of 2008 was 
presented as a having the potential to unsettle the balance of power in the region and put Russia 
in a structural position of insecurity. Drawing on these arguments, the FT (3 June 2008) 
predicted that Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations were bound to stir up animosities with 
Moscow, which in the near future could have led to the rekindling of frozen conflicts – i.e. the 
conflict in South Ossetia. While NATO’s eastwards expansion was viewed by the three 
publications as one of the main reasons that ignited the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, only the FT 
in a significant degree supported the idea that the US or NATO should be the main global actors 
that had the duty and power to settle the conflict and keep Moscow in check. Otherwise, the 
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other two publications advocated a secondary role for both NATO and the US, either 
supplementing or aiding the efforts of the EU. This view did not mirror the attitude of most 
policymakers interviewed103, who argued that the EU needs to develop its own relationship with 
Russia independently from other international actors104. Similarly to the model detailed in 
chapter 3, EU policymakers were largely unresponsive to the policy solution defined by the 
transnational media as they believed that such discourse could damage the EU’s credibility and 
legitimacy in dealing with Russia and Eastern Neighbourhood105.   
 
Agenda setting 
Around 70 percent of the articles (highlighted in table 5.6) in the sample linked Russia’s 
intervention in Georgia with a strategy of hinting to Europe that it sought to regain its former 
superpower status and ‘establish a new status quo’ (Financial Times, 13 August 2008). In 
defining this policy problem the transnational media put forward compelling arguments derived 
from the current international context. The media’s discourse emphasised that Moscow aimed to 
achieve this – to regain its former superpower status – by recovering its hegemonic position in 
the post-Soviet space and using its energy supplies in order to condition political outcomes. 
Russia’s malign intentions were also presented as affecting the whole of the EU, which provided 
more weight to the problem definition. Such ideas were reflected in a similar degree throughout 
the three publications, all suggesting that Russia’s new status should be understood to be 
synonymous with the emergence of a new Cold War. The FT even argued that the Russian 
intervention in Georgia was a direct result of and a response to Europe and the West’s eastern 
advance in the 1990 and early 2000s (Financial Times, 4 September 2008). On the other hand, in 
a small number of articles, EV argued that Russia was far less powerful than the Soviet Union, 
raising questions regarding the actual intentions of the leaders in the Kremlin: ‘behind Russia's 
return to traditional imperialism is a glaring lack of self-confidence’ (European Voice, 28 August 
2008).  
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Table 5.6 Agenda Setting – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Russia is regaining its great power status Policy problem 68.70 
Russia is a security threat Policy problem 64.30 
The EU should do more in the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy expectation 43.20 
Source: Author’s own data 
Transnational journalists linked to this idea another policy problem which framed Russia as a 
threat to the security of the EU. Both policy problems were defined as to affect large populations 
within the EU, making them even more salient within the public sphere, and thus putting 
pressure on policymakers to take them into account. The agenda setting power of the media was 
predicated in both cases on journalists’ network of informal ties and trust relationships built in 
time with EU policymakers, which allowed them to provide policy input106. At the same time, 
transnational journalists created the discursive context in which individuals could be linked to 
decision-making by presenting their perceptions of the interests of the general public to EU 
policymakers, who in turn believed that the image painted by the media of public opinion was a 
relevant one107. In relation to both policy problems, transnational journalists became part of the 
political process. However, agenda setting manifested itself here (in the case of policy problem 
which defined Russia as a threat to Europe’s security)108 only in the first phases of the conflict, 
when EU policymakers were taken by surprise and instinctively reacted against Moscow’s 
intervention109.  
In another instance of agenda setting, the transnational media also acted as the gatekeeper of EU 
policymakers’ commitments and promises, criticising the Union for not living up to the 
commitments and ambitions set up in the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The EaP was understood to 
be characterised in its initial phases by failure and the Union’s inability to promote democratic 
reforms that could keep its eastern neighbours at bay from Russian intrusion. EUObserver (5 
March 2009) noted that the EU’s Russia first approach (Berryman, 2012; Kanet, 2012; Sakwa, 
2013) hampered positive developments in the region, as the Union continuously shied away from 
practically engaging in areas that were seen to potentially damage Moscow’s interests 
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(EUObserver, 21 August 2008). Split between Russia’s interests and its own aspiration of 
spreading its norms globally, the EU was urged not to cave in to dictators from the Eastern 
Neighbourhood. These states were perceived to adopt opportunistic strategies, in that they tried 
to get as many benefits as possible (from both the EU and Russia) without giving too much in 
return (European Voice, 2 October 2008). The transnational media put here pressure on EU 
policymakers to make more ambitious commitments towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. Again, 
the efforts of transnational journalists were facilitated by the informal relations they built in time 
with policymakers110, allowing them to become part of the political process – as detailed in the 
interaction effects model presented in chapter 3. Spurred on by the transnational media’s support 
for a stronger European presence in the Eastern Neighbourhood, former EU High Representative 
Javier Solana also stressed the Union’s commitment to aiding the countries in the region, and 
Georgia more specifically: ‘for the EU, to be in Georgia is a great responsibility and it is a great 
honour. We will work with the people of Georgia and this will bring us closer (…) the EU is here 
in Georgia to work for the stability of the country. Our engagement is serious’ (EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 2008). 
 
5.3 Discussion 
5.3.1 Climate Change 
Due to the effects of the ‘Brussels bubble’, journalists often felt compelled to promote the EU’s 
policy on climate change, presenting points of view gathered both through formal means and 
deep relationships of trust built in time with policymakers. What this all points to, is that to a 
large extent the transnational media acted similarly to a third arm of the EU, communicating and 
backing up its policies. Moreover, the support of public opinion perceived by both transnational 
journalists and EU policymakers resulted in the fact that the transnational media reinforced in the 
minds of the latter the idea that their policies on climate change fully enjoyed democratic 
legitimacy111. Indexing was the primary interaction effect identified pointing to the idea that 
journalists acted as an extension of the EU’s decision-making processes, communicating its 
policies in relation to climate change and educating the general public (highlighted in table 5.7). 
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Table 5.7 Frames present in the transnational media – climate change policy 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
Number 
of 
articles 
Rate of 
occurrence 
(%) 
EUObserver 
(%)* 
European 
Voice 
(%)* 
Financial 
Times (%)* 
Climate change – medium to long term 
threat 
Policy problem Indexing 156 97.50 100.0 93.00 97.30 
Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen Policy problem Bounding 38** 80.90** 85.70*** 70.60*** 88.90*** 
Copenhagen – a crucial moment  Policy expectation Agenda setting 123 76.90 86.30 58.10 78.40 
The EU lost its global leadership after 
Copenhagen  
Policy problem Bounding 32** 68.10** 71.40*** 58.80*** 77.80*** 
Climate change is happening now  Policy problem Bounding 102 63.80 66.30 58.10 64.90 
The EU is the only actor that can forge a 
global agreement on climate change 
Policy expectation Indexing 101 63.10 68.80 65.10 48.60 
The EU still has the potential to globally 
lead in climate change  
Policy expectation Indexing 28** 59.60** 76.20*** 41.20*** 55.60*** 
The EU should do more Policy expectation Agenda Setting 92 57.50 57.50 67.40 45.90 
Blaming other states Policy solution Indexing 89 55.60 62.50 30.20 70.30 
Equal climate change deal Policy solution Indexing 62 38.80 46.30 37.20 24.30 
Notes: * Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified. 
            **Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit (N=47). 
            ***Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit: EUObserver (N=21); European Voice (N=17); FT  (N=9). 
Source: Actor’s own calculations: (N=160) / EUObserver (N=80); European Voice (N=43); FT (N=37). 
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The pervasiveness of this interaction effect was sustained by the perception that tackling the 
effects of global climate change shared wide support from citizens across the member states. The 
transnational media also acted as a gatekeeper of policymakers’ commitments criticising the 
EU’s downgrade in the aid it envisaged to send to developing countries in the eve of the summit 
– following the breakdown of the negotiations. 
Agenda setting was present only in two situations, putting pressure on EU policymaker to make 
even more ambitious commitments in tackling climate change. Great policy expectations were 
put by the transnational media before the summit on the ability of the EU to strike a progressive 
deal. On the other hand, this high degree of publicity and the fact that the approach of the Union 
for the summit was made public well in advance, weakened the EU’s leverage in relation to other 
states such as China or the US – because, despite them, it did not have what to negotiate for in 
the intergovernmental setting. Bounding appeared in situations where the media was perceived 
by EU policymakers to be too critical due to its proneness to search for sensational news – 
similarly to the interaction effects model presented in chapter 3. For example, the failure of the 
Copenhagen summit was seen as a huge disappointment within the transnational media, a view 
which resonated with that of the EP, but to a lesser extent with those of the Commission and the 
Council, which perceived the accord as a crucial step forward in tackling global climate change. 
In the six month period that followed the summit, the transnational media underscored that the 
EU still had the potential to lead in global climate change policy. In this way transnational 
journalists fuelled and legitimised a new approach from the Commission based on convincing 
small and island states, rather than major actors – a strategy which proved successful during the 
subsequent summits in Cancun and Durban (Boykoff, 2011; Roberts, Parks and Vásquez, 2011; 
Van Schaik and Schunz, 2012). 
The prime policy expectation put forward by the media involved the EU’s ability to drive 
forward negotiations on a progressive agreement at the Copenhagen summit – highlighted in 
table 5.7. Accordingly, the transnational media underscored the magnitude of the international 
event and its overall importance and meaning for the future of peoples around the world. By 
presenting numerous statements from EU policymakers who expressed high hopes regarding the 
potential outcome of the summit, the media reinforced and unpacked EU official discourse for 
the understanding of the general public. Linked to this, media frames expressed an expectation 
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that if the EU was to lead in global climate change it would need to act unitedly. Thus, Poland 
and other reluctant member states from CEE were highly criticised based on information, often 
leaked through informal means from EU policymakers, which could not have been made public 
through official channels. According to one high level official in Commissioner Hedegaard‘s 
team, the media aided their effort by highlighting that ‘Poland and the Czech Republic were 
unwilling to accept the 30 percent target’112. In the aftermath of the summit, a large number of 
articles backed–up official discourse by claiming that even though the EU had a weak position in 
Copenhagen, it still had the potential to lead in global climate change policy. Indexing in the case 
of climate change implied that most transnational journalists felt compelled to support the EU’s 
ambitious agenda, as it matched the views of the general public, and it was related to a problem 
which had global effects. At the same time, transnational journalists perceived themselves as 
educators who had the duty to inform individuals regarding the EU’s approach which was 
infused with principles and values related to justice, human rights and equality. Transnational 
journalists also encouraged public debate – on issues where EU policymakers were open to 
public scrutiny – within the public sphere by providing individuals with detailed scientific 
accounts regarding the effects of climate change. 
Through bounding the transnational media constrained the EU’s approach to climate only in a 
limited number of situations. Drawing mostly on points of view from actors outside the official 
EU foreign policy circle – such as academia, the NGO community or activists –, journalists put 
significant pressure on EU policymakers through the way in which they defined three policy 
problems (summarised below). This happened even though EU policymakers chose not to 
engage with such policy definitions because they diverged significantly from official approaches. 
At the same time, transnational journalists provided detailed information to the general public, 
encouraging debate within the public sphere. The three transnational publications claimed that 
the Union failed miserably and lost its leadership at the Copenhagen summit, being shunned by 
China and the US, in this way damaging the Union’s reputation. The failure of the Copenhagen 
summit was defined as a policy problem by the media, which urged the EU to take visible steps 
in order to convince other states to bind themselves to a progressive agreement – in contrast to 
the policy definition focusing on the loss of leadership. Due to the high level of publicity and 
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coverage that the summit received, its failure was seen to affect indiscriminately European 
citizens and peoples around the world. At the same time, the media’s policy definition also found 
a fit with the overall ambitions of the Commission, which was keen to put the process back on 
track after the failure of the summit (European Commission, 2010d). 
Moreover, the media criticised the EU’s ambiguous attitude towards China, where European 
businesses were pleased to deal with Beijing, while the official rhetoric criticised China for not 
adopting a more progressive European agenda. Hence, a number of articles proposed that the EU 
should have a more coherent approach towards China, a view which did not resonate with that of 
EU policymakers (European Commissioner for Climate Action, 2010b). This happened because 
the EU was keen to present itself as a supporter of transparent and fair multilateralism, as one 
interviewee argued that ‘the greatest strength of the EU is its desire to deal internationally 
through multilateralism, it’s in its DNA’113. Finally, although EU policymakers supported the 
idea of an equal agreement that would be fair to developing countries, they felt that some 
journalists were too subjective and highlighted only the sensational, arguing that only developed 
states should bear the weight of emissions reductions. Moreover, policymakers agreed that this 
type of framing discredited journalists who were presented to be over critical, since ‘media 
reporting that is overtly critical doesn’t have a clue (and is not interested) of the political 
constraints in which EU leaders operate’114.  
By presenting views from actors outside foreign policy circles, the transnational media 
encouraged debate and painted a balanced argument, which highlighted a more inclusive picture. 
Moreover, transnational journalists supported the efforts of environmental NGOs critical of the 
EU by highlighting the inconsistencies that characterised the Union’s approach to China or the 
US, and its inability to negotiate with them. However, EU policymakers felt that the high degree 
of transparency that the EU creates in its approach to climate change by making expectations 
clear – to the media, the general public and other states – can have a damaging effect on its 
ability to negotiate with China or the US. Due to the activity of the media which publicises and 
multiplies the Union’s ambitions in climate change, EU policymakers felt deprived of any 
leverage in their intergovernmental negotiations with other states, which were aware of the EU’s 
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position and could disregard it. According to one EU policymaker, ‘the US does not want media 
attention, because it would be blamed domestically for binding the country to international 
agreements and externally for not being ambitious’115. The reverse argument claims that 
enhanced publicity for the EU’s approach to climate change can gather support from less 
influential states, which feel disaffected by the US and China’s attitude (Kelemen, 2010; 
Oberthür and Dupont, 2011; Vogler, 2011). 
The agenda setting power of the transnational media in the case of climate change was internally 
legitimised by the conviction that individuals across the member states supported a progressive 
and strong stance from the EU. Transnational journalists’ networks of informal ties with EU 
policymakers allowed them to convey their perceived image of public opinion, which facilitated 
linking individuals to EU decision-making. Moreover, these relationships gave the opportunity to 
transnational journalists to put pressure on EU policymakers through their efforts to define two 
pervasive policy expectations: around the crucial moment that Copenhagen represented in 
development of global climate change policy and the fact that the EU should make even more 
ambitious commitments. At times, journalists working for the three publications also acted as 
activists pushing for a stronger EU presence in global climate change policy, because, as one 
article in EV put it, climate change was ‘one of the few areas where the EU has consistently won 
respect and recognition from its citizens’ (European Voice, 19 October 2009).  
Agenda setting also stemmed from the way in which the media constructed the two policy 
expectations, regularly featuring commentaries from individuals throughout Europe, and points 
of view from various NGOs; in this way, initiating and fostering debate within the public sphere. 
Even before official rhetoric surfaced, the lack of solidarity among the member states in sharing 
the burden of tackling climate change was also severely criticised. This attitude was widely 
shared by most EU policymakers who felt their ideas reinforced by the reporting activities of the 
media. Through its reporting, the transnational media reinforced EU policymakers own belief 
that the EU was justified in trying to secure a global deal on climate, in this way boosting its 
democratic legitimacy.To that extent, by providing thrust to policymakers own views which were 
also mirrored by the general public, journalists became part of policy processes. Hence, this case 
confirms the potential of the EU’s foreign policy to enjoy democratic legitimacy through the 
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activity of the transnational media – which is in the scope of the first research question explored 
in thesis. 
 
5.3.2 The policy towards Russia 
In the second case study, the prevalence of instances of indexing – highlighted in table 5.8 – 
meant that, at most times, the transnational media provided biased information to the general 
public and did not spur on public debate. It only reinforced and legitimised at times official 
current EU policies – having a limited impact on democratic legitimacy. Nonetheless, the 
transnational media criticised the member states for seeking bilateral ties with Russia, rather than 
achieving a common approach, which left weaker member states vulnerable to Moscow’s 
political use of energy prices. A stronger EU involvement in the Eastern Neighbourhood was 
also a pervasive theme throughout the articles analysed. The transnational media presented a 
more disengaged view on Russia than on climate change, pointing to the idea that it considered it 
as an area of foreign policy somewhat distant from the general public, and part of high politics. 
Nevertheless, the war prompted vigorous calls from transnational journalists for the EU to 
intervene in order to settle the conflict and promote security and stability in the region. This 
provided EU policymakers with an opportunity and a carte blanche to prove that the Union was 
truly an important international actor which had the ability to stabilise a conflict on its doorstep. 
The moderate message that the EU ended up conveying was also mirrored by the transnational 
media, which argued that the Union needed to act with caution in its relations with Russia and try 
to develop a strategic partnership with it.  
Unlike the case study on climate change policy where indexing processes dominated the 
media/foreign policy nexus, here the media had a more balanced approach, instances of indexing 
being outnumbered by those in which journalists sought to influence the foreign policy agenda, 
together with those of bounding. Nonetheless, due to the fact that Russia was seen as a topic 
slightly detached from the interests of European citizens, coupled with the perception that 
dealing with Russia was still the remit of the member states, the transnational media here had 
only a limited effect in infusing the EU’s approach with democratic legitimacy. The transnational 
media was more successful in acting as an educator and sometimes a supporter of the Union’s 
ambitions in the international arena widely shared by EU policymakers. Furthermore, it had the 
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Table 5.8  Frames present in the transnational media – the policy towards Russia 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
Number 
of 
articles 
Rate of 
occurrence 
(%) 
EUObserver 
(%)* 
European 
Voice 
(%)* 
Financial 
Times 
(%)* 
The EU should be the main actor in 
dealing with Russia 
Policy 
expectation 
Indexing 175 77.10 83.80 87.50 60.00 
Russia is regaining its great power status 
Policy problem Agenda 
setting 
156 68.70 61.30 73.60 72.00 
Russia is a security threat 
Policy problem Agenda 
setting 
146 64.30 61.30 61.10 70.70 
The war seen as a Russian aggression Policy problem Indexing 115 50.70 40.00 59.70 53.30 
The EU should do more in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood 
Policy 
expectation 
Agenda 
setting 
98 43.20 45.00 38.80 45.30 
The EU should cooperate with Russia Policy solution Indexing 86 38.90 41.30 37.50 34.70 
The EU is divided in its approach 
towards Russia – seen in a negative light 
Policy problem Bounding 81 35.70 38.80 43.10 25.30 
The US and NATO to shape Europe’s 
approach towards Russia 
Policy solution Bounding 62 27.30 18.80 23.60 40.00 
Russia promoting peace and wanting to 
integrate 
Policy solution Indexing 61 26.90 27.50 19.40 33.30 
Russia is an immediate threat for 
Europe’s energy security 
Policy problem Indexing 53 23.30 23.80 25.00 21.30 
Georgia isresponsible for the war Policy problem Bounding 26 11.50 13.80 11.10 9.30 
Notes:  
* Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified.  
Source: Author’s own calculations (N=227) / EUObserver (N=80); European Voice (N=72); FT (N=75). 
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potential, in some situations, to link individuals to policymaking through its agenda setting 
power (by supplying an image of public opinion to EU policymakers).  
In this case, indexing effects implied that the media acted as a tool at the disposal of 
policymakers – which points to low levels of democratic legitimacy. This allowed EU 
policymakers to gain support for either having a tougher approach towards Russia or advocating 
the development of a strategic partnership. Journalists acted here as educators of the general 
public, providing individuals with detailed accounts of the EU’s policies and its approaches. In 
this way, they aimed to initiate debate within the public sphere on an issue where EU 
policymakers felt needed more legitimation and justification in front of citizens. The three 
transnational publications frequently featured articles which contained a policy expectation that 
the EU should take on the responsibility of dealing with Russia on equal terms and assuring 
peace and stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood. The transnational media followed official 
rhetoric in defining the war in Georgia as a threat to the stability of the EU’s Eastern 
Neighbourhood. Russia was seen as the main aggressor, the media praising the French 
presidency of the EU for taking a tough stance against Moscow in the initial phases of the 
conflict.  
The transnational media also advocated the need for the EU to reshape its relationship with 
Russia and build a strategic partnership which would keep the European continent and its near 
abroad at bay from instability. Transnational journalists achieved this by highlighting the 
common values and historical heritage that Moscow shared with Europe, which as a policy 
solution meant that the EU should treat Russia as an equal and take into account its interests. The 
EU policymakers interviewed for this thesis were keen to argue that the prospect of a strategic 
partnership originated from within the Commission and that this has been often picked up and 
reinforced by journalists116. According to one official from the EEAS the ‘strategic partnership 
with Russia involves foreign policy cooperation, climate change, multilateral engagement, 
development aid, self recognition’117. Simultaneously, journalists working for transnational 
publications argued that they felt favourable towards the prospect of building a stronger 
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partnership with Russia118, and hence compelled to report on and inform the public general 
regarding this initiative. This policy solution was facilitated by the fact that it was based on 
broad consensus among the member states. Although, generally, the EU’s policy towards Russia 
was perceived by the three transnational media not to affect large populations within Europe, 
transnational journalists defined the EU’s vulnerability to Russia’s political use of energy prices 
as a policy problem to which large populations within the Union were sensitive.  
Instances of bounding were present in situations where the media identified divisions among the 
member states as one of the most salient policy problems, hampering the EU’s approach towards 
Russia and its efforts to stabilise the conflict. On the one hand, the three transnational 
publications criticised big member states such as Germany or France for their appeasing attitude 
towards Russia. On the other, Poland or other new member states from CEE were presented as 
taking an unnecessary tough stance against Russia. While the Commission or the EP informally 
sided with both types of arguments119, the member states in question and their representatives in 
the Council were unwilling to engage with the problems defined by the media (Council of the 
European Union, 2008c). However, media discourse mirrored here voices from the Commission, 
which were seen as being too critical of the member states to be stated through official channels. 
The three transnational publications also sought to maintain a balanced position towards Russia 
throughout the period analysed. Voices from Russian political elites and representatives were 
often featured, and reinforced the view that Moscow should be seen as part of Europe, and that 
its intervention in Georgia was justified by the need to help its citizens. In only a limited number 
of articles, the three transnational publications identified a policy problem in the fact that the war 
might have been caused by Georgia’s rash actions.   
Although most articles expressed the policy expectation that the EU should take the lead in 
promoting democracy and modernisation in Russia in order to achieve stability in the Eastern 
neighbourhood, a number of arguments were put forward especially in the FT in order to 
highlight the fact that the EU did not and could not possess the political willingness and military 
capabilities in order to back up such an ambitious goal. This was linked to a policy solution 
which argued that the US would be better equipped to deal with Russia and ensure peace and 
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stability in the region. The transnational media provided here information and criticism departing 
from the mainstream and official rhetoric, outlining a balanced and objective picture. Bounding 
also implied that transnational journalists presented information to individuals within the public 
sphere which otherwise would have been inaccessible to them, encouraging in this way public 
debate. Moreover, transnational journalists were perceived here to focus on conflict and 
sensational news, rather than on policy successes, due to their lack of knowledge about the 
constraints and the complexity which characterises decision-making in foreign policy. Because 
the policy towards Russian was widely viewed by both journalists and policymakers as a domain 
of high politics, this policy definition was not successful in influencing the foreign policy 
agenda. However, it managed to constrain the actions of EU policymakers only in the first 
instances of the conflict, due to high levels of coverage. 
The most salient policy problem defined by the transnational media referred to Russia regaining 
its superpower stratus due to its intervention in Georgia. Discourse throughout the three 
publications signalled a shift in Russia’s reputation and stance, which now desired and proved it 
had the means to recover its hegemonic position in the post-Soviet space. This policy problem 
was backed up with arguments derived from recent developments in the international arena, 
where Russia was increasingly using energy prices in order to condition political outcomes. 
Policymakers were urged to take into account Russia’s new status and felt compelled to revise 
their policy. According to one EEAS official, Russia wanted ‘also to be an equal partner of the 
EU and US mostly due to its past status’120. Across the three transnational publications the idea 
that the Union should step-up and be the main actor in pacifying the conflict which was on its 
doorstep became prevalent. Through this, transnational journalists provided thrust to EU 
policymakers’ own understanding that the Union should develop its own relationship with 
Russia.The transnational media also acted as a gatekeeper of the EU’s commitment to aiding the 
democratising processes of the countries in its Eastern Neighbourhood. At times, it reminded 
policymakers that promoting a Russia first policy was detrimental to the development of its 
Eastern neighbours. In the way it was framed, this policy expectation reinforced the widespread 
desire to build a stronger EU foreign policy held by both journalists and policymakers (Matlary, 
2006; Gariup, 2008; Biava, Drent and Herd, 2011). At the same time, it damaged its own 
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foundations by emphasising the EU’s lack of capacity and instruments to act in the international 
arena relative to other world powers. 
EU policymakers especially from the Commission banked on the support of the media121 and 
often reaffirmed the EU’s commitment and willingness to aid the states in the region (European 
Commission, 2008b, 2009a; EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
2010). Although the transnational media through its policy definitions gave drive to certain EU 
approaches in its relations with Russia, its ability did not stem from the activism of journalists or 
the general public’s (low) interest in the issue. Similarly to the case of climate change, the 
agenda setting powers of the transnational media were predicated upon journalists’ informal ties 
and trust relationships built in time with EU policymakers.Transnational journalists seemed to 
take pride in influencing the EU’s policy towards Russia. This happened because they perceive it 
as an area of high politics to which they take pride in being part of, as according to one journalist 
enhancing its diplomacy should be a prime concern for the EU, to which journalists could also 
contribute122. Furthermore, agenda setting relied on the view held by EU policymakers that the 
media can paint a sufficiently reliable picture of public opinion, which endowed transnational 
journalists with the ability to link individuals to decision-making by providing their feedback to 
EU policymakers123. 
 
5.4 Conclusions 
The analysis of interaction effects in this chapter has highlighted that transnational journalists, 
deeply immersed in the ‘Brussels bubble’, rarely go out of their way to criticise the EU. They get 
most of their information regarding the EU’s foreign policy either through informal means based 
on trust relationships, or through the official communication channels of the Union. Moreover, 
the ‘Brussels bubble’ infuses journalists with a sense of optimism regarding European integration 
and the EU’s ability and duty to shape events in the international arena, which translated into the 
prevalence of instances of indexing. On most occasions, the transnational media acted as a third 
arm of the EU, publicising and gathering support for its policies, whilst also fostering debate 
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within the public sphere. This attitude was mainly influenced by two factors. Firstly, it was 
influenced by the belief shared by EU policymakers that even though on the surface the EU’s 
foreign policy might seem detached from citizens, the various aspects of democratic legitimacy 
and a concern for mitigating the EU’s democratic deficit form an integral part of decision-
making in this policy area124. Transnational journalists argue that the EU is sufficiently 
transparent and willing to debate policy initiatives and proposals within the European public 
sphere – although this is not always evident in policy outcomes125. Moreover, they agree with EU 
policymakers in arguing that is in the EU’s DNA to be open to public debate, as its institutions 
are very transparent and regularly consult with stakeholders and civil society126.  
Secondly, openness and transparency characterises EU policymakers’ engagement with 
journalists which they view to be key to the interaction with the general public, as the media has 
the ability to portray the policy preferences of individuals within the EU. Transparency is 
paramount in every institution’s day to day activities, but more so in the Commission (Curtin, 
2007). EU policymakers argue that there is a high degree of openness towards public debate, 
where impact assessments are open to the public and to all other institutions in the EU (Góra, 
Mach and Trenz, 2012). Moreover, in general, scholars and practitioners argue that at the 
transnational level democracy works in practice through overarching consultations with all strata 
of society (Abromeit, 1998; Eriksen, 2007; DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann, 2007). At a deeper 
level, openness, transparency and accountability to each and every citizen are seen as crucial for 
upholding the EU’s commitment to democratic values and principles. EU policymakers indicate 
the existence of different aspects of accountability, but ultimately argue that they feel they are 
accountable to the public127, while some felt accountable to the ‘rules and values of the EU’128.  
 Nevertheless, the three transnational publications due to their commitment to the principle of 
objectivity and their high levels of professionalism framed contrasting (and sometimes 
conflicting) policy definitions, in this way providing individuals in the public sphere information 
which would have otherwise inaccessible. In both case studies, instances of bounding were 
evident in situations where the media featured mostly severe criticism which was directed 
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towards the Union’s inability to live up to its ambitious goals, or the tendency of some member 
states to act individually, while disregarding the common values shared by the Union. In the 
realm of foreign policy, Eurosceptic journalism seems to be almost non-existent. Moreover, in 
instances of agenda setting the transnational media highlighted that the EU should do more in the 
international arena. This in turn, allowed policymakers often to legitimise their normative 
discourse by alluding to the need to address the criticism expressed in the media that the EU 
should do more in foreign policy. Contrary to other policy areas, where Hooghe and Marks 
(2009) recently argued that through politicisation of European issues and increased public 
debate, the permissive consensus which provided thrust to European integration has transformed 
into constraining dissensus, foreign policy – at the transnational level – is still reinforced by a 
deep perception perpetuated by the media that individuals support a stronger European presence 
in the international arena. The pervasiveness of the EU in the policy definitions framed by the 
three transnational publications also points to the intense Europeanisation of their discourse – 
having the Union as a central theme.  
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Chapter 6 – The United Kingdom 
 
 
 
As with the case of other empirical chapters, this chapter will first provide a description of the 
context within which journalists and policymakers interact, followed by an analysis of 
interaction effects in the two cases studies and a discussion of their meaning for the role of 
democratic legitimacy129 – in this way exploring the two research questions. Two newspapers 
were selected as representative for the British media: the Guardian, and the Times. The 
distribution of the articles within the two newspapers is presented in annex A in table A.1 (page 
301), and the coverage of the two case studies in figures A.1, respectively A.2. Annex D 
highlights that in the case of climate change, the period surveyed was 1 June 2009 – 1 June 2010, 
with 136 articles selected. On other hand, in the case of the policy towards Russia the period 
examined stretched six months before and after the conflict (8 March 2008 – 5 March 2009), 
with 181 articles selected.  
 
6.1 The media/foreign policy nexus 
With the late 90s, equating the UK’s national interest to the development of a strong European 
foreign policy became a recurrent theme for British leaderships (Cameron 1999). For example, 
former Foreign Secretary David Miliband stressed on many occasions Britain’s need to 
contribute to the foreign policy of the EU and embrace it: ‘to be frightened of European foreign 
policy is blinkered, fatalistic and wrong (...) Britain should embrace it, shape it and lead 
European foreign policy’ (The Guardian, 26 October 2009). Nonetheless, British support for the 
EU’s foreign policy has been often limited only to an abstract goal and its possible 
consequences, but almost never expressed in relation to the methods that could turn such an 
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aspiration into reality. Criticism towards the EEAS is indicative of British distrust for modes of 
further integration in foreign policy and diplomacy devised at the supranational level (Burke, 
2012). Public opinion surveys highlight the same tendency for the British general public, who is 
more willing to accept ‘more Europe’ (German Marshall Fund 2010) in foreign policy than in 
other policy areas (European Commission 2006; YouGov-Cambridge 2012), and even consider 
an individual approach from Britain less desirable than a unified European policy.   
Both the Russian-Georgian war and the Copenhagen summit attracted the direct involvement of 
Prime Minister Brown and members of his cabinet, who offered myriad interviews to the media, 
whilst writing editorials which explained Britain and the EU’s positions. Britain’s approach to 
climate change differs significantly from that of other member states (Harris, 2007a, p. 23). It 
has made the most important contribution towards emission reductions, thus reinforcing the EU’s 
burden sharing approach. Together with Germany, it has pushed for tougher climate change 
regulations within the EU (Schreurs and Tiberghien, 2007, p.25). Furthermore, during the last 
decade (i.e. between 1999 and 2009) the British government has invested a lot of resources in 
tackling climate change, together with hiring a large number of personnel. Ed Miliband acted as 
Climate Change Secretary and spearheaded the UK, and the Union’s efforts during the 
Copenhagen summit. On the other hand, Britain’s lack of dependence on Russian energy and its 
geographical remoteness have made it less interested than other member states in dealing with 
Moscow on bilateral terms, and more in favour of a European multilateral framework (Lynch, 
2005; Christou, 2010). During the Russian-Georgian war, David Miliband as foreign secretary 
led the opposition towards Russia’s aggression by visiting Georgia and reassuring its leadership 
of Western support. Nonetheless, the limited peace agreement brokered by France and Germany 
which saw Russia as the de facto winner in the region was duly accepted by the British 
government (Cornell and Starr, 2009; Asmus, 2010; David, 2011).  
To a larger extent than in the case of the European or Romanian parliaments, the British 
parliament is able to exercise effective oversight on Britain’s foreign policy and its activity in the 
EU through its select committees (Bulley, 2011). For example, during the war between Russia 
and Georgia (and in its aftermath) the Select Committee on EU Affairs held numerous hearings 
with members from the cabinet and issued reports on how the EU should deal with the conflict, 
whilst also assessing its activity after the ceasefire (House of Commons, 2008; House of Lords, 
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2008a, 2008b, 2009a). The Select Committee on Energy and Climate Change acted similarly, 
issuing numerous reports on the EU’s approach to global climate change, or holding hearings 
with scientists, NGOs and members of the cabinet (House of Lords, 2009c, 2009b, 2009d, 2010). 
Effective parliamentary oversight is part of a larger pattern, where decision-making processes in 
the UK in relation to the two case studies are made transparent through the well updated websites 
of institutions and the various public information campaigns they organise. Transparency, on the 
other hand seems to be much lower in quality than at the transnational level, very often specific 
information about policies and policymakers being hidden or even absent altogether130. British 
policymakers have mixed feelings about the relationship between democratic legitimacy and 
foreign policy, however they are keen to emphasise that accountability and transparency are 
paramount in their daily activity (Burke, 2012). According to one interviewee, democracy 
‘decreases the effectiveness of policies as bureaucrats have to listen to electoral pressures from 
their ministers which most times, when confronted with technical issues constrain them not to 
take the most appropriate course of action’131. However, British policymakers contend that the 
media can reflect the views shared by the general public, and more importantly can be used as a 
way of interacting with citizens, surveying their opinions and receiving feedback on policies. As 
interest among citizens and availability of information regarding the EU (in most of its aspects) 
is quite scarce in the UK, the media is thought to have a central role in influencing the 
democratic legitimacy of the Union in Britain (Morgan, 1995; Hurrelmann, 2008). This makes 
the enquiry (in the case of the UK) into the two research questions explored in this thesis even 
more relevant.  
In chapter 4 it was stressed that the British media system is characterised by non-institutionalised 
self-regulation, strong commercial and market orientation, and high levels of professionalism. In 
judging the level of professionalism of publications in reporting about foreign policy issues and 
the EU, British policymakers argue that it is proportional to the number of foreign 
correspondents, resources, the political orientation and the ability to capture and portray 
polarised views within the political arena and the public sphere132. There is a widely shared view 
that quality media tends to have a balanced approach, albeit subjective and infused with political 
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considerations. In practice this assessment translates into the fact that British policymakers are 
attentive and exclusive in terms of the journalists they choose to interact with and provide 
background information, making informal ties and personal relationships very important 
(Henningham and Delano, 1998; Mannin, 2010; Hug, 2011). Trust relationships build in time 
and are maintained by continuous feedback loops between policymakers and journalists. 
Institutions also maintain blacklists which contain journalists that have misused quotes or 
background information133.   
British journalists believe that while their readers are generally interested in foreign policy – 
including global climate and the policy towards Russia –, they do not possess the necessary 
knowledge in order to understand the complexity of decision-making in foreign policy (even 
more in the case of the EU)134. On the other hand, scholars and practitioners contend that within 
the British media there is a tendency to treat issues related to the EU as external topics related to 
foreign policy (Anderson and Weymouth, 1999; Kent, 2005; Statham, 2007a). British journalists 
argue that they are simply reporters, while some put emphasis on their role as educators of the 
general public or political partisans135. Capturing their readerships’ attention, access to 
policymakers and the availability of news space are thought to have significant influence on their 
reporting decisions. Commercial or editorial pressures, journalists’ own knowledge of the topic 
or access to expert knowledge are generally not considered to have a great impact on the way in 
which British journalists choose to report. The EU is considered to provide specialist knowledge 
and to be very accessible, as well as the UK national representation in Brussels. British 
journalists contact the EU’s institutions for information only occasionally136. Very often, 
journalists target both national and transnational publics, and sometimes other journalists, 
academia or civil society. To a greater extent than in the case of journalists working for 
transnational publications or the Romanian media, British journalists do not have too much time 
because they need to write every day a blog piece, a news piece for the printed version, 
contribute to the website of the publication, whilst also responding to comments online137.  
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British policymakers are frequently interviewed by the media as they view it as an effective 
avenue for giving voice to their policies in order to gain public support.  They contend that a two 
way process characterises their interactions with journalists. The media needs policymakers for 
sources, and policymakers use the media in order to publicise their policies, legitimise their 
actions or boost their reputation138. Furthermore, the media is employed in order to encourage 
and foster public debate in relation to issues that British policymakers feel require public 
legitimation (Bond, 2003; Berkel, 2006). This belief is predicated upon the idea that the media 
can reflect a reliable image of the state of public opinion. Moreover, British policymakers argue 
that the media can provide feedback from individuals on their policies, which allows them to 
adjust the way in which policies are officially framed and presented to the general public139. 
British journalists also pride themselves in the fact that they sometimes act as educators, 
providing crucial information about foreign policy or the EU to citizens which otherwise would 
have been inaccessible140. Accordingly, indexing (as well as bounding and agenda setting) is 
more successful in instances where policy definitions are framed in a way in which they affect 
large groups of individuals both within Britain and globally. Policy problems are also more 
pervasive when they converge with definitions articulated by the UN or the US – due to the 
traditionally strong transatlantic relations. Policy solutions and expectations are successfully 
indexed when they resemble high political administrative viability based on consensus in the 
political sphere, or respectively draw on the broader British social, cultural or political context.  
British journalists engage in investigative reporting, and due to their commitment to the principle 
of objectivity aim to present polarised views from all the actors affected by the topic they report 
on (Henningham and Delano, 1998; Gavin, 2001). The bipolar structure of the British political 
landscape means journalists also draw their sources from the opposition, or from other actors 
outside foreign policy circles. Bounding is more evident in situations where decision-making 
processes lack transparency and British policymakers shy away from the limelight, avoiding 
public scrutiny or being held accountable. The media acts here as a watchdog of democracy, 
encouraging public debate and contestation within the public sphere, whilst putting British 
policymakers and their policies in the spotlight. On the other hand, British policymakers justify 
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their decision not to take into account the discourse of the media and its perceived view of public 
opinion because journalists are thought to be prone to focus on conflict and sensational news 
(Kent, 2005). Newspapers are also considered to have their own agenda in reporting about 
foreign policy and the EU, sometimes being prone to search for sensational news. Coupled with 
the lack of detailed technical knowledge that journalists have about decision-making, it decreases 
the influence of the media. British policymakers argue that in such instances, the media fails in 
delivering a clear picture of their policies to the general public, and misleads citizens into 
rejecting them. Hence, journalists are seen as tending to dismiss policies which fall outside 
accepted boundaries due to the fact that they often lack specialist knowledge about foreign policy 
which would allow them to grasp the constraints and the complexity of decision-making in this 
policy area141. Secondly, there is a perception that media owners and British journalists’ own 
activism can have malign effects on the way in which policies are received by the general public. 
This leads British policymakers to the idea that through its discourse, the British media is able to 
produce significant damage to the reputation of politicians and even states or international 
organisations (Morgan, 1995; Hurrelmann, 2008; Gavin, 2010).  
Agenda setting relies on the network of interactions and dialogue that journalists maintain with 
policymakers. British journalists are here able to both put pressure on policymakers and convince 
them to adapt their policies, and through their partisanship very often become part of the political 
process. Journalists are able to frequently link individuals to policymaking by providing 
information to citizens regarding decision-making or the way policies are implemented, and then 
convey their feedback to policymakers. In relation to policy solutions, agenda setting is more 
successful when little policy and administrative accommodation is needed, and there is wide 
consensus among political parties. The agenda setting power of the media also manifests itself 
when British journalists act as activists and diligently pursue various issues which they perceive 
to have wide social and economic implications, and where political action is urgently needed. 
They achieve this through investigative journalism or by giving voice to various groups within 
the public or NGOs. Similarly, both the Guardian and the Times often feature public information 
campaigns and debates which run sometimes for weeks. Moreover, journalists’ diligence allows 
them to follow-up on policymakers’ promises and commitments, acting as their gatekeeper. In 
                                                          
141
 British policymakers 1, 2. 
 161 
 
the context of the structure of the British media/foreign policy nexus described in this section, 
the next sections will analyse interaction effects between the media and policymakers in the two 
cases and discus their implications for the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in the 
EU’s foreign policy – aiming to explore the two research questions set out in the introductory 
chapter.  
 
6.2 Interaction effects 
6.2.1 Climate Change 
Indexing 
Indexing in the case of climate change was present in the way in which the media drew on 
British policymakers’ rhetoric in order to define one policy problem, two solutions and an 
expectation. Firstly, climate change was extensively presented as a threat to global security in the 
medium and long term, with around 95% of the articles (highlighted in table 6.1) warning about 
the risks associated with it. This policy problem drew on the approach of both the British 
government and the parliament, which argued that in the medium and long term climate change 
can have negative consequences on the security and wellbeing of peoples around the world – 
which could also affect the UK and the EU (Miliband, 2009a). More specifically, climate change 
was charged with increasing the vulnerability of states to prolonged droughts and severe floods, 
and with encouraging desertification, the degradation of ecosystems, or with leading to reduced 
agricultural productivity (Miliband, 2010b). For example, in a report on ‘Adapting to climate 
change: EU agriculture and forestry’, British MPs acknowledged that ‘climate change will have 
major consequences for food production, water availability, ecosystems and human health, 
migration pressures, and regional instability’ (House of Lords, 2010, p.8). Moreover, Prime 
Minister Brown, in the build up to the summit, vigorously combated the idea that climate change 
was not a long term danger due to the absence of clear and trustable scientific evidence, noting 
that ‘those people who have become climate change deniers are against the grain of all the 
evidence that has been assembled that global warming and climate change are indeed challenges 
that the world must meet and that can only be met together’ (Press Association, 2010). As 
inferred in the model described in chapter 3, the two British newspapers publicised here the 
official approach of the government, which identified climate change as a threat in the medium 
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and long term, in this way gathering public support, but also opening the issue for public debate. 
In the way defined by the British media, this policy problem became legitimate due to its large 
and indiscriminate effects on peoples globally and its convergence with policy definitions 
constructed  by the UN. Through regularly presenting detailed scientific evidence and analyses, 
British journalists also acted as educators providing citizens a wealth of information about the 
threat posed by climate change in the medium and long term. 
Table 6.1 Indexing – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Climate change – medium to long term threat Policy problem 94.90 
The EU should do more Policy expectation 68.40 
Equal climate change deal Policy solution 37.60 
Blaming other states Policy solution 36.80 
The EU still has the potential to globally lead in 
climate change 
Policy expectation 31.40 
Source: Author’s own data 
Within the EU, Britain was pushing for an agreement which would have been fair for developing 
countries, and entailed aid from rich countries to poor countries142. This approach was justified 
by the fact that ‘some countries and regions are already vulnerable to climate variability and 
change, but in the coming decades all countries will be affected, regardless of their affluence or 
individual emissions’ (House of Lords, 2010, p.8). The British media also afforded considerable 
publishing space to issues of global justice and equality in climate change policy, a policy 
solution which was seen as enjoying high political and administrative viability stemming from 
the consensus in the British political sphere. Hence, the need for a deal that would ‘have at its 
heart equity and social justice between north and south’ (The Guardian, 30 September 2009) was 
a pervasive policy solution proposed by the two newspapers. Accordingly, the EU was seen as 
responsible for securing an agreement at Copenhagen that would be fair for developing 
countries. Even though the Union was committed to aiding poor countries with several tens of 
billions of Euro, the media still criticised the fact that most of the member states were not doing 
enough to convince tax payers about the need to tackle climate change. Here again, British 
journalists assumed the role of educators, providing information to the general public within the 
public sphere. They achieved this through a series of articles in both newspapers which 
concentrated on how developed countries have profited throughout history in the detriment of 
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poorer countries from the south which are now the main victims of climate change (The Times, 
20, 23, 27 October 2009; The Guardian, 25 September 2009, 10, 15 November 2009). At the 
same time, in defining an equal agreement as a viable policy solution, the media chose to create 
publicity for an initiative that the British government was ardently supporting within the EU. 
Another policy solution – which sought to justify the Union’s inability to negotiate a progressive 
deal – constructed by British policymakers and taken up the media, involved putting the blame 
on other states on like China or the US for refusing to comply within international emissions 
reduction standards. In contrast to these states, Britain through the EU was willing to safeguard 
the environmental security of future generations and act as a leader by example in climate 
change policy. The EU’s unique position as a normative leader in climate change was 
constructed negatively against the US and China. Putting the blame on other states for not doing 
enough or not living up to their commitments was a method present almost in 40 percent of the 
articles in the sample. Titles like ‘Your emission cuts are not enough, EU tells Obama’ (The 
Times, 8 December 2009) worked to build up the Union’s moral stature, from which, it was 
hoped, it could usher in a more progressive and fair agreement at the Copenhagen summit. 
Despite traditionally strong transatlantic relations, British policymakers framed the leadership of 
the EU in climate change in opposition to the actions of the US. The British media incorporated 
the official rhetoric about the US in its discourse, claiming on many occasions that the US 
adopted a rather detached attitude towards climate change, which could have on the long run 
harmful effects for all the peoples around the world. Thus, in the run-up to the Copenhagen 
summit there was an overarching feeling that if an ambitious agreement would fail, the US 
would be responsible: as its ‘ignorance about the risks and reality of global warming could sink 
hopes of a new global deal to control greenhouse gas emissions at December's climate talks in 
Copenhagen’ (The Guardian, 29 September 2009).  
Although recognised as the biggest polluter in the world, China received less harsh reviews from 
the British media in relation to its approach to climate change. Media discourse was in line here 
with the views of the British government which on many occasions encouraged China to bind 
itself to a progressive agreement (Gray, 2009; House of Lords, 2009d; Richardson, 2009; 
Miliband, 2010a; Press Association, 2010). For example, after the summit, the British foreign 
secretary David Miliband visited China arguing that it had received unnecessary bad PR: ‘it still 
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baffles me why some people continue to make an issue about China’ (Pomfret, 2010). Similarly, 
Ed Miliband before the summit pointed to the high possibility of a failure: ‘there is a wider 
question, too, about the structures and nature of the negotiations (…) we cannot again allow 
negotiations on real points of substance to be hijacked in this way’ (Miliband, 2009b). Indexing 
implied here that the media drew on the discourse of both British and EU policymakers which 
underscored the US or China as scapegoats in order to justify the Union’s weak influence and 
policy outcomes. While on the one hand, the two British newspapers publicised the 
government’s approach, building public support, on the other, they sent a clear message to non-
EU states regarding the Union’s normative intentions which mounted significant international 
pressure on the US or China. 
Even though the media was largely disappointed with the outcomes of the Copenhagen summit 
and the EU’s inability to convince other states to commit to effectively tackling the effects of 
climate change through a global accord, around 30 percent of the articles still claimed the Union 
had the potential bounce back. As such, both newspapers were still highly supportive and 
constructed a policy expectation that the Union should try to reassert itself as leader in climate 
change. The Times (18 February 2010) went as far as to publish an opinion piece from various 
British and European leaders which had the role of reassuring readers that: ‘the EU must reaffirm 
its role as a leader within a multipolar world, setting itself out as a secure reference point for 
democracy, human rights and social progress for the world’ (The Guardian, 3 January 2010). 
This policy expectation was linked to a broader expectation frequently expressed by the British 
government throughout the timeframe explored. According to it, even though the EU was 
committed to and engaged in tackling the effects of climate change, some member states were 
still unwilling to fully comply. This hindered the Union’s success in the international arena and 
its ability to act as model for other states (Miliband, 2009a; Richardson, 2009; House of Lords, 
2010). Indexing implied in this case that the media was used by British policymakers in order to 
voice, publicise and justify their ambitions that the EU should engage even more, and their 
conviction that in the light of the outcome of the Copenhagen summit, the Union had not lost its 
global leadership143. 
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Bounding 
Bounding was evident (shown in table 6.2) in the way the two British newspapers presented the 
summit through two policy problems. Firstly, the days of the summit determined a shift in the 
way the EU was seen and presented to the general public as a leader in climate change policy. 
During the summit it became apparent for the British media that the EU would not be able to 
assume leadership and broker an agreement on climate change that would commit the US or 
China, and help poor countries – which spelled a disappointing outcome for the summit. In the 
run-up the summit, the British media warned that due to American pressures, the EU was ready 
to accept a watered down version of the agreement, replacing its commitment to ‘30% cuts by 
2020 with 30% by 2025’ (The Guardian, 18 December 2009). Britain’s Prime Minister Brown, 
in a series of interviews published in both the Guardian and the Times also admitted that failure 
at the summit was a real possibility (The Guardian, 19 December 2009; The Times, 19 
December 2009). There was uncertainty about the prospects for an agreement – ‘as more than 
115 world leaders descend on Copenhagen to make the crucial decisions, what can we expect? 
Nobody really knows’ (The Guardian, 17 December 2009). The Times (18 December 2009) 
went as far as to set up an online poll and debate where people could express their opinion about 
the possible outcome of the summit.  
Table 6.2 Bounding – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen  Policy problem 41.20 
The EU lost its global leadership after Copenhagen Policy problem 23.50 
The UK should lead by example independently Policy expectation 2.90 
Source: Author’s own data 
Secondly, the two newspapers identified a policy problem in the fact that the EU had not backed 
up its ambitious and normative rhetoric, and had lost its global leadership: ‘we now need to see 
more from Brussels, both in terms of emissions cuts and climate financing’ (The Guardian, 17 
December 2009). The limited agreement that the EU achieved at Copenhagen and its exclusion 
from the negotiations between China and the US was presented in the British media as a 
significant failure for both the UK and the Union. A lack of political leadership on the part of the 
EU was framed as the main cause of the failure in Copenhagen ‘which has put the whole world 
more at risk’ (The Guardian, 13 March 2010). For the next three months, the Copenhagen 
summit became a point of reference, against which the British media would compare policy 
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initiatives that did not live up to their goals: ‘like the Copenhagen summit, it has been a largely 
miserable event, exposing the limits of environmental co-operation’ (The Guardian, 23 March 
2010). Simultaneously, the British media noted that the outcome of the summit had the potential 
of raising electricity bills throughout Britain, as European industries would find it more and more 
difficult to cope with competition from other firms that are not subject to such ambitious 
reduction commitments.  
In the aftermath of the summit, the British media also presented a series of opinions from 
researchers and think thanks that were disappointed with the EU’s failure to secure an ambitious 
agreement. The Union was considered to have an inferior power to China and the US: ‘the 
message that Copenhagen sent is that Europe is not at the table (...) the fact of the matter is that 
Europe's leaders were taking a coffee and (Barack) Obama visited them at the coffee break. But 
he negotiated with others’, according to a senior EU independent advisor (The Guardian, 9 
February 2010). Conversely, British journalists presented points of view from actors outside 
policy circles in order to highlight the failure of the EU at the summit and inform the general 
public regarding the reasons that led to it. As detailed in the interaction effects model presented 
in chapter 3, through this, the British media contributed to encouraging debate within the public 
sphere on the issue of climate change. However, the media was perceived not to have access to 
all the details of the negotiations that took place behind closed doors at Copenhagen, and thus to 
be prone to dismiss any outcome that diverged from the ambitious expectations that were 
previously associated with the summit. According to one British policymaker, the British media 
was oblivious or ignorant of the fact that there was ‘considerable pressure on the EU to do more 
which made it cave (...) the transparent nature of the EU’s internal negation outcome and its 
stance at the Copenhagen gave away its leverages in negotiations with the US and China’144.   
Bounding was present here because, after the summit, British policymakers admitted that 
Copenhagen had been an obvious failure due to the fact that it did not establish a clear timetable 
for a legal and globally binding treaty, but continued to stress their commitment to tackling 
global climate change (Miliband, 2010a, 2010c). According to Ed Miliband, the UK and the EU 
had to reflect on the outcome of the summit and devise new approaches in order to secure an 
inclusive global agreement: ‘we have to begin by understanding the lessons of what went wrong 
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but also recognise the achievements that it secured (…) this was a chaotic process dogged by 
procedural games’ (Miliband, 2009b). In various official documents (House of Lords, 2009c, 
2009b, 2009d; Miliband, 2009a, 2010a) both the British government and the parliament 
presented the outcome of the summit in a positive light, claiming that even though on the surface 
the summit might have seemed like a failure, it actually progressed in a substantial manner the 
negotiation process, highlighting the EU’s ability to effectively lead in global climate change 
policy. These documents argued that it was for the first time that an agreement was signed by 49 
states which produced 80% of global emissions. At the same time, the agreement endorsed ‘the 
limit of two degrees warming as the benchmark for global progress on climate change’ 
(Miliband, 2010c) and made significant commitments for rich countries to aid third world and 
developing states. 
 
Agenda setting 
Agenda setting was present in the way the British media constructed three salient frames which 
are highlighted in table 6.3. A significantly lower number of media reports145 – than those 
framing climate change as a medium to long term threat – considered that climate change was 
also a present threat and urgent policy problem. At times, official rhetoric also emphasised the 
urgency that tackling climate change presupposed, but argued that in order to be effective any 
measure had to be carefully thought through and implemented according to local circumstances 
(Gray, 2009; Richardson, 2009; The Telegraph, 2009). Ed Miliband agreed with the views 
expressed by the British media and in an interview for the Guardian (26 June 2009) highlighted 
the fact that: ‘people believe climate change is happening in the UK, most people do not think it 
is a plot or something made up, but most people do not seem to think it will happen in their area’. 
By framing climate change as an urgent issue which had to be mitigated at the Copenhagen 
summit, the British media acted as an agenda setter telling people how to view climate change 
and pushing policymakers for more commitment.  
The success of the media’s policy definition was facilitated by the indiscriminate effects that 
climate change was perceived to have on peoples globally. Furthermore, this policy problem 
converged with and drew on definitions framed by the UN, by British policymakers (whose 
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views were only marginal before the summit and became prevalent during it146) and the 
perceived state of public opinion in Britain and the EU – which was understood to favour 
immediate action. Through its agenda setting power, the British media had the potential to link 
individuals to decision-making processes, by conveying their views to policymakers and 
encouraging debate within the public sphere. Journalists achieved this by frequently featuring 
views from the general public such as opinion polls, op-eds and letters to the editor, all of which 
criticised and urged British policymakers to do more in order to tackle climate change. 
Environmental campaigners were also presented in a positive light in the two newspapers. 
Reports showed in detail how over 10000 protesters were arrested in Copenhagen, having their 
rights infringed. The Guardian showed more initiative, starting a campaign (10:10) that urged 
people to set an example by helping Britain to cut greenhouse gases by 10% by 2010 (The 
Guardian, 2 September 2009). The campaign had two main goals: the first was to inform world 
leaders about popular commitment to tackling global climate change. Secondly, in the context in 
which states like US or China opposed an ambitious international agreement, the campaign 
strived to make people conscious of their power to make positive changes to the environment – 
even if global leaders avoided tackling such changes in the climate with urgency:  
in other words, our elected leaders are giving us – at best – a coin-flip chance of 
avoiding catastrophe. It is hard to imagine a more total failing of our political 
system. Imagine if they were standing at a plane door: "Come on citizens, get on 
this plane – 50/50 chance of a safe landing . . ." All of which means that we 
non-politician human beings who depend on the climate remaining habitable 
had best jump into action (The Guardian, 3 September 2009).  
Table 6.3 Agenda Setting – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Copenhagen – a crucial moment  Policy expectation 78.70 
Climate change is happening now Policy problem 55.20 
The EU is the only actor that can forge a global 
agreement on climate change 
Policy expectation 45.60 
Source: Author’s own data 
                                                          
146
 British policymaker 2; British journalists 1, 2. 
 169 
 
The coverage of climate change during the selected timeframe – which is highlighted in figure 
A.1 (page 301) – in the two British newspapers shows that the main policy expectation expressed 
by the media framed the 2009 Copenhagen climate summit as a crucial moment in the global 
fight against climate change. A ‘truly momentous event’, the Times (24 October 2009) 
underlined, where 20000 people from 198 countries converged to discuss the fate of climate 
change policy; an underlying idea that was identified in a significant number of articles. On their 
part, British policymakers argued that the summit was a critical moment, where the EU could 
have effectively taken charge of the negotiations and driven forward a progressive accord. 
However, officially the use of both formal and informal channels was seen as paramount for the 
success of the conference: ‘if we want to do a deal we will need to create greater momentum and 
make active efforts to find solutions (...) we need more progress before the leaders arrive’ (House 
of Lords, 2010). Similarly to the model specified in chapter 3, the agenda setting power of the 
media implied here that British policymakers were responsive to journalists’ discourse and felt 
compelled to add more salience to the way in which they perceived the Copenhagen summit and 
the EU’s role in tackling climate change147. Through this, British journalists not only encouraged 
and fostered debate by providing citizens detailed information about the summit and the global 
challenges posed by climate change, but through their dialogue with policymakers became part 
of the political process148. Furthermore, British journalists covered the summit extensively, 
sometimes their reporting being infused with activism and overt support for the need to forge an 
accord at the summit that would immediately and effectively tackle the effects of climate change. 
Before the summit, the Union was presented as the most important actor that could forge an 
agreement on climate change. In another instance of agenda setting, the British media featured 
the expectation that the EU would live up to its commitments and lead the Copenhagen summit 
towards a progressive global accord. Journalists put pressure on British policymakers to act 
through the framework of the EU and also try to convince other member states to commit to 
more ambitious measures. Continuous dialogue and interactions between British policymakers 
and journalists enhanced the agenda setting power of the media, whereby journalists also became 
part of the political process. Thus, the British media associated the summit with a strong policy 
expectation – becoming gatekeeper of policymakers’ commitments –, whereby Copenhagen was 
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an opportunity for the EU to do more and pursue its global leadership. It had the potential to 
address the shortcomings of the emissions trading regime by committing all of its member states 
to clear policies. Such a display would serve as a model for other countries and would endow the 
global leadership of the EU with legitimacy in the international arena. At the same time, the 
British media claimed that the EU should do more in order to forge a progressive global 
agreement on climate change because it was the only international actor that had the potential to 
do so. The British official rhetoric stressed the ability of the EU to act as leader in climate 
change and to drive forward a global agreement, whilst warning that in order to do this the 
member states would  have to live up to their commitments. A further incentive recognised by 
the government for the EU to assume a leading role in tackling climate change involved linkages 
between financial assistance and migration towards the Union, whereby funding the adaptation 
of developing countries might have limited immigration to the EU (Miliband, 2009a, 2009b). 
 
6.2.2 The policy towards Russia 
Indexing 
The main interaction effect identified in the case of the policy towards Russia was undoubtedly 
indexing. During the initial phases of the conflict, Russia was presented as the aggressor by 
around three quarters of the articles (highlighted in table 6.4), defining a policy problem to which 
Britain and the EU had to respond swiftly. During the first days of the Georgian-Russian war, the 
British media featured articles which supported the EU’s policy of condemning Moscow for its 
aggression. Moreover, it praised Prime Minister Brown’s tough initial stance against Russia’s 
intervention, who argued shortly after the start of the conflict that: ‘in light of Russia’s actions ... 
we should suspend negotiations on a successor to the partnership and cooperation agreement 
between the EU and Russia’ (The Sun, 2008). Although the war was perceived as remote, the 
media drew on the rhetoric of the British government, promoting and publicising the issue in the 
public sphere. Through this, it informed the general public, aiming to educate individuals 
regarding the politics of the region and the conflict. Moscow’s intervention was widely viewed 
as an attack against a country in the process of democratisation, which shared aspirations of 
integrating into Europe. After the conflict, Russia was presented both as a threat to global 
security and as a state which was showing signs of adapting to the rules of the international 
community – and desiring peace and stability. In the House of Lords, voices were claiming that 
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Russia’s intervention marked the start of a new Cold War, the pinnacle of a period of negative 
transition (House of Lords, 2008a). On the other hand, former foreign secretary David 
Miliband’s surprise visit to and support for Georgia was fiercely criticised by the opposition (The 
Guardian, 18 August 2008) who considered that Britain should be more cautious when dealing 
with Russia. The Times also revealed that the British government had known in advance, but had 
not tried to calm down leaders in Tbilisi (The Times, 13 August 2008). Moreover, in a report, the 
Parliament emphasised that Russia was responsible for the conflict, even though Georgia might 
have taken a series of rash decisions: 
Russia’s actions in Georgia have been rightly condemned as disproportionate. 
The scale of Russian militarisation on the Georgian border always belied 
Russia’s claim that it was only reacting to a Georgian attack, and mobile phone 
intercept evidence presented by Georgia now supports the assertion that, despite 
Georgia’s misjudgements, Russia was the aggressor (House of Lords, 2008a). 
Table 6.4 Indexing – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
The war seen as a Russian aggression Policy problem 72.40 
The US and NATO to shape Europe’s approach 
towards Russia 
Policy solution 44.70 
The EU is  the main actor in dealing with Russia Policy expectation 43.60 
The EU should do more in the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy expectation 43.60 
The EU should cooperate with Russia Policy solution 35.90 
Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s energy 
security 
Policy problem 16.60 
Russia promoting peace and wanting to integrate Policy solution 14.40 
Source: Author’s own data 
The weak ceasefire agreement brokered by the Union which left ‘Moscow calling the shots in the 
energy-rich Black Sea littoral and Caspian basin’ (The Guardian, 18 August 2008) was contested 
by the British media – which called for a tougher European stance. The Guardian even went so 
far as to call for the suspension of the trade agreement between the Union and Russia, whilst 
arguing that Europe’s condemnation of Russia was more symbolic and not wholeheartedly 
shared by its member states (The Guardian, 2 September 2008). Europe’s dependence on 
Russian energy, coupled with Moscow’s political and preferential use of gas prices fuelled a 
problem policy which highlighted the fact that Russia was an ‘energy bully’ (The Times, 1 
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January 2009) and a threat to regional security. Prime Minister Brown in the weeks that followed 
the conflict the crisis presented this idea, criticising Russia more or less openly. For example, in 
one of his statements soon after the ceasefire which made headline news throughout Europe, he 
stated, pointing an obvious finger at Russia that ‘no nation can be allowed to exert an energy 
stranglehold over Europe’ (RIA Novosti, 2008). Russia was seen by the UK government as a key 
supplier for Europe’s energy needs, making a fair and reliable deal with Moscow paramount for 
assuring the energy security of the EU (Cabinet Office, 2008, p.19; Miliband, 2008b). The 
British media also sided with the government’s view regarding Britain and Europe’s energy 
dependence on Moscow publishing headlines such as : ‘beware the bear trap: Britain, like most 
of Europe, is at risk of being the target of Russia's energy export weaponry’ (The Guardian, 30 
August 2008). Europe’s energy dependency and vulnerability to Russia, as in the case of the 
previous policy problem related to Russia’s aggression, was publicised through the efforts of the 
British media. British journalists drew on official rhetoric in order to warn about the threat that 
Russia’s strong grip posed to the EU’s energy security. Here again, the British media informed 
the public about Moscow’s malign intentions and practices, drawing on the common view within 
the public sphere unfavourable to Russia. 
As a solution to this policy problem, these articles argued that the Union could not afford not to 
sign a partnership agreement, as Moscow seemed to have the upper hand in terms of energy 
security (The Times, 2 September 2008; The Times, 2 January 2009). At the same time, the 
British media voiced concerns regarding the possible re-emergence of a new Cold War:  ‘a new 
Cold War? We're yet to adjust to the old one ending: Bad-tempered relations between Russia and 
the EU cannot be allowed to stymie a new partnership deal: both sides need it’ (The Guardian, 23 
May 2008). While maintaining a critical approach towards Russia, the British government and 
the parliament recognised the need for the EU to build and maintain a partnership with Moscow 
(House of Commons, 2008; House of Lords, 2008a). Increasing trade and economic relations, 
together with Europe’s energy dependence were listed among the main reasons why the ‘the EU 
should resist any attempts to isolate Russia’ (House of Lords, 2008a). Even if officially, British 
policymakers in the weeks that followed Russia’s intervention in Georgia adopted a tough 
stance, before the conflict and after the ceasefire, both the government and parliament strongly 
supported the EU’s initiative of developing and strengthening a strategic partnership with Russia. 
Indexing implied here that the British media was used in order to justify this approach in the 
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light of Moscow’s hegemonic behaviour in the Eastern Neighbourhood and its actions which 
threatened European security more broadly. Hence, according to the interaction effects model 
described in chapter 3, the relevance of this policy solution was enhanced by the high political 
viability of the EU’s approach to building a partnership with Russia and Britain’s adherence to 
it149. 
In constructing the policy definition related to building and maintaining an effective partnership 
with Russia, the two newspapers defined helping Russia to integrate with the West and the 
peaceful resolution of its conflicts as a policy solution. This was achieved by highlighting 
Moscow’s shared European identity, heritage and history. Nonetheless, the Guardian (18 August 
2008) stressed that the Russians would ‘become willing to play with the west by western rules 
only if or when they no longer perceive those rules as disadvantaging’. The Times (29 January 
2009) signalled that Moscow didn’t desire direct confrontation with the West and that it wanted 
to forge a new partnership with Europe based on more equal terms. Russian leaders were also 
keen to stress that they did not approve of using energy prices for political purposes, and 
Gazprom’s trade with countries like Ukraine should not damage its overall image as a 
trustworthy supplier to Europe. Points of view from Russian officials were often featured in the 
two newspapers. Most views expressed by them related to Moscow’s desire to cooperate with the 
West (The Guardian, 18 August 2008), its peaceful intentions (The Guardian, 27 August 2008), 
and blaming the Georgian leadership for intentionally sparkling the fuse for the war (The Times, 
13 September 2008). This mirrored the British government’s mixed approach which was, on the 
one hand, criticising more or less openly Russia for its intervention in Georgia or its political use 
of energy prices. On the other hand, British policymakers were encouraging Russia to integrate 
into the international community, as otherwise it stood to lose because it was ‘too enmeshed in 
the world economy’ (Miliband, 2008b). 
During the conflict, the British government pointed to the ability and duty of the EU to assure 
stability in the region and to place Russia on a path to modernisation in the international arena 
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2008, p.12, 2009, p.14). This commitment was best 
captured in Prime Minister Brown’s words: ‘the EU's prime aim has been that the continent must 
never again be bloodied by wars of aggression (…) is time to recall that high ideal and send 
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Russia a clear, united message that its aggression will not be rewarded’ (Hinsliff, 2008). At the 
same time, British policymakers argued that the EU had to enhance its presence in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood, a policy expectation which was also taken up by the British media. Hence, 
media discourse drew yet again on British policymakers’ own rhetoric and promoted it in the 
public sphere, informing citizens about the EU’s ability and constructing an expectation that the 
Union should engage sustainably in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Throughout most articles in the 
sample, the British media expressed a policy expectation which framed the EU as the main actor 
in dealing with Russia. This policy definition did not refer to the Union’s institutions, but to the 
EU leaders or to a common European approach, which was more or less characterised by internal 
division. Three expressions marked the UK media’s interpretation of the EU here: ‘The EU 
heads of government’ (The Guardian, 14 November 2008), ‘EU leaders’ (The Times, 1 
September 2008), ‘European leaders’ (The Guardian, 8 August 2008).  
Unlike other member states, the British government – although officially preferring to deal with 
Russia through the EU – advocated an approach towards Moscow (with the exception of the 
initial phase of the conflict) which involved interacting and negotiating with it within multiple 
multilateral arenas such as the G8, the NATO-Russia council, the UN Security Council or the 
OSCE (Freeman and Williams, 2008; House of Commons, 2008; House of Lords, 2009a). Due to 
the UK’s close ties with its transatlantic partner, the British government envisaged the US to play 
an important role in assuring peace and stability in the region, as it had the ability and 
capabilities to hold Moscow at bay, and also to orient it towards a path of adaption and 
transformation in the international arena (Cabinet Office, 2008, p.3). France and other member 
states managed in the end to bring together a common voice for the Union. The Commission’s 
aid for the reconstruction of the regions affected by the conflict, and the 200 EU observers sent 
to Georgia were hailed as a huge achievement by both the Times and the Guardian. Despite this, 
only a third of the articles published during the war presented the EU as the main actor that 
should engage in the peaceful resolution of the conflict, while almost half of the references were 
to the duty of the international community (Europe together with the US through NATO – and/or 
the UN) to stabilise the region150. Thanks to the fact that strong transatlantic ties were also widely 
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shared within the British national public sphere, the media could incorporate in its discourse 
more easily, facilitating indexing effects. 
 
Bounding 
Three policy problems defined by the British media resembled three instances of bounding. 
Firstly, within two weeks of the start of the conflict, the British government adopted a less vocal 
and critical attitude towards Moscow, pointing to Russia’s need to balance: ‘between short term 
military victories and longer term economic prosperity’ (Miliband, 2008b), if it was to salvage its 
‘international reputation and its relations with countries across the globe’ (Sparrow, 2008). The 
two British newspapers criticised the EU and Britain for giving in to Russia’s demands and not 
recognising the significant threat that Russia posed to Europe’s security (table 6.5). This policy 
problem – Russia seen as a security threat – was constructed mainly through the use of emotions, 
empathy and fear. By employing and portraying the realities of the conflict, the media sought to 
address the emotions of the general public, making individuals feel part of the war (Balabanova, 
2007; Bleiker and Hutchison, 2008; Brody, 1994; Gilboa, 2005; Rid, 2007). The British media 
recalled disturbing eye witness accounts from the war; for instance one villager remembered his 
neighbour: ‘he looked out of his window and they killed him’ (The Guardian, 20 August 2008). 
An article published by the Guardian evoked the ‘stories of survival and destruction from 
residents of the Georgian town hit by Russian jets that missed their target’ (The Guardian, 28 
August 2008), a mother sharing her story of how she got her children out of the house just 
moments before the bombs fell. Moscow was portrayed in apocalyptic terms which identified it 
as a major threat for global peace, a number of articles emphasising one of president Medvedev’s 
daring statements at the beginning of the war: ‘attack our citizens and Russia will shatter you' 
(The Times, 19 August 2008). Finally, the British media sought to arouse empathy for Georgia 
by vividly portraying the abuses, rapes, orgies and looting that the Russian army was accused of. 
As specified in the model presented in chapter 3, British policymakers were largely unresponsive 
to the policy problem framed by the media, due to their perception that journalists are prone to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
spearheaded the Union’s attempt to pacify the region and manage the cease-fire and post-war agreement (The 
Guardian, 14 August 2008; The Guardian, 19 September 2008; The Guardian, 27 August 2008; The Guardian, 14 
November 2008.The Times, 17 November 2008). The overwhelming preference of statements from leaders of the 
member states, rather than those from the institutions of the EU, reinforces the finding that the UK media viewed the 
policy towards Russia and expected it to be a dealt as a topic of high politics, where mostly the interests of the 
nation states mattered. 
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cover and focus on sensational news (Blair, 2008; Brown, 2008; Freeman and Williams, 2008; 
Miliband, 2008a). Furthermore, they perceived that British journalists lacked knowledge about 
foreign policy which made them unable to understand the complex network of constrains which 
characterises decision-making in this policy area151. Nonetheless, presenting the war and 
Moscow’s intentions and actions in this manner put considerable indirect pressure on British 
policymakers, due to the sensitivity of the general public towards this type of framing. 
Table 6.5 Bounding – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Russia is a security threat Policy problem 61.90 
Georgia is responsible for the war Policy problem 21.50 
The EU is divided in its approach towards Russia – 
seen in a negative light 
Policy problem 14.90 
Source: Author’s own data 
However, the discrepancy between the EU’s rhetoric and its practical actions echoed throughout 
the pages of the two newspapers – with reports observing that European leaders were not as 
united as they would have liked to show – defined a policy problem in the EU’s inability to forge 
a common position towards Russia. This was considered to hamper its ability to engage more 
substantially in stabilising the Eastern Neighbourhood and the development of the states in the 
region. For example, just a few days after the EU’s vigorous response against Russia’s 
aggression, the Guardian was keen to note that: ‘already the European appetite for sanctions 
appears to be fading, with the French and the Germans signalling an unwillingness to punish 
Moscow (...) but the EU needs to be clear about what is happening’ (The Guardian, 1 September 
2008). Hence, the two newspapers identified a policy problem in the lack of unity between 
member states in drafting a common response to Russia’s aggression. Poland and the Baltic 
countries were considered to be responsible for the derailing of the peace negotiations between 
Union and Russia. Divisions among the member states in devising a common strategy towards 
Russian were framed as the most important hurdle that impeded the Union from constructively 
engaging in the conflict and its resolution. Simultaneously, the EU was criticised for its 
inefficacy in providing support for the countries in its Eastern Neighbourhood (The Guardian, 1 
September 2008). The ‘newer arrivals’ from CEE (The Times, 17 December 2008) were 
denounced for being particularly worried about Moscow and pushing for a tougher stance. 
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Nonetheless, their points of view were ‘heavily outnumbered by those such as Germany that 
prize[d] their relations with Russia, seemingly, above all else’ (The Times, 9 August 2008). 
In a weak instance of bounding, the British media presented here information regarding the 
unilateral interests and actions of various member states in their relations with Russia. Due to 
Russia’s remoteness to the British general public, this policy expectation did not encourage 
public debate within the public sphere. The government was largely unresponsive to the British 
media’s discourse, presenting an optimistic view regarding the EU’s ability to act unitedly 
against Russia and ensure stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Simultaneously, the British 
parliament claimed in an official document that the EU’s member states should work more on 
devising a common stance towards Russia, in whose absence the Union was found to be unable 
to support the development of the countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood and back up its 
promises with real commitments (House of Commons, 2008). On the other hand, France’s ability 
to construct a common EU position and to drive forward the ceasefire agreement was presented 
by Prime Minister Brown as an important achievement: ‘the 27 members of the EU are totally 
united in condemning the aggression of the Russian Government’ (Waterfield, 2008). Individual 
and somewhat isolated voices from the opposition within the House of Lords were even more 
poignant in arguing in relation to the EU’s approach that: ‘the reality is that the European Union 
has proved most enthusiastic at generating words and lengthy statements, but the practical effects 
on the ground are most disappointing, and even negligible’ (House of Lords, 2008a). 
Finally, bounding was present in the way in which the British media framed the fact that Georgia 
might have caused the war by forcing Russia to intervene due to its rash actions. Articles that 
contained this policy problem argued that Georgia’s lack of caution in dealing with Moscow had 
the potential to drag Europe into an undesirable and unintended conflict. On the other hand, Ed 
Miliband’ s visit to Georgia, together with his repeated reassurances that the EU and the UK 
would stand by its aspiration to integrate into Europe were expressive of the government’s 
conviction that Russia acted as an aggressor. This made it unresponsive to the policy problem 
defined by the British media. The campaign driven by British policymakers to put the blame on 
Russia was so successful that even the Guardian (14 November 2008) emphasised that Moscow 
might have won the conflict on the ground, but lost the PR war against Georgia. In the pages of 
the two newspapers frequently featured stories regarding Georgia’s president Saakashvili’s 
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tendency to make rash decisions without considering their consequences or consulting the 
country’s western supporters. Although interest for this policy problem within the public sphere 
was low, it was present in about a fifth of the articles pointing to the fact that journalists – due to 
their commitment to the principle of objectivity – chose to portray the conflict from the 
standpoint of both actors involved. The general public was thus offered information that would 
allow them to form coherent opinion and challenge the decision of the British government to 
blame Russia for the war. Debate also ensued in the pages of the two newspapers about the state 
responsible for starting the war, with letters and commentaries from the general public making a 
case for either Russia or Georgia.  
 
Agenda setting 
The agenda setting power of the British media manifested in a policy problem which stressed 
Russia’s re-emergence as an important global power – seen in table 6.6. In the six months period 
leading to the conflict, the British media warned about the possibility of a war breaking in the 
frozen conflict areas of the South Caucasus (The Times, 2 January 2009). Nonetheless, the 
increase in the number of articles caused by the war did not result only in reports related to the 
conflict. Commentaries and analyses regarding Russia’s role in Europe and in the world, its 
threat to regional security or Europe’s energy security were frequently featured during the war 
and its aftermath. Such reports continued to be represented at a steady rate in the British media in 
the following six months, emphasising Russia’s increasing importance as a global power after 
the war (Blair, 2008). More than 80 percent of the reports contained a reference to Russia’s new 
status, almost always linking it with the need for the West (Europe and the US) to acknowledge 
and adapt to these new developments. By employing echoes of the Cold War, British journalists 
managed, at the same time, to arouse public interest for the issue and foster debate within the 
public sphere. Furthermore, in the weeks following the war, the two British newspapers warned 
policymakers regarding Russia’s new status, advising them to take account and adapt their 
policies. Through this, the British media became part of the political process, which is line with 
the interaction effects model presented in chapter 3. Thus, Russia’s re-emergence was also a key 
topic for the government, Miliband capturing the eye-opening effect of the conflict: ‘the Georgia 
crisis has provided a rude awakening (…) the sight of Russian tanks in a neighbouring country 
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on the 40th anniversary of the crushing of the Prague Spring has shown that the temptations of 
power politics remain’ (Blair, 2008). Drawing on the discourse of the media, Russia was seen by 
British policymakers (Brown, 2008; Miliband, 2008b; House of Lords, 2009a) to be regaining its 
economic and military power, which left it more isolated, less trusted and less respected than 
before the conflict152. 
Table 6.6 Agenda Setting – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Russia is regaining its great power status Policy problem 84.50 
Source: Author’s own data 
 
6.3 Discussion 
6.3.1 Climate Change 
British policymakers were convinced that climate change was an important issue which had 
global effects and posed a threat in the medium and long term. Moreover, they were committed 
to tackling climate change through the framework of the Union and convincing other states to 
adapt their policies accordingly. On the other hand, the policy definitions framed by the British 
media were salient both within the public sphere and among British policymakers due to the fact 
that, very often, they converged to those articulated by the UN (or other international 
organisations) or NGOs who were viewed as legitimate – together with the salient effects that 
climate change was perceived to have on peoples globally. Sometimes, British journalists took 
up ideas and causes related to climate change found within the public sphere and started personal 
crusades in trying to push for them on the political agenda, thus acting as activists. Instances of 
agenda setting and bounding – seen in table 6.7 –, where the media put pressure on policymakers 
to make more ambitious commitments (whilst acting through the EU) and follow them through, 
point to the ability of journalists to enhance the Union’s democratic legitimacy. Moreover, the 
instances of indexing in which the British media publicised and supported the British 
government's (through the EU) commitment to tackling climate change were also based on 
journalists' perception of public opinion (i.e. in favour of tackling climate change). This again, 
                                                          
152
 British policymaker 1. 
  
1
8
0 
 
 
 
Table 6.7 Frames present in the British media – climate change policy 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
Number of 
articles 
Rate of 
occurrence 
(%) 
The 
Guardian 
(%)* 
The Times 
(%)* 
Climate change – medium to long term threat Policy problem Indexing 129 94.90 96.50 92.20 
Copenhagen – a crucial moment  Policy expectation Agenda setting 107 78.70 78.80 78.40 
The EU should do more Policy expectation Indexing 93 68.40 65.80 72.50 
Climate change is happening now Policy problem Agenda setting 75 55.20 58.80 49.00 
The EU is the only actor that can forge a global 
agreement on climate change 
Policy expectation Agenda setting 62 45.60 43.50 49.00 
Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen  Policy problem Bounding 21** 41.20** 45.50*** 30.00*** 
Equal climate change deal Policy solution Indexing 51 37.60 37.60 37.30 
Blaming other states Policy solution Indexing 50 36.80 36.50 37.30 
The EU still has the potential to globally lead in 
climate change 
Policy expectation Indexing 16** 31.40** 33.30*** 27.80*** 
The EU lost its global leadership after 
Copenhagen 
Policy problem Bounding 12** 23.50** 24.20*** 22.20*** 
The UK should lead by example independently Policy expectation Bounding 4 2.90 5.90 2.00 
Notes: * Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified. 
            **Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit (N=51). 
            ***Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit: The Guardian (N=33); The Times (N=18). 
Source: Actor’s own calculations: (N=136) / The Guardian (N=85); The Times (N=51). 
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contributes to outlining a more complete answer for the first research question, namely whether 
the EU’s foreign policy can enjoy democratic legitimacy through the activity of the media. The 
media achieved this by extensively covering the summit and providing information based on 
scientific reports and assessments to the general public regarding the disastrous effects of climate 
change.  
Similarly to what the model presented in chapter 3 specified, individuals were thus offered 
information which had the potential to make decision-making processes more transparent and 
accountable, whilst also encouraging public debate within the public sphere. Various campaigns 
and debates were initiated in the pages of the two newspapers which engaged their readers in 
participative forms of democracy. Due to the high level of responsiveness from policymakers – 
and their perception that the media could portray a relevant image of public opinion –, the media 
had the potential to link individuals to decision-making processes by conveying their views to 
policymakers. On the other hand, in two instances of indexing, the media gathered support and 
publicised two policy solutions advocated by the British policymakers – where they felt they 
needed backing up from the general public. Bounding effects appeared when the media was 
considered to be too critical, or journalists were perceived to be lacking expert knowledge about 
climate change policy, international negotiations or foreign policy which made them prone to 
dismiss any result short of policymakers’ previous promises. Euroscepticism also was infused 
into the two newspapers’ critique of the EU’s poor record at the Copenhagen summit.    
Within the EU, Britain was aiming to lead in climate chance policy, together with Germany 
intensively trying to convince reluctant member states of the need to act unitedly and commit to 
ambitious adaptation policies. Domestically, against the background of profound Euroscepticism 
– which characterises British public opinion in relation to most of the EU’s activity – the British 
media played a crucial role in gathering support for and justifying the government’s approach of 
acting through the framework of the EU. However, drawing on British Euroscepticism, the 
government, whilst supporting the Union’s efforts wholeheartedly, frequently criticised it for 
agreeing on and setting too low emission reductions targets, or for the failure of some member 
states to implement their policy commitments. Indexing was present as an interaction effect in 
the case of climate change due to the fact that the British government fully embraced the need to 
tackle the consequences of climate change. The British media publicised and supported the 
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approach of the government defining a policy problem in almost all articles in the sample, which 
framed climate change as a threat in the medium or long term. In constructing this problem, the 
media featured scientific debates and information regarding the current global effects of climate 
change or about the various policies that Britain through the EU was supporting and 
implementing. The convergence with definitions from the UN and the indiscriminate effects that 
climate change can have on peoples globally granted even more salience to the policy problem 
within the public sphere. Additionally, the British media presented negatively points of view 
prevalent within the scientific and policy communities which denied the malign global effects of 
climate change. Here journalists acted as educators providing information to citizens – about 
scientific evidence and policies – in this way encouraging public debate on an issue where 
policymakers were open to public input and scrutiny153. 
The British media also drew on official rhetoric and took cues from British policymakers in 
defining two policy solutions. Firstly, forging a global agreement that would be fair to 
developing states was a pervasive policy definition which was presented by British journalists as 
a policy priority. Journalists achieved this by featuring extensive reports on how implementing 
adaptation policies could have dramatic consequences on the economic welfare of citizens in 
developing countries, if not compensated by developed states. This policy solution was based on 
consensus among British policymakers, who used the media in order to educate the general 
public and generate debate within the public sphere (Christoff, 2010). Although not in the same 
degree as in the case of transnational publications, British journalists in about one fifth of the 
articles presented the claim that Britain and the EU’s efforts were hampered by China or 
America’s unwillingness to acknowledge the negative effects that climate change was having154. 
On the other hand, official British rhetoric frequently highlighted the fact that the US or China 
should be blamed for the lack of progress in tackling global climate change. One reason for the 
fact that this policy solution was not fully internalised by the two newspapers might reside in the 
strong transnational transatlantic relations which characterised British media reporting 
(Egenhofer and Georgiev, 2010; Rynning and Jensen, 2010); hindering, at times, British 
policymakers’ efforts to justify their failure by using the media to portray the US or China as 
scapegoats.  
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Bounding effects appeared due to the media’s critical assessment of the outcome of the 
Copenhagen summit and the EU’s inability to drive forward a progressive global agreement. 
Although, at times, British policymakers hinted at the failure of the summit, they were optimistic 
regarding the EU’s ability to bounce back. They were also convinced of the fact that the 
agreement signed at the Copenhagen summit represented a step forward (although not as 
impressive as it had been hoped). Furthermore, they argued that media discourse was prone to 
dismiss any result short of the ambitions and goals expressed before the summit. This happened 
because of journalists’ tendency to focus on sensational news, fuelled by their lack of expert 
knowledge or insight into the pressures or constraints which characterise policymaking and 
international negotiations155. Journalists featured stories including testimonies from scientists, 
NGOs, bureaucrats or political actors outside foreign policy circles, which described the 
negotiations behind closed during the summit (which left the EU isolated). Simultaneously, the 
British media featured commentaries and letters from the general public which expressed deep 
disappointment regarding the outcome of the summit. British policymakers also ignored the 
policy expectation (which was marginal within the British media) that the UK should act 
unilaterally in tackling global climate change, because they believed that acting through the EU 
would be a more effective avenue for pursuing their goals (House of Lords, 2009c; Miliband, 
2009a, 2010b).  
The agenda setting power of the British media was most evident in the way it defined the 
Copenhagen summit as a crucial moment. The EU was expected to lead a progressive global 
agreement that would set up a sustainable strategy for tackling the effects of global climate 
change. In doing so, British journalists informed the general public through extensive analyses 
and reports regarding the magnitude of the summit, and the significant moment it represented in 
the development of global climate change policy. Views from British, European and 
international political elites, coupled with scientific reports, or statements from transnational or 
grassroots NGOs frequently added weight to the policy expectation that was associated with the 
summit. Agenda setting meant here that the British media was able to put pressure on the 
government to recognise and commit itself to achieving an ambitious international agreement at 
Copenhagen. This happened through both its reporting and journalists’ continuous dialogue with 
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policymakers. Associated with extensively covering the summit and emphasising its magnitude, 
the two newspapers expressed another policy expectation which argued that Britain would be in 
a better position to follow through its commitments if it supported and acted through the 
common framework of the EU. This drew on British policymakers’ own views, but amplified 
them, prompting journalists to act as gatekeepers of official commitments. Thus, British 
journalists became part of the political process, assessing the way in which policymakers 
implemented their policy promises and pressuring them to commit to even greater targets. These 
two policy expectations were also built on the idea that climate change represented a present 
policy problem which had to be tackled with urgency. Detailed scientific reports and assessments 
featured regularly in the two newspapers together with public campaigns which were aimed at 
making both the general public and British policymakers aware of the need to tackle the effects 
of climate change presently – not in a distant future, as in the case of the policy problem which 
framed climate change as a threat in the medium and long term. In all three instances described 
above, the global effects of climate change coupled with the convergence with international 
actors’ (international organisations such as the UN, or transnational NGOs such as Green Peace) 
own policy definitions enhanced the media’s agenda setting power. Moreover, agenda setting 
implied here that by providing individuals with detailed reports and often publishing voices and 
opinions from the general public within their pages, the two newspapers encouraged and fostered 
debate within the public sphere, and had the potential to link citizens to policymaking.  
 
6.3.2 The policy towards Russia 
The Georgian-Russia war of 2008 brought about echoes from the Cold War period, which 
reminded both British policymakers and the general public of the tensions and the Russian threat 
which characterised it (Asmus, 2010). Such memories influenced the way in which the British 
media reported throughout the period analysed, and the subsequent interaction effects with 
policymakers. Similarly, the traditionally strong transatlantic relations with the US shaped the 
way in which the British media presented the EU’s potential to deal with Russia and the Eastern 
Neighbourhood. This point was evident in the confusion which characterised official rhetoric – 
and media discourse which drew on it and was indexed –, which presented US involvement as a 
viable policy solution, whilst only arguing that the EU had the potential to act (and was expected 
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to). However, the Union was not seen to be able to back up its commitments and promises due to 
the member states’ tendency to deal bilaterally with Russia. The British media’s deep 
Euroscepticism – which is characteristic for most of the Union’s activity (Boomgaarden et al., 
2011; Usherwood, 2011; White, 2012) – also shaped the way in which journalists criticised the 
EU for not doing enough in tackling Russia’s malign and hegemonic interests. Policymakers 
used the media in order to publicise their approaches, gather support for them, or at times initiate 
public debate in relation to issues they believed required more justification and legitimacy. At 
the same time, journalists sometimes acted as educators of the public, featuring detailed stories 
regarding EU and British policies. As specified in the interaction effects model detailed in 
chapter 3, close informal relationships between policymakers and journals facilitated the 
former’s ability to index the media’s discourse156. 
Indexing was the most prevalent interaction effect identified in the case of the policy towards 
Russia, which points to the fact that the British media had only a marginal ability to enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of decision-making processes within the EU.  One reason for this resides 
in the low levels of interest that the general public shared for the issue, only Russia’s aggression 
raising its profile within the British national public sphere. There was also a mixed message in 
official rhetoric which was fed to the British media, and involved in the first days of the conflict 
a tough stance against Russia. This was influenced mainly by Prime Minister Brown and former 
Foreign Secretary David Miliband‘s ambitions to portray themselves as strong and decisive 
leaders, whilist before the war and in the months that followed the ceasefire, promoting the idea 
that the EU should develop a strategic partnership with Russia. On the other hand, in instances of 
bounding the media was considered to be too critical and focus too much on the sensational 
through its use of emotions, in order to shape public opinion and put pressure on policymakers. 
Agenda setting was present in one instance in which the British media defined a policy problem 
related to Russia’s re-emergence as an important international actor. The British media here put 
pressure on policymakers to recognise Russia’s new status and adapt their policies according.  
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Table 6.8 Frames present in the British media – the policy towards Russia 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
Number of 
articles 
Rate of 
occurrence 
(%) 
The Guardian 
(%)* 
The 
Times 
(%)* 
Russia is regaining its great power status Policy problem Agenda setting 153 84.50 84.00 85.20 
The war seen as a Russian aggression Policy problem Indexing 131 72.40 79.00 64.20 
Russia is a security threat Policy problem Bounding 112 61.90 65.00 58.00 
The US and NATO to shape Europe’s 
approach towards Russia 
Policy solution Indexing 81 44.70 37.00 54.30 
The EU should be  the main actor in 
dealing with Russia 
Policy expectation Indexing 79 43.60 41.00 46.90 
The EU should do more in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood 
Policy expectation Indexing 79 43.60 45.00 42.00 
The EU should cooperate with Russia Policy solution Indexing 65 35.90 34.00 38.30 
Georgia is responsible for the war Policy problem Bounding 39 21.50 25.00 17.30 
Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s 
energy security 
Policy problem Indexing 30 16.60 16.00 17.30 
The EU is divided in its approach towards 
Russia – seen in a negative light 
Policy problem Bounding 27 14.90 17.00 12.30 
Russia promoting peace and wanting to 
integrate 
Policy solution Indexing 26 14.40 15.00 13.60 
* Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified.  
Source: Author’s own calculations (N=181) / The Guardian (N=100); The Times (N=81). 
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Table 6.8 highlights that both the Guardian and the Times presented Russia as the aggressor in 
the war drawing on the official rhetoric of the British government and taking cues from 
policymakers. Indexing implied here, that British policymakers employed the media in order to 
publicise their critical stance against Russia’s intervention in Georgia in the first days of the 
conflict, and build public support for the need to tackle this policy problem. Echoes from the 
Cold War reminding of tensions and the constant fear of a potential Russian intervention in the 
West made this policy problem salient within the public sphere. This happened although most 
commentaries and letters from the general public featured in the media recognised that Russia 
was not able to pose the same threat to Europe as during the Cold War. Less appealing within the 
public sphere due to Britain’s energy independence, journalists, in another instance of indexing, 
stressed the threat that Russia posed to Europe’s energy security. Here again, British 
policymakers employed the media in order to signal a clear message which advocated solidarity 
among the member states. The British media also claimed with a hint of Euroscepticism that the 
EU was not able to convince states such as France or Germany not to strike bilateral energy deals 
with Moscow. Their individual approach was seen to leave a large number of the member states 
dependent on Russia for gas highly sensitive to Moscow’s use of energy prices.  
On the other hand, before the conflict and in the months that followed the ceasefire, the two 
British newspapers reflected the views of the government, which advocated the idea that the EU 
should develop a strategic partnership with Russia in order to place it on a path to modernisation, 
and assure peace and stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Furthermore, Euroscepticism 
influenced the way in which media discourse – drawing on official rhetoric – framed as a policy 
expectation the EU’s ability to act in the region and deal with Russia. The EU was considered to 
have the potential, but not to be able at the time to provide a viable policy solution to the 
conflict. British journalists linked this idea to the expectation that in order to be effective, the EU 
would have to live up to its commitments, whilst the member states should be more willing to act 
unitedly and support the Union’s initiatives. As interest within the public sphere regarding 
Russia or the EU’s approach towards Moscow was meagre at best, the British media played a 
crucial role in providing information to individuals, which otherwise would have not been 
available. In doing so, the British media aided policymakers’ efforts to initiate public debate in 
relation to issues where they felt policy needed to be better justified and made legitimate to the 
general public. 
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Bounding was present in the way in which the British media framed Russia as security threat due 
to its hegemonic intentions and aggression against Georgia, a policy problem which was 
perceived to be far too critical of Russia by British policymakers157. In constructing this policy 
problem, the British media employed emotional frames featuring shocking eye witness accounts 
together with graphic descriptions of Russia’s interventions. In doing so, journalists aimed to 
make the general public aware and responsive to the idea that Russia posed a major security 
threat, whilst putting pressure on policymakers to act accordingly. However, bounding (where 
policymakers seem to be unresponsive to the media’s discourse) might be seen here as a strategy 
on the part of British policymakers to send indirectly a message to Russia, which they felt was 
too critical to be made public through official channels. The British media also framed the lack 
of unity among the member states as a policy problem which undermined the EU’s ability to 
engage in the Eastern Neighbourhood or deal with Russia on equal terms. Again, journalists 
expressed views which were held by some policymakers, but were generally seen to be largely 
rooted in the British media’s deep Euroscepticism158. While both policy problems were not 
framed in such a way as to affect British citizens or large populations globally, Russia’s threats 
to European security echoed with remnants from the Cold War and spawned debate reflected in 
the numerous commentaries and letters from the general public published by two newspapers. 
British policymakers’ tendency to ignore and be unresponsive towards the media’s discourse in 
these instances of bounding was also predicated upon their belief that journalists are prone to 
exaggerate news and focus on the sensational. This was seen to be caused by journalists' lack of 
expert knowledge and understanding of the pressures or mechanisms through which foreign 
policy functions. Finally, due to its commitment to objective reporting, the British media 
presented voices from Russian leaders and actors outside British foreign policy circles who 
claimed that Georgia might have been responsible for starting the war. 
The agenda setting power of the British media was evident in relation to one policy problem 
which framed the re-emergence of Russia as a major actor in the international arena. Even 
though the policy problem was not defined to affect indiscriminately British citizens or peoples 
globally, it became popular within the public sphere as it reminded of echoes from the Cold War 
era. In defining this policy problem, the British media presented a wealth of commentaries, 
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letters and op-eds from members of the general public. These contributions alarmingly 
highlighted the fact that Britain and the EU should not ignore Russia’s new status or ambitious, 
and adapt their policies accordingly. At the same time, journalists drew here on views from 
throughout the British political spectrum, including political actors from the opposition or 
outside foreign policy circles, coupled with policymakers in power who viewed responsiveness 
to media discourse in this case as having salient implications for their public reputation159. 
Through their continuous dialogue with policymakers – and news spinning on the latter’s part – 
British journalists pushed them to adapt their rhetoric and policies according to Russia’s new 
perceived status in the international arena, becoming part of the political process. This policy 
problem, in the way defined by the British media, was the most pervasive frame identified, 
having the potential to foster debate within the public sphere. However, the presence of only one 
instance of agenda setting points to the fact that the British media was largely uninterested in 
influencing the UK or the EU’s policy towards Russia. This contrasts with the regular behaviour 
of the British media, which is generally considered to be able and willing to engage in agenda 
setting (Morgan, 1995; Davis, 2000; Akor, 2011). 
 
6.4 Conclusions 
The chapter has shown that in the case of climate change, the ability of the British media to 
enhance the EU’s democratic legitimacy was much more evident than in the case of the policy 
towards Russia – where the media had only a limited effect on democratic legitimacy. The 
British government was already convinced that climate change was a threat in the middle or long 
term – and that the EU should lead globally in tackling this issue. The British media also put 
British policymakers under tremendous pressure to recognise the present threat that climate 
changes posed, coupled with the need to forge a progressive global agreement at Copenhagen – 
or the EU’s failure at the summit. Journalists achieved this by presenting alarming reports and 
points of view from scientists, or transnational environmental NGOs, together with letters and 
commentaries from the general public. Their ability was also facilitated by the fact that climate 
change was widely perceived to affect large groups of individuals, which made British 
policymakers even more sensitive to the media’s portrayal of public opinion. On the other hand, 
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in the case of the policy towards Russia, the British media was much less willing to engage in 
agenda setting and mostly followed governmental rhetoric, publishing and supporting it. 
According to British journalists, the main reason for this resided in the overt lack of interest 
found for the issue within the British national public sphere. Only Russia’s intervention in 
Georgia brought back echoes and memories from the Cold War, which prompted the two 
newspapers to put pressure on the British policymakers to recognise Moscow’s new status and its 
ability to pose a threat to European security.  Similarly to the case of climate change, the British 
media presented commentaries, op-eds or letters from the general public which warned that 
Russia could direct its guns towards Europe. However, the ability of the British media to link 
individuals to decision-making or foster debate within the public sphere was less visible than in 
the case of climate change.  
What is important though in both case studies, is the fact that in the context of profound 
Euroscepticism160, the policy definitions framed by journalists almost always contained a 
reference to the EU. Both in tackling climate change or keeping Russia in check, acting through 
the framework of the Union was seen as more beneficial for the UK than acting on an individual 
basis – journalists, at times, criticising the EU for not living up to its promises or not choosing to 
engage even more. On the other hand, Britain’s tradition of strong transatlantic ties with the US 
influenced the way in which the EU was perceived and presented by both journalists and 
policymakers in relation to its potential to lead in climate change, but more importantly in 
dealing with Russia and the conflicts in the Eastern Neighbourhood. As the chapter on the 
transnational level highlighted, criticism towards the US’ unwillingness to bind itself to a 
progressive global treaty that would have tackled climate change was much lower in the case of 
Britain, whilst support for the idea that the US could provide an effective solution to the war in 
dealing with Russia was much higher. Nonetheless, the central position that was allocated to the 
EU in the two case studies – in a different manner than the case of the transnational level, a 
contrast discussed in the final chapter – point to the fact that the EU was seen as a legitimate and 
appropriate avenue for the UK to act. Moreover, even though the British media had only a 
limited effect on democratic legitimacy in the case of the policy towards Russia, the case of 
climate change showed that it had the potential to enhance democratic legitimacy. 
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Chapter 7 – Romania 
 
 
 
Similarly to the case of the UK and the transnational level, the ability of the media to endow 
decision-making processes with democratic legitimacy through its discourse and the nature of its 
interaction effects with policymakers within the public sphere is considered to be influenced by 
characteristics of Romania’s political system and its media landscape161. Following an overview 
of the media/foreign policy nexus in Romania, the chapter will delve into the analysis of 
interactions effects in the two case studies. It will achieve this by drawing on the types of policy 
definitions (problems, solutions and expectations) framed by the media. Two newspapers were 
selected as representative for the Romania media: Adevărul and Jurnalul Naţional. Table A.1 in 
annex A (page 301) presents the distribution of articles within the two newspapers, while figures 
A.1 and A.2 (in the same annex) highlight the coverage of the two case studies in the Romanian 
media. Annex E shows that the case of climate change in the period surveyed was 1 June 2009 – 
1 June 2010, with 103 identified. On the other hand, in the case of the policy towards Russia the 
period examined stretched six months before and after the conflict (8 March 2008 – 5 March 
2009), with 125 articles selected. Finally, in the last section, the chapter provides a detailed 
discussion of the findings and their implication for the way in which the Romanian media within 
the EPS endows the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. 
 
7.1 The media/foreign policy nexus 
Chapter 4 highlighted that Romania is a semi-Presidential republic, where the President with the 
government share executive duties in foreign policy. The Romanian parliament has virtually no 
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ability to provide input, although it has formal avenues in order to exercise oversight over 
foreign policy. In both issue areas – climate change and relations with Russia – the President and 
the government are able to act largely without encountering any opposition and debate within the 
parliament. During the period analysed, most of Romania’s foreign policy was spearheaded by 
its President, supported by the governing centre right coalition which had a significant majority 
within the parliament162. As a consequence, the Prime Minister was largely absent in dealing with 
foreign policy, while the Romanian Ministry for Foreign Affairs informally became subordinated 
to the presidency. The President’s direct involvement was more evident in the case of the policy 
towards Russia – which he saw as having prime security implications for Romania and the EU –, 
than that of climate change where decision-making was left to the government and its agencies 
which were committed to acting through the common framework of the EU (Băsescu, 2008a; 
Boc, 2009; Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009b). The President supported these policy 
approaches in the period around the summit, when tackling climate change gained increasing 
publicity both in Romania and globally. Otherwise, both the President and the government 
perceived climate change as a salient issue, but not one that should be included on Romania or 
the EU’s political agendas as a top policy priority163. 
Moreover, the parliament was often left outside the loop, the governing coalition choosing not to 
open foreign policy issues to the parliament’s oversight. When it occurred, it proved to be no 
more than an exercise in listening to symbolic speeches from the President. Formal 
representative processes that could ensure democratic legitimacy to decision-making processes 
were here clearly side-stepped, making the activity of the Romanian media even more salient 
(Chifu, 2010; Ivan, 2012b). However, the policymakers interviewed argued that the meagre 
oversight that the parliament has on foreign policy is accountable and transparent.  For example, 
one MP, member of the foreign policy committee claimed that ‘all session of the foreign policy 
committee are public and can be viewed on the official site of the institution (...) also these 
decisions are disputed in the chamber of deputies’164.  In theory, Romanian policymakers also 
claimed that, not in the same degree as domestic politics, foreign policy can be made 
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democratically legitimate165. The media is considered to be a central player in constructing a link 
between citizens and decision-making processes, which is very often built and maintained 
through the network of interactions and dialogue that journalists share with policymakers166. 
Informal interactions are very effective, and provide journalists with background information, 
scoops and the ability to feed back into decision-making167. On the other hand, more formal 
means of interaction have to be, according one Romanian policymaker, framed as clearly as 
possible, in order to allow policies to be covered coherently by journalists and then to gather 
public support: ‘a press release is a way, for you to highlight your activities and it also allows 
you to communicate your message (...) the most important thing is to write the statement in a 
clear way so everybody will understand the message you are trying to send out to the public’168. 
Chapter 4 presented an overview of the Romanian media landscape – focusing on the two 
selected newspapers – which highlighted the existence of significant levels of polarisation, the 
influence of politically active or engaged owners, coupled with low journalistic professionalism. 
According to the interviews and questionnaires with Romanian policymakers169 – which 
correlates with findings from the limited literature (Stefanita, 2011; Dobrescu and Bargaoanu, 
2012) –, it appears that the level of professionalism is dependent upon Romanian newspapers’ 
resources, number of staff, their ability to present polarised views (whilst also focusing on issues 
of public interest) and journalists’ ability to maintain a fairly objective discourse. Political 
orientation and ideology are found to be synonymous with low levels of professionalism, 
although the ability of journalists to educate the public in understanding foreign policy (and the 
approaches of Romania and the EU) is highly valued by policymakers. In comparison to Western 
media, they argue that the Romanian media ranks very low on most of the above aspects, leading 
to an overt search for sensational news and conflict. Moreover, Romanian policymakers argue 
that the media reflects the views and preferences of the general public only in a limited 
manner170. One reason for this, identified by Romanian policymakers, resides in the media’s 
tendency to have their own agenda, due to intense pressure from politically engaged owners. 
They identify another reason in journalists’ unilateral efforts to further their careers through 
                                                          
165
 Romanian policymakers 1-3. 
166
 Romanian policymakers 1-4. 
167
 Romanian journalists 1, 2. 
168
 Romanian policymaker 4. 
169
 Romanian policymakers 1-4. 
170
 Romanian policymakers 1-3. 
 194 
 
strictly promoting the views that they see as matching the views of their publication’s owners 
(Gross, 2008a, 2008b; Coman, 2009). However, Romanian policymakers view the media as a 
powerful and useful tool for interacting with citizens and gathering support for their policies. 
Translated into practice, this means that very often Romanian policymakers, when it suits their 
interests, choose to take for granted the assumption that the media portrays a relevant picture of 
public opinion171. 
One main difficulty that hampers the activity of the media resides in the lack of transparency 
which engulfs decision-making within Romania – ranging from domestic issues to foreign 
policy. Even more than in the case of the transnational level or the UK, Romanian journalists 
have to rely on informal contacts in order to get access to information. The lack of transparency 
is also evident in the way institutions in Romania open their decision-making processes to public 
scrutiny. Here, information about various policies or provisions on how to contact policymakers 
or institutions is seldom present – this has hampered also this thesis, as lower ranking 
policymakers were on most occasions inaccessible. Both Romanian policymakers and journalists 
believe that foreign policy, in general – but, especially the policy towards Russia –, is a sensitive 
policy which should be kept insulated from the public172. Secondly, Romanian journalists claim 
that most policymakers, although tend to be responsive, approach only subjects that are 
favourable to them or enhance their reputation. On the other hand, Romanian policymakers claim 
that media discourse has the potential sometimes to damage the reputation not only of 
individuals, but also of institutions, and jeopardise the development and implementation of 
crucial policies173. Hence, international organisations such as the UN, NATO or the OSCE are 
generally held in high esteem, their points of view being used both by the media and 
policymakers as legitimising tools and sources for the definition of policy problems. At the same 
time, legitimacy is added to a definition by the dimensions of the groups of individuals affected 
by the respective issue.   
In the case of indexing, Romanian journalists draw their sources from policymakers (from whom 
they take regularly cues) or their own perception of public opinion (Lepadatu et al., 2010). Policy 
solutions which are based on wide consensus within the political sphere – such as most foreign 
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policy issues – benefit from extensive positive coverage from the Romanian media. Similarly, 
journalists draw on and present policy expectations constructed by Romanian policymakers, 
which are in line with notions of national interest. Indexing is based here on the fact that 
policymakers are often interviewed by journalists and are willing to be featured in the pages of 
newspapers in order to get publicity. On the other hand, lower ranking bureaucrats are often 
reluctant to interact with the media and usually have their agendas overcrowded – and lack 
time174. Ministers and high ranking officials seem to be always happy to be in the spotlight and to 
respond to the queries of the media. Romanian journalists sometimes feel that they need to 
educate the public regarding most aspects related to the EU. Issues related to the EU are to a 
large extent framed through contradictory lenses (not to the same extent as in the UK), either as 
topics of foreign policy or as ones of domestic politics (Lazăr, 2006; Coman, 2010).  
Romanian journalists argue that citizens do not regularly have access to information about 
foreign policy175. On the other hand, Romanian policymakers frequently employ the media in 
order to survey and influence public opinion in order to gather support for their policies176.  Due 
to journalists’ belief that the media should educate the public regarding issues related to foreign 
policy and the Union, there is a perception that the media should aid the government in 
upholding national interest177. The partisan media landscape also contributes to this view, as 
owners are more or less directly linked to political parties and the government. The newspapers 
analysed reflect the bipartisan landscape of the Romanian media, where Adevărul’s owner was 
considered to have strong economic links with the President and the governing coalition (Chifu, 
2010; Popescu, 2010). On the other hand, the owner of Jurnalul Naţional was a central figure in 
the opposition and a fervent critique of the President and the government (Ulmanu, 2002; 
Dobrescu and Bargaoanu, 2012). 
In general, bounding is present when the Romanian media features criticism of foreign policy, 
policymakers dismissing it as upholding the corrupt interests of their owners, or those of various 
interest groups. At the same time, both journalists and policymakers admit that the former do not 
possess detailed knowledge about foreign policy and often search for conflict and disagreement 
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within the governing coalition or sensational news178. The Romanian media is thus perceived to 
be prone to cover policy failure and try to damage the reputation of elites in order to appeal to 
the demands for sensational news from their readerships (Ghinea and Avădani, 2011). In 
instances of bounding, lacking background knowledge and access to policymakers, Romanian 
journalists rely on commonly held views within the public sphere, which can make them prone to 
dismiss policies or official rhetoric that fall outside accepted boundaries. Bounding is related to 
the media’s ability to act as watchdogs of democracy. Even though its discourse is largely 
disregarded by Romanian policymakers, through investigative journalism, information about 
decision-making processes is made available within the public sphere, enhancing their 
transparency and making them more accountable. The definition of policy problems, solutions 
and expectations in the case of bounding usually draws its sources from journalists’ investigative 
endeavours, political actors outside foreign policy circles whose views diverge from the official 
rhetoric, or from international actors whose approaches are most often taken for granted and 
deemed legitimate. Investigative journalism often allows the Romania media to highlight various 
acts of corruption or lack of professionalism from policymakers, in this way undermining the 
implementation of policy solutions179.  
Romanian journalists pride themselves in contributing to decision-making and providing their 
input through either formal or informal means to policymakers180. Their agenda setting power is 
predicated on the networks of dialogue and interactions they have policymakers, which 
sometimes are based on or transform into strong personal ties. At the same time, journalists 
move back and forth from working in the media to within the government. This provides them a 
better understanding of decision-making processes and the way in which to influence them. On 
the other hand, once in government, they are in a better position to index the media and use it in 
order to promote different policies. Hence, although transparency is low within institutions 
dealing with foreign policy and EU issues, the Romanian media can get insight into policy 
circles, extensive policy background information and highlight various policy problems, 
solutions and expectations. This allows journalists also to act as gatekeepers of policymakers’ 
commitments. As in the case of indexing, where policymakers choose to employ the media 
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because they perceive it as resembling public opinion, the agenda setting powers of the 
Romanian media also rely on its ability to shape and convey the view of the general public to 
policymakers. Here, the agenda setting power of the media dwells in its ability to portray the 
views of individuals within the public sphere through featuring comments, op-eds, or interviews 
with members of the general public. In doing so, the media links individuals to decision-making 
processes and fosters debate within the public sphere. Due to their proneness to act as activists, 
Romanian journalists sometimes define policy expectations and solutions which are far too 
ambitious and require a high degree of political and administrative accommodation. Hence, 
agenda setting is more successful in cases where the levels of required accommodation are 
low181. Policy solutions that are proposed by the Romanian media also stem from lower ranking 
bureaucrats who informally express concerns widely shared within their institution regarding 
official approaches or propose solutions which have been ignored by the government182. Drawing 
on these insights regarding the media/foreign policy nexus within which policymakers and the 
media interact, the chapter next analyses interaction effects within the two case studies. 
 
7.2 Interaction effects 
7.2.1 Climate Change 
Indexing 
Indexing was present in the case of climate change in the way the Romanian media constructed 
three frames which defined one policy problem and two solutions (highlighted in table 7.1). 
Nearly all the articles presented climate change as a threat to global security in the medium and 
long term. Voices and points of view from both Romanian and EU policymakers were presented 
in order to define this policy problem which was perceived to affect populations globally. It also 
fitted within the overall discourse regarding climate change articulated at the European 
transnational level, and with the views of Romanian policymakers which stressed the need to 
tackle the global and indiscriminate effects of climate change (Băsescu, 2009b; Boc, 2009; 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009b). Moreover, President Băsescu (2009b) argued that 
‘the degradation of the environment and climate change are the most important threats to 
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economic and social stability and to the development of our countries, affecting especially the 
poor’. Defined in this way, climate change affected large areas of population, having salient 
impact both at regional and local levels. In defining this policy problem, the Romanian media 
took cues not only from national or EU policymakers, but also from other influential 
international organisations such the UN, the World Bank or the World Food Organisation, whose 
assessments and reports were frequently quoted. Indexing implied that the Romanian media 
internalised official discourse and built support for coherent action against the effects of climate 
change. Scientific reports that warned about the long term impact of changes in the climate were 
often cited by the two newspapers, with an emphasis on the need for politicians around the world 
to take concrete actions in order to tackle this issue. Besides building support for the need to 
tackle the effects of climate change (as specified in the framework described in chapter 3), 
Romanian journalists also acted as educators, encouraging the general public to become aware of 
the dangers that climate change posed. The Romanian media also provided individuals with 
scientific evidence supporting climate change and the need to adapt their way of life to a more 
sustainable existence. 
Table 7.1 Indexing – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Climate change – medium to long term threat Policy problem 99.00 
Blaming other states Policy solution 48.50 
Equal climate change deal Policy solution 22.30 
Source: Author’s own data 
Romanian policymakers viewed an equal climate change deal as integral to any solution that 
would address the effects of climate change. This view was justified by the fact that developing 
countries were perceived to be the most affected both by changes in the climate and the emission 
reductions which stifled their economic development (Băsescu, 2009d). In its official rhetoric, 
the Romanian government advocated an approach based on consensus throughout all political 
parties: ‘the need to implement measures aimed at financing the adaption costs incurred by 
developing and less developed economies (...) we hope that these resources will be channelled 
towards new technologies and the assurance of energy efficiency, which is an important 
economic resource’ (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010).  
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Similarly to the previous policy problem, the Romanian media drew on the official discourse of 
both national and EU policymakers in order to focus attention on and justify in front of the 
general public an agreement based on equality. Moreover, the Romanian media contributed to 
opening up public debate on the issue, which was seen in positive terms by policymakers183. The 
EU’s decision to aid third world and developing states in support of their commitment to 
implement climate change policy was hailed by the Romanian media as a viable policy solution. 
Through a contribution of 100 billion dollars spread between 2013 and 2020, the Union sought to 
encourage developing and third world states to commit to a progressive agreement at the 
Copenhagen summit. According to the two Romanian newspapers, these states were demanding 
for a long time that the West would take the responsibility for the majority of carbon emissions. 
However, in contrast to the EU, sacrificing the continuous growth of their economy in order to 
reduce their emissions was not an option that countries like Russia, India or Brazil sympathised 
with.  
Blaming the US or China for the breakdown and the failure of the climate change negotiations 
was a strategy employed by the Romanian government. This policy solution highlighted that the 
EU’s efforts were hampered by the negotiations behind closed doors between countries unwilling 
to respond in a progressive manner to the challenges to global security posed by climate change 
(Băsescu, 2010a). In the Romanian media, the US and China were also presented as the main 
culprits that opposed the climate change deal proposed by the EU. Here too, the media took cues 
from Romanian and EU policymakers, and through its discourse provided an explanation for the 
EU’s failure at the Copenhagen summit. At the same time, the two newspapers argued that any 
effective solution that would lead to a progressive accord had to persuade China and the US to 
comply. Although, the newly installed Obama administration showed signs of trying to engage 
with the issue of climate change from a new perspective, the Congress didn’t share such an 
opinion. President Obama’s commitment to reduce emissions with 4% by 2010 (Adevărul, 11 
December 2009) and his participation at the Copenhagen summit were undermined by the 
limited mandate he received from the US Congress. In justifying this policy solution, Adevărul 
(8 December 2009) even featured an article where Fidel Castro criticised President Obama for 
being too weak in the face of the ‘blind and irresponsible oligarchy’ which seemed to be 
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opposing any sort of measure against climate change. China was also criticised for its stubborn 
attitude towards climate change: ‘Do you know any Chinese man or woman that wishes to pay 
for Copenhagen?’ (Adevărul, 4 December 2009). 
 
Bounding 
The Romanian media also constructed policy definitions which were considered by Romanian 
policymakers to be too critical and damaging of the EU’s reputations and approach to global 
climate change. Hence, bounding was present in the way in which the Romanian media defined 
the failure of the EU during the Copenhagen summit as a policy problem, and a policy 
expectation which argued that the EU should increase significantly its internal efforts. One in ten 
articles – highlighted in table 7.2 – framed the agreement brokered at Copenhagen as 
disappointing and a policy problem which remained unresolved. Although most countries 
committed themselves to limiting the rise in global temperatures to maximum two degrees, both 
newspapers highlighted that the mechanisms proposed in order to achieve this goal were at best 
very vague. Disagreements between the US, China and the EU were perceived to have been the 
main cause for the failure of the summit. Even though it was proposing a progressive agreement 
that could tackle global climate change, the EU was sidelined and isolated by US, China and the 
other major emerging powers – i.e. Brazil, India or Russia. A lack of transparency in drafting the 
documents of the summit was also emphasised, surprisingly, by China’s representative, Su Wei: 
‘this process is not transparent (...) text made out of thin air cannot be simply agreed upon’ 
(Jurnalul Naţional, 12 December 2009). 
The two Romanian newspapers posited that the EU’s stance at the summit was undermined by 
accusations of illegal transactions regarding carbon emissions presented by Europol. The sense 
of disappointment expressed by the Romanian media was largely overlooked by the official 
rhetoric. The Romanian government argued that while the summit could have been viewed as a 
disappointing moment, there were a number of positive things that could be noted, such as the 
EU’s commitment to a fair deal. In this sense, the Romanian government stressed that more time 
and reflection was required in order to draw on the lessons learnt in Copenhagen and try to build 
the Union’s influence in the international arena through boosting its ability to convince small 
states – and act as a model (Boc, 2009; Băsescu, 2010b). Less concerned about climate change 
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after the Copenhagen summit, the Romanian government afforded little if any attention to the 
issue in the following six months. Although, Romanian policymakers largely turned a blind eye 
to the disappointing outcome of the summit, the critique constructed by the two newspapers 
became pervasive within the public sphere, due to the broad global and regional effects of 
climate change. By presenting views, commentaries and letters from the general public around 
the issue, Romanian journalists encouraged debate within the public sphere. 
Table 7.2 Bounding – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen Policy problem 64.70 
The EU lost its global leadership after Copenhagen Policy problem 23.50 
The EU should do more Policy expectation 22.30 
Source: Author’s own data 
The EU was also charged for not doing enough in order to promote a progressive climate change 
agreement in its position of global leader. More than a fifth of the total articles contained an 
expectation related to the need for the EU to increase its global efforts in order to convince other 
states to commit themselves to ambitious emissions reduction targets. Before the Copenhagen 
summit, several statements from European leaders calling for more focus and decisiveness in the 
Union’s approach were featured in the two newspapers. For example, the President of the 
European Commission, Barroso (Adevărul, 3 November 2009) argued that the member states 
should present ‘concrete numbers’ in order to aid the developing countries. British Prime 
Minister Brown stressed that the member states should translate their ambitious discourse into 
practice: ‘our states should be as ambitious as they argue; it is not sufficient to say merely I can 
do, I would do, or I will do’ (Adevărul, 8 December 2009). Here, the Romanian media focused 
on the failure of the EU and its loss of reputation in order to appeal to readers’ perceived 
preference for sensational news. Due to its tough stance and policymakers’ perception that 
journalists are prone to cover policy failure, the official rhetoric of the Romanian government 
was largely unresponsive to the policy expectation expressed by the media184. Rather, while 
acknowledging partly the EU’s failure to influence the outcome of the Copenhagen summit, the 
Romanian government underlined that: 
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the EU and its member states have made strong unilateral commitments towards 
reducing emissions and implementing new technologies (…) we can be very proud 
of this, but we cannot stop here (…) in the light of the negotiations (at Copenhagen) 
we need to carefully evaluate what we need to do in order to in order to reach our 
goal of limiting the rise in temperature to two degrees (Adevărul, 28 September 
2009).  
 
Agenda setting 
Agenda setting was the most pervasive interaction effect identified, being highlighted by the way 
in which the Romanian media defined a series of policy problems, solutions and expectations. 
Not all the articles that framed climate change as a threat in the medium and long term focused 
on the need to tackle it urgently. In only about half of the articles, readers were informed and 
warned that global changes in the climate were happening right before their eyes. The rise of 
global temperatures was considered to have the potential to cause extreme meteorological 
phenomena and wipe out entire species of animals and plants. Moreover, climate change was no 
more a ’virtual threat, but a reality responsible already responsible for the death of 300.000 
people a year, nearly equivalent to the effects of the 2004 tsunami’ (Jurnalul Naţional, 2 July 
2009). The sense of urgency was also constructed by portraying the protests and activity of 
various and global NGOs and members of the general public. Supporters and members of 
Greenpeace were featured due to their civic actions all around Europe: UK (Jurnalul Naţional, 12 
October 2009), Italy (Adevărul, 4 December 2009) or the Netherlands (Adevărul, 11 October 
2009). Voices from the general public were also featured in order to highlight the present threat 
posed by climate change through various social and cultural programs or demonstrations 
(Jurnalul Naţional, 12 December 2009). The actions of the general public were also presented in 
connection to the policy definition which claimed that climate change was a current threat.  
 
Besides focusing on the actions of demonstrators around Europe, Adevărul (7 December 2009) 
featured a glimpse into the attitudes of citizens in other member states towards climate change185. 
By taking the side of demonstrators and pushing for governmental response, Romanian 
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had to make a change in their life in order to reduce the effects of climate change. 
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journalists acted here as activists, contributing to new forms of participative democracy. At the 
same time, by conveying a perceived image of public opinion to policymakers, the Romanian 
media created the discursive context for individuals to be linked to policymaking. Romanian 
policymakers also underlined the urgency with which the effects and causes of global climate 
change needed to be addressed: ‘the circumstances which led to the negotiation of the Kyoto 
Protocol a decade ago have significantly worsened’ (Băsescu, 2009a, 2009d). This policy 
definition was based on the discourse of EU policymakers and Western media, which Romanian 
journalists found to be highly legitimate186. Climate change defined as urgency became a hot 
topic in the Romanian media, prompting also responsiveness from Romanian policymakers. On 
their part, Romanian journalists perceived that by reporting on the need to tackle urgently the 
effects of climate change, they were safeguarding the interests of citizens in Romania and those 
of peoples around the world. This was in line with the views shared by the general public – 
perceived by the media187 and policymakers188. 
Table 7.3 Agenda Setting – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Copenhagen – a crucial moment Policy expectation 81.60 
Climate change is happening now Policy problem 59.20 
The EU is the only actor that can forge a global 
agreement on climate change 
Policy expectation 33.00 
The EU still has the potential to globally lead in 
climate change 
Policy expectation 11.80 
Source: Author’s own data 
 
The Romanian media also focussed on the long term impact that climate change might have on 
Romania, its policies and its involvement within the European Union, whilst proposing practical 
policies for mitigating effects of climate change. Most of its proposals either expressed views 
pertaining to the private sector, or the NGO and academic communities. Some solutions sided 
with policy approaches which had been already discussed as viable options by Romanian 
policymakers, but had not been agreed on. For example, according to the Romanian Centre for 
European Politics, Romania had to make investments in order to ‘cleanse’ its energy production 
sector and try to convince the private sector about the importance of climate change policy 
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(Adevărul, 6 December 2009). On the other hand, the media argued that within the EU, Romania 
had to comply with the ambitious emissions reductions agreed on by the member states, 
mirroring the official commitment of the government which stated that ‘Romania together with 
other EU member states is determined to act firmly towards reducing emissions and 
implementing significant measures for reduction and adaption’ (Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2010). One such measure, highly publicised in the two newspapers, involved a policy of 
renewing the national car pool which implied trading old, highly polluting cars for a discount on 
new ones, which received praise from the two newspapers (Jurnalul Naţional, 4 August 2009). 
The solutions defined by the media in order to be implemented were already being considered by 
Romanian policymakers, and were supported by lower ranking bureaucrats within the 
government189. Hence, the Romania media became here part of the political process by proposing 
and supporting policy solutions to which policymakers were responsive. This resulted also from 
the fact that Romanian journalists found themselves in a continuous dialogue on the topic with 
policymakers who frequently offered them interviews or background information190. 
The Copenhagen summit was perceived in the Romanian media as a paramount gathering of the 
time, where effective and sustainable plans for tackling the effects of climate had to be drafted 
and agreed upon. As table 7.3 shows, about four in five articles constructed this policy 
expectation related to importance of the summit. Moreover, the coverage of climate change in 
the period analysed confirms the finding that the Copenhagen summit was perceived by the 
Romanian media as a crucial moment, where an ambitious agreement had the potential to be 
forged. Figure A.1 (page 301) shows a spike in the months before and during the summit, 
signalling a rise in the interest of the two Romanian newspapers in issues regarding global 
climate change policy. The magnitude of the summit was captured in news reports by portraying 
the impressive ‘numbers’ in play at the meeting: 192 states, 5000 journalists and 12 days 
(Adevărul, 7 December 2009). Adevărul (21 November 2009) sided with the Italian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in highlighting the importance of the Copenhagen Summit, where the credibility 
and legitimacy of the EU’s approach to climate change was at stake: ‘we cannot afford missing 
the crucial opportunity we will have at the UN conference in Copenhagen’. Representatives of 
the civil society and the general public were also featured in order to portray the overarching 
                                                          
189
 Romanian policymaker 1, 2. 
190
 Romanian journalists 1, 2. 
 205 
 
interest for the summit (and climate change in general) found throughout the public sphere. 
Besides drawing on the views of NGOs or members of the scientific community, the Romanian 
media also presented statements from EU and UN policymakers who were considered to possess 
high levels of credibility. Hence, journalists acted here as activists, pushing for an issue 
considered to be legitimate and salient for the future security and welfare of peoples globally. 
The view that the Copenhagen summit was a crucial juncture in global climate change policy 
was shared by the Romanian government which hoped for the signing of a ‘fair and progressive 
agreement – that would continue the progress achieved under the Kyoto Protocol’ (Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009c). Through its ties and dialogue with policymakers, Romanian 
journalists could push even more for the issue to be placed high on the political agenda of the 
Romanian government191. 
Within the timeframe explored, the EU was presented as a global leader in tackling the effects of 
climate change. This contained the policy expectation that the EU had to forge a global climate 
change agreement at the Copenhagen summit. Due to its member states’ own commitments to 
reduce carbon emissions and the Commission’s goal of providing aid to developing and third 
world states, the Union was considered to act as a leader by example: according to a French 
MEP, Europe could have played a ‘driving role at the climate change conference in Copenhagen’ 
(Jurnalul Naţional, 9 December 2009). Among the member states, Romania was praised by both 
its national media and the Commission for its contribution and commitment to the EU’s common 
approach (Jurnalul Naţional, 6 December 2009). The expectation that the EU should act as a 
leader in global climate change constructed by policymakers from the EU’s institutions, MEPs or 
political leaders from the member states also featured in the two newspapers. For example, in the 
build up to the Copenhagen summit, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Franco Frattini was 
keen to note that: ‘our commitment is to stop global warming and reduce emissions by 20 
percent, and we are ready, in the event that our partners will support us, to reduce them even to 
30 percent’ (Adevărul, 21 November 2009). Similarly, Romanian policymakers praised the 
Union’s leadership in global climate change policy due to its ability to act as an example for 
developing countries, and in this way catalyse the international negotiations for a new treaty 
(Băsescu, 2009d, 2010a, 2010b; Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009a, 2010). In this 
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case, agenda setting manifested itself through the ability of the Romanian media to emphasise 
the EU’s own expectations and aspirations, putting pressure on Romanian policymakers to 
comply to a greater degree with them. Romanian journalists achieved this through their dialogue 
and interactions with policymakers who were already supporting the EU’s leadership. Promoting 
and building support for a policy expectation again implied that the media acted as a gatekeeper 
of official policy commitments (as specified in the interactions effects model detailed in chapter 
3). However, its criticism of the failure of the EU during the summit did not prompt the same 
level of responsiveness from policymakers – pointing to instances of bounding, as was 
highlighted earlier. 
 
7.2.2 The policy towards Russia 
Indexing 
In their framing of the policy towards Russia, the two Romanian newspapers mostly took cues 
from policymakers and tried to publicise and build up support for their policies. One of the prime 
policy problems defined by the Romanian media focused on division and disagreements between 
member states. Germany and France were considered the main culprits that had constructed 
profitable economic relations with Russia in the past, disregarding the interests of other member 
states (Jurnalul Naţional, 8 January 2009). In a special issue, Adevărul (24 October 2008) asked 
high profile national and European policymakers why the EU had a divided approach to Russia 
and had been unwilling (unable) to speak with a single voice in relation to energy security issues. 
Romanian policymakers equated the EU’s weak policy towards Moscow with the big member 
states’ purely self interested ties with Russia, which disregard the interests of the new member 
states from CEE. Germany was framed as a defiant state which ignored the EP’s 
recommendation to forego its involvement in the North Stream project (Adevărul, 29 May 2008). 
In this instance of indexing, the media Romanian took cues and was used by policymakers in 
order to convey a message which diverged from official EU approaches and could not have been 
stated directly192. Moreover, by reporting on the deep divisions which plagued the EU’s ability to 
forge a common stance towards Russia, the two newspapers helped policymakers open up the 
issue to public debate. A clash with the more balanced approach of member states such as 
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Germany surfaced in 2011, when Wikileaks published a telegram from the US ambassador in 
Romania to the US state department in which President Băsescu was presented mentioning to an 
influential US senator the possibly of Romania being involved in a war against Russia, if the big 
EU players didn’t adopt a tougher, common position against Moscow (Popescu, 2011). On the 
other hand, Bulgaria and Romania were urged by a series of MEPs to resist Moscow’s offers to 
participate in the South Stream pipeline project which would have short-circuited the EU 
supported Nabucco pipeline (European Parliament, 2009d). Before and during the war, both 
newspapers overtly criticised the EU’s lack of unity, commitment and decisiveness in responding 
to Russia’s discursive and practical aggressions toward the physical or energy security of the 
states in CEE and those of the Eastern Neighbourhood.  
Table 7.4 Indexing – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
The EU should be main actor in dealing with Russia Policy expectation 36.80 
Regional stability – Black Sea region Policy expectation 23.20 
The EU should cooperate with Russia Policy solution 20.00 
The EU is divided in its approach towards Russia – 
seen in a negative light 
Policy problem 16.00 
Russia promoting peace and wanting to integrate Policy solution 13.60 
Source: Author’s own data 
The main policy solution proposed by the Romanian media involved the development within the 
EU of a strategic partnership with Russia (highlighted in table 7.4). The Romanian government 
promoted the idea of constructing a strategic partnership with Russia which would assure 
stability and security in the region: ‘it is important to define the EU and NATO’s partnership 
with Russia on the basis of a coherent  and transparent dialogue (...) our common objective is to 
consolidate European and international security’ (Băsescu, 2008d). While this view did not 
mirror a widely shared consensus among Romanian policymakers – some of which still shared 
deeply antagonistic feelings towards Moscow – it fitted into to the overall approach of the EU, 
which the Romanian government was officially committed to. Chapter 3 highlighted that 
indexing implies that policymakers rely on the media in order to give voice to their policies. 
Here too, the media was used by the Romanian government in order to portray a message 
towards Russia in line with the EU’s aspiration to build an effective strategic partnership. One in 
five articles examined argued that the EU should try to cooperate with Moscow, due to the 
important economic and historical ties they shared. A few weeks after the Union’s strong 
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response to Russia’s intervention in Georgia, the Romanian media urged the EU to be more 
lenient towards Moscow, as the latter seemed to have understood the message of peace and 
stability. This view was also predicated upon the idea that Russia desired to cooperate with the 
international community and promote peace and stability – a view which became prevalent in the 
pages of the newspapers after the ceasefire agreement. Former President Medvedev was featured 
in the two newspapers supporting a multipolar world, where peace and stability could be 
‘maintained if only one state is deterred from acting on its own’ (Jurnalul Naţional, 6 October 
2008). Consequently, in the build up to the 2008 US elections he was hopeful that the next 
American administration would favour strong relations with Russia. Moscow was also offering 
support for NATO actions in Afghanistan, a sign of a shift in Russia’s attitude towards the West.   
Indexing in this case is also supported by the fact that, Russia as foreign policy issue was treated 
as a topic concerning only high politics, where Romania had to try to negotiate and conform to 
the policy agreed on within the EU. For Romanian policymakers there was also a contention that 
Russia should be dealt as an issue of high politics which was remote from the general public. In 
the pages of the two newspapers, there was almost complete absence of positions and arguments 
constructed within the public sphere by members of the civil society or the general public. This 
was also highlighted by the analysis of the coverage of the Romanian media of Russia as a topic 
of foreign policy. Although the Georgian-Russian war caused a sudden spike in the number of 
media reports relating to Russia as a foreign policy issue, it did not seem to have any long term 
effects on the coverage of the issue in the two newspapers. As seen in figure A.2 (page 302), 
after the conflict, media coverage returned to the same steady pace registered before the war, 
with an average of 7 articles per month. The war and the ceasefire produced almost five times 
more reports than this average, reinforcing the assumption that the conflict was an important 
issue in the Romanian public sphere. While Russia’s intervention had an upward effect on its 
reputation as a powerful international actor in the Romanian media, it did not produce the same 
results in terms of coverage. This could be accounted for by the fact since the fall of 
Communism in 1989, Russia, due to its past behaviour, has always been an important topic in the 
Romanian public sphere.  
Optimism towards the EU’s abilities was shared by Romanian policymakers, who highlighted 
repeatedly the need to deploy a permanent EU mission in Georgia, and if possible in the frozen 
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conflict areas in the Eastern Neighbourhood (Băsescu, 2008f, 2008e, 2009c). The Romanian 
media also supported the expectation that the EU could assure peace and stability in its Eastern 
Neighbourhood, by focusing on its capabilities, and educating the general public regarding its 
policies and achievements. The Union was presented in almost half of the articles as the main 
actor that could provide peace and stability in the region (its Eastern Neighbourhood). Romania 
and Bulgaria’s accession brought the EU closer and made it more sensitive to the conflicts in the 
Black Sea region, constraining it to assume a coherent strategy towards the states in the area. 
However, the two newspapers stressed that a stronger involvement from Romania and Bulgaria – 
which were sidelined from contributing to the EU’s approach towards the region – would 
provide more legitimacy for the EU, due to the new member states’ close ties with the states in 
the region (Jurnalul Naţional, 21 October 2008). The EU’s policy in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
was based on convincing leaders in the region of the benefits of adapting to its economic 
conditionality (Adevărul, 26 May 2008). During the war, the EU was hailed by the Romanian 
media for being the first to act, before the US or other international actors.  
Linked to the previous policy expectation, ‘more Europe’ or a stronger European attitude 
towards Russia’s interference in the democratisation processes of the countries in the Black Sea 
region (and its aggression towards Georgia) was also a salient policy expectation constructed by 
the Romanian media. The Romanian government called on repeated occasions for the EU to 
work together with NATO in order to ensure an enhanced European presence in the region: ‘the 
events in Georgia have demonstrated that regional actors do not have the ability to manage a 
conflict situations (...) this is why it is up to the international community, especially the EU and 
NATO to step up and get involved to a greater extent in ensuring the peace and stability of the 
region’ (Băsescu, 2009c). According to the Romanian media, the EU had to overcome its 
economic interests in the region and shelter states such as Georgia or Moldova from the negative 
influence of Moscow. Georgia was presented as a victim of the lack of willingness from 
Europeans to act in order to defend a country which shared aspirations for European integration. 
Editorials in both newspapers called for a more protective approach from the EU towards young 
democracies such as Ukraine or Georgia, which were highly vulnerable to Moscow’s malign 
interests (Adevărul, 26 August 2008). This expectation was in line with the common views held 
by the general public that Russia’s power had to be counterbalanced in order to assure the 
stability and developed of the region (especially that of the Republic of Moldova). Through its 
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discourse, the Romanian media reified the expectation that the EU could neutralise Russia’s 
hegemonic interests in the Eastern Neighbourhood. In the months before the conflict, the 
Romanian media constructed a similar policy expectation, and through its agenda setting power 
managed to have a rather limited impact on official rhetoric. On the other hand, during the first 
two weeks that followed Russia’s intervention in Georgia, Romanian policymakers (who were 
before somewhat ignorant of this expectation) incorporated it into their discourse, radicalising it 
and feeding it back to the media (in an instance of indexing).  
 
Bounding 
Bounding was present in situations where the Romanian media defined policy problems and 
solutions which implied a tougher stance towards Russia than the Romanian government was 
prepared to adopt – highlighted in table 7.5. The main effect of the Russian-Georgian war on the 
Romanian media was undoubtedly the emergence of the idea that Moscow had regained its 
former great power status – which was defined as a salient policy problem. Over 60 percent of 
the articles in the sample argued that the EU and the rest of the international community should 
not disregard Russia, because such an attitude could have led to a new Cold War. According to 
Adevărul (28 September 2008), Europe could not afford to fight an economic war with Russia 
and should be very careful in managing its relations with Moscow. Russia’s investments in the 
military industry and naval presence in the war games organised by Venezuela were perceived as 
a testimony of Moscow’s growing power. Most articles warned that Russia was becoming again 
a powerful international actor which could pose an important security threat to Europe. Adevărul 
observed that with the start of the Georgian crisis: ‘the spectrum of the Cold War (was) more and 
more evoked’ (Adevărul, 8 September 2008), while the small conflict in the Caucasus turned into 
to a ‘fight for democracy’ (Adevărul, 12 August 2008). 
Media discourse here can be viewed as integral to the common views shared within the 
Romanian national public sphere about Russia’s malign interests and its potential to endanger 
global and regional security. Romanian journalists here adopted an active stance in promoting a 
critical view towards Russian which was rooted in the historical antagonism shared by a large 
part of the general public. In contrast, the Romanian government – after the first confusing 
moments which followed Russia’s intervention – presented a more nuanced view on Russia, 
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which both tried to appease it and to highlight the idea that Moscow needed to change its 
approaches to regional and global security: ‘Russia clearly has to play a major role in the peace 
and stability of the region Eastern Neighbourhood, (...) but it is not very clear whether it can 
supply in an impartial manner troops in the region’ (Băsescu, 2008f). Hence, Romanian 
policymakers perceived that the media’s discourse was too much influenced by journalists’ 
interests rooted in a traditional and unreflective fear towards Russia193. 
Table 7.5 Bounding – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
Russia is regaining its great power status Policy problem 64.80 
Russia is a security threat Policy problem 63.20 
The war seen as a Russian aggression Policy problem 52.00 
The US and NATO to shape Europe’s approach 
towards Russia 
Policy solution 48.80 
Georgia is responsible for the war Policy problem 19.20 
Source: Author’s own data 
Even months before the August war, the Romania media observed the increasing tensions in 
South Ossetia, where Moscow had strengthened its military presence. A move which Adevărul 
considered could have triggered a ‘conflict in the Caucasus with global implications’ (Adevărul, 
6 May 2008). Thus, there is no surprise that one of the most important policy definitions 
constructed by the Romanian media presented Russia as the aggressor. More than half of the 
articles showed how Russian forces invaded Georgia’s sovereignty, disregarding the principles 
of international law. In the aftermath of the conflict, the Romania media asked whether the war 
was caused by the Russian secret services (Adevărul, 14 August 2008) as part of a broader plan 
to create a new ‘Union for Eastern Europe’ (Adevărul, 18 August 2008), which would allow it to 
manage the geopolitics of the region. Simultaneously, Russia was criticised by the Romanian 
media for not respecting the ceasefire agreement brokered by France, whilst President Băsescu 
made a case for a new type of engagement with the frozen conflicts in the region: ‘I have 
observed the inefficiency of current peace keeping mechanisms in South Ossetia, Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, etc. (...) maintaining current mechanisms would increase the risk of exacerbating the 
frozen conflicts’ (Adevărul, 14 August 2008).  
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Georgia was also seen as responsible for the conflict due to its hasty decision to attack the 
separatist forces. News reports that constructed this frame argued that President Saakasvili acted 
impulsively, ignoring the advice of the West. Integrating the ‘irresponsible’ Georgia (Jurnalul 
Naţional, 1 December 2008) in NATO was seen to present a high risk to the security and stability 
of the Black Sea region, and more broadly Europe. Within the same perspective, Romania was 
also criticised for supplying arms to Tbilisi, while the Western media was charged with 
manipulating public opinion in blaming Russia for the starting the conflict. On the other hand, 
journalists’ own agendas influenced by the need to focus on the sensational and the deeply 
ingrained fear towards Russia, coupled with the perception that they lack knowledge about 
foreign policy, made Romanian policymakers unresponsive to the policy problem defined by the 
media which presented Russia as the main aggressor
194
. Romanian, journalists were seen here to 
push for extreme approaches and dismiss without rational justification policies that tried to 
appease Russia
195
. Hence, the official Romanian rhetoric presented a balanced attitude, on the 
one hand, arguing for the territorial integrity of Georgia, and on the other, for the need for Tbilisi 
to start negotiations with Russia:   
we are endorsing without reservations Georgia’s territorial integrity (...) we are 
convinced that it is in the interest of all the states in the region –, be it Russia, 
Georgia or Romania – to ensure stability in the area and make sure that the Russian-
Georgian conflict is settled as soon as possible, (...) to this end, we think that 
Georgia needs to find solutions in order to start negotiations with Russia (Băsescu, 
2008b).  
The official governmental rhetoric advocated an European solution – for the conflict and in 
dealing with Russia and the Eastern Neighborhood – where either the EU in cooperation with 
NATO or by itself would have to assume leadership in order to settle the frozen conflicts in the 
region. During the war and shortly after the ceasefire, President Băsescu repeatedly argued for 
enhancing the current peacekeeping international mission in the region with the presence of the 
EU: ‘if international mechanisms such as those of the UN and OSCE are not able to manage the 
situation appropriately, it is the moment for other international or regional organisations to get 
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involved, as is the case of the European Union’ (Băsescu, 2008f). In the Romanian media, the 
US was framed as another important international actor in the region, who could militarily 
oppose Russia and provide a viable policy solution – while the EU only had diplomatic 
instruments. Both newspapers hailed the arrival of a series of American warships in the Black 
Sea, underscoring Romania’s strong transatlanticism. US State Rice (Jurnalul Naţional, 15 
August 2008), and Senator Lugar (Adevărul, 29 August 2008) the Chair of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee congratulated Romania for its contribution to the stability of the region. 
Nonetheless, the US was also criticised for losing its position in Europe and for not managing 
divisions within NATO. As half a year before the conflict, Georgia was denied NATO 
membership, the organisation was often referred to in the articles in the sample. The war 
threatened the eastern border of NATO, where the West ‘was fighting for every point on the 
map’ (Jurnalul Naţional, 19 August 2008). In highlighting the various drawbacks that the EU and 
NATO faced in dealing with threats to security in the Eastern Neighbourhood, together with the 
former’s lack of capabilities and political will, the Romanian media enhanced the transparency of 
the EU within the public sphere. 
 
Agenda setting 
The agenda setting powers of the media were largely limited in the case of the policy towards 
Russia. However, two policy definitions (one problem and one expectation) had a mild effect on 
official approaches and rhetoric (presented in table 7.6). Reducing Europe’s high energy 
dependency on Russia was a policy problem defined by almost a third of the articles examined. 
Moscow’s political use of energy prices, coupled with its policy of interrupting supply to 
commercial partners were the basic arguments that fuelled the idea that Russia posed an energy 
threat for Romania and the EU. The media also criticised Romania’s proposed participation in 
the South Stream pipeline project, which could have derailed the EU’s efforts of reducing its 
energy dependency towards Russia through the Nabucco pipeline. Romania’s energy security 
seemed for Romanian policymakers to be more important than maintaining the EU’s common 
approach: ‘if invited, Romania will participate (in the South Stream project) in any form in order 
to strengthen its energy security’ (Jurnalul Naţional, 14 March 2008), as Varujan Vosganian 
Minister for Finance and Economy stressed. As energy prices affected the wellbeing of a large 
number of Romanian citizens – and others within the EU – the problem identified by the media 
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became an important theme within the public sphere. Some articles pointed to corrupt politicians 
both in Romania and in other member states who were willing to sacrifice the interests of their 
citizens in order to get personal financial gains. The Romanian leadership also expressed 
recurrent concerns towards Moscow’s political use of gas and energy prices which had 
destabilising effects for the countries in the Eastern Neighbourhood and to small EU member 
states – that were entirely dependent on Moscow for energy supplies (Băsescu, 2008d, 2008e, 
2008c). Romanian journalists acted here as activists often through detailed investigations 
pursuing the reasons behind Russia’s preferential use of energy prices, and Romanian or EU 
political elites’ subsequent collaboration and acceptance. In this way, they strived to provide 
information to individuals within the public sphere, having the potential to encourage public 
debate. Moreover, the media pressured the Romanian government to adopt a critical approach 
against Russia’s energy policy, by legitimising its policy definitions through the perceived state 
of public opinion. 
Table 7.6 Agenda Setting – frames 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Rate of occurrence 
(%) 
The EU should do more in the Eastern Neighbourhood Policy expectation 31.20 
Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s energy 
security 
Policy problem 29.60 
Russia is a threat to Moldova’s security Policy problem 24.80 
Source: Author’s own data 
In another instance of agenda setting, the Romanian media defined an expectation that the EU 
would actively engage in assuring stability in the Eastern Neighborhood and the Black Sea 
region – where stability was equated with tackling Russia’s negative actions. In this sense, the 
media encouraged and prompted the Romanian government on the one hand, to respond 
vigorously to Russia’s aggression towards Georgia in the first days of the conflict, and on the 
other, to contribute to and try to deal with the Eastern Neighborhood through the common 
framework of the Union. The success of this policy expectation was ensured by the high level of 
responsiveness from Romanian policymakers who maintained an open dialogue and enhanced 
network of interaction with journalists196.  The main reason for this was found in the high level of 
publicity and concern that was associated in the public sphere with Russia’s malign intrusion in 
Moldova’s domestic affairs – which the two newspapers presented as representative for the 
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whole region. Letters, commentaries and points of view from the general public were frequently 
featured in the two publications, contributing to the intense public debate which followed 
Russia’s intervention. Additionally, Romanian policymakers became aware of the views 
prevalent within the public sphere regarding Russia’s policy in the Eastern Neighborhood and 
the EU’s capacities and aspirations197.   
Before the August war, according to Adevărul (29 July 2008), the Black Sea was no more a 
‘Russian lake’ as President Traian Băsescu characterised it in 2005, but a space where all the 
important actors in the region had to collaborate, and where Moscow was supposed to 
acknowledge the interests of other states. At the 2008 NATO Summit, President Băsescu invited 
Russia to concentrate less on the issues that divided the states in the Black Sea region and focus 
more on essential common problems such as drugs, arms and people trafficking (Jurnalul 
Naţional, 5 April 2008). However, Russia’s aggression towards Georgia caused a harsher attitude 
from the Romanian media and the political sphere, which called for a large European military 
presence in the Black Sea region to tackle the Russian threat. President Băsescu travelled 
throughout the countries in the region and reassured them of the EU and NATO’s support 
without consulting the other EU member states.  
Romania’s close cultural and historical ties with the Republic of Moldova prompted a significant 
number of articles that condemned Russia’s policy towards the latter, and urged Bucharest to act 
towards the resolution of the Transnistrian conflict. According to both newspapers, Romania had 
to act through the common framework of the Union in order to produce a common policy 
towards Moldova which would aid the country’s path to democracy. In the aftermath of the 
Russian-Georgian war a high number of reports warned of Russia’s efforts to resolve the conflict 
in Transnistria following the South-Ossetia example. Simultaneously, such perspectives were 
dispelled by EU officials who reassured that ‘Transnistria will not follow in Ossetia’s footsteps’ 
(Adevărul, 8 September 2008). Similarly, Romanian policymakers adopted a pessimistic 
approach, expressing deep concerns that Russia might use similar arguments to those deployed in 
the case of South Ossetia in order to support the independence of Transnistria and hence 
precipitate a potential conflict in the Republic of Moldova and the Black Sea region (Băsescu, 
2008e, 2008c, 2009c). 
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7.3 Discussion 
7.3.1 Climate Change 
The ability of the Romanian media to enhance democratic legitimacy was far more evident in the 
case of climate change policy than in that of the policy towards Russia. Table 7.7 highlights that 
instances of agenda setting and bounding198 were more pervasive than those of indexing. The 
issue of climate change was salient both within the media (in the public sphere) and in the 
discourse of Romanian policymakers. One reason for this is found in the indiscriminate effects 
that climate change was thought to have on peoples globally. Hence, in its reporting, the 
Romanian media acted on the assumption that public opinion was greatly concerned with the 
issue of climate change and the need to engage with its consequences. At the same time, the need 
to tackle climate change and the crucial moment that Copenhagen represented was a pervasive 
theme within the more global discourse of the UN, which enjoyed high levels of legitimacy and 
esteem in the two Romanian newspapers. Hence, in defining and pushing for political action, the 
Romanian media relied mostly on policy definitions already articulated at various times either by 
the EU, the UN, transnational NGOs or the wider scientific community. 
The analysis of the policy definitions framed by the media together with their interaction effects 
with Romanian policymakers highlights that instances of bounding and agenda setting 
outweighed those of indexing both in terms of number and in terms of quality. Agenda setting 
implied that Romanian journalists became part of the political process, maintaining a continuous 
dialogue and with policymakers. Moreover, through agenda setting the Romanian media put 
pressure both before and after the summit on Romanian policymakers to support the EU’s 
approach to climate change and its global leadership. At the same time, by publicising the 
importance of the Copenhagen summit and its place in global climate change policy, the 
Romanian media strived to offer information to individuals, which had the potential to encourage 
public debate. Bounding was synonymous in this case to enhancing the accountability and 
transparency of decision-making processes, where the media became a watchdog of democracy. 
Bounding effects were present in situations where the Romanian media was perceived to have a 
discourse which was too critical, stemming from journalists’ tendency to focus on failure. 
Finally, in instances of indexing, the two newspapers gathered support for official policy 
approaches that they perceived to be in line with the interests of the general public.  
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Table 7.7 Frames present in the Romanian media – climate change policy 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
Number of 
articles 
Rate of 
occurrence 
(%) 
Adevărul 
(%)* 
Jurnalul 
National 
(%)* 
Climate change – medium to long term threat Policy problem Indexing 102 99.00 100.00 96.80 
Copenhagen – a crucial moment  Policy expectation Agenda setting 83 81.60 94.40 51.60 
Disappointing outcome at Copenhagen Policy problem Bounding 11** 64.70** 71.40*** 60.00*** 
Climate change is happening now Policy problem Agenda setting 61 59.20 59.20 58.10 
Blaming other states Policy solution Indexing 50 48.50 53.50 38.70 
The EU is  the only actor that can forge a global 
agreement on climate change 
Policy expectation Agenda setting 34 33.00 36.60 22.60 
The EU lost its global leadership after 
Copenhagen 
Policy problem Bounding 4** 23.50** 42.90*** 10.00*** 
The EU should do more Policy expectation Bounding 23 22.30 23.90 19.40 
Equal climate change deal Policy solution Indexing 23 22.30 23.40 16.10 
The EU still has the potential to globally lead in 
climate change 
Policy expectation Agenda setting 2** 11.80** 14.30*** 10.00*** 
Climate change – medium to long term threat Policy problem Indexing 102 99.00 100.00 96.80 
Notes: * Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified. 
            **Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit (N=17). 
            ***Takes into account the articles published after the Copenhagen summit: Adevărul (N=7); Jurnalul National (N=10). 
Source: Actor’s own calculations (N=102)/ Adevărul (N=71); Jurnalul National (N=31)
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Instances of indexing implied that the media acted as a tool at the disposal of policymakers, 
which allowed them to publicise their policies and gather public support. At the same time, 
indexing meant that journalists aimed at educating the general public regarding the dangers 
posed by climate change. Romanian journalists acted in this way due to their belief that citizens 
were concerned with tackling climate change, which elevated this issue into a matter of national 
interest. The Romanian media also highlighted the need to devise and implement coherent 
policies that would tackle both the causes and the consequences of climate change. In doing so, 
the Romanian media took cues from national policymakers, but also relied on discourse from EU 
policymakers which was often presented in order to justify the policy definitions constructed. 
The most pervasive policy problem defined by Romanian media (which viewed climate change 
as a threat in the medium and long term) drew to a large extent on policymakers’ own discourse 
and fitted with definitions from other influential international organisations such as the UN. 
Together with two other instances of indexing (the need to forge an equal deal and putting the 
blame on China or the US) this policy problem helped promote public debate in areas where 
policymakers were open and responsive. In putting the blame on other states, journalists relied 
on points of view from both Romanian and EU policymakers, and aimed to justify publicly the 
EU’s leadership in climate change199. On the other hand, the other policy solution framed by the 
media related to the need to forge an equal deal converged with the approach of the UN, which 
was made even more legitimate in the public sphere.  
Bounding effects appeared due to the criticism of the EU’s poor track record at the Copenhagen 
summit and its subsequent disappointing outcome that the Romanian media highlighted. 
Although partly admitting failure, Romanian policymakers found this criticism too harsh and at 
most times disregarded it completely. In constructing this policy problem, the Romanian media 
provided individuals with detailed accounts of the negotiations that took place behind closed 
doors at Copenhagen, leaving the EU isolated. Through this, Romanian journalists enhanced the 
EU’s democratic legitimacy by making its approaches more transparent. Moreover, by covering 
protests which took place throughout the country, the Romanian media had the potential to 
encourage processes of contestation in the public sphere. Linked to the disappointment of the 
Copenhagen summit, the Romanian media framed the EU’s subsequent failure as a policy 
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problem. Additionally, the Romanian media continuously presented the expectation that the 
Union should do even more. This view conflicted with the official stance of the Romanian 
government which portrayed a rather satisfied and proud attitude regarding the Union’s efforts. 
Both definitions, while not being taken into account by Romanian policymakers, provided 
valuable information to the general public. In doing so, journalists acted as watchdogs of 
democracy and empowered individuals to hold policymakers more accountable. Bounding also 
implied, in the case of climate change that policymakers were unresponsive, due to their belief 
that journalists are prone to focus on sensational news and failure, rather than success200. 
While Romanian policymakers viewed climate change merely as a threat in the medium and long 
term, the media also highlighted the urgency with which the issue should be tackled. In 
constructing this policy problem, the two newspapers reported extensively on the various 
protests and demonstrations that were taking place throughout Romania. The media achieved this 
by featuring commentaries, letters from NGOs, scientists and members of the general public. 
Through this, the Romanian media had the potential to link individuals to policymaking 
processes by conveying their views directly to policymakers who were willing to interact with 
the content produced by the two newspapers. Here, the agenda setting power of the media 
managed to add a sense of urgency to the discourse of the Romanian government and the 
President in the build up to the Copenhagen summit. Agenda setting in the case of climate 
change also saw the media proposing a number of practical policies which would serve as 
solutions for mitigating the effects of climate change. These proposals originated from the NGO 
and academic communities, and some were even being discussed in various policy circles. 
Hence, in this instance, the Romanian media became part of the political process due to 
journalists’ dialogue and informal interactions with policymakers, but also their proneness to act 
as supporters or activists for different solutions. Romanian journalists’ activism also influenced 
their reporting of the Copenhagen summit which was framed as a crucial moment in 
development of global climate change policy. The policy expectation defined by the media, 
elevated the success of the Copenhagen summit into a top policy priority for the Romanian 
government. Additionally, the media acted as a gatekeeper of Romanian policymakers’ 
commitments, constraining them to adjust to the ambitious discourse of the EU and support its 
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approaches to global climate change policy. After the summit, the Romanian media also 
advocated for and put pressure on Romanian policymakers to continue to support the EU’s 
leadership in global climate change policy.  
 
7.3.2 The policy towards Russia 
In contrast to the case of climate change, the policy towards Russia was not perceived to have 
global effects, but rather local and regional implications, to which, nonetheless, Romanian 
citizens were highly sensitive. The case of the policy towards Russia also differs in regard to the 
nature of the political action envisaged. Tackling climate change was perceived by the Romanian 
media to be more effective when approached at a multilateral level through the framework of the 
EU – which would take into account the interests of peoples around the world. Romanian 
journalists argued that Romanian policymakers should try to negotiate a position within the EU – 
which was a better avenue for engaging Russia than bilaterally – that would safeguard the 
country’s interests towards Russia and the Eastern Neighbourhood. However, Romania’s rhetoric 
towards Russia, during the one year period analysed, was at best mixed and ambiguous. While it 
is not within the scope of this study to evaluate the reasons that led to confusion and sudden 
shifts in Romania’s rhetoric, one reason might reside in President Băsescu‘s personal ambition of 
engaging Russia’s singlehandedly. He achieved this by hijacking completely from the 
government leadership in foreign policy201. Secondly, trade with Moscow and foreign investment 
coming from Russia have intensified since Romania’s accession to the EU (Nitoiu, 2011), 
making it increasingly difficult for the Romanian government to maintain a tough stance against 
Russia in the period before the war and after the ceasefire. Ambiguity and confusion was present 
also in the Romanian media’s discourse, which, on most occasions, took cues from 
policymakers, supporting and publicising their approaches. At other times, it adopted a discourse 
which was viewed as too critical, and thus ignored by the Romanian governing elite. Hence, the 
difference between bounding and indexing resides here in the fact that the media was criticised 
for going too far. Moreover, bounding shifted to indexing in the first moments of the crisis, 
which left Romanian policymakers somewhat perplexed.  
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Table 7.8 Frames present in the Romanian media – the policy towards Russia 
Frame Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction effect Number of 
articles 
Rate of 
occurrence (%) 
Adevărul 
(%)* 
Jurnalul 
National 
(%)* 
Russia is regaining its great power status Policy problem Bounding 81 64.80 68.30 61.50 
Russia is a security threat Policy problem Bounding 79 63.20 68.30 58.50 
The war seen as a Russian aggression Policy problem Bounding 65 52.00 58.30 46.20 
The US and NATO to shape Europe’s 
approach towards Russia 
Policy solution Bounding 61 48.80 41.70 55.40 
The EU  should be main actor in dealing 
with Russia 
Policy expectation Indexing 46 36.80 43.30 30.80 
The EU should do more in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood 
Policy expectation Agenda setting 39 31.20 40.00 23.10 
Russia is an immediate threat for Europe’s 
energy security 
Policy problem Agenda Setting 37 29.60 31.70 27.70 
Russia is a threat for Moldova’s security Policy problem Agenda setting 31 24.80 16.70 32.30 
Regional stability – Black Sea region Policy expectation Indexing 29 23.20 23.30 23.10 
The EU should cooperate with Russia Policy solution Indexing 25 20.00 16.70 23.10 
Georgia is responsible for the war Policy problem Bounding 24 19.20 16.70 21.50 
The EU is divided in its approach towards 
Russia – seen in a negative light 
Policy problem Indexing 20 16.00 18.30 13.80 
Russia promoting peace and wanting to 
integrate 
Policy solution Indexing 17 13.60 15.00 12.30 
* Percentages show the proportion of articles from each newspaper that feature the frames identified.  
Source: Author’s own calculations (N=125)/ Adevărul (N=60); Jurnalul National (N=65). 
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Instances of indexing and bounding outweighed those of agenda setting, pointing to low levels of 
democratic legitimacy – seen in table 7.8. They also highlight the fact that both the Romanian 
media and Romanian policymakers viewed the policy over Russia as a topic of high politics, 
where decisions can be detached from the general public. The media acted, on most occasions, as 
a tool which Romanian policymakers could employ in order to publicise their approach to Russia 
and gather support for it. It also allowed policymakers to survey public opinion and ignite public 
debate on issues where they felt public support was necessary. At the same time, through the 
discourse of the Romanian media, policymakers were able to indirectly make public positions 
which they could not afford to state openly through official channels. The Romanian media 
portrayed a critical discourse – which surpassed that of the Romanian government – of Russia’s 
actions and intentions before the war and in the months that followed the ceasefire agreement, 
making policymakers unresponsive. Nonetheless, by providing information about Russia’s 
intentions and actions, the two newspapers provided a better position to citizens to hold 
policymakers accountable and claim more transparency. In defining Russia’s political use of 
energy prices as a policy problem before the war, the Romanian media offered policymakers an 
avenue through which they could adopt a more decisive discourse. Hence, interactions between 
Romanian journalists and policymakers moved from agenda setting or indexing to bounding, in 
situations where media discourse became much more critical than the official rhetoric.  
In the case of the policy towards Russia, indexing effects implied that the media was used by 
Romanian policymakers in order to gather support for their policies and send an indirect message 
to both Moscow and to other member states – as specified in the framework describing 
interactions detailed in chapter 3. For example, in defining divisions among the member states as 
one of the most important hurdles that were hampering the EU’s ability to achieve a common 
approach towards Russia, the Romanian media took cues from policymakers, presenting a 
rhetoric which the government felt it could have not stated publicly. The Romanian media 
provided to individuals in the public sphere access to information regarding the different 
interests that were fuelling each member state’s approach towards Russia, encouraging debate 
within the public sphere. Indexing effects characterised the media’s decision to report on the 
need for the EU to develop a strategic partnership with Russia. The Romanian media aimed to 
gather support and educate the general public regarding the benefits of such a partnership, even 
though most Romanian citizens shared a deeply engrained hatred towards Russia. 
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The mixed and ambiguous messages that were being sent by the Romanian government through 
official channels were mirrored by the media. While supporting the development of a partnership 
with Russia, the Romanian media also claimed that the EU had the capacity and should do more 
in order to stabilise the Eastern Neighbourhood and keep the countries in the region at bay from 
Russia’s malign influence. Linked to this policy solution, the media presented myriad views 
from Russian leaders and Romanian policymakers who claimed that Moscow wanted to strike a 
deal with the EU, which would have assured peace and stability in Eastern Neighbourhood. In 
the case of indexing, the media’s policy definitions drew on the common view held by the 
general public and Romanian policymakers regarding Russia’s hegemonic intentions and the 
EU’s potential to keep them in check. Drawing on official rhetoric, the Romanian media framed 
two policy expectations which had the EU at their core. Firstly, journalists argued that the EU 
had both the potential and the capacity to engage with Russia in the Eastern Neighbourhood 
successfully. Secondly, due to the proximity of the Black Sea – unlike the British and the 
transnational media – the Romanian media advocated that the EU should assure stability in the 
Black Sea region. Indexing again here meant that the Romanian media aimed to gather support 
for the government’s approach. 
The Romanian media defined four policy problems which were largely ignored by Romanian 
policymakers due to their highly critical stance in the aftermath of the conflict (although 
accepted during the first days of the war). Firstly, articles pointed to the fact that Moscow had 
intentionally started the war and invaded a sovereign country. However, a smaller number of 
articles also argued that Georgia was responsible for the conflict. In this way, the Romanian 
media provided information from both sides of the conflict, painting a less biased picture. The 
Romanian media also warned policymakers that the Georgian conflict confirmed Russia’s power, 
status and hegemonic intentions in the international arena. Journalists linked to this policy 
problem the threat to Romania and Europe’s security posed by Moscow. The Romanian media 
drew here on the common view shared by the general public regarding Russia’s hegemonic 
intentions. Nonetheless, the media was seen by policymakers to be overtly critical and searching 
too much for the sensational. Bounding here can be seen only at the level of formal discourse and 
interactions, as policymakers also shared partly the critical stance of the Romanian media, but 
felt that such a rhetoric could be very damaging and publicly disapproved of the two 
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newspapers’ one-sided reporting202. Bounding was more evident in relation to the media’s 
proposal which envisaged the US and various international actors (other than the EU) to have a 
significant contribution in engaging with Russia in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Romanian 
policymakers were, on the other hand, highly committed to a purely European solution to the 
conflict which involved a strong presence and response from the EU. Through this, the two 
newspapers provided information about the willingness and capacity of the US and other 
international actors to involve in the conflict and assure stability in the region. 
Romania and Europe’s high energy dependency on Russia was a policy problem that the two 
newspapers articulated, adopting most times a very critical stance. Affecting the welfare and the 
economic security of a large part of the general public both in Romania and throughout other 
member states, the issue became a popular stereotype when thinking about Russia within the 
public sphere. Simultaneously, it fitted with the discourse of the Commission which had been 
working for a number of years to try to build solidarity among the member states, and discourage 
them from negotiating preferential energy deals with Russia at the expense of others. Through 
their discourse, Romanian journalists acted as activists and provided information to the general 
public regarding Moscow’s political use of energy prices, and Germany or France’s bilateral 
deals with Russia. The Romanian media fostered public debate on the issue and put pressure on 
Romanian policymakers to adopt a decisive approach in tackling Russia’s threats to Europe’s 
energy security, in this way becoming part of the political process.  
During the one year period analysed, the Romanian media constructed a policy expectation that 
the EU had the capacity and should involve itself in the Eastern Neighbourhood in order to foster 
the economic development of the countries in the region (and peace and stability). Agenda 
setting was evident in this case before and during the war, when the two newspapers often 
featured commentaries, op-eds and letters from the general public, which urged the Romanian 
government to support the EU’s position towards the region. During the war, Romanian 
policymakers’ rhetoric adopted the positions expressed by the media earlier, and even went 
further, claiming that the EU should do more in the region (in an instance of indexing, as was 
shown earlier). Again, the Romanian media became an integral part of the political process 
completing a full circle, first constructing a policy expectation based on their perception of 
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public opinion, feeding it to and putting pressure on policymakers, and after the latter adopted it 
and somewhat radicalised it, acting as a tool for gathering support.  
Finally, unlike the transnational media or the British media, the two Romanian newspapers – due 
to Moldova’s proximity and the historical ties with the country – framed a policy expectation 
related to Romanian policymakers’ duty to argue within the EU for a stronger and more 
favourable attitude towards the Republic of Moldova. This policy expectation was seen by 
Romanian journalists to reflect the overwhelming support that most citizens shared for 
Moldova’s ambitions for European integration203. The two newspapers featured voices from the 
general public together with commentaries which had the potential to encourage public debate on 
the issue, putting pressure on Romanian policymakers.  
 
7.4 Conclusions 
This chapter shows that within Romania’s national public sphere, the EU’s climate change policy 
was endowed with higher levels of democratic legitimacy through the activity of the media, than 
the policy towards Russia.The Romanian media’s agenda setting powers and its abilities to 
constrain decision-making through bounding, even in situations where policymakers lacked 
responsiveness, is indicative of the media’s ability to enhance democratic legitimacy in the case 
of climate change policy. Oppositely, the pervasiveness of instances of indexing points to low 
levels of legitimacy in the second case study, which can be partly attributed to the widespread 
view among Romanian policymakers and journalists that Russia should be treated as a topic of 
high politics where decision-making can be remote from the general public. Nonetheless, the 
analysis showed that in both case studies, the Romanian media not only viewed the EU as the 
main global and regional player (and the primary avenue through which Romania should act), 
but also criticised it for not doing enough or not living up to its goals. Hence, through its 
discourse, the Romania media raised awareness about the EU’s abilities and potential in the 
international arena, in this way encouraging public debate – also enhancing the transparency of 
the EU’s decision-making processes. Romanian policymakers were at times persuaded and 
constrained to act and contribute to the EU’s global or regional efforts. At other times, they were 
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aided by the Romanian media in publicising their approaches which converged with those of the 
Union. National policymakers’ approach to Romania’s activity within the EU was made more 
accountable within the public sphere. Furthermore, most of the policy definitions framed by the 
Romanian media (be they problems, solutions or expectations) envisaged a central role for the 
EU, which points to the Europeanisation of media discourse within the Romanian national public 
sphere. In turn, this gives weight to idea that the EPS – described in chapter 2 as the result of the 
overlapping between Europeanised national public spheres – through the activity and discourse 
of national media had the ability to enhance (in varying degrees) the democratic legitimacy of 
the EU’s decision-making processes in foreign policy.   
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Conclusions 
 
 
Introduction 
This thesis has highlighted that the media can indeed enhance the democratic legitimacy of the 
EU’s foreign policy. It has done so by posing two research questions: a) Can the EU enjoy 
democratic legitimacy in its foreign policy through the activity of the media?, and b) In what 
ways does the activity of the media endow the EU’s foreign policy democratic legitimacy?  The 
argument developed in the thesis drew on insights from political theory and introduced the 
concept of the European public sphere, in order to highlight the ability of the media to enhance 
the multiple aspects of democratic legitimacy – transparency, accountability, responsiveness and 
openness to public debate. As citizens do not commonly have access to information about the 
EU’s foreign policy, the media becomes their primary avenue for getting in contact or being 
actually linked to decision-making in this policy area. At the same time, it has presented and 
employed a model consisting of three interaction effects (between the media and policymakers) – 
indexing, bounding and agenda setting – which can shed light on the ability of the media to 
enhance the democratic legitimacy of decision-making in the area of foreign policy. In this 
regard the empirical cases have provided mixed results. The case study on the Union's approach 
to climate change emphasised more clearly the fact that indeed the media has the ability to 
endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy, and that it has acted accordingly. 
The empirical chapters have highlighted that identifying and distinguishing between instances of 
the three interactions effects has shown that the media almost never can enhance simultaneously 
on all the aspects of democratic legitimacy. Rather, the way it frames its policy definitions, 
together with the nature of its interactions with policymakers can boost certain aspects (such as 
transparency and accountability) even when decision-making lacks for example, responsiveness. 
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Moreover, the findings presented in three empirical chapters should not be generalised to every 
aspect of the EU’s foreign policy, as the two case studies paint merely a snapshot of two very 
different issue areas of the EU’s foreign policy. What they do highlight is the fact that the 
interactions between the media (and its discourse) and policymakers affect the way in which 
democratic legitimacy is enacted in the EU’s foreign policy. At the same time, they show that 
this thesis provides a robust framework which can be applied in order to assess any issue on the 
Union’s foreign policy agenda. After briefly revisiting the content of the previous chapters, this 
concluding chapter outlines the insights from the empirical chapters. The following sections then 
reflect on the theoretical and methodological approaches employed in the thesis, together with 
their strengths and limitations. The last section provides a discussion of the potential avenues for 
future research stemming from the findings, and the contribution to the literature of the thesis. 
The introductory chapter outlined the aims of the thesis and positioned the argument within the 
literature. The chapter advocated that a broader understanding of democratic legitimacy should 
be employed. Rather than solely focusing on the principle of representation, and empirically 
evaluating the way in which it is inscribed into the legal and institutional make-up of the EU’s 
foreign policy, this thesis viewed democratic legitimacy as being composed of various aspects. 
These aspects are transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. An 
increase in any of these aspects is considered to have a positive effect on the way democratic 
legitimacy is enacted in foreign policy decision-making. The introduction to the thesis also 
included a brief note which summarised the theoretical framework and the methods employed, 
which were presented in more detail in chapters 3 and 4.  
Chapter 1 highlighted the way in which the literatures on the EU’s foreign policy and foreign 
policy analysis have engaged with the issue of democratic legitimacy. The study of the EU’s 
foreign policy was seen to be dominated by three broad debates which have either ignored issues 
of democratic legitimacy, or, in very few cases, have equated democratic legitimacy with the 
principle of democratic representation. Firstly, scholars have focused on the nation state, 
enquiring into the role of the member states in the constructing of the EU’s foreign policy, or 
have compared the EU to the nation state in order to account for the nature of its foreign policy. 
Drawing on insights from the realist tradition in IR, contributions to this debate have ignored the 
issue of democratic legitimacy, treating it as a domestic variable which does not have significant 
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effects on foreign policy. Secondly, scholars have focused on the institutional make-up of the EU 
and the internal processes that characterise it, equating democratic legitimacy with the principle 
of representation and its salience in the context of the perceived decline of intergovernmentalism. 
The third debate focuses on the way in which the EU’s ontology influences its behaviour in the 
international arena. Contributions here are centred on the assumption that because the EU is 
deeply committed to fostering the principles of democracy laid out in its founding treaties, its 
policies enjoy democratic legitimacy. The tendency to sideline the salience of democratic 
legitimacy in the literature on the EU’s foreign policy was found to reflect the lack of attention 
that foreign policy analysts afford to the issue. Some ignore its role altogether or take for granted 
its existence in democratic systems when a correlation between the media or public opinion and 
foreign policy decisions can be established. Others have enquired into the notion of democratic 
legitimacy by focusing on the principle of democratic representation or by proposing other 
complementary approaches. 
The concept of the (European) public sphere was introduced in chapter 2 in order to highlight 
the ability of the media to enhance the democratic legitimacy of decision-making processes in 
the EU’s foreign policy – and aim to answer the first research question. The public sphere is 
generally seen as the space where people come into contact with politics through the information 
supplied by the media and the public debate it fosters. In this way, the media has, within the 
public sphere, the ability to positively affect all the aspects of democratic legitimacy: 
transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. The media play a 
crucial role, to the extent that the EPS is what the media make of it (Risse, 2010). As a 
consequence, the media’s interactions with policymakers were viewed in the thesis to be crucial 
for understanding the way in democratic legitimacy is enacted in EU foreign policy decision-
making. The EPS was seen to have a complex structure resulting from the overlapping of various 
Europeanised national public spheres.   
Analytically, an interaction effects model was presented and employed in this thesis in order to 
account for the ability of the media to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic 
legitimacy. Chapter 3 presented three types of interaction effects between the media and 
policymakers: indexing, bounding and agenda setting. Indexing captures instances where the 
media lacks independence and supports the activity of policymakers, whilst being employed by 
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them as a tool for publicising and gathering support for policies. Bounding implies that the media 
has the ability to affect decision-making even though policymakers are unaware of or unwilling 
to interact with its discourse. The ability of the media purposively to influence decision-making 
aided by journalists’ ties with policymakers is encapsulated by instances of agenda setting. The 
chapter also highlighted that the modes through which the media frames its policy definitions –
focusing on problems, solutions and expectations – are crucial for identifying and distinguishing 
instances of the three types of interaction effects.  
Frame analysis was employed in the thesis in order to identify the way in which the media 
constructs its policy definitions. Chapter 4 highlights that framing captures the efforts of the 
media to unpack reality and present it to its readership. The frame analysis was complemented 
with data from interviews and questionnaires, coupled with various primary and secondary 
sources. Interviews and questionnaires were targeted on specific policymakers and journalists 
involved in the two issue areas analysed. The first part of the chapter outlined the two case 
studies analysed in the thesis, highlighting the fact that they resemble two distinctive areas of the 
EU’s foreign policy, which exhibit multiple contrasting characteristics. The empirical analysis 
focused on two member states (the United Kingdom and Romania) and the transnational level – 
chapters 5, 6 and 7 presented the findings from each of the three. This chapter now moves to 
highlighting the findings from the empirical chapters. The following sections reflect on the 
theoretical and methodological approach employed in the thesis, together with its strengths and 
limitations. 
 
Answering the research questions: the insights from the three empirical 
chapters 
This section presents the findings from the empirical chapters, highlighting the way in which 
they address the two research questions explored in the thesis. It first provides an overview of the 
media/foreign policy nexuses at the transnational level, and in the British and Romanian cases. 
The following two subsections focus on the two case studies, highlighting the way in which the 
empirical evidence addresses the two research questions. They show that the media had the 
ability to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy and the subsequent ways 
through which it achieved this – together with the variations in the extent to which it was 
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achieved. Additionally, in each case study, analyses between and across the three media/foreign 
policy nexuses are made, with an overview being presented in tables 8.1 and 8.2. 
 
The three media/foreign policy nexuses 
The transnational level 
Chapter 5 highlighted that there is a widespread belief among transnational journalists that the 
EU is committed to upholding democratic values and principles. It also stressed that EU 
policymakers feel they need to be accountable and transparent to citizens, even more than 
national policymakers. They believe that the media has the potential to influence public opinion 
and to present a relevant picture of it. This is why the EU uses the media in order to multiply its 
message and get it across to citizens. On the other hand, transnational journalists contend that the 
EU’s decision-making is sufficiently transparent, providing relatively easy access to information. 
Nonetheless, they add that the information supplied by the EU’s institutions is most times very 
technical requiring significant specific knowledge, or that the EU is trying to sell its policies 
through the media to citizens. Due to the ‘Brussels bubble’, transnational journalists have a 
cosmopolitan and enthusiastic perspective on the European project, which leads them very often 
to refrain from criticising the EU. Linked to this, chapter 5 showed that the most pervasive role 
that transnational journalists assume is that of educators of the general public204 in relation to the 
politics of the EU. This sheds light on both research questions, as in their role as educators of the 
general public, transnational journalists are able to encourage debate within the EPS. 
Euroscepticism almost never surfaces in the policy definitions framed by transnational 
publications. Moreover, transnational journalists argue that citizens’ interest towards the global 
role of the EU has been increasing during the last ten years. Journalists that have been based for 
a long time in Brussels – and are deeply immersed in the ‘Brussels bubble’ – develop strong ties 
with EU policymakers based on trust which give them a better position to engage in agenda 
setting. Indexing occurs very often, journalists taking cues or drawing on the discourse of EU 
policymakers in order to paint a supportive picture of the EU’s efforts in the international arena. 
Nonetheless, regardless of their support for the Union and their types of interactions with EU 
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 Transnational publications aim to reach various audiences ranging from national to transnational, aiming more 
for the informed publics. 
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policymakers, transnational journalists think that they can enhance the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy – which builds towards a positive answer to the first research question. Nonetheless, 
they argue that it is ultimately the duty of policymakers to solve the Union’s democratic deficit. 
 
The United Kingdom 
In chapter 6 it was highlighted that British policymakers argue that the EU is a better avenue 
through which to achieve the country’s foreign policy goals than acting unilaterally. Hence, 
during the 2008 Copenhagen summit, Britain aimed to spearhead the EU’s climate change policy 
– having Ed Miliband as Climate Change Secretary. The policy towards Russia was seen as a 
remote issue, British policymakers being in favour of a common European stance, unlike most of 
the member states which tended to deal bilaterally with Moscow. At the same time, the UK 
parliament, through the detailed work of its committees, enjoyed more power and better 
oversight over foreign policy and European issues than the Romanian or the European 
parliaments. Transparency205 in foreign policy decision-making was assured through regular 
public campaigns. British policymakers believe that the media can be used as a tool for 
surveying and influencing public opinion, but also as a crucial avenue for educating citizens. 
British policymakers frequently employ the media in order to initiate public debate on issues 
they feel need more legitimation and justification in the public sphere. Hence, responsiveness to 
media discourse is high due to the informal ties that journalists maintain with policymakers. 
However, media professionalism is a very important aspect for British policymakers in 
constructing their interactions with journalists. This is why they are very careful in building 
relationships based on trust with journalists. Moreover, institutions maintain blacklists for 
journalists who break the informal rules of engagement. 
The British media tends to treat EU related news as foreign news. This can be seen as a 
consequence of the fact that the policy definitions framed by the media are more salient in the 
public sphere when they are articulated to affect primarily British citizens, or have global impact. 
The habits of the British media paint a clear picture of how it enhances democratic legitimacy, in 
this way addressing the second research question. For example, the more quality British media 
frequently initiate public campaigns where individuals are encouraged to advocate various issues 
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 Transparency is believed by both British journalists and policymakers to be a crucial aspect of decision-making. 
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and make them clear to policymakers – which can make the latter more accountable and 
responsive. On the other hand, British journalists often put policymakers in the spotlight for their 
lack of transparency. They achieve this by frequently engaging in investigative journalism, 
through which they present information that is usually placed outside of public scrutiny by 
policymakers. Nonetheless, British policymakers argue that sometimes the media misleads the 
general public more or less willingly. In some cases, it is also thought to have the power to inflict 
significant reputational damage to British policymakers and institutions.  
 
Romania 
Chapter 7 has shown that the nature of Romania’s political system and its media landscape 
should be seen as salient variables in assessing the democratic legitimacy of foreign policy 
decision-making. Romania is a semi-Presidential system where the President shares executive 
duties in foreign policy with the government. The Romanian parliament’s ability to set the 
agenda and provide input in foreign policy is low, but it can exercise oversight. Usually, foreign 
policy decisions in Romania enjoy consensus among political parties. During the period 
analysed, President Băsescu spearheaded the country’s foreign policy, side-lining the 
government and the parliament. Presidential involvement was more evident in the case of the 
policy towards Russia, which was seen to have more direct implications for Romania’s national 
interest. On the other hand, climate change was perceived to be a salient issue by Romanian 
policymakers and journalists, but not a policy priority. Hence, in relation to climate change, 
decision-making was left to the government and its agencies. As the parliament was ignored and 
side-lined during the period analysed, the principle of democratic representation had no positive 
effect, making the activity of the media crucial for enhancing democratic legitimacy in the two 
case studies. This also made enquiring into the two research questions even more timely and 
relevant. During the same timeframe, transparency was not a prime concern for Romanian 
policymakers. Responsiveness was also low, informal ties being the preferred mode through 
which journalists got access to information about foreign policy. Lower ranking bureaucrats 
lacked the time and the will to interact with journalists (an aspect which also hindered the 
empirical research presented in this thesis). 
Chapter 7 also highlighted that there is a widely shared view among Romanian policymakers and 
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journalists that foreign policy is a policy area insulated from public scrutiny. It is linked with the 
view that the media should help the government to uphold the country’s national interest in its 
foreign policy206. In practice, this translates into the fact that Romanian journalists have a rather 
confused understanding of the EU; European issues being presented either as domestic or as 
foreign topics, or simultaneously as both. On the other hand, Romanian policymakers believe 
that the media can portray a coherent and relevant image of public opinion, and can be used in 
order to survey and influence it. At the same time, the Romanian media are perceived by 
policymakers to have their own agenda stemming from their politically active owners and their 
lack of professionalism. The media is also seen to be interested in sensational news and conflict, 
always searching for ways in which to damage the reputation of political elites or institutions. 
Through investigative journalism, the media often highlights cases of corruption which 
undermine the authority and status of policymakers. 
 
Climate Change 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 have highlighted that the national and the transnational media viewed the 
EU’s approach to climate change and the 2009 Copenhagen summit through similar frames. 
These findings point to the Europeanisation of the British and Romanian public spheres, and 
confirm the multilayered structure of the EPS. In the case of climate change, the activity of the 
media and its interactions with policymakers positively affected all aspects of democratic 
legitimacy: transparency, accountability, openness to public debate and responsiveness. Hence, 
the case of climate change offers a positive answer to the first research question, with table 8.1207 
providing a comparative overview of the interaction effects in the three media/foreign policy 
nexuses. As the empirical chapters showed, the ability of the media to endow policymaking with 
democratic legitimacy was not uniform, and varied according to each arena (i.e. the transnational 
level, the UK and Romania). In what follows, the discussion highlights these variations and the 
subsequent ways the way in which the media endowed the EU’s approach to climate change with 
democratic legitimacy, thus addressing the second research question. 
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 Romanian journalists feel a sense of pride in being part of political processes and contributing to safeguarding the 
country’s national interest. 
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 The bold text in table 8.1 emphasises the areas where similar frames prompted different interaction effects in 
each media/foreign policy nexus, pointing to variations in the media's ability to affect democratic legitimacy. 
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Table 8.1 Climate Change – Overview of the media’s policy definitions and the subsequent interaction effects. 
Frame The transnational level United Kingdom Romania 
Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
Climate change – medium to long 
term threat 
Policy problem Indexing Policy problem Indexing Policy problem Indexing 
Disappointing outcome at 
Copenhagen 
Policy problem Bounding Policy problem Bounding Policy problem Bounding 
Copenhagen – a crucial moment  Policy expectation Agenda 
setting 
Policy expectation Agenda 
setting 
Policy expectation Agenda 
setting 
The EU lost its global leadership 
after Copenhagen  
Policy problem Bounding Policy problem Bounding Policy problem Bounding 
Climate change is happening now  Policy problem Bounding Policy problem Agenda 
setting 
Policy problem Agenda 
setting 
The EU the only actor that can 
forge a global agreement on 
climate change 
Policy expectation Indexing Policy expectation Agenda 
setting 
Policy expectation Agenda 
setting 
The EU still has the potential to 
globally lead in climate change  
Policy expectation Indexing Policy expectation Indexing Policy expectation Agenda 
setting 
The EU should do more Policy expectation Agenda 
Setting 
Policy expectation Indexing Policy expectation Bounding 
Blaming other states Policy solution Indexing Policy solution Indexing Policy solution Indexing 
Equal climate change deal Policy solution Indexing Policy solution Indexing Policy solution Indexing 
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Both EU and national policymakers were convinced that climate change was a medium to long 
term threat. British and Romanian policymakers supported the EU’s global leadership and were 
pressured by their national media to make even more ambitions commitments. British 
policymakers were also aiming to take the lead within the EU in global climate change policy, 
proposing more ambitious commitments than other member states. The same policy definition – 
referring to the EU’s ability to act as global leader in climate change policy – was synonymous 
with instances of indexing at the transnational level. The transnational media was employed by 
EU policymakers in order to gather support for the Union’s approach to global climate change. 
Both national and transnational journalists perceived the general public as supporting the EU’s 
leadership in global climate change208. There was also a high level of responsiveness on the part 
of EU and British policymakers. In the case of Romania, informal ties allowed Romanian 
journalists to get important insight into the country’s approach within the EU on climate change. 
This allowed journalists to convey to policymakers their perceived feedback from the general 
public, which had the potential to link individuals to decision-making. 
In the discourse of the all the media analysed indexing primarily implied that journalists 
supported and publicised the EU’s commitment to tackle climate change. One reason for this 
resided in the fact that the issue of climate change was seen as a threat in the medium and long 
term. It was also perceived to affect peoples globally and to converge with definitions articulated 
by the UN.  Nonetheless, indexing in the case of climate change should not be viewed as having 
solely malign effects on the aspects of democratic legitimacy. Both the national and the 
transnational media aimed to educate the general public by providing detailed reports and 
assessments from scientists or the NGO community, which allowed individuals to form coherent 
opinions, in this way encouraging public debate. At the same time, Romanian journalists aimed 
to gather support for policies when they perceived them to be in line with the country’s national 
interest. At the transnational level, indexing was the primary interaction effect identified which 
found expression in the transnational media communicating the EU’s policies in a positive light. 
Moreover, due to the ‘Brussels bubble’, transnational journalists felt compelled to support the 
EU’s approach to climate change, whilst educating the general public regarding the EU’s effort. 
The three transnational publications indirectly aided the efforts of the Commission to single out 
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 Moreover, Romanian journalists also relied on definitions from EU policymakers and transnational publications, 
which put even more direct pressure on Romanian policymakers to commit to the Union’s policy and support it. 
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member states that were unwilling to commit themselves (i.e. Poland or the Czech Republic).  
After the EU’s failure at the summit, indexing was present in the way the British and the 
transnational media sought to gather support for the idea that the EU had the potential to bounce 
back. On the other hand, due to the fact that Romanian policymakers were largely uninterested in 
the issue of climate change after the summit, the Romanian media was able to set the agenda and 
put pressure on them to commit to supporting the EU’s efforts to regain its global leadership.  
Table 8.1 also shows that both EU and national policymakers were successful in using the media 
in order to publicise two policy solutions related to putting the blame on the US or China, and 
the need to forge an equal global agreement at the Copenhagen summit. In contrast to the 
Romanian or the transnational media, British journalists did not portray the same level of 
criticism towards the US or China, being influenced by the traditionally strong transatlantic 
relations.  
By providing detailed accounts of the negotiations that took place during the summit (and left the 
EU isolated) whilst drawing on voices from actors outside foreign policy circles, the national and 
the transnational media enhanced the transparency of the Union’s approach. The analysis of 
instances of bounding can shed light on the second research question. More specifically, 
bounding implied that the media (national or transnational) encouraged public debate and 
processes of contestation within the EPS by reporting on various protests or social movements, 
and regularly featuring commentaries or letters from the general public. Bounding was generally 
present in situations where both national and transnational media were viewed to construct 
policy definitions which were too critical, due to journalists’ lack of knowledge about foreign 
policy, coupled with their tendency to focus on failure, rather than success. Moreover, 
policymakers argued that journalists lack specific knowledge about the mechanisms and 
constraints that characterise foreign policy decision-making, which make them reject policies 
that fall outside accepted boundaries or stereotypes. Bounding was also evident in situations 
where the media presented the negotiations behind closed doors. This made national and EU 
policymakers impervious to the media’s discourse, due to their perception that the media’s policy 
definitions had a damaging effect on the EU’s global leadership. At the transnational level, 
unresponsiveness on the part of the EU policymakers was predicated upon their belief that the 
Union should not be criticised, as it was a global champion of multilateralism. Although it made 
 238 
 
their activity more transparent and accountable, EU policymakers also argued that the significant 
amount of coverage around the Copenhagen summit and the EU’s approach weakened its 
leverage in international climate change negotiations. This perception points to a research 
question related to the relationship between effectiveness in foreign policy and democratic 
legitimacy, which will be expanded in the last section of this chapter as an avenue for future 
research. 
Agenda setting was predicated on the belief held by journalists that citizens in the EU were 
deeply concerned with the issue of climate change. Journalists, through their policy definitions, 
encouraged public debate by providing in the EPS detailed information about the present 
consequences of climate change and the crucial moment that the Copenhagen summit 
represented in the development of global climate change policy. The salience of the summit is 
also confirmed by the spike in coverage it received in all the publications in the sample, which is 
highlighted in figure A.1 in annex A (page 301). In this case, due to high levels of 
responsiveness, journalists from all publications in the sample were able to feed their perception 
of public opinion to policymakers. In this way, they encouraged debate in the EPS by frequently 
featuring comments and letters from the general public, and also had the potential to link 
individuals to decision-making. Through its agenda setting power, the transnational and the 
national media put pressure on policymakers to make more ambitious commitments in tackling 
global climate change – and live up to them. Agenda setting also occurred in situations where 
journalists acted as activists, taking up issues promoted by civil society groups or various social 
movements, and publicising them in the public sphere. Moreover, the informal ties between 
journalists and policymakers, but also the way in which the latter viewed the former’s ability to 
portray and influence public opinion, enhanced the agenda setting powers of the media.   
 
The policy towards Russia 
In contrast to the case of climate change, the transnational and the national media’s activity and 
interactions with EU policymakers had here (i.e. the policy towards Russia) only a limited effect 
on democratic legitimacy. The main reasons for this were the perception that the policy towards 
Russia was not of interest for the general public (with the exception of Romania), and the view 
that it was an area of high politics. Although not as evident and strong as in the previous case, it 
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also highlights that the media can in fact (in varying degrees) endow the EU’s foreign policy 
with democratic legitimacy. The bold text in table 8.2 highlights the areas where similar frames 
prompted similar interaction effects in each media/foreign policy nexus. The low level of 
convergence between interactions effects shows that the media had a rather limited effect on 
democratic legitimacy, and its effects varied significantly across the three arenas (the 
transnational level, the UK and Romania). Nonetheless, the EU was at the centre of the framing 
strategies of both the national and the transnational media in relation to Moscow and the Russia-
Georgia war – pointing to the Europeanisation of national public spheres. Figure A.2 (page 302) 
emphasises that the conflict was seen as a salient moment in EU-Russia relations by both the 
national and transnational media, due to the spike in coverage in all three media landscapes. Due 
to the informal ties between transnational journalists and EU policymakers based on trust 
developed in time, the latter were generally responsive to the policy definitions framed by the 
media. The transnational media was also seen to paint a sufficiently reliable picture of public 
opinion. In the case of the UK, transatlantic relations together with Eurosceptic tendencies 
influenced the way in which the British media perceived the Union’s role in dealing with Russia 
and assuring peace and stability in the Eastern Neighbourhood. At the same time, the policy 
definitions framed by the British media were made salient through featuring points of view 
reminding of the Russian threat from during the Cold War. On the other hand, Romania was 
expected by its national media to take the lead within the EU in dealing with the conflict and 
Russia. This to a large extent stemmed from President Băsescu’s ambitions of establishing 
Romania as a key geopolitical player in the region. In comparison to the transnational and the 
British media, Romanian journalists also constructed two frames centred on the Republic of 
Moldova’s and the Black Sea region’s security. 
An analysis of the three interaction effects in the empirical chapters highlighted the way the 
media endowed the EU’s policy towards Russia with democratic legitimacy, thus addressing the 
second research question – table 8.2 providing a comparative picture of the interaction effects in 
the three media/foreign policy nexuses. Firstly, indexing was the most important 
interactioneffect identified in the case of Britain and Romania, having equal incidence to 
instances of bounding and agenda setting in the case of the transnational level. It implied that 
policymakers were given a carte blanche for pursuing the EU’s policy towards Russia, whilst 
trying to avoid public scrutiny. Moreover, this meant that the media acted mainly as a tool 
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Table 8.2 The policy towards Russia – Overview of the media’s policy definitions and the subsequent interaction effects. 
Frame The transnational level United Kingdom Romania 
Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
Type of policy 
definition 
Interaction 
effect 
The EU should be the main actor in 
dealing with Russia 
Policy 
expectation 
Indexing Policy 
expectation 
Indexing Policy 
expectation 
Indexing 
Russia is regaining its great power 
status 
Policy problem Agenda 
setting 
Policy problem Agenda 
setting 
Policy problem Bounding 
Russia is a security threat Policy problem Agenda 
setting 
Policy problem Bounding Policy problem Bounding 
The war seen as a Russian aggression Policy problem Indexing Policy problem Indexing Policy problem Bounding 
The EU should do more in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood 
Policy expectation Agenda 
setting 
Policy 
expectation 
Indexing Policy expectation Agenda 
setting 
The EU should cooperate with 
Russia 
Policy solution Indexing Policy solution Indexing Policy solution Indexing 
The EU is divided in its approach 
towards Russia – seen in a negative 
light 
Policy problem Bounding Policy problem Bounding Policy problem Indexing 
The US and NATO to shape Europe’s 
approach towards Russia 
Policy solution Bounding Policy solution Indexing Policy solution Bounding 
Russia promoting peace and wanting 
to integrate 
Policy solution Indexing Policy solution Indexing Policy solution Indexing 
Russia an immediate threat for 
Europe’s energy security 
Policy problem Indexing Policy problem Indexing Policy problem Agenda 
Setting 
Georgia is responsible for the war Policy problem Bounding Policy problem Bounding Policy problem Bounding 
Russia threat for Moldova’s security - - - - Policy problem Agenda 
setting 
Regional stability – Black Sea - - - - Policy expectation Indexing 
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at the disposal of EU and national policymakers for publicising and gathering support for their 
policies in the public sphere. Through indexing policymakers also surveyed and initiated public 
debate on issues where they felt more justification to the general public was required. Moreover, 
Romanian policymakers employed the media in order indirectly to articulate messages which 
they felt could not have been made public through more official channels. 
Indexing was also present in the way in which the Romanian and the British media mirrored the 
mixed message constructed by national policymakers, who advocated the construction of a 
strategic partnership before and after the conflict, whilst also exhibiting an overtly critical stance 
towards Moscow during the war. At the transnational level, indexing implied that the 
transnational media followed EU official rhetoric and portrayed a moderate message towards 
Russia’s aggression, whilst arguing the need to develop a strategic partnership with Moscow. 
This was a result of the fact that, due to the ‘Brussels bubble’, the transnational media acted as an 
enthusiastic supporter and educator of the general public regarding the EU’s ambitions in the 
international arena. The war and the policy towards Russia were not seen by the national and the 
transnational media to have broad global ownership, rather they were perceived to have regional 
or local effects. Hence, journalists drew on official discourse advocating policy solutions which 
focused on getting the EU involved in the Eastern Neighbourhood and also in the Black Sea 
region (in the case of the Romanian media). Both the national and the transnational media 
provided detailed accounts of the war and information about the EU’s policy towards Russia. 
Journalists acted here as educators, providing individuals information that would allow them to 
form coherent opinions and with a better position to hold policymakers accountable. 
Secondly, bounding was present in situations where the transnational and the British media 
criticised the EU for not achieving a common stance. This policy definition mirrored the views 
of the Commission and the EP, but was seen by policymakers in these institutions as too critical 
to be stated through official channels. Similarly, British policymakers were strongly against the 
tendency of some of the member states to act individually in relation to Russia, but felt that such 
a message could not have been stated through official channels due to its critical nature. On the 
other hand, as table 8.2 highlights, Romanian policymakers openly criticised other member states 
for dealing bilaterally with Russia, a message which was also diligently conveyed by the 
Romanian media. Bounding was also predicated on the balanced approach to reporting that the 
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transnational and national media exhibited by portraying points of view from myriad sources. 
This in turn, led journalists to argue that the war might have been caused by Georgia’s rash 
actions.  
On the other hand, bounding effects also appeared in situations where journalists were perceived 
by both EU and national policymakers to focus too much on sensational news, coupled with the 
use of emotional framing in reporting on the conflict in order to put pressure on policymakers or 
influence public opinion. Emotional framing consisted in this case of images of the war and 
graphic or disturbing eye-witness testimonies. The media’s policy definitions which framed the 
US as willing and able to provide a viable solution to the conflict and assure stability in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood were synonymous to instances of bounding in the case of Romania and 
the transnational level. This happened because EU and Romanian policymakers were committed 
to fully supporting the Union’s ambitions in the international arena. In contrast, due to the strong 
transatlantic relationship, the British media followed official discourses in advocating a salient 
role for the US in keeping Russiain check in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Consequently, while 
British journalists were arguing that the EU should be involved in the region, they also believed 
that Union would not be able to draw on the same capabilities as the US. 
Thirdly, agenda setting was present only in a handful of situations, pointing to a lack of 
willingness on the part of the media to directly influence policymaking in this issue area. The 
discourse of the transnational media represented an exception, as transnational journalists were 
keen to push for the EU to have a stronger global presence. Through its agenda setting power, 
the Romanian and the transnational media put pressure on policymakers to involve the EU more 
in the Eastern Neighbourhood and in supporting the democratisation and development of the 
countries in the region. On the other hand, the same policy expectation defined by the British 
media was synonymous to an instance of indexing, due to the low interest of the British general 
public in the politics of the Eastern Neighbourhood, coupled with British policymakers’ 
commitment to supporting the EU’s international ambitions. Both the British and to a lesser 
extent the transnational media featured commentaries from the general public, which pointed to 
the tensions that characterised the Cold War, in order to define a threat in Russia’s re-emergence 
as an important international actor. Agenda setting meant that journalists put pressure on EU and 
British policymakers to acknowledge this new situation and act accordingly. This policy problem 
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was also salient in the Romanian national public sphere, but it led to bounding, as it was seen by 
Romanian policymakers as too critical to be stated publicly – due to their strategy of forging 
strong economic and energy ties with Russia. Agenda setting was also present in the way in 
which Romanian journalists framed Russia’s threat to Europe’s energy security as a policy 
problem. On other hand, Europe’s energy security was seen by both transnational journalists and 
EU policymakers as not being seriously threatened by Russia’s actions. Nonetheless, through 
agenda setting, transnational journalists provided thrust to EU policymakers own understanding 
and views. For example, in the few examples of agenda setting, EU policymakers from the 
Commission frequently banked on the support from the media in order to put forward their 
initiatives. 
 
Reflections on theoretical approaches 
Drawing on the summary of the empirical findings of the thesis presented in the previous section, 
this section reflects on the theoretical approaches employed. Firstly, this thesis has provided a 
relevant though incomplete picture of the EU’s foreign policy, by exploring a snapshot of two of 
its issue areas. The highly contrasting characteristics of the way the EU engages with global 
climate change and constructs its policy towards Russia were presented in chapter 4 to cover a 
whole array of structural, institutional or agency related aspects which also describe other policy 
areas in EU foreign policy. What the analysis has shown is that in order to assess the concept 
democratic legitimacy, a focus on individual policy areas is needed, rather than on the EU’s 
foreign policy as a whole (Rosenau, 1967; White, 1999, 2001; Carlsnaes, 2004; Carlsnaes, 
Sjursen and White, 2004). Furthermore, the thesis points to the fact that, to a large extent, 
member states are in charge of delivering concrete policy outcomes in the EU’s foreign policy – 
an idea which has been revisited in the literature during the last two decades (Hill, 1983, 2003; 
Aggestam and Hill, 2008; Gegout, 2010; Tiersky, 2010; Aggestam, 2011; Rynning, 2011; 
Jørgensen, 2013; Rieker, 2013). The 2008 Russian-Georgian war provides a good example, 
where France, whilst holding the presidency of the Council, spearheaded the ceasefire 
agreement, partly due to former President Sarkozy’s own ambitions (Asmus, 2010). Personal 
ambitions seemed also to inform the British and Romanian leaderships’ unilateral involvement in 
the conflict, who openly supported Georgia, whilst claiming that they spoke on behalf of the EU 
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(Halbach, 2008; Cornell and Starr, 2009; Nichol, 2009). Hence, besides focusing on various 
issue areas, research enquiring into the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted should 
also concentrate on individual member states, besides the EU’s institutions. The thesis provided 
a positive answer to the first research question, highlighting that the media had the potential and 
willingness to endow the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy. The media had 
positive effects in varying degrees on its multiple aspects: transparency, accountability, 
responsiveness and openness to public debate. Consequently, the media (within the EPS) can be 
thought to have had this ability in other issue areas in the EU’s foreign policy. 
Secondly, the focus on the activity of the media within the public sphere provides a robust 
framework for understanding the way in which democratic legitimacy is enacted in foreign 
policy decision-making – and a relevant avenue for exploring the second research question. The 
interaction effects model offers an overview of the way in which the media and policymakers 
interact, making it readily applicable to the foreign policies of nation states. Moreover, the 
interaction effects model does not have to be employed in order to account only for democratic 
legitimacy, as it can be adapted to focus on other aspects of decision-making. Nonetheless, a 
focus on democratic legitimacy using the interaction effects model might not prove to be 
practical outside democratic systems. On the other hand, while citizens have different avenues 
through which to come into contact with and influence policymaking on domestic issues (e.g. 
through civil society, social movements, or various stakeholders), foreign policy is generally 
characterised by greater degrees of secrecy, and is thought to be detached from society (Rosenau, 
1967; Potter, 1980; Bynander and Guzzini, 2013; Risse, 2013; Wight, 2013). Hence, the media 
has a central role in supplying information about foreign policy in the public sphere to the 
general public, feeding their views to policymakers – in this way linking individuals to decision-
making. The focus on the media allows this thesis to go beyond the principle of democratic 
representation. It also presents a framework which can overcome the way in which mainstream 
FPA literature commonly ignores or takes for granted the issue of democratic legitimacy.  
The interaction effects model presented in chapter 3 is built on the assumption that the media tell 
individuals in the public sphere not only what issues are salient, but also how to interpret them. 
While this assumption is widely debated by media studies or political communication scholars, 
this thesis has highlighted and confirmed that an examination of the interactions between the 
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media and policymakers can provide a reliable assessment of democratic legitimacy. As a 
consequence, journalists’ and policymakers’ perceptions of public opinion are more salient than 
enquiring into the actual state of public opinion. In advocating an enquiry centred on the activity 
of the media, the thesis introduced the concept of the European public sphere. It is broadly 
considered to be a normative space, where individuals freely and openly discursively interact 
with decision-making through the activities of the media. Moreover, structurally, the EPS was 
seen to be the result of the overlapping between multiple Europeanised nation public spheres. In 
the empirical chapters, such Europeanisation was highlighted by the pervasiveness of the EU in 
the way in which the media constructed its discourse, and also in the presence of similar policy 
definitions throughout the publications in the sample. Processes of vertical Europeanisation were 
also highlighted by the fact that EU policymakers, together with articles from the transnational 
media, were frequently quoted in national media – which at times also translated articles from 
the three transnational publications.  
Thirdly, this thesis has highlighted that, in foreign policy, the issue of democratic legitimacy 
cannot be studied solely as an objective category. Approaches that focus on the principle of 
democratic representation and the way it is instantiated by legal documents and political 
institutions view democratic legitimacy as an objective category. They fail to provide a reliable 
picture, due to the fact that in foreign policy, unlike domestic policy, citizens are detached from 
decision-making and their representatives rarely have significant agenda setting power. Even 
more, individuals feel disaffected with their representatives both at the national level, and in 
transnational institutions within the EU (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2000; Koenig-Archibugi, 
2002; Wagner, 2007). Hence, this study has advocated an understanding of democratic 
legitimacy associated with a subjective assessment of its multiple aspects –transparency, 
accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. An increase in any of these aspects 
is understood to be synonymous with a positive effect on democratic legitimacy. Nonetheless, 
complementarity between approaches based and on the principle of democratic representation 
and a broader take on democratic legitimacy can provide a more comprehensive picture of the 
EU’s foreign policy, and a more detailed answer to the second research question. 
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Strengths and limitation of the thesis 
This section highlights the strengths of the thesis, and looks at the way in which it deals with the 
inherent limitations of the methods and theoretical approaches employed. Firstly, the concept of 
democratic legitimacy was defined in this thesis to encompass various aspects: transparency, 
accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. Such an understanding of 
democratic legitimacy complements more rigid frameworks which focus solely on the principle 
of democratic representation and the way institutions enact it. The limited ability of 
representative institutions to influence the agenda of the EU’s foreign policy, coupled with 
citizens’ detachment and disaffection with them justifies a focus on a composite definition of 
democratic legitimacy such as the one applied in this thesis. Nonetheless, viewing this 
perspective on democratic legitimacy to resemble an objective category can prove to be very 
dangerous, as it refers here only to a rather subjective assessment of decision-making – which is 
very much dependent on the range of issues explored, the methods used, together with the focus 
on the activity of media within the public sphere.   
Secondly, the thesis drew on the existence of the European public sphere as the result of the 
overlapping between various Europeanised national public spheres. While the study of 
Europeanisation was not the focus of the study, it is worth noting that the data presented offers 
great potential for exploring processes of vertical Europeanisation, which seem to have been 
prevalent. Moreover, chapter 2 highlighted the debates around the nature and the existence of the 
EPS, rather downplaying scholarly arguments that share a pessimistic view. Although during the 
late 1990s scholarly debate around the existence or the possibility of an EPS was fierce, recent 
years have underscored a consensus towards the idea that the EPS should be considered to be a 
multilayered structure, which is different from public spheres pertaining to nation states 
(Venturelli, 1993; Jakubowicz, 1995; Schlesinger, 1997; Statham, 2008; Wessler, 2008; 
Schifirneţ, 2010). Most scholars tend to agree that, even if it does not already exist, the EPS 
could have positive effects on the democratic legitimacy of the EU (Linklater, 2007; Koçan, 
2008; Gripsrud and Weibull, 2010; Splichal, 2011; Habermas, 2012). This in turn justifies the 
structure of the EPS applied here.  
The multilayered structure of the EPS points to the fact that the media is able to grant legitimacy 
both to national and EU policymaking. By focusing on policymaking at the national level (and 
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the subsequent national public spheres) in the UK and Romania, the empirical chapters showed 
that the EU was covered extensively by the media and featured in virtually all of the policy 
definitions it constructed in relation to the two case studies.  Even more, the analysis emphasised 
that both journalists and policymakers (with some exceptions) viewed acting through the 
framework of the EU more beneficial than acting unilaterally in the two issue areas. This points 
to the fact that the EU's legitimacy in its foreign policy is to be found simultaneously at the level 
of national policymaking (in its member states) and at the transnational level. 
The lack of empirical focus on Europeanisation is predicated on the assumption that the 
interactions between the media (and its policy definitions) and policymakers are crucial for 
understanding the way in which democratic legitimacy is conferred on decision-making in the 
EU’s foreign policy. This raises two sets of concerns. On the one hand, the media is perceived to 
be the primary actor within the EPS, overlooking in this way other actors such as NGO’s, social 
movements or various other stakeholders. Nonetheless, the focus on the media is justified by the 
fact that it is best equipped actor within the EPS to provide the discursive avenues through which 
citizens can acquire information about the EU’s foreign policy and come to interact with its 
decision-making. On the other hand, there is an underlying assumption that through its discourse, 
the media shapes the opinions of individuals, telling them what to think about, but also how to 
think about a certain issue. In media studies and political communication there are intense 
debates regarding the extent to which the media influence the views of the general public 
(Everts, 2000; Holsti, 2000, 2004; McLaren, 2002; Aldrich et al., 2006; Potter and Baum, 2010). 
Nonetheless, there is also a consensus claiming that both journalists and policymakers work or 
interact on the basis that the media can both portray a coherent picture of public opinion and 
ultimately shape it (Cohen, 1986, 1993; Powlick and Katz, 1998). This in turn, makes the 
interactions between the media and policymakers within the public sphere the obvious locus for 
assessing democratic legitimacy – adding strength and increasing the relevance of the interaction 
effects model.  
Thirdly, in the way it was presented in chapter 3, the interaction model makes it sometimes 
difficult to analytically distinguish between the three types of interaction effects. This problem of 
overlapping is overcome by triangulating the findings of the frame analysis with those from 
interviews, questionnaires, and various primary or secondary sources. The empirical chapters 
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highlighted that, on some occasions, the media framed policy definitions which were supported 
by policymakers, but were perceived to be too critical to be expressed through official avenues, 
pointing to overlap between interaction effects. Another limitation of the way in which the study 
distinguished between interactions resides in the fact that it associated each policy definition to 
an interaction effect. The empirical analyses showed and specified that some policy definitions 
might have prompted two contrasting interaction effects. Consequently, the model could be 
strengthened in the future by understanding (and integrating) the way in which different policy 
definitions are constructed in relation to each other, and the potential overlap between them (and 
between subsequent interaction effects).  
Fourthly, the sample focuses on quality media which do not have the highest circulation rates in 
their respective media landscapes. Nonetheless, quality publications are widely viewed to be the 
main avenues for analysis, discourses and debate about the EU, due to their focus on quality and 
objective reporting (D’Haenens, 2005; Meyer, 2005; Trenz, 2007). Integrating social media (for 
example blogs) within the analysis could have added more breadth. Nonetheless, it would have 
also raised important practical and methodological concerns regarding the complementarity 
between traditional and social media (Wallsten, 2007; Domingo et al., 2008; Hermida and 
Thurman, 2008). A focus on more publications would have undoubtedly granted more validity 
and reliability to the analysis. However, such an effort would have been more suitable for the 
concerted work of an entire research group. Similar effects would be achieved through exploring 
more member states with contrasting political systems and media landscapes. Integrating the 
online publication EUObserver.com into the sample also raises important questions regarding the 
comparability between print and online media. Nonetheless, chapter 4 emphasised that its 
journalistic style and culture is similar to that of the Financial Times and the European Voice, 
having also comparable daily coverage rates and readerships. More attention could have been 
directed towards the various differences between the publications analysed, together with the 
way in which they framed their policy definitions. However, such an endeavour, while 
worthwhile, would have not advanced the enquiry focused on democratic legitimacy.  
Finally, the use of data from interviews and questionnaires adds strength to analysis, but also 
raises issues of reliability and validity. The main difficulty resided in the inability to access 
through interviews all the policymakers identified to be relevant for the study (detailed in annex 
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B). As a consequence, the empirical chapters display an imbalance in their use of interview data, 
where the analysis of the transnational level benefits from more interviews and questionnaires – 
in cases where subjects were willing to participate in an interview, but lacked the time, an online 
questionnaire was sent. This raises questions regarding integrating data from questionnaires and 
interviews, which were addressed here by supplying similar interview questions, which were also 
tailored according to each respondent’s background, role and experience (see annex F for an 
overview of the general questions used in the interviews and questionnaires). On the other hand, 
questioning individuals about their role in various social and political processes is widely 
thought to incur considerable difficulties regarding replicability, validity and reliability 
(Robinson, 2002; Touri, 2006; Akor, 2011). However, this thesis employed data from interviews 
and questionnaires, to a large extent, in order to describe the context in which the media and 
policymakers interact (the media/foreign policy nexus) – with the exception of the transnational 
level where the response level detailed in annex B was greater than in the case of Britain and 
Romania. The strength of this thesis is based on the fact that inferences about the three 
interaction effects were made only on the basis of data triangulated from various sources: frame 
analysis, interviews, questionnaires, or primary and secondary sources.  
 
Implications for the study of EU foreign policy and future research 
In the background of the EU’s evermore present focus on mitigating its democratic deficit, this 
thesis has enquired into the influence of the media on the democratic legitimacy of the EU’s 
foreign policy. This enquiry is justified by the lack of focus on the concept of democratic 
legitimacy in the literatures on the EU’s foreign policy and foreign policy analysis. In this sense, 
the thesis has sought to address the question of whether the media can endow the EU’s foreign 
policy with democratic legitimacy, confirming this ability through the empirical analysis of the 
two case studies: the EU’s policy towards climate change, and its policy towards Russia. The 
thesis also has important implications for the three types of debates around the foreign policy of 
the EU discussed in chapter 1. In relation to the first debate which focuses on the nature of the 
EU in comparison to the nation state, it reinforces the view that member states still are the 
primary actors responsible for the formulation and implementation of the Union’s foreign policy 
– which was more visible in the case of the policy towards Russia. On the other hand, the 
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findings of the thesis highlight that both the national media and the transnational media, while 
leaning towards this view, advocated foreign policy action through the common framework of 
the EU. This assertion is supported by the pervasiveness of similar policy definitions throughout 
all the publications analysed. From the perspective of foreign policy analysis, the thesis 
empirically showed that the interactions between the media and policymakers found at the 
transnational level are similar to those present within the two member states. This can be viewed 
as a mark of the EU’s aspiration to develop a foreign policy which would match in effectiveness 
and coordination that of the nation state.  
In both issue areas, the empirical chapters showed that at times the media became part of the 
political process either through its abilities to consciously influence decision-making (in 
instances of agenda setting), or by being used by policymakers in order to publicise and gather 
support for their policies (in instances of indexing). In doing so, the media fed into the 
institutional processes behind the formulation and implementation of EU foreign policy both at 
the transnational level and within the two member states. The thesis highlights that while the 
media might not be a central actor in the EU’s foreign policy, institutional perspectives should 
not ignore its role. Through their interactions with policymakers, journalists were shown to build 
trust relationships with policymakers, which in some cases became institutionalised at an 
informal level. This allowed the media to enhance the various aspects of democratic legitimacy – 
transparency, accountability, responsiveness and openness to public debate. 
Finally, chapter 1 described how the third debate set in motion by the EU’s search for meaning 
and its ontology is built on the underlying idea that Union is inherently democratic and has a 
normative foreign policy due to its commitment inscribed in the founding treaties to the 
principles of democracy. Chapter 1 also argued that this claim should not be taken for granted 
and requires empirical evidence. Hence, the empirical chapters showed that, in the case of 
climate change, where the EU is considered to have a more normative approach, the media was 
in a better position to endow the Union’s approach with democratic legitimacy. It achieved this, 
to a large extent, through journalists’ belief that they represented within the EPS the views and 
values held by the general public, and policymakers’ perception that the media can paint a 
coherent picture of public opinion. What this points to, is the fact that claims that the EU is 
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acting normatively in its foreign policy should be predicated on the way it is made 
democratically legitimate, a process in which the media within the EPS plays a salient role.  
The findings and the framework applied in this thesis also point to a number of avenues for 
future research. Firstly, the findings of the frame analysis of the transnational media can be used 
in order to qualitatively and quantitatively assess in more detail the level of Europeanisation of 
national public spheres. They can also highlight the quality and direction of transnational 
communication flows within Europe. However, any further research project that would aim to 
achieve this goal should also include in the analysis media from other member states (at least 
five to seven) which have different media landscapes and political systems. Secondly, the focus 
on the European public sphere can be enhanced by broadening the analysis to (and integrating) 
other less influential actors such as civil society groups, or social movements, other than the 
media. Moreover, the data from interviews and questionnaires, if supplemented, can be used in 
order to explore in depth the discursive communities and structures within which policymakers 
and journalists interact, and their influence on decision-making in foreign policy. 
Thirdly, the framework presented in the thesis should be applied and extended to other issue 
areas (in the EU’s foreign policy) and to more member states. The interaction effects model can 
also be used in order to analyse the domestic constrains on foreign policy within the nation state. 
Global or transnational governance systems can also be explored through this model. A more 
comprehensive comparative analysis would account for the differences in the way in which the 
policy definitions of the transnational and national media create different interactions effects. 
These contrasts were highlighted in this chapter in the section detailing the findings from the 
empirical chapters. However, they were discussed only in relation to the ability of the media to 
endow decision-making with democratic legitimacy. Drawing on the analysis of the three 
interaction effects, broader comparative conclusions can be drawn about decision-making in 
foreign policy in the member states.  
Fourthly, the focus on the media might be merged with that on the principle of democratic 
representation in enacting democratic legitimacy. In practice, this would mean exploring the way 
national legislatures in the EU interact with the media in order to put more pressure on 
executives, expanding their ability to influence the agenda of foreign policy. More specifically, it 
could feed into an exploration of the conditions and mechanisms under which the European 
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Parliament has expanded its competences in the realm of foreign policy since the adoption of the 
Lisbon treaty. 
Finally, an inherent next step in the analysis would be to enquire into the way in which endowing 
the EU’s foreign policy with democratic legitimacy impacts its effectiveness. Chapter 1 
highlighted that more than half a century ago, scholars following Almond (1950), Lippmann 
(1955) and Kennan (1985) were keen to argue that, foreign policy, in order to deliver the desired 
policy outcomes, should be kept insulated from the scrutiny and input of the irrational or 
emotional public. While such views on the role of the public (and implicitly of democracy) that 
inform both political practice and scholarship have become less influential, the literature is yet to 
have explored in a coherent manner the link between democratic legitimacy and foreign policy 
effectiveness in the case of the EU, but also more generally in the case of the nation state. The 
findings of the thesis could form the basis of an enquiry which correlates the effects of media on 
democratic legitimacy in the two issue areas with notions of effectiveness and performance in 
foreign policy. Nonetheless, in an increasingly multipolar world, where more established and 
rising powers seem to be uninterested in issues relating to democratic legitimacy in constructing 
their foreign policies, the EU might find its effectiveness and ability to negotiate in the 
international arena short-circuited by its increased attention to the activity of the media and the 
perception of public opinion painted by it. 
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Annex A: Article selection methodology 
 
 
 
In this thesis, after being selected on the basis of a simple keyword search on Lexis-Nexis or on 
the online database of the publications, articles underwent three separate and detailed readings in 
order to identify the relevant policy definitions framed by the media – providing an in depth 
analysis. The first reading excluded the articles that did not present climate change or Russia as 
political issues, while the second reading identified and coded the predominant policy definitions 
framed by the media. The third reading focused on the accuracy of the coding process. 
Narrowing the sample in this way allowed for a greater focus in the analysis, by removing all 
articles that viewed climate change as merely general news, which had no political effects. 
Coding such media reports would have skewed the analysis, as most of them framed climate 
change only in relation to the domestic society/popular culture, which is highly detached from 
national or European politics. On the other hand, articles, commentaries, news reports, etc. that 
presented Russia as a foreign policy issue – either for the UK, Romania, the European Union or 
other states and international organisations – were selected. This narrowed the total number, 
excluding the articles that treated solely internal developments in Russia, or other reports 
concerning Russian economy, culture, society and lifestyle. Secondly, the articles that focused on 
the probability of war in the South Caucasus – before August 2008 –, the war itself, its aftermath 
(the ceasefire) and the post-conflict management by international actors were also included in the 
analysis after the first reading. Table A.1 presents the distribution of the articles in the all the 
selected publications according to each case study. The coverage of the two case studies is 
featured in figures A.1, respectively A.2. An overview of the articles selected for each arena is 
presented in the following three annexes: C, D, and E. 
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Table A.1: Coverage by publication 
 
Publication 
 
Climate change 
 
Policy Over Russia 
 
Number of 
articles 
Percentage 
of the 
Total* 
Percentage 
of the 
Total** 
Number of 
articles 
Percentage 
of the 
Total* 
Percentage 
of the 
Total** 
EUObserver.com 80 50.00 20.10 80 35.20 15.00 
European Voice 43 26.90 10.80 72 31.70 13.50 
Financial Times 37 23.10 9.30 75 33.10 14.10 
The Guardian 85 62.50 21.40 100 55.20 18.80 
The Times 51 37.50 12.80 81 44.80 15.20 
Adevărul 71 69.60 17.80 60 48.00 11.20 
Jurnalul Naţional 31 30.40 7.80 65 52.00 12.20 
Source: Author’s own data. 
*Refers to the total number of articles from each arena. 
**Refers to the total number of articles from all publications covered in the sample (transnational, British and 
Romanian). 
 
 
 
Figure A.1: Media coverage of climate change: 1 July 2009 – 1 July 2010 (number of 
articles/month). 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Figure A.2: Media coverage of Russia as a foreign policy issue: 8 March 2008 – 5 March 2009 
(number of articles/month). 
 
Source: Author’s own data 
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Annex B: Sampling, interview and 
questionnaire methodology 
 
 
Sample 
Field research was conducted between March-April 2011, March-April and August-September 
2012 and March-April 2013. Subjects for interviews and questionnaires were not chosen at 
random. Interviews and questionnaires were conducted with policymakers who were involved in 
policymaking at the time of the Copenhagen summit and the Georgian-Russia war; and 
journalists who covered climate change policy and the policy towards Russia in the same 
timeframe. In general, three or four relevant policymakers were identified for each issue area in 
Britain or Romania, and between five and seven in the case of the EU’s institutions. Some 
policymakers moved from working for member states to working in the EU’s institutions in this 
period, whilst others moved from one institution to another within the EU. Finally, a small 
number of policymakers were involved in decision-making in both issue areas and thus able to 
provide rich data for both case studies. At times, policymakers who had key roles in decision-
making in the two issues areas were inaccessible or unwilling to be interviewed, forwarding my 
repeated enquires to their institutions’ press officers or spokespersons – who very often sent me a 
formal message which stated that their institution is committed to upholding democratic 
principles. This lack of responsiveness manifested itself especially in the case of Romanian and 
British policymakers, which is reflected in the low number of interviews and questionnaires. At 
the transnational level, within the EU’s institutions the policymakers’ response rate was much 
higher which allowed for a more in depth analysis in chapter 5.  
Contacting journalists also represented a challenge as they lacked time due to the demands and 
pressures imposed on them by their media institutions. For example, regardless of the publication 
they worked for, journalists are usually expected to write daily one or two articles for the daily 
issue, a blog piece, a certain number of news pieces, update the website of the publications, 
while also constantly responding to comments on online platforms (Allern and Blach-Ørsten, 
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2011; Dahlgren, 2012; Lecheler andde Vreese, 2012; Matthes, 2012; Schejter and Tirosh, 2012). 
Since around two journalists from each publication in the sample covered the two issue areas (or 
foreign policy in general in the case of the Romanian newspapers), this cross-section paints a 
slightly more reliable picture than in the case of policymakers. The response rate for journalists 
(out of all the individuals approached and considered to be relevant for this thesis) was over 70 
percent, and around 60 percent in the case of policymakers. A sample of the questions used in 
the interviews and questionnaires is presented in annex F. Nonetheless, all the interviews and 
questionnaires – with both policymaker and journalists – triangulated with data from scholarship 
and official documents provided valuable insights. This allowed mapping broadly the 
media/foreign policy nexus and exploring the way in which democratic legitimacy was 
understood and enacted in foreign policy in general. Tables B.1 and B.2 detail the sample: 
 
Table B.1 Sample: policymakers 
 The 
transnational 
level 
United 
Kingdom 
Romania Total 
Climate change 3 1 1 5 
Russia 4 1 2 7 
Both areas 3 1 2 6 
Total 10 3 5 18* 
Note:  * Sixteen policymakers were interviewed in total, but two Romanian and 
British policymakers moved from working for national governments to the 
European Commission during the timeframe analysed and could thus offer insight 
into their experiences.  
Table B.2 Sample: journalists 
 The 
transnational 
level 
United 
Kingdom 
Romania Total 
Climate change 2 2 0 4 
Russia 3 1 0 4 
Both areas 1 1 2 4 
Total 6 4 2 12* 
Note:  * Eight journalists were interviewed in total, but four Romanian and British 
journalists published in both national and transnational publication, and were able 
to provide insight from both points of view. 
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List of interviews and questionnaires209 
 
Policymakers 
EU policymaker 1, European Commission, DG Clima, interview, Brussels, 21/06/2013. 
EU policymaker 2, European Commission, DG Clima, interview, Brussels, 27/03/2012. 
EU policymaker 3, European Commission, interview, Brussels, 10/04/2012. 
EU policymaker 4, European Commission, interview, Brussels, 30/03/2012. 
EU policymaker 5, European Commission, interview, Brussels, 29/03/2012. 
EU policymaker 6, EEAS, interview, Brussels, 02/04/2012. 
EU policymaker 7, European Commission, interview, Brussels, 28/03/2012. 
EU policymaker 8, European Parliament, interview, Brussels, 21/06/2013. 
EU policymaker 9, EEAS, interview, Brussels, 03/04/2012. 
EU policymaker 10, European Commission, questionnaire, 26/03/2013. 
British Policymaker 1, Foreign Office, interview, Brussels, 23/03/2013. 
British Policymaker 2, Foreign Office, questionnaire, 27/03/2013. 
British Policymaker 3 (EU policymaker 1), British Parliament, interview, Brussels, 21/06/2013. 
Romanian policymaker 1, Office of the Romanian President, interview, Bucharest, 21/01/2013. 
Romanian policymaker 2, Romanian Parliament, questionnaire, 28/03/2013. 
Romanian policymaker 3, Romanian Parliament, questionnaire, 30/03/2013. 
Romanian policymaker 4, Romanian Parliament, questionnaire, 09/04/2013. 
                                                          
209
 For reasons of confidentiality, neither the names nor the respective positions are mentioned. 
 306 
 
Romanian policymaker 5 (EU policymaker 5), Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview, 
Brussels, 29/03/2012. 
 
Journalists 
Transnational journalist 1, freelancer and Adevarul, interview, Brussels, 08/04/2011. 
Transnational journalist 2, freelancer, interview, Brussels, 12/04/2011. 
Transnational journalist 3, freelancer and European Voice, interview, Brussels, 09/04/2011. 
Transnational journalist 4, freelancer, questionnaire, 26/03/2013. 
Transnational journalist 5, freelancer, questionnaire, 27/03/2013. 
Transnational journalist 6, European Voice, questionnaire, 26/03/2013. 
British journalist 1, The Guardian, questionnaire, 26/03/2013. 
British journalist 2, The Times, questionnaire, 29/03/2013. 
British journalist 3, The Guardian, questionnaire, 29/03/2013. 
British journalist 4 (Transnational journalist 3), freelancer and European Voice, interview, 
Brussels, 09/04/2011. 
Romanian journalist 1 (Transnational journalist 1), freelancer and Adevarul, interview, Brussels, 
08/04/2011. 
Romanian journalist 2 (Transnational journalist 2), freelancer, interview, Brussels, 12/04/2011. 
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Interviews and questionnaires 
The interviews averaged around an hour, although they lasted between 30 minutes and 120 
minutes. They were conducted mostly in the respondent’s office, but also in staff cafeterias 
within their institution’s building. The interviews were not taped, but recorded shortly afterwards 
through note taking by the author and further reconstruction of the responses. All the interview 
questions were open-ended allowing for clarifying and follow-up questions to be asked when 
necessary. The author was guided by a list of questions presented in the style of a questionnaire –
a sample is presented in annex F. Although the interviews followed a standard set of questions, 
new ones were asked if the respondent strayed away from the focus of the interview. Similarly, 
the order of the questions was changed if the interviewee turned to a logical path different from 
the aims of the interview. There was considerable variance among the interviews based on the 
experience, role, and background of each respondent. This was a conscious decision on the part 
of the author, aimed to keep the level of interest of the respondent high, overcome the formal 
nature of the situation and get more quality information from the interviewees. This type of 
interviewing can lead to errors related to the comparability of data from different interviews, but, 
at the same time, can provide valuable insight and greater amounts of information than more 
rigid interview frameworks (Hermann, 1980; Rasler, Thompson and Chester, 1980; Powlick, 
1991, 1995; Powlick and Katz, 1998). Questionnaires were used in situations where journalists 
and policymakers agreed to an interview, but stated that they did not have enough time for a 
meeting. Questionnaires were developed online on the ‘Bristol Online Surveys’ platform and 
were sent by email to each individual targeted. Similarly to the case of interviews, questions 
were tailored according to the role and experiences of each individual, and varied from closed-
ended, to others which allowed for more elaboration.  
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Annex C: Transnational publications – 
selected articles 
 
 
EUObserver.com 
 
Climate change  
Willis, A. ‘G8 agrees climate targets but wider deal unlikely’, EUObserver.com, 09/07/2009, 
http://EUObserver.com/885/28435 
Willis, A. ‘G8 to pledge funding for food security’, EUObserver.com, 10/07/2009, 
http://EUObserver.com/885/28442 
Kirk, L. ‘MTV and EU team up to fight climate change’, EUObserver.com, 10/07/2009, 
http://EUObserver.com/1016/109677 
Phillips, L. ‘Barroso holds his own in spectacular brawl with Greens’, EUObserver.com, 10/09/2009, 
http://EUObserver.com/843/28646 
Phillips, L. ‘EU criticised for 'inadequate' climate fund’, EUObserver.com, 11/09/2009, 
http://EUObserver.com/885/28648 
Rettman, A. ‘EU leaders take aim at Obama on banks and climate’, EUObserver.com, 17/09/2009, 
http://EUObserver.com/885/28675 
Phillips, L. ‘EU urges world leaders to keep cash flowing for now’, EUObserver.com, 18/09/2009, 
http://EUObserver.com/19/28683 
Pop, V. ‘Copenhagen spends protocol money on climate scholarships’, EUObserver.com, 21/09/2009, 
http://EUObserver.com/881/28690 
Phillips, L. ‘Sarkozy proposes extra climate summit ahead of Copenhagen’, EUObserver.com, 
23/09/2009, http://EUObserver.com/885/28705 
Phillips, L. ‘EU court slaps down Brussels attempts to lower eastern CO2 emissions’, EUObserver.com, 
23/09/2009, http://EUObserver.com/885/28710 
Phillips, L. ‘Commission says Poland, Estonia cannot issue more carbon allowances’, EUObserver.com, 
25/09/2009, http://EUObserver.com/885/28720 
Willis, A. ‘G20 adjusts to new economic landscape’, EUObserver.com, 25/09/2009, 
http://EUObserver.com/19/28721 
Holslag, J. and D. Freeman ‘China challenges Europe's climate change leadership’, EUObserver.com, 
28/09/2009, http://EUObserver.com/7/28733 
Phillips, L. ‘Construction sector across Europe given an eco-renovation’, EUObserver.com, 18/11/2009, 
http://EUObserver.com/885/29012 
Phillips, L. ‘UN climate chief: 'The world is waiting for the EU'’, EUObserver.com, 23/11/2009, 
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own green revolution), Adevărul, 05/11/2009 
‘Ţările bogate se ceartă cu naţiunile sărace pe clima planetei’ (Rich countries are arguing with poor 
nation’s over the planet’s climate), Adevărul, 05/11/2009 
‘Ban Ki-moon cere SUA să se ocupe de încălzirea globală’ (Ban Ki-moon is asking the US to tackle 
global warming), Adevărul, 11/11/2009 
‘Merkel va merge la summitul de la Copenhaga’ (Merkel will attend the Copenhagen summit), Adevărul, 
16/11/2009 
‘Bangladesh-ul cere ţărilor bogate 10 miliarde dolari ca ajutor împotriva încălzirii globale’ (Bangladesh is 
asking rich countries for 10 billion dollars in aid against global warming), Adevărul, 17/11/2009 
‘Surpriza la summitul de la Copenhaga vine dinspre America şi China’ (Surprise at the Copenhagen 
summit comes from America and China), Adevărul, 18/11/2009 
‘Isteria încălzirii globale’ (The hysteria of global warming), Adevărul, 20/11/2009 
‘Danemarca: Poliţia cere ajutorul populaţiei pentru prevenirea atentatelor’ (Denmark: The police is asking 
for the help of its citizens in order to prevent terrorist acts), Adevărul, 20/11/2009 
‘Franco Frattini: "Credibilitatea politicienilor este în joc la summitul de la Copenhaga"’ (Franco Frattini: 
‘The credibility of politicians is at stake at the Copenhagen summite’), Adevărul, 21/11/2009 
‘60 de lideri mondiali se întrunesc la summitul de la Copenhaga’ (60 world leaders are reuniting at the 
Copenhagen summit), Adevărul, 23/11/2009 
‘Copenhaga: UE mulţumită de participarea lu Obama, dar rămâne prudentă’ (Copenhagen: The is happy 
about Obama’s participation, but remains cautions), Adevărul, 26/11/2009 
‘Premieră: SUA reduc emisiile toxice’ (Premier: The US will reduce toxic emissions), Adevărul, 
26/11/2009 
‘Un mic pas la Copenhaga’ (A small step at Copenhagen), Adevărul, 03/12/2009 
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‘Şedinţă de Guvern pe Everest, înaintea summitului climatic’ (Governmental meeting on the Everest 
before the climate summit), Adevărul, 04/12/2009 
‘Greenpeace: “Berlusconi, nu fi prost, salvează clima!”’ (Greenpeace: Berlusconi, don’t be stupid, save 
the climate), Adevărul, 04/12/2009 
‘100 de şefi de stat şi-au confirmat participarea la summitul de la Copenhaga’ (100 heads of state have 
confirmed thei participation at the Copenhagen summit), Adevărul, 04/12/2009 
‘Cu ce merge România la Copenhaga?’ (How is Romania going to Copenhagen), Adevărul, 06/12/2009 
‘Copenhaga bursa intereselor climatice’ (Copenhagen the market of climate interests), Adevărul, 
06/12/2009 
‘Schimbări climatice: UE va oferi ajutor de miliarde de dolari statelor sărace’ (Cliamte change: The EU 
will offer billions od dollars in aid to poor states), Adevărul, 07/12/2009 
‘80% dintre francezi, americani şi japonezi, gata să-şi schimbe obieciurile’ (80% of French, American 
and Japanese are ready to change their habits), Adevărul, 07/12/2009 
‘Salvarea planetei – neînţelegeri la preţ’ (Saving the planet – discord on prices), Adevărul, 07/12/2009 
‘Schimbări climatice: UE va oferi ajutor de miliarde de dolari statelor sărace’ (Climate change: The EU 
will billions of dollars in aid to poor states), Adevărul, 07/12/2009 
‘Copenhaga: În această săptămână se decide viitorul planetei’ (Copenhagen: This week the future of the 
planet will be decided), Adevărul, 08/12/2009 
‘Timişorenii sunt informaţi prin artă despre încălzirea globală’ (People in Timişoara are informed about 
art and global warming), Adevărul, 08/12/2009 
‘2000-2009, cel mai cald din 1850, potrivit Organizaţiei Mondiale a Meteorologiei’ (2000-2009, the 
hottest year since 1850, according to the World Meteorological Organization), Adevărul, 
08/12/2009 
‘Gordon Brown: "Europa trebuie să reducă cu 30 % emisiile de gaze"’ (Gordon Brown: ‘europe has to 
reduce its gas emissions by 30%), Adevărul, 08/12/2009 
‘ONG-urile denunţă metoda preşedinţiei daneze’ (NGOs are denouncing the Danish presidency’s 
methods), Adevărul, 09/12/2009 
‘Bucureşti: Capitala, printre cele mai poluate oraşe din Europa’ (Bucharest:  The capital, among the most 
polluted cities in Europe), Adevărul, 09/12/2009 
‘Un acord privind clima ar putea costa mii de miliarde de dolari’ (An accord on the climate could cost 
thousands of billions of dollars), Adevărul, 09/12/2009 
‘Castro: Obama că este "slab" în chestiunea încălzirii climatice’ (Castro: Obama is ‘weak’ on the issue of 
climate change), Adevărul, 10/12/2009 
‘Ecologiștii orădeni spijină conferința pe tema schimbărilor climaterice prin acțiuni locale’ (Ecologist 
from Oradea are supporting the climate summit through local actions), Adevărul, 10/12/2009 
‘România, criticată la Copenhaga că nu se ocupă de ariile protejate’ (Romania, criticised at Copenhagen 
because it does not take care properly of protected areas), Adevărul, 10/12/2009 
‘Bucureşti: Dansează pentru un aer mai curat!’ (Bucharest: Dance for a cleaner air), Adevărul, 10/12/2009 
‘Permisele de poluare, o piaţă a fraudelor’ (Pollution permits, o market of fraud), Adevărul, 10/12/2009 
‘Barack Obama, criticat la summitul climatic de Suedia şi Belgia’ (Barack Obama, criticised for the 
climate summit in Sweden and Belgium), Adevărul, 11/12/2009 
‘SUA şi Asia în era Obama’ (The US and Asia in the Obama era), Adevărul, 10/01/2010 
‘Următorii 40 de ani, cruciali pentru evoluţia climei’ (The next 40 years, crucial for the evolution of the 
climate), Adevărul, 12/01/2010 
‘Încălzirea globală, un mit cu picioare scurte’ (Global warming, a short lived myth), Adevărul, 
15/02/2010 
‘Planeta se confruntă cu schimbări climatice ireversibile’ (The planet is facing irreversible changes in the 
climate), Adevărul, 18/03/2009 
‘Preţul încălzirii’ (The price of warming), Adevărul, 22/03/2010  
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‘Din culisele summitului de la Copenhaga: liderii mondiali au avut discuţii aprinse’ (From behind 
backstage of the Copenhagen summit: the world’s leaders had steamy discussions), Adevărul, 
03/05/2010 
‘2010, cel mai călduros an?’ (2010, the hottest year?), Adevărul, 24/05/2010 
‘Apocalipsa verde’ (The green apocalypse), Adevărul, 20/06/2010 
 
The policy towards Russia 
‘Rusia se oferă să ajute NATO în Afganistan’ (Russia is offering help to NATO in Afghanistan), 
Adevărul, 08/03/2008 
‘Încălzirea globală, sursa unui posibil conflict major UE-Rusia’ (Global warming, the source for a new 
potential major EU-Russia conflict), Adevărul, 08/03/2008 
‘"Atitudinea Moscovei îmi trezeşte amintiri triste"’ (‘Moscow’s attitude is arousing sad memories’), 
Adevărul, 25/03/2008 
‘Cui i-e frica de Rusia?’ (Who is afraid of Russia), Adevărul, 21/03/2008 
‘Abhazia vrea să devină protectorat rusesc’ (Abhazia wants to become a Russia territory), Adevărul, 
30/04/2008 
‘Georgia şi Rusia sunt la un pas de război’ (Georgia and Russia are on the brink of war), Adevărul, 
02/05/2008 
‘De ce se teme Chişinăul de NATO’ (Why is Kishinev affarid of NATO), Adevărul, 05/05/2008 
‘Abhazia - "detonatorul" unui posibil conflict în Caucaz’ (Abhazia – the ‘spark’ of a possible conflict in 
Caucasus), Adevărul, 06/05/2008 
‘Europa nu-şi poate permite un război economic cu Rusia’ (Europe can’t afford an economic war with 
Russia), Adevărul, 23/05/2008 
‘UE câstiga teren in Republica Moldova’ (The EU is winning ground in the Republic of Moldova), 
Adevărul, 26/05/2008 
‘Europa pune beţe-n roate Rusiei’ (Europe shortcircuits Russia), Adevărul, 29/05/2008 
‘Putin, la dineu cu Sarkozy’ (Putin dinner with Sarkozy), Adevărul, 30/05/2008 
‘Medvedev ia pulsul Europei’ (Medvedev takes Europe’s pulse), Adevărul, 05/06/2008 
‘Uzbekistanul întoarce din nou spatele Rusiei’ (Uzbekistan turns its back to Russia), Adevărul, 
06/06/2008 
‘Tarja Halonen: "Finlanda poate fi un bun exemplu pentru România"’ (Tarja Halonen: ‘Finland can be a 
good example for Romania), Adevărul, 09/06/2008 
‘"Prietenia", blocată în conductele ruseşti’ (‘Friendship’ blocked in Russian pipelines), Adevărul, 
15/06/2008 
‘Cât de reala este reintegrarea Transnistriei in Republica Moldova’ (How real is Transnistria’s 
reintegration in the Republic of Moldova), Adevărul, 30/06/2008 
‘Olimpiadă cu război în coastă’ (The Olympics overshadowed by the war), Adevărul, 09/08/2008 
‘Agresiunea rusă, prelungită în Georgia’ (The Russian aggression prolonged in Georgia), Adevărul, 
12/08/2008 
‘Georgia, victima setei planetare de petrol’ (Gerogia, the victim of the global thirst for petrol), Adevărul, 
13/08/2008 
‘Războiul din Georgia, provocat de serviciile secrete ruseşti?’ (The war in Russia, provoked by the 
Russian secret services?), Adevărul, 14/08/2008 
‘Război în Georgia’ (War in Georgia), Adevărul, 15/08/2008 
‘Jurnalişti împuşcaţi de ruşi în Georgia’ (Journalists shot by Russians in Georgian), Adevărul, 16/08/2008 
‘Uniunea Europei de Est - proiect rusesc de tip euroasiatic’ (The Eastern European Union – an Euroasian 
type of Russia project), Adevărul, 18/08/2008 
‘"Marea Neagră: lac NATO"’ (“The Black Sea: a NATO lake), Adevărul, 20/08/2008 
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‘Băsescu, turneu-fulger pe malurile lacului rusesc’ (Băsescu, lightning tour on the shores of the Russian 
lake), Adevărul, 21/08/2008 
‘Rusia ocupă poziţii strategice în Georgia’ (Russia takes strategic positions in Georgia), Adevărul, 
22/08/2008 
‘Sfârşit de sejur all-inclusive pentru ruşii din Georgia’ (The end of all-inclusive holiday for Russians in 
Georgia), Adevărul, 24/08/2008 
‘Bătălia pentru Poti’ (The battle for Poti), Adevărul, 25/08/2008 
‘NATO, la un pas de dezmembrare?’ (NATO, on the brink of break-up), Adevărul, 25/08/2008 
‘UE ar trebui să ia Ucraina sub aripă’ (The EU must take Ukraine under its wing), Adevărul, 26/08/2008 
‘SUA laudă România pentru politica sa’ (The US praises Romania for its policy), Adevărul, 26/08/2008 
‘Ce deosebeste si ce aseamana Osetia de Sud si Kosovo’ (What distinguishes south Ossetia from 
Kosovo), Adevărul, 01/09/2008 
‘"Am putea verifica oamenii de afaceri ai Kremlinului"’ (We could check businessmen from the 
Kremlin), Adevărul, 03/09/2008 
‘Putea Europa fi mai dură faţă de Rusia?’ (Could Europe have been tougher against Russia), Adevărul, 
03/09/2008 
‘SUA şi Rusia, la cuţite pentru Georgia’ (The US and Russia, fighting for Georgia), Adevărul, 08/09/2008 
‘România încearcă să-şi facă loc spre Tiraspol de la Seul’ (Romania is trying to build it’s to Tiraspol from 
Seul), Adevărul, 12/09/2008 
‘Sarah Pahlin s-ar război cu Rusia’ (Sarah Pahlin would wage war with Russia), Adevărul, 13/09/2008 
'FP-România a votat pentru Casa Albă' (FP-Romania voted for the white House), Adevărul, 13/09/2008 
‘Ruşii au început să se retragă din Georgia’ (The Russians have started withdraw from Georgia), 
Adevărul, 15/09/2008 
‘"Criza georgiană confirmă ce spunem de trei ani"’ (‘The Georgian crisis confirms what I have been 
saying for three years’), Adevărul, 15/09/2008 
‘Sarkozy propune spaţiu economic comun cu Rusia’ (Sarkozy is proposing the creation of a common 
economic space with Russia), Adevărul, 25/09/2008 
‘Flota rusă va staţiona din nou în Caraibe’ (The Russian fleet will station again in the Caribbean), 
Adevărul, 27/09/2008 
‘Turcia se reaşază în Caucaz’ (Turkey reasserts itself in the Caucasus), Adevărul, 29/09/2008 
‘„Bulgaria se va întoarce la Rusia”’ (Bulgaria will return to Russia), Adevărul, 29/09/2008 
‘Distrugător american, reperat de Rusia în Marea Neagră’ (American war vessel, repaired by Russia in the 
Black Sea), Adevărul, 03/10/2008 
'Întâlnire sub semnul tensiunilor' (Tensed meeting), Adevărul, 03/10/2008 
‘UE, în Georgia cu aprobarea Rusiei’ (The EU, in Georgia with Russia’s approval), Adevărul, 05/10/2008 
‘Vosganian, gata să bată palma cu ruşii’ (Vosganian, ready to strike a deal with the Russians), Adevărul, 
24/10/2008 
‘Putin şi Medvedev, în topul preferinţelor moldovenilor’ (Putin and Medvedev, preferred by Moldovans), 
Adevărul, 24/10/2008 
‘Medvedev speră că "noua administraţie SUA" va opta pentru relaţii bune cu Rusia’ (Medvedev hopes 
that ‘the new US administration’ will opt for good relations with Russia), Adevărul, 05/11/2008 
‘Rogozin compară NATO cu regimul nazist’ (Rogozin compares NATO with the Nazi regime), Adevărul, 
14/11/2008 
‘Leonard Orban: „Criza va accelera consolidarea UE”’ (Leonard Orban: ’The crisis will accelerate the 
consolidation of the EU’), Adevărul, 14/11/2008 
‘Focuri de armă asupra observatorilor UE din Georgia’ (Gun fire on EU observers in Georgia), Adevărul, 
17/11/2008 
‘SUA au întins şi mai mult coarda în privinţa Rusiei şi au ancorat o navă de război în Georgia’ (The US 
have exaggerated in relation to Russia and anchored a war ship in Georgia), Adevărul, 22/11/2008 
‘S-a întâmplat în 2008, fără să băgăm de seamă’ (It happened in 2008, without us noticing), Adevărul, 
09/12/2008 
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‘UE, arbitru între Ucraina şi Rusia’ (The, referee between Ukraine and Russia), Adevărul, 09/01/2008 
‘O Asie Centrală fără Occident?’ (A central Asia without the West), Adevărul, 02/02/2008 
‘Kremlinul şi-a consumat resursele de optimism’ (The Kremlin has consumed his resources of optimism), 
Adevărul, 13/02/2008 
‘UE întinde o mână lungă vecinilor estici’ (The EU stretches its long hand to its eastern neighbours), 
Adevărul, 23/02/2008 
 
Jurnalul Naţional 
Climate change 
‘Încălzirea globală provoacă moartea a 300.000 de persoane pe an’ (Global Warming is killing 300.000 
people every year), Jurnalul Naţional, 01/06/2009 
‘Canada şi Japonia, împotriva unui acord pentru combaterea încălzirii globale’ (Canada and Japan, 
against a new climate change accord), Jurnalul Naţional, 02/07/2009 
‘Schimbările climaterice omoară lupta împotriva sărăciei’ (climate change is killing the fight against 
poverty), Jurnalul Naţional, 06/07/2009 
‘Noi probleme cu poluarea în Beijing’ (New pollution problems in Beijing), Jurnalul Naţional, 
04/08/2009 
‘România poate obţine două miliarde de euro din vânzarea surplusului de CO2’ (Romania can get 2 
billion euro from selling its CO2 surplus), 31/08/2009 
Cristea, I. ‘100 de lideri caută o soluţie’ (100 liders are searching for a solution), Jurnalul Naţional, 
23/09/2009 
Ki-Moon, B. ‘Adierea schimbării’ (The wind of change), Jurnalul Naţional, 30/09/2009 
‘Greanpeace a ocupat acoperişul Parlamentului Britanic’ (Greenpeace occupied the roof of the British 
Parliament), Jurnalul Naţional, 12/10/2009 
Stancu, S.  ‘Refugiat climatic în curtea Parlamentului European’ (Climate refugee in the backyard of the 
European Parliament), Jurnalul Naţional, 20/10/2009 
Aldea, A. ‘Liderii lumii, personaje la circ’ (The worlds, circus actors), Jurnalul Naţional, 27/10/2009 
Capatos, M. A. ‘100.000 de euro pe zi, amendă pentru poluare’ (Polluttion fine, 100.000 euros a day), 
Jurnalul Naţional, 04/12/2009 
‘Sex pe gratis’ (Free sex), Jurnalul Naţional, 05/12/2009 
‘Ştire pe scurt’ (Brief news), Jurnalul Naţional, 09/12/2009 
Aldea, A. ‘Miza de la Copenhaga’ (The stake at Copenhagen), Jurnalul Naţional, 06/12/2009 
Stancu, S.  ‘Suntem prea mulţi pe Pământ’ (We are too many on earth), Jurnalul Naţional, 11/12/2009 
‘Copenhaga: SUA contestă raportul pentru încălzirea globală’ (Copenhagen: The US is contesting the 
global warming report), Jurnalul Naţional, 12/12/2009 
'Schimbări climatice' (Climate change), Jurnalul Naţional, 14/12/2009 
Aldea, A. ‘Încălzirea globală i-a îngheţat pe jurnalişti şi ecologişti’ (Global warming has frozen 
journalists and ecologists), Jurnalul Naţional, 16/12/2009 
‘Summit-ul de la Copenhaga’ (The Copenhagen summit), Jurnalul Naţional, 17/12/2009 
‘Băsescu merge la summitul ONU privind schimbările climatice’ (Băsescu is attending the UN climate 
change summit), Jurnalul Naţional, 17/12/2009 
‘Ştire pe scurt’ (Brief news), Jurnalul Naţional, 18/12/2009 
Cionoff, S. ‘Ce rămâne din acest "an straniu" – 2009?’ (What reamians of this strange year 2009), 
Jurnalul Naţional, 29/12/2009 
‘Învestirea lui Barack Obama şi decesul lui Michael Jackson, printre evenimentele marcante în 2009’ 
(The investiture of Barrack Obama and Michael Jackson’s death, among the most important events 
of 2009), Jurnalul Naţional, 29/12/2009 
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‘Măsuri extreme împotriva schimbărilor climatice’ (Extreme measures against climate change), Jurnalul 
Naţional, 14/01/2010 
Aldea, A. ‘Spionii încălzirii’ (Global warming spies), Jurnalul Naţional, 02/02/2010 
‘Brazilia va construi un observator gigantic pentru a studia clima din Amazonia’ (Brazil will construct a 
huge observatory to study climate change in the Amazon), Jurnalul Naţional, 14/02/2010 
‘Europa verde va economisi 60 de miliarde de euro din importurile de gaz şi ţiţei’ (Green Europe will 
save 60 billion euro on gas and oil imports), Jurnalul Naţional, 23/02/2010 
Dăianu, D. ‘Europa 2020’ (Europa 2020), Jurnalul Naţional, 10/03/2010 
Stan, E. ‘Bani mai mulţi pentru "Rabla"’ (More money for "Rabla"), Jurnalul Naţional, 22/04/2010 
Stancu, S.  ‘Jose Manuel Barroso vrea încă un mandat’ (Jose Manuel Barroso wants another term in 
office), Jurnalul Naţional, (Tax on global warming), Jurnalul Naţional, 20/05/2010 
Cristea, I. ‘Din ce mai face bani Tony Blair’ (How is Tony Blair earning money),Jurnalul Naţional, 
27/05/2010 
 
The policy towards Russia 
Andriuţă, C. ‘Disensiunile dintre Alinţă şi Rusia transformă summitul de la Bucureşti într-o încercare 
istorică de reglementare a problemelor’ (Divergencies between the Alliance and Russia transform 
the Bucharest summit in an attempt to solve historical problems), Jurnalul Naţional, 08/03/2008 
Andriuţă, C. ‘Liderii europeni vor o analiză strategică a politicii energetice’ (European leaders want an 
strategic analyse of energy policy), Jurnalul Naţional, 14/03/2008 
Stancu, S.  ‘Rusia se dă speriată’ (Russia is playing scared), Jurnalul Naţional, 14/03/2008 
Severin, A. ‘România la Summit-ul NATO’ (Romania at the NATO summit), Jurnalul Naţional, 
01/04/2008 
Călugăreanu, V. ‘Voronin a venit la Bucureşti cu sarcini primite de la Moscova’ (Voronin has arrived to 
Bucharest with instructions from Moscow), Jurnalul Naţional, 02/04/2008 
Cretu, C. ‘Summitul NATO la final’ (The NATO summit at the end), Jurnalul Naţional, 02/04/2008 
Ciutescu, O. ‘Moscova a învins la Bucureşti’ (Moscow has won in Bucharest), Jurnalul Naţional, 
04/04/2008 
Constantinoiu, M. ‘Good bye, Bush, bun venit, Putin!’ (Goodbye Bush, welcome Putin), Jurnalul 
Naţional, 05/04/2008 
Andriuţă, C. ‘Lituania vrea negocieri cu Rusia pentru conflictul din Transnistria’ (Lithuania wants 
negociations with Russia in the Transnistrian conflict), Jurnalul Naţional, 23/04/2008 
Andriuţă, C. ‘Dmitri Medvedev începe mandatul cu dureri de cap’ (Dmitri Medvedev will start his term 
with a headache), Jurnalul Naţional, 05/05/2008 
Constantinoiu, M. ‘Abhazia - Pe picior de război’ (Abhazia – On the brink of war), Jurnalul Naţional, 
07/05/2008 
Stancu, S.  ‘Info’ (Info), Jurnalul Naţional, 07/05/2008 
Severin, A. ‘UE are nevoie de o acţiune externă realistă’ (The EU needs a realist external action), Jurnalul 
Naţional, 10/06/2008 
‘A început războiul’ (The war has started), Jurnalul Naţional, 09/08/2008 
‘1.000 de morţi la Ţhinvali’ (1.000 dead in Thinvali), Jurnalul Naţional, 09/08/2008 
Roseti, R. and Ionut Raduica ‘Georgia se află în stare de război’ (Georgia is at a state of war), Jurnalul 
Naţional, 10/08/2008 
Stancu, S.  ‘Rusia a intrat în Georgia!’ (Russia has invaded Georgia), Jurnalul Naţional, 12/08/2008 
Belgiuganu, R. ‘Mesajul Moscovei’ (Moscow’s message), Jurnalul Naţional, 13/08/2008 
Mătăchiţă, M. ‘Info’ (Info), Jurnalul Naţional, 14/08/2008 
Mătăchiţă, M.  ‘Rice intră în luptă’ (Rice enters the fight), Jurnalul Naţional, 15/08/2008 
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Călugăreanu, V. ‘Tiraspolul ameninţă Chişinăul că merge pe urmele Georgiei’ (Tiraspol is threatening 
Kishinev that it could share the same faith as Georgia), Jurnalul Naţional, 15/08/2008 
Stancu, S.  ‘Pact de compromis’ (Compromise pact), Jurnalul Naţional, 16/08/2008 
Stancu, S.  ‘Rusia pleacă din Georgia, dar nu de tot’ (Russia is leaving from Georgia, but for good), 
Jurnalul Naţional, 18/08/2008 
Avramescu, L. ‘Soldatul sovietic n-a murit’ (The soviet soldier has not died), Jurnalul Naţional, 
19/08/2008 
Severin, A. ‘Quod erat demonstrandum’ (Quod erat demonstrandum), Jurnalul Naţional, 19/08/2008 
Călugăreanu, V. ‘Războiul ruso-georgian reaprinde vrajba interetnică în Moldova’ (The Russian-
Georgian war reignites the interethnic conflict in Moldova), Jurnalul Naţional, 20/08/2008 
Tudor, R. ‘Securitatea Mării Negre, prioritate strategică’ (The security of Black Sea, a strategic priority), 
Jurnalul Naţional, 21/08/2008 
‘Dmitri Rogozin: "Atmosfera politică actuală se aseamănă cu cea dinaintea primului război mondial"’ 
(Dmitri Rogozin: The present political atmosphere is similar to the one before the first world war), 
Jurnalul Naţional, 26/08/2008 
‘Alexandr Churlin: Tonalitatea presei arată că România nu înţelege cine e răspunzător în criza georgiană ‘ 
(Alexandr Churlin: The tone of the media shows that Romania does not understand who is 
responsible for the Georgian crisis), Jurnalul Naţional, 26/08/2008 
Călugăreanu, V. ‘Decizia Moscovei pune Republica Moldova între ciocan şi nicovală’ (Moscow’s 
decision leaves the Republic of Moldova undecided), Jurnalul Naţional, 28/08/2008 
Munteanu, M. ‘Criza din Caucaz şi alegerile din SUA’ (The crisis in the Caucasus and the US elections), 
Jurnalul Naţional, 29/08/2008 
Severin, A. ‘O ipoteză’ (An hypothesis), Jurnalul Naţional, 02/09/2008 
Stancu, S.  ‘Medvedev - Noua ordine mondială’ (Medvedev – the new world order), Jurnalul Naţional, 
02/09/2008 
‘Republica Moldova va rămîne neutră şi nefederalizată’ (The Republic of Moldova will remain neutral 
and will not federalize), Jurnalul Naţional, 05/09/2008 
Ciutescu, O. ‘Negocierile petru Transnistria continuă în formatul 5 + 2’ (The negotiations for Transnistria 
continue in the 5+2 format), Jurnalul Naţional, 05/09/2008  
Constantiniu, D. ‘Frica are ochii mari’ (Fear has big eyes), Jurnalul Naţional, 10/09/2008 
Stancu, S.  ‘Uniunea Europeană suflă şi în ... Ucraina’ (The European Union breathes also in Ukraine), 
Jurnalul Naţional, 10/09/2008 
Cristoiu, I. ‘Spre un nou război mondial încă nedefinit? (IV)’ (Towards a war yet to be defined), Jurnalul 
Naţional, 11/09/2008 
Constantinoiu, M. ‘Georgia şi-a cam tăiat craca NATO’ (Gerogia has blown its chance with NATO), 
Jurnalul Naţional, 18/09/2008 
Severin, A. ‘Strategia compensaţiei şi strategia autoînşelării’ (The strategy of compensation and of self-
deceiving), Jurnalul Naţional, 23/09/2008 
Călugăreanu, V. ‘O Moldovă neutră, cu trupe ruseşti în ea’ (A neutral Moldova with Russian troops on its 
territory), Jurnalul Naţional, 24/09/2008 
Gaze mai ieftine contra unui sistem comun antirachetă’ (Cheaper gas against a common anti-missile 
system), Jurnalul Naţional, 06/10/2008 
‘Info’ (Info), Jurnalul Naţional, 09/10/2008 
Călugăreanu, V. ‘Tiraspolul vrea ca SUA şi UE să dispară de la masa de negocieri’ (Tiraspol wants the 
US and the EU to disappear from the negotiations table), Jurnalul Naţional, 09/10/2008 
Severin, A. ‘Evoluţii şi dileme la Marea Neagră’ (Evolutions and dilemmas at the Black Sea), Jurnalul 
Naţional, 21/10/2008 
Călugăreanu, V. ‘Moldovenii nu au învăţat nimic din politică. Partidul lui Voronin rămâne favorit în ochii 
electoratului’ (Moldovans don’t have anything to learn from politics. Voronin’s party will remain 
favorite in the eyes of the electorate), Jurnalul Naţional, 29/10/2008 
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Ciutescu, O. ‘Alegerea lui Obama produce opinii diferite în Rusia’ (Obama’s election arouses different 
opinions in Russia), Jurnalul Naţional, 05/11/2008 
Ciutescu, O. ‘SUA trimite încă un distrugător în Marea Neagră. Ruşii au luat foc!’ (The US is sending 
another war vessel in the Black Sea. The Russian’s are mad), Jurnalul Naţional, 19/11/2008 
Ciutescu, O. ‘Rusia vrea să rezolve problema Transnistriei pe şine ruseşti’ (Russia wants to resolve the 
Transnistrian through Russian ways), Jurnalul Naţional, 27/11/2008 
Constantinoiu, M. ‘"Adio NATO!”. Semnează: Georgia şi Ucraina’ (‘Goodbye NATO’. Georgia and 
Ukraine are signing), Jurnalul Naţional, 01/12/2008 
Ciutescu, O. ‘SUA estimează un posibil conflinct militar în Marea Neagră’ (The US predicts a possible 
military conflict in the Black Sea), Jurnalul Naţional, 12/12/2008 
‘Tbilisi acuză Moscova că ascunde “crime de război”’ (Tbilisi acusses Moscow of keeping hidden ‘war 
crimes’), Jurnalul Naţional, 23/12/2008 
‘141 miliarde de dolari pentru înarmarea Rusiei’ (141 billion dollars for Russia rearming), Jurnalul 
Naţional, 23/12/2008 
Ciutescu, O. ‘Gazul nu trebuie să devină instrument politic’ (Gas should not become a political 
instrument), Jurnalul Naţional, 07/01/2009 
Tudor, R. ‘Vladimir Vladimirovici Gazprom’ (Vladimir Vladimirovici Gazprom), Jurnalul Naţional, 
08/01/2009 
Mătăchiţă, M.  ‘Criza gazului aduce gerul Bobotezei în Europa’ (The gas crisis brings frost to Europe), 
Jurnalul Naţional, 08/01/2009 
Ciutescu, O. ‘Leonid Kravciuk: Putin şi Medvedev tratează Ucraina ca pe o regiune a Rusiei’ (Leonid 
Kravciuk: Putin and Medvedev are treating Ukraine as a region of Russia), Jurnalul Naţional, 
13/01/2009 
‘"Comedia gazelor": Posibil complot al Moscovei şi Kievului’ (‘The gas comedy’: Potential plot between 
Moscow and Kiev), Jurnalul Naţional, 14/01/2009 
Călugăreanu, V. ‘Moldova ajutată de Ucraina, dar solidară cu Moscova’ (Moldova helped by Ukraine, but 
siding with Moscow), Jurnalul Naţional, 16/01/2009 
Ciutescu, O. ‘Serghei Lavrov: Sper ca relaţia SUA - Rusia să se schimbe’ (Serghei Lavrov: I hope that the 
US-Russia relationship will change), Jurnalul Naţional, 19/01/2009 
‘Richard Lugar: SUA a pierdut din influenţă. Trebuie să schimbe politica externă!’ (Richard Lugar: The 
US suffered loses of influence. It has to change its foreign policy!), Jurnalul Naţional, 23/01/2009 
‘Petiţii româneşti către Europa’ (Romanian petitions to Europe), Jurnalul Naţional, 27/01/2009 
‘Răzbunarea Mării Negre’ (The Black Sea’s revenge), Jurnalul Naţional, 05/02/2009 
‘Comănescu, avizat’ (Comănescu, cleared), Jurnalul Naţional, 04/03/2009 
‘Ştiri pe scurt’ (Brief news), Jurnalul Naţional, 05/03/2009 
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Annex F: Sample questions used in 
interviews and questionnaires 
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